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South American Navies:
Who Needs Them?
By Robert L. Scheina
Chilean Frigates
Venezuelan Gunboat
Brazilian Frigates
Colombian Destroyer; Ecuadorian Frigate
Peruvian Cruiser and Oiler
Argentine Aircraft Carrier
During the heyday of “Massive Retaliation,” there seemed to he no role for the moderate-size military power in global strategy. The Vietnam War, the Yom Kippur War, and other recent conflicts have changed such thinking. The U.S. Navy needs its Latin American allies.
I-rfatin Americans have sensed a changing attitude in U.S. policy toward providing material assistance to their navies. They believe that should this attitude continue, the culmination will be the complete loss of aid.
Since the early 19th century, the United States has played a dominant role in formulating the international policies of the Western Hemisphere. Regardless of how benevolent U.S. policy may have been, this country generally sought neither the advice nor the consent of its Latin American neighbors. The manifestation of this policy, as it concerns the hemisphere, has been the Monroe Doctrine and its corollaries. The major Latin American nations have viewed this doctrine as a challenge to their sovereignty, but they have also used it as a shield. In 1913, Chilean diplomat Marcial Martinez de Ferrari expressed the utopian view: “My opinion is that the Monroe Doctrine . . . is an obsolete document, and to consider it as in force is a striking anachronism.”1 However, the Dominican Republic landings of 1965 proved that the Monroe Doctrine is alive and is a reality.
As the major power within the hemisphere, the United States dominates cooperative military ventures. Years ago, the United States initiated a major intra-American naval exercise—UNITAS.2 The origins of this word are as obscure as the promulgating documentation for the exercises. Since the first exercise in I960, a U.S. task force, usually consisting of a few destroyer types, some aircraft, and a submarine, annually circumnavigates the South American continent, exercising Latin American naval units in combined antisubmarine exercises. (Antiair warfare and antisurface warfare now constitute about 30% of these exercises.) Although the objective of these exercises is not exclusively for training in antisubmarine warfare, this mission does dominate the exercise activity and appears to fulfill the needs of the United States far more than those of our southern
'For footnotes, turn to page 66.
allies.3 This domination of international and hemispheric naval affairs should obligate the United States to support Latin American navies, particularly in antisubmarine warfare—the aspect of naval warfare that we have concluded would best support the needs of the Free World.
Past Trends: From the time of independence in the early part of the 19th century until World War II, Latin American navies purchased modern, sophisticated naval hardware. Often, these navies were so shrewd in negotiating contracts that their acquisitions excited the envy of contemporary superpowers. Latin American navies have possessed trend-setting ships. The Mexican warship Moctezuma of 1842 was the world’s first iron-hulled steam frigate. The Brazilian Riachuelo of 1883 has been cited as the model for the first U.S. battleship, Texas. The superiority of Brazilian dreadnoughts Minas Gerais and Sao Paulo was such that, in 1909, rumors circulated that Brazil was acting as an agent for one of the superpowers, for it had no need for such powerful ships.4 The technology that was demanded by Latin American navies was exemplified by Argentina’s negotiations for dreadnoughts Rivadavia and Moreno. In 1908, Argentina sought bids for the construction of these two ships and numerous minor ones. Fifteen companies representing France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, and the United States responded. An Argentine commission reviewed these initial submissions, selected the best features from each, and then sent revised guidelines to the competing firms. This process was repeated a second and a third time. The competitors were furious and considered this a looting of their trade secrets. Professor John H. Biles, a noted British naval architect, bitterly wrote:
No shipbuilder in this country can separate the knowledge which he acquires in the building of ships for the British Admiralty from the rest of his knowledge. We may assume that the British battleships embody good ideas and good practice—in all probability the very best. These cannot fail, in a greater or less degree, to become part of the designs which the British shipbuilder first submits to the Argentine Government. In the second inquiry it may be presumed that everything that was good in the first proposals had been seized upon by the Argentine authorities and asked for in the new design. This second request went not only to British builders but to all the builders of the world, and in this way it is exceedingly probable that a serious leakage of ideas and practice of our ships was disseminated through the world by the Argentine Government. The British builders, in replying to this second inquiry, would, in all
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The new Argentine battleship Rivadavia at the New York Navy Yard in August 1913, prior to delivery. She still has the U.S. ensign on the fantail and builder's flag at the maintruck. She remained in service until the 1930s.
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probability point out that some of the things are impracticable, or have been tried and found undesirable in the British Navy, and the Argentine authorities would be informed on additional matters which have come under the builders’ knowledge by their acquaintance with British practice. The third inquiry that was issued showed to all the builders of the world what has been eliminated or modified in the second inquiry; and so the process of leakage went merrily on, and with it that of the education of foreign builders and the Argentina Government.5
Professor Biles failed to acknowledge that in 1910 it was a buyer’s market, and the Argentines drove a bard bargain. Latin American acquisitions were usually equal or superior to their contemporaries in the navies of the major powers. A U.S. magazine called The Navy published a detailed comparison between U.S. (USS Arkansas and USS Wyoming) and Argentine (the Rivadavia and the Moreno) battleships under construction in the United States and concluded, “It is patent that the Argentine designs—on the whole— are greatly superior to those of the latest vessels building for the United States.”6 Combatants built b°t Latin American navies during this first century of independence were technologically equal to their European, Japanese, and North American contemporaries.
Prior to World War II, numerous competing nations shared in the sale of naval armaments to Latin America. Great Britain sold dreadnoughts to Brazil and Chile; cruisers to Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Peru; and destroyers to most of the major Latin American navies. Italian-built cruisers were in the Argentine Navy, and Italian-constructed submarines Were in the Brazilian inventory. The two Argentine dreadnoughts were U.S.-built, as were the four Peruvian submarines. An analysis of the origin of Brazilian warships from 1890 through 1939 shows that 75% were British-built, 15% were products of continental Europe, 10% came from Brazilian yards, and an insignificant fraction came from the United States.7 Although the impact of British warship construction was less pronounced in Argentina, Chile, and Peru, it is indisputable that, prior to World War II, European yards accounted for the major share of Latin American naval tonnage.
After World War II, the United States became the sole source of supply. The favorable buyer’s market, which had existed for a century, had vanished. Relatively new U.S.-built warships were sold to Latin America under monetary terms favorable to the buyers. New, however, does not equate to modern; obsolescence is determined by competition, not age. The USS Monitor and HMS Dreadnought proved this. The operational value of warships acquired from the United States following World War II should be judged by the combat systems on board rather than by the age of the hull and machinery. Electronic and fire control equipment should be considered the accurate measurement. Latin America was acquiring warships that were obsolescent as soon as they were purchased!
By the early 1960s, Latin American navies sought modern replacements from their northern ally. However, U.S. policy at this time was not to sell modern military hardware to Latin America. In 1965, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara testified before Congress, “we have absolutely opposed the acquisition of what I call sophisticated weapons [by Latin America].”8 This policy was formalized by law” but was corrupted by pragmatic influences. In 1968, the U.S. Ambassador to the Organization of American States, Sol Linowitz, attempted to persuade President Victor Belaunde of Peru not to purchase supersonic jets because such a purchase might stimulate a Latin American arms race. Six months later, however, Mr. Linowitz returned to Peru as a representative of the government with the mission of capturing that arms market for the United States.10 American credibility was destroyed.
By the late 1960s, the warship construction industry in Europe had sufficiently recovered from World War II to challenge U.S. domination in Latin America. The five major Latin American navies contracted with European yards for major combatants. In 1971-72, two Leander-clzss frigates were laid down in Great Britain for Chile; the Condell and the Lynch are now operational. Great Britain is constructing six N/Vero/'-class frigates for Brazil and two Type 42 destroyers for Argentina. Italy has sold two Lupo- class destroyers to Peru and six to Venezuela. Most of
these ships should be operational by 1985. Latin America has satisfied its long-term major combatant needs from its former supplier, Europe. The United States has failed to hold a market which it had hitherto dominated.
U.S. Policy Today: Yesterday, America decided not to sell sophisticated military hardware to Latin America; the United States lost the arms market but did not halt the spread of weapons. Today, the United States threatens to sever aid to nations which do not respect human rights. On 14 April 1977, President Carter outlined before the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States a new U.S. approach toward Latin America, an approach based upon the regard for the individuality and the sovereignty of each nation, respect for human rights, and the relations between developed and developing nations. The human rights aspect of this program is causing much apprehension.
Many Latin American nations are engaged in urban warfare with an opponent no less resolute than the Axis powers of World War II. Their enemy has adopted 20th century guerrilla warfare tactics. In many countries, the revolutionists have a very small following and claim no secure territory. Their chief weapon is terror. The legal government has felt forced, regardless of its respect for human rights, to restrict individual freedoms during the crisis period.
Latin American nations fear that such steps, judged essential to ensure success against the enemy, will be interpreted in the United States as an unnecessary restriction of human rights and will lead to the eventual loss of aid.
If U.S. aid to Latin America were cut, both giver and recipient would be adversely affected. Latin American fleets are saturated by aging U.S.-built combatants. Although Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Venezuela have substantial building programs under way to modernize their fleets, these new ships will not be available in sufficient numbers for approximately seven years. Until that time, these navies are dependent upon obsolete discards from the U.S. Navy. The loss of aid would sever the supply of spare parts at a time when these U.S.-built ships have become most difficult to maintain. There are 16 ships of the 36-year-old Fletcher (DD-445) class serving as front-line destroyers in the four most powerful Latin American navies: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Peru. The loss of assistance would immobilize half of South America’s destroyer force within a short time.
Curtailing military aid to Latin America would also have an impact on the U.S. Navy. This country would lose allies and might even transform them into potential enemies. Latin American navies contributed according to their means (including losses of lives and treasure) to the Allies in World War I, World War II, and Korea. Latin American nations showed Western Hemisphere solidarity during the blockade of Cuba and the Dominican Republic operation. Brazil, the southern giant that sent a naval squadron to European waters during World War I and dominated the South Atlantic during World War II, has already loosened its alliance with the United States. Loss of any of the important Latin American nations would adversely affect Ameri-
ca’s military posture.
Severing aid would remove American influence from Latin America, the opposite goal of what the policy Lopes to achieve. A major piece of hardware such as a ship, tank, or aircraft has a useful life of about 20 years, sometimes longer in the case of ships. The nation supplying the hardware is normally the source of spare parts and usually provides the site for major refits and modernizations. During their 40-year careers, each of the five Latin American dreadnoughts returned to the country of construction for rebuilding or received major technical assistance for reconstruction from that nation. Hence, the hardware supplier obtains favorable economic and military treaties and maintains a continuous presence within the purchasing nation through training missions; additional purchasing habits and political discussions are influenced. Pragmatically, withdrawal of aid has long-term impact only when the supplier is the sole source.
The Exigency of Mutual Trust and Cooperation: The U.S. Navy needs its Latin American allies. During the Era of the Massive Retaliation Doctrine,” when the consensus was that nuclear war was so horrible that the ultimate outcome would be world destruction, there seemed to be no role for the moderate-size military powers in global strategy. The Vietnam War, the Yom Kippur War, and other recent conflicts have proved the fallacy of this doctrine. Today, articles concerning lim- *ted war abound in professional literature, and war games are based upon such scenarios. The possibility of a geographically limited war, conventional and nu- Uear, is gaining in proponents. In this environment, conventional forces would be extremely important. For a decade, the United States has placed its tactical capability in a secondary position; allies with significant conventional forces are becoming increasingly important.
Naval status today is best expressed by plateaus. Admittedly, the difference between levels can be awesome. Latin American navies, although on the fourth level, are theoretically secure due to their remoteness from potentially hostile land and air forces. If a limited war involving the superpowers became a reality, other world military forces would be significant assets. Argentina operates the small but modernized light carrier Veinticinco de Mayo. In 1974, this carrier was fitted with action data automation (ADA)—equivalent to the Navy tactical data system (NTDS). This technology had been the exclusive possession of U.S. and British carriers. The two new Argentine destroyers Hercules (1977) and Santissima Trinidad (1978) are fitted with ADA and can thus link up with the carrier’s system. The Veinticinco de Mayo—armed with A-4Q Skyhawk attack jets, S-2F Trackers, and SH-3 Sea King helicopters for antisubmarine warfare and escorted by the new destroyers—is the basis of a carrier strike force. The six ships of the Brazilian Niteroi class will all be operational by 1980. The Niterois are some of the best-armed ASW destroyers in the world. Coupled with the carrier Minas Gerais, which has recently been overhauled, these ships represent a major ASW force, even by superpower standards. Chile is now operating four modern destroyer types armed with Exocet missiles. Peru is refitting the former Dutch cruiser De Zeven Provincien as a helicopter ship. These Latin American warships, plus others not mentioned, would be valuable additions to a pro-United States force.
In order to understand Latin America’s naval needs, it is essential to know the missions of the various navies and the resources available to each. U.S. strategists can delineate and dissect the missions and needs of our allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. English-language publications vividly describe Royal Navy aviation and the significance of its decline; the British amphibious force reduction has been publicly analyzed. The South American nations have not had the
Visitors tour the USS Leahy at Guayaquil, Ecuador, during UN IT AS X. The cultural exchanges may he of more value to the South Americans than is their ASW training with the U.S. Navy, for they face virtually no submarine threat.
advantage of such exposure. Which of our southern allies are heavily dependent upon petroleum importation? Which have been struggling to develop an amphibious capability? What missions are unique to Latin American navies?
The prime duty of Latin American navies is national defense. These navies have strived to maintain a balance of power with their neighboring economic and cultural rivals. The primary rivals have been Argentina versus Brazil and Chile versus Peru. The less powerful South American navies and pan-Andean competition complicate this oversimplification. Intra-South American military rivalries are misunderstood by the United States, which has always viewed them as a waste of resources and an unwarranted basis for naval preparedness. In the view of U.S. policymakers, the Rio Treaty11 and other international commitments eliminate the need for offsetting military forces. The United States has not had a hemispheric rival for more than one- hundred years. However, a review of the General Board files—records of the U.S. Navy’s policymaking organ—reveals an arms rivalry with even the Royal Navy. Included in the files are “Plan of Operations in case of War with Great Britain,” authored by Alfred T Mahan in 1890, and numerous documents on the same subject entitled “Plan Red” in the 1920s and 1930s.12 Numerous international agreements and close cultural ties should have precluded the necessity for such preparations. However, the armed forces have the obligation to prepare for all eventualities. The United States apparently considers that this same rationale for preparedness is not valid for Latin America.
The Latin American military is politically active. This role has led many to conclude that armaments dominate national expenditures, thus sapping limited resources. In fact, based upon percentage of gross national product, Latin America spends less on armaments than any other populated world region. During periods of intense competition, Latin American nations have also had the maturity to voluntarily restrict naval armaments by international agreement. In 1904, Argentina and Chile signed the Pactode Mayo. halting a naval arms race.
Today, serving human needs is a prime mission of many Latin American navies. Riverine environments dominate the frontier regions, and these areas are the navies’ responsibility. Duties include exploration, settlement, and the welfare of the civilian inhabitants. Recently-commissioned Brazilian river gunboats Pedro Teixeira, Raposo Tavares, Roraima, Ron- donia, and Arnapa have special facilities dedicated to serving the medical needs of the Amazon population. In 1976 the Peruvian Navy completed the riverine hospital boat Rio Morona, also to serve the civilian population.
On the Horns of a Dilemma: Latin America reacted to U.S. arms restriction of the 1960s by seeking alternative suppliers. The possible U.S policy of the 1970s- the withdrawal of naval aid leaves Latin Amerira two perceivable alternatives The first is to obtain material from Western Europe. Continuity of systems and parts gives this much appeal. The major drawback to this is price. An alternative course is the Soviet Union. Today, the U.S.S.R. is anxious to extend its influence in South America. The Soviets perceive that a major arms purchase by a Latin American navy would give them long-term influence. Undoubtedly, they have offered hardware to Larin American navies on favorable economic terms. Given a postulated -withdrawal of U.S. assistance, to whom else would I atin America turn for naval aid?
Until U.S. strategists can address the missions and needs of our southern allies as profoundly as they can address those for Europe, the LInired States will not be able to communicate with South American navies.
■ Dr. Scheina received a Ph.D fr«'m The Catholic University of America in 1976. His dissertation, "Indigenous Larin American Sea Power, 189^-1974,” is the basis for research and publication within this field. In early 1977, he became the historian for the Coast Guard. Previously, the author was an analyst for four years with the Naval Intelligence Support Center and a historian for five years with the Naval Historical Center. Dr. Scheina has previously been published in the Encyclopedia Britanmca, The American Neptune, Marinerr Mirror, Warship International, and the Proceedings.
'Dexter Perkins. Hands Off: A History of the Monroe Doctrine (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1941), p. 320.
2See ‘‘UNITAS X,” Hnited States Naval Institute Proceedings, July 1970, pp. 73-83.
3Robert I.. Scheina, “Latin American Naval Purpose,” Proceedings, September 1977, pp. 116-119.
4Revista General de Marina (Madrid) 67 (1910): pp. 316-19.
*The Naiy (Washington) July 1910, p. 30 6Ibid., p. 10; The Navy. October 1910, p. 264.
7Scheina, “Indigenous Latin American Sea Power, 1890-1974“ (Unpublished doctoral dissertation, The Catholic University of America, 1976), p. 15.
8U.S. Congress, Senate, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations. Foreign Assistance 1965, 89th Cong., 1st sess., 1965, p. 632.
9Section 504a and Section 520a of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1971* Section 1, Section 4, Section 33, and Section 35 of the Foreign Military Sales Act for FY 1972.
10U.S. Congress, Senate, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, 94th Cong., 1st sess., 1975, p. 27.
1'Intra-American treaty of reciprocal assistance, entered into by the United States on 3 December 1948. This treaty obligates the signatories to mutual assistance and common defense.
,2General Board Files. Operational Archives, Naval History Division.