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The Navy has invested billions of dollars in antisubmarine ships and planes such as the USS Brooke (FFG-1) and the LAMPS helicopter shown here. But is it using these valuable assets to best advantage when nearly all seagoing staffs operate without benefit of trained oceanographers? For years, the Navy has been sending officers to postgraduate school for oceanographic education. We should use them in a way that will enhance our ability to perform one of the most important of all Navy missions.
Will "The Big Stick" be big enough in 1985 and beyond? This is the question.
irt of the answer could be the naval officer oceanographer. A vast improvement in the Navy’s ability to keep the sea-lanes open could be realized simply by taking more advantage of the environment, particularly in regard to antisubmarine warfare (ASW). There is a virtual cornucopia of oceanographic data and expertise available. A great deal of money has been and is currently being expended in oceanographic research and in the development of computer models for predicting ASW environmental conditions. These assets can be utilized more effectively by commanders during the decision-making process, both in port and at sea.
Knowledge and exploitation of the ocean environment can contribute significantly to improving success in ASW, because oceanic conditions directly affect the operational performance of ASW sensors and thus the performance of the ships and aircraft which carry those sensors. This knowledge can be used in two ways—to minimize the effectiveness of opposition submarines and to enhance the effectiveness of our own force’s sensors. We seek to maximize coverage while at the same time minimizing detectability.
A staff uses the services of experts in various warfare areas. Surface, submarine, and air operations are accounted for, and so are intelligence, material, electronic warfare, and logistics. An element generally lacking is the environment. The lack of an environmentalist frequently causes this aspect of planning to be neglected or considered only after key decisions have been made. Flexibility in tactical exploitation of the environment is thus significantly reduced. As a result, antisubmarine warfare success is severely limited, regardless of the number of units and the amount of firepower that can be mustered. The key is to know how, when, and where to concentrate forces. To do this, the environment must be considered a basic part of the ASW decision-making process.
In order for the ASW task group commander to effectively employ the sophisticated weapon systems of today and tomorrow, he must have, and be able to use, a similarly sophisticated, near-real-time knowledge of ocean conditions in the immediate operating area. When the test comes, the victor is quite likely to be the force with the most acute hearing. With the possible exception of the human eye, sound remains virtually the sole means of detecting and localizing a submarine. The present state of the art in ‘For footnotes, please turn to page 49.
antisubmarine warfare rests principally on the phenomena of underwater acoustics—sound propagation in the marine environment—which form the basis of accurate detection/counter-detection ranges. This propagation is primarily a function of temperature, pressure, and salinity—all of which vary with reference to time, space, and local anomalies. Since successful detection and localization of a submarine requires that the capabilities of our sensors be the best possible, they must be operated in modes which take advantage of natural sound transmission paths such as surface duct, convergence zone, sound channel, and bottom bounce (Figure 1). To do this requires a precise knowledge of these ocean factors on a daily (even hourly) basis.
The importance of technological leadership in preserving the power that permits nations to control their destinies is widely appreciated. However, as aptly stated by retired Rear Admiral Carl O. Holmquist, “It is ironic that even with our great modern strides in technology . . . further significant improvement in the performance of these devices and weapons may only come from an increased knowledge of the environment in which they operate.”1
Until near-real-time, on-scene oceanographic knowledge is readily available to our ASW forces and is employed to enhance the chances of success, further advancements will be wasted. Control of the undersea space will be impossible, rendering the concept of sea control (and virtually all else for which the Navy is responsible) out of the question. This deficiency is especially critical in light of the adversary’s capability to gain an over-the-horizon fire control solution (undetected on the periphery of a designated sea control area) and with the deadly element of surprise on his side, strike the first (possibly final) blow with one or more cruise missiles.
In a few words, ASW depends upon optimum force dispositions and correct selection of sensor modes and sonobuoy patterns. The effective monitoring of these sensing devices dictates the difference between success and failure. The efficiency achieved is directly dependent on an ability to exploit sound propagation loss graphics (Figure 2). Such graphics depict areas of low attenuation (high probability of submarine contact) and high attenuation (holes in the sound field where the submarine could hide). Intelligent use of these graphics makes possible the achievement of complete sonic coverage (yielding the highest probability of detection) by positioning submarines, destroyers, helicopters, sonobuoys, and fixed-wing aircraft in geometric dispositions so as to fill all the holes. These graphics also afford the commander the benefit of intelligent prediction of enemy submarine
tactics and where the submarine is most likely to be so that when her skipper pops up to fire his missile, an aircraft or destroyer is there to deter or kill as the situation dictates. This necessarily requires a level of oceanographic expertise which can be provided only by someone trained in oceanography and its application in antisubmarine warfare: the naval officer oceanographer.
This significant improvement, which we need, can be realized by greater operational employment of naval officer oceanographers—aided by a dedicated, on-board acoustic range prediction capability. Not only would the cost be negligible, since both are available now, but it would save a great deal in the long run by realizing a significant rise in efficiency. The integrated command acoustic prediction system (•CAPS) was favorably evaluated during Exercise RlMPAC 73 on board the aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk (CV-63) and shortly thereafter on board the Independence (cv-62). The carriers Saratoga (CV-60), Enterprise (CVM-65), Ranger (CV-61), America (CV-66), John F. Kennedy (CV-67), and Constellation (CV-64) also have •CAPS2.
At present, all eight of these carriers have a billet (br an officer with an 1800 designator (geophysical specialist trained in both oceanography and Meteorology), but only three of the incumbents are So qualified. The other five are weather officers only. Further, not one of these ships has a billet carrying the oceanographic subspecialty (0049P) code, but all °f the associated carrier group staffs do. Not one of rbe carrier group billets is occupied by an officer 'vith the subspecialty qualification.
The Naval Postgraduate School has been turning °ut oceanographers for many years. Unfortunately, Most of them who serve “payback” tours do so ashore °n staffs and in research and development. As of n°w, there are 269 billets in the Navy calling for the '800 designator, but only 28 are in operational units at sea and only seven of those are filled by officers lt;h the correct qualifications. Aside from the three Steady mentioned who are serving in carriers, the Mrnaining four are serving in the USS Tripoli (LPH- USS Saipan (LHA-2), the staff of Amphibious r°up One, and the Seventh Fleet staff. There are 64 esignated oceanographic subspecialist billets, but °nIy 11 of these are at sea. Even more incongruous is e fact that not one of these is occupied by a naval °fficer oceanogapher.
Why, then, if it has long been recognized that °Ceanography is the “key to ASW,”3 are there not More oceanographers on board the carriers in order to Use ICAPS more effectively? Why aren’t they in air- Cfaft squadrons, surface ships, and submarines? Why
Figure 2
PROPAGATION LOSS PROFILE
isn’t there a greater employment of ICAPS by destroyers, submarines, and staffs since it has been judged an “invaluable asset to at-sea ASW forces”?4 Why is this true when there is a great deal of significant evidence attesting to the fact that units having the benefit of oceanographic expertise have had far greater overall performance in underwater detection than those that have not? This evidence has been emphasized in particular by Rear Admiral Carl J. Seiberlich, USN, reporting on the Pacific Fleet exercise series Uptide,5 and by a Second Fleet staff study.6 Both clearly demonstrate the tactical usefulness of oceanographic information (supplemental to that available from fleet numerical weather centrals) in planning, stationing, and operating ships and aircraft, and in deceiving opposing submarines.
During the fourth evaluation of the interim sea control ship Guam (LPH-9) during fiscal year 1974, the officer in tactical command required the services of a full-time oceanographic subspecialist to apprise him of how well his sensors would perform under varying environmental conditions and to make recommendations on depth settings and employment. During this exercise, the sea control force located opposing submarines 11 times before they reached missile firing range in 18 interactions (a success record of better than 50%). Three previous sea control exercises, conducted in fiscal year 1973 managed to locate only five enemy submarines in 39 interactions (13%). Not one of these exercises had the benefit of a naval officer oceanographer.
The reason is twofold. First, commanders have been reluctant to request that certain of their operational billets be coded to specify that graduate education in oceanography is essential for proper performance of required ASW tasks. To do so would restrict the number of eligible officers to those with postgraduate education and thus eliminate many outstanding officers deemed able to handle the environmental requirement adequately. The Navy has been unwilling to create new billets, with the addition of specialists, in a time of manpower reduction when each watch officer is expected to do the work of three. Second, commanders have felt that fleet numerical weather central support in the form of acoustic sensor range prediction system (ASRAPS) and ship helicopter acoustic range prediction system (SHARPS) messages will satisfy fleet requirements for ocean data.
Consider the commander faced with tactical ASVf decisions as to what range the pursuing destroyer should begin using active sonar to assure contact; or how sonobuoy pattern orientation, spacing, and depth settings should be altered in order to cover all the holes; or where the carrier should be, at what speed, and with what screw count configuration in order to minimize her detection and identification. Would he prefer the advice of one of his unrestricted line officers, to whom he gave this unfamiliar task, over that of an experienced oceanographer?
Acoustic range prediction is a full-time job at sea requiring close analysis of propagation loss profiles and a thorough grasp of how the interaction of 'veather (sea state), water depth, bottom type, layer depth, ambient noise, ocean fronts, eddies, currents, ‘nternal waves, transition zones, and sound channels affect the propagation of sound in the ocean. The ocean environment is an interactive, dynamic variable. Environmental considerations must be weighed r°gether with ship and aircraft capabilities, intelligence, logistics, and mission requirements to deter- ro'ne the best course of action. The naval officer with rhe task of environmental prediction must be able to offer options and alternative recommendations based °n all of these factors. Keeping the commander ap- Ptised should not be a reaction to events. Such information should be provided to him in anticipation of possible events so it will figure prominently in the decision process.
Would a commander prefer environmental support from ashore (keeping in mind the turn-around time delay and garble in communications plus the fact that his ship might very well be out of range of the beach or the carrier with ICAPS), rather than an onboard, near-real-time capability? In a task group situation, force status may change suddenly and unexpectedly. Units may join or be detached. Casualties will occur, or some vital mission consideration will necessitate a rapid reorientation of screening forces. A task group dependent on shore-based acoustic forecasts does not have the capability to react quickly to a changing tactical situation. Fleet numerical weather central services, although valuable, are intended only as a first step in the art of environmental prediction. They provide a global, macro-scale forecast prepared by a centrally located computer that averages out micro-scale perturbations, such as sound channels, thermocline tran-
Our submarines spend little of their time on the surface, as the Flasher, the Guardfish, the Barb, and the Plunger are doing here, hut once submerged, their skippers must be experts in oceanography to survive, and ice may presume their Soviet counterparts are experts as well. It would behoove the Navy’s ASW forces to field a team of experts also in order to even the odds in this deadly game.
sients, and diurnal heating, all of which have significant tactical implications. Further,the shore-based system could not provide tactical decision or realtime localization assistance, both of which exist in the form of a tactical antisubmarine decision aid (TASDA),7 available along with ICAPS.
At this point, to strengthen the argument, it would be most useful and instructive to illustrate via a practical problem, for the most neglected part of using the environment in ASW is actually translating scientific and climatological data into tactically useful information. Consider the following scenario. A carrier task force will begin a combined Mediterranean/North Atlantic deployment in the spring, escorting a high-value amphibious group from Norfolk, Virginia, to Portsmouth, England. Two routes are being considered (Figure 3): a northern route which would try to use bad weather and oceanographic conditions to accomplish a covert transit and a more southerly route (initially at approximately 30° North) which would try to use good weather and sonar conditions to counter any submarine threat. How would the oceanographer contribute to the decision?
The task of the environmentalist is to compare the active and passive probabilities of detection and counter-detection by analyzing the environmental effects on sensors along the two routes. In this particular case, such a study would reveal that a submarine’s capabilities would be on a par with (if not superior to) those of the ASW forces along the southern route. However, the complex thermal structure associated with the eddies and transition zones of the Gulf stream (Figure 4) along the northern route would generally enhance the passive convergence zone and bottom bounce capabilities of the antisubmarine forces, while degrading those of the enemy. Therefore, the oceanographer would recommend the northern route. (Of course that would be only one of the information sources the commander considers. The commander might still take the other route if he knew he could face far fewer submarines that way of if he could get better air cover, etc.)
The ultimate test, however, is in actually applying environmental conditions in modification of strategy and tactics while under way, for conditions are rarely as predicted during planning. Oceanographic features may be a few miles from where expected. Weathef patterns may deviate from where they have been forecast. The on-scene environmentalist must implement a data-gathering scheme internally, using his own bathythermographs and those from the other ships- in addition to analyzing information provided from shore. A continuous local analysis of bathythermograph information received must be kept up to ensure that an accurately representative sample is used in ICAPS and to locate and define tactically signify cant features. This is necessary in order to use oceanographic information effectively, thus keeping the force at peak ASW efficiency.
Specifically illustrating how each particular piece
°f oceanographic information could be useful in mis- Sl°n planning and in modification of strategy and tactics, should ocean conditions change significantly during the mission, would make this article unnecessarily long. Such a practical problem is included in Environment and ASW Tactical Decision Making Published in September 1976, a must for all who are close to antisubmarine warfare.8
The naval officer oceanographer must put to sea ^tth the fleet. Carrier group, cruiser-destroyer 8r°up, and air group commanders, as manpower sPonsors, must assure that their unit and squadron c°rnmanders designate billets suitable for the oceanographic subspecialty code or request the establish- tTlent of additional operational oceanographic billets ^’here warranted. Qualified officers can then be as- ^gned upon graduation from Monterey or reassigned r°m shore assignments when such would not prove adverse to the needs of the Navy. Such steps would elp arrest the present downward trend in our naval Capability. We must accurately assess the potential ^teat in light of severely limited appropriations, and e°ncentrate our assets accordingly.
The Soviet Union’s primary military goal is sea ^°ntrol, as stated in Admiral Gorshkov’s book Sea °u’er of the State. The U.S.S.R. now has a blue-water
navy fast approaching the ability to achieve this goal, and the nuclear submarine is the primary weapon. The Soviets, by gaining command of the sea, can, at the most opportune time, deny America the necessary raw materials to feed its industrial base and prevent the U.S. Armed Forces from honoring their commitments abroad. In doing so, the Soviet Union can dictate the terms of peace and snatch the control of this country’s destiny from its people. Need more be said of the continued vital importance of our ASW capability, and of the value of the naval officer oceanographer in this effort?
Sending the qualified oceanographer to sea is a small price to pay for significant improvement in the Navy’s most critical warfare area, in the overall operational readiness posture of the Navy, and in America’s continuing ability to use technology to control its destiny.
'Rear Admiral Carl O. Holmquist, USN (Retired) “Long-Range Weather Prediction,” United States Naval Institute Proceedings, November, 1973, p. 50.
2ICAPS is a program designed to utilize on-board computer capability, in situ environmental data, and deep ocean historical information to compute acoustic propagation loss for passive aircraft sonars; direct path, convergence zone, and bottom bounce ranges for hull-mounted sonar; best depth for sonobuoy hydrophones, dipping variable depth sonar, and helicopter sonar; and counter-detection ranges.
3Vice Admiral Harold E. Shear, USN, "Oceanography—Its Implication on ASW,” Undersea Technology, November 1971, pp. 16-19.
4G. L. Hanssen and W. B. Tucker, Review of ICAPS Aboard USS Independence (U), U.S. Naval Oceanographic Office, 1975, p. 2.
5Rear Admiral Carl J. Seiberlich, USN, Briefing, “Uptide 12 Update” delivered 15 November 1972, Fleet Combat Directions Systems Training Center Atlantic, Dam Neck, Virginia.
6Captain Clarence J. Wages, Ji\, USN, "Impact of Environmental Expertise on Task Group Operations,” Staff Study, Second Fleet Warfare Committee, August 1974.
7TASDA is a computer program, used following ICAPS, employing Monte Carlo simulation techniques to predict optimum passive sonobuoy configurations (based on best probability of detection) using on-scene tactical and environmental considerations.
8Lieutenant Commander Robert F. Barry, USN, and Lieutenant William K. McCord, USN, The Environment and ASW Tactical Decision Making (U), Fleet Anti-Submarine Warfare Training Center, Pacific, San Diego, California, September 1976, pp. 32-77.
I A 1965 graduate of the University of Massachusetts, Lieutenant Commander Shaar was commissioned at f Pensacola in October 1965 and designated a naval av
I iator in February 1967. He subsequently saw duty in v jNlH VS-27 and VT-28. He graduated in March 1973 from the Naval Postgraduate School with a master’s degree in ^ oceanography and served on board the USS Kitty Hawk
(CVA-63) as oceanographer/assistant ASW officer from 1973 to 1975. After attending the Armed Forces Staff College, he was assigned to Special Programs Division, Headquarters, Defense Mapping Agency, Washington, D.C. in February 1976. Since September 1977, he has been executive officer to Rear Admiral Robert M. Collins, Deputy Director, Defense Mapping Agency.