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Soviet Warships of the Second World War
Jiirg Meister. New York: Arco Publishing Co., 1977. 348 pp. Illus. $19.95 ($17.95).
Reviewed by Arthur Davidson Baker III
(Mr. Baker, a Harvard graduate, is an analyst for the Navy Department. While on active duty he served in a destroyer escort and with the Naval Intelligence Command. A 1977 distinguished graduate from the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, he has contributed to a number of books and periodicals, including the Proceedings and Naval Review.)
Swiss naval writer Jiirg Meister s Soviet Warships of the Second World War is a major contribution to the readily available Western literature on that most obscure yet historically important navy. Working with the assistance of a number of acknowledged experts on the subject, particularly Rolf Erikson of the United States, Meister has brought vast amounts of information and commendable organization to a subject for which little that is useful has heretofore been available.
The Soviet Navy, as the author points out, has always been a difficult subject to deal with and remains so today. During World War II, it expanded rapidly from a formally structured coastal defense force into a very large, often ad hoc, aggregation of makeshift conversions and panic-built small combatants. Many of its finest achievements were made with tiny riverine craft operating far inland. The Red Fleet was split by geography into widely separated entities, and locally built versions of a class were often tailored to special operating conditions. Entirely different ships in different fleets, and even, on occasion, within fleets, might bear the same names or identifying numbers, making monumental the task of a researcher in sorting out identities from the available Soviet literature. While the U.S.S.R. is a prolific publisher on the heroic exploits of its ships and sailors of the “Great Patriotic War,” Soviet publications are still vague as to operational specifics and closemouthed on technical details. Admiral of the Fleet Gorshkov’s short table comparing data on certain wartime U.S. and Soviet designs (an apples- and-oranges selection not unpredictably favoring Soviet technological achievements) in the Navies in War and Peace series, published in the 1974 issues of Proceedings, is almost unique as an official revelation of specific characteristics.
This is not merely a listing of ships, their careers, and their characteristics, however; scattered throughout are fascinating discussions of Soviet operations and design philosophy. For example, while not supplying documentation, the author indicates that the Soviets were working on closed- cycle submarine propulsion systems prior to the war, anticipating rather than copying German developments in that field. A strong distaste for Soviet secretiveness and aggrandizement is frequently displayed; in spite of grandiose Soviet historical pronouncements, Meister rightly points out that the largest warship ever sunk by a Soviet submarine was an anchored 1,300-ton British destroyer in August 1919. Despite Meister’s jaundiced viewpoint on much of Soviet naval expertise of the period, his record of the literally thousands of ships and craft which came under naval control during the war speaks highly of their innovation in desperate circumstances.
Because of the duplication of names and numbers between fleets (possibly occuring in part because the Soviets have always been unimaginative in their naming of objects), for a user of this book to look up a specific unit would require a very detailed and fully cross-referenced index. Unfortunately, there is no index of any kind at all. Nor is there a bibliography or detailed listing of references.
While this reviewer is in no position to challenge the accuracy and completeness of the ship listings, there are grounds for complaint about the characteristics data. Obviously, for many of the more obscure units, little is known but a name, while for former merchant ships, information from pre-war ship registries has been adequately exploited. But for the hard-core navy of cruisers, destroyers, and submarines, more data of greater accuracy are available, if not widely published. Meister has employed declassified U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence estimates of Soviet ship characteristics published through 1947 plus German wartime documents based in part on captured Soviet materials. But the Soviet Baltic Fleet Guide 1940, acquired by the Germans and available after the war, does not seem to have been used in preparation of this book. Meister’s data thus frequently conflict, although to no great degree, with official and presumably accurate Soviet figures. Characteristics data on Allied units transferred to the Soviet Union often both conflict with U.S. and British records and with the photos in the book itself. Also, occasional historical discussions of wartime-built Soviet ship classes, such as those appearing in the excellent Polish periodical Morze and even in such Soviet publications as Morskoy Sbornik, do not seem to have been sufficiently exploited.
The photographs illustrating Soviet Warships of the Second World War are remarkable and are not duplicated elsewhere. Although some views are either hazy or clumsily retouched (having been duplicated from notoriously poorly printed Soviet sources), they constitute a unique and comprehensive record of what Soviet naval architects and engineers were able to achieve. A
few photos, unfortunately, are mis- identified as to class of ship. The book is also illustrated by a number of crisply executed line drawings by Siegfried Breyer, whose work on the modern Soviet Navy is well known.
Soviet Warships of the Second World War expands on material previously published in the author’s The Soviet Navy volumes in the “MacDonald Navies of the Second World War” series and adds a great many additional categories of ships. While it may not be the final word on technical matters, Meister’s book is by far the best source generally available. Despite its lack of index and references, as a record of the Red Fleet’s strength and composition, it is unsurpassed.
Basic Ship Theory
K. J. Rawson and E. C. Tupper. New York: Longman, 1976. 2 Vols. 623 pp. Ulus. $16.50 per volume.
Reviewed by Norman Friedman
(Dr. Friedman is a theoretical physicist currently concentrating on naval problems at the Hudson Institute. A Columbia University graduate, he has authored or coauthored articles and papers on the U.S.-Soviet naval balance, an analysis of Soviet naval missile systems and tactics, and warship design. His writing has appeared in the Proceedings on several occasions; most recent was the article “C3 War at Sea” in the May 1977 Naval Review issue. Dr. Friedman is currently writing a history of carrier design for the Naval Ship Engineering Center.)
Most naval officers have two levels of interest in naval architecture. First of all, they must know something of the theory of how ships behave in order to operate them properly— indeed, even in order to understand such aids to operation as damage- control diagrams. However, most officers also require some appreciation for the broad concepts of ship design, for otherwise large areas of a technology intimately important to them will be unintelligible. This is not mere curiosity: for example, many officers not educated in technical naval architecture will sit on boards responsible for the features of new or modernized warships. The better their comprehension of broad naval architectural ideas, especially as they relate to warship design, the better the chance that those lay boards will interact with the technical community to produce ships acceptable to all.
It is clear that this interaction has not been entirely successful in the recent past: the fleet at large seems unhappy with most recent escorts, for example. The pages of this magazine have carried both the fleet’s outrage and some of the technical community’s reasoning; but it does not seem that the few technical articles which are addressed to a broad naval audience can accomplish their intended mission.
Nor is Basic Ship Theory intended to educate the casual reader; it is a formidable beginning text for professional naval architects. The question, then, is not so much whether it is useful in its intended role, but whether it can form a useful reference for naval officers whose main contact with naval architecture may well be Thomas C. Gillmer’s Modern Ship Design (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1975). Certainly Gillmer is far more accessible to a lay reader; and certainly he gives far more space to such essentials as engineering plant design and hull construction. However, Gillmer has not gone into great detail concerning many of the technical issues of ship design; a book like Basic Ship Theory may prove extremely useful as a supplement or as a kind of encyclopedic reference.
The writing is generally clear; but American readers may find the partial use of SI units (International System of Units) somewhat uncomfortable at first glance. A more fundamental problem is the very limited attention paid issues specific to warship design.
Something more basic appears to be missing. Perhaps the greatest issue dividing the fleet from the technical community is the concept of tradeoffs, of just how a series of conflicting requirements add up to a ship. Over 50 years ago William Hovgaard approached this subject in The General Design of Warships (London: E. & FN. Spon, Ltd., 1920), but nothing similar has been written for many years. One reason may be the level of security designers attach to warship design. Indeed, although the foreword to the first edition notes that “both authors have recently been in the forefront of the design of complex warships,” the few examples of warship design estimates presented are not clearly connected with any particular ships. Even worse, there is little or no attempt to indicate a major development in recent warship design, the need to balance volumes as well as weights in ships whose loads are not nearly so dense as formerly. As one U.S. naval architect said, “our ships used to be weight-critical—now they are volume-critical,” and a tentative design whose weights add up perfectly may yet prove unfeasible due to a lack of internal volume.
This situation, which is crucial to recent U.S. designs, has been pointed out in a few professional papers, including one Proceedings Professional Note, “We Make Our Ships Ugly by Design” by Philip Sims, pp. 113-118’ November 1974. It deserves enshrinement in any serious reference on modern warship design, yet all it gets in Basic Ship Theory is a brief note that ". . . the volume required ... is generally a more significant parameter for modern warships than weight. . .
In fact, security need not prevent the production of an American text based on concrete examples with which naval officers can identify: Why is a K«0x-class frigate so large? Why does the Spruance-class destroyer look the way she does? Indeed, many of the crucial parameters of modern American warships are not classified. From the naval officer’s point of view, the most valuable handbook on warship design might well be a series of careful accounts of the basic design history of typical modern warships, showing explicitly the kinds of compromise made.
No such book exists; and even if it were to be written, there would still be a need for detailed, usable references to topics such as stability, ship structural strength, and ship powering. Basic Ship Theory certainly fills this requirement.
Its high cost, unfortunately typical of modern engineering texts, can only be regretted. From a naval officers point of view a book like Basic Ship Theory is a useful but essentially casual addition to his library.
The Russian Navy: Myth and Reality
Eric Morris. London: Hamish Hamilton Ltd., 1977. 134 pp. (Approx. $10.00)
Reviewed by Captain Mathew J. Whelan, U. S. Navy
(Captain Whelan is presently serving as the Executive Assistant to the Director, National Security Agency. He holds a BA (Harvard) and a A1A (Georgetown) in Russian Studies.
In the past Captain Whelan has contributed to Comment and Discussion as well as a review of Fleet Admiral Gorshkov's Sea Power of the State for the Proceedings.)
Eric Morris has produced a particularly readable monograph on the Soviet Navy. Within a relatively few pages he has successfully captured the essence of Russian naval tradition and illuminated the checkered growth and development of the Soviet Navy. The main purpose of his book is to portray Soviet maritime power against the backdrop of its development and the various constraints faced by the Soviets in developing both a naval, policy as well as a navy. In such a manner the author hoped to exorcise the myth and place the reality of Soviet naval power in its proper perspective. He was successful.
In the opening pages he describes Russian naval developments since the time of Peter the Great. He points out the early wholesale incorporation of Western expertise in shipbuilding and shiphandling. Interestingly enough this provides a sharp contrast to the Soviet Navy of today which is unique in its ship development, construction, and armament. His dispassionate commentary on Soviet naval operations during World War II enables the reader to retreat from the extremes of Western critique and Soviet propaganda, and to appreciate the basic limitations under which the Russian sailors had to operate.
The author would have us believe that the same limitations encountered in World War II, in the larger sense, govern the operations of the Soviet Navy even today. He observes that so long as the Soviet Navy assumes a defensive role, its position is strong, but an offensive posture is weakened by the same problem encountered during the war years, i.e., geographic constraints.
The author’s discussion of the cold war years provides sharp relief to the naval policies of Stalin and his successors. It would appear that Stalin’s naval policy was goal oriented whereas Khrushchev’s policy was developed in reaction to the perceived policy of the West. In this vein the author points out the five-year lag from decision to operational capability in the maritime arena and that the systems going to sea at the end of the 1950s reflected decisions made on Khrushchev’s accession to power. Thus it is, according to the author, that the West enjoyed its maritime superiority well into the 1960s. While the Soviets were concentrating on the threat from the carrier, the West was already looking into the development of submarine- launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and into related construction programs when the Soviet leadership first recognized the SLBM threat.
Khrushchev’s successors, faced with the reality of the missile threat from the sea, focused their attention on the problems of a sea-based missile delivery system and the antisubmarine warfare (ASW) problem. The abandonment of the cruise missile programs in favor of a short-range missile program and new emphasis on submarine developments were the result. In addition, the Soviets became concerned with the implications of ASW, and it was the attendant concern for long-range ASW that, according to the author, was the genesis of the Moskva-class helicopter carrier. In effect, the Soviets recognized that the encounter zone had moved further out to sea into an area in which only sea-based forces could be used as an effective counter.
The author also provides an interesting analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis. He chides Western analysts for viewing the crisis as a watershed in the development of the Soviet Navy, for he would treat the crisis as a catalyst.
The author contends that the fundamental principle governing Soviet naval development in the 1960s is that of a forward defense. He then states that Soviet military doctrine sees nuclear deterrence and general concepts of defense as synonymous. This translates today to what is termed the pro-SSBN mission of Soviet surface forces. The surface fleet would sweep the sea approaches of opposing ASW forces to allow their own submarines free play in both a deterrent (nuclear strike capability) and defensive (ASW or anti-Polaris) role. The pro-SSBN role has become more critical and is considered a primary mission of the Soviet Navy with the advent of Poseidon and the necessity to ensure the deployment of a credible Soviet deterrent. The secondary mission of the Soviet Navy appears to be sea denial. As the author states, Russia "can reach all of its major allies without recourse to the sea and therefore they aim to deny the sea to others. . . This has resulted in the extensive development of both their naval air forces and massive submarine fleet. The author notes that these are the main reasons that Soviet naval developments do not parallel those of the West.
The author moves from a discussion of naval developments and hardware to that of the foreign policy which the Soviet Navy serves. He admits to the incredible difficulties encountered in attempting to determine the precise direction of Soviet policies and deems it sufficient to describe Soviet diplomatic activity as opportunistic. The author also believes that detente falls under much the same rubric.
The second half of the book is used to describe Soviet deployment strategies. In the Mediterranean, the author sees the naval question in terms of the Soviet drive for security and a way out of encirclement. With the reduction of U. S. commitment in that area, the author sees the Soviets using the Mediterranean essentially as a means of access to the Atlantic.
Turning to the Baltic and the Barents seas, the author states that alarmists in the West have ballooned Soviet naval power in those regions beyond its real capabilities. In actuality there are geographical constraints which the Soviets must overcome prior to taking the maritime offensive and attempting to control these waters. In the author’s opinion, overcoming these geographical barriers as well as the naval forces of the littoral states would result in a major escalation of
any conflict.
In the East, the author argues that Soviet activity in the Indian Ocean is a direct result of Soviet perceptions of U. S. options in that area. He also makes the rather astute observation that Soviet naval deployments in that region are “commensurate with that of a power with global interests.”
In the Pacific, Soviet fleet operations are geared to project a presence as well as to act as a counter to the U. S. Seventh Fleet. The author believes that future activities in this area will depend on the Soviet need to contain China and a resurgence of Japanese naval power.
The author concludes with the thought that the Soviet Union is indeed a global maritime power. He believes, however, that Soviet naval policy and naval capabilities will be constrained by doctrinaire leadership new to the maritime aspects of foreign policy. In the author’s view the primary mission of the Soviet Navy “is that of strategic deterrence provided by the fleet of ballistic-missile-armed submarines.” In the event of conflict
Soviet surface ships intend to support their own strategic submarines by sweeping away Western ASW forces and denying the West access to vital waterways by a surge deployment. In peacetime, the role of the Soviet Navy is to assert a presence where deemed necessary.
The author asserts that the Soviet Union is not spending any more than is necessary to ensure the security of the state. Furthermore, with respect to the total maritime strength of the Soviet Union, the author believes that although the Soviet Navy has developed into a modern fighting force, it is overextended with respect to the tasks outlined by Admiral Gorshkov.
The author finally concludes that the postwar development of the Soviet Navy has been a reaction to U.S. sea- power, and he does “not envisage any reversal of this trend.”
In summary, the book itself is skillfully organized and easily read. Although it is not encyclopedic in nature, it is certainly thought provoking and would serve to whet the appetite of any student of the Soviet Navy.
The Mariner’s Pocket Companion 1978
By Wallace E. Tobin III.
First published in 1971, this handy book achieved immediate popularity and has been reprinted each year since with a new calendar. Its major components—shiphandling information, selected Rules of the Road, safety information and aids to navigation, nautical tables, lists and formulae, appointment book and calendar—make it ideal for the yachtsman or the Navy man. Compiled by an experienced mariner, The Mariner’s Pocket Companion 1978 has its own bound-in 1978 calendar and a wealth of information in easy-to-find form. Weather forecasting information is here, along with the Beaufort Scale, speed indicators, and a table of distances between major ports. First aid, damage control, distress signals and survival tips are included, along with wave characteristics, compass corrections, and a check list for getting underway.
1977. 3% x 63A inches. 224 pages.
List price: $5.00. Member’s price: $4.00 A Naval Institute Press Book
Add 75g to each order for postage and handling.
(Please use book order form in Books of Interest to the Professional section.)
Compiled by Professor Jack Sweetman, Associate Editor
NAVAL AFFAIRS [2] The Critical Convoy Battles of March 1943: The Battle for HX. 229/SC 122
Jurgen Rohwer. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1977. 256 pp. Maps. Illus. Append. Bib. $12.95 ($10.35).
The Battle of the Atlantic reached a climax in the spring of 1943- This meticulous study, made possible by the recent declassification of important British and Ameri
can records, recreates the great convoy battles during the first 20 days of that March from the perspectives of both submarine and surface forces. Dr. Rohwer is a leading German naval historian.
The Genesis of the Professional Officers’ Corps
Gerke Teitler. Beverly Hills, Ca.: Sage Publications, 1977. 246 pp. Bib:-* 13-50 ($12.15).
Most studies of the origins of the professional officer corps in 16th and 17th century Europe emphasize land forces. This scholarly study is exceptional in that it centers on the developments in the period’s three great navies — British, French, and Dutch. The author belongs to the faculty of Erasmus University, Rotterdam.
[2] Naval Operations Analysis Prepared by the Operations Analysis Study Group, U.S. Naval Academy. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1977. 372 pp. $16.95 ($13.55).
The text for the Naval Academy course in Naval Operations Analysis explains the application of scientific analysis to the naval decision-making process.
[21 The Sailor’s Wife
Jean Ebbert. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1977. 186 pp. Append. $5.95 ($4.75) paper.
The third edition of a Navy wife’s handbook for Navy wives offers information and advice on a wide range of topics relevant to the service family.
Soviet Armed Forces Review Annual: Volume I, 1977
David R. Jones (Editor). Gulf Breeze, Fla.: Academic International Press, 1977. 277 pp. Bib. $29.50 ($26.55).
The first volume of a projected annual series discusses the history, current status and potential development of the Soviet armed forces. Several of the contributions are devoted to naval topics, including reviews of the Soviet Navy by Michael MccGwire and the Naval Air Forces by Jacob W. Kipp.
USS Ward: The First Shot
Lieutenant Commander Arnold S. Lott, U.S. Navy (Retired), and Chief Hull Maintenance Technician Robert F. Sumrall, U.S. Naval Reserve. Annapolis, Md.: Leeward Publications, 1977. 40 pp. Ulus. $3.50 ($3.15) paper.
The first shots fired by American forces in World War II were from the four-inch guns of the USS Ward (DE-139), a flush- deck, four-stack World War I destroyer on patrol off Pearl Harbor at 0645 on 7 December 1941. Their target was the conning tower of one of the Japanese midget submarines which were attempting to penetrate the Pacific Fleet anchorage. The technical and operational history of the Ward is presented in a well-illustrated "Ship’s Data" special.
MARITIME AFFAIRS
[21 The Medley of Mast and Sail: A
Camera Record
Frank G. Carr and others. Annapolis, Md.:
Naval Institute Press, 1976. 330 pp. Illus. $21.95 ($17.55).
This beautiful book, illustrated by over 400 photographs, presents a graphic record of the vanished merchant sailing fleet of the world. The quality of the reproductions is superb.
A Natural History of Marine Mammals
Victor B. Scheffer. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1976. 157 pp. Illus. Append. Bib. $7.95 ($7.16).
The six groups of mammals who live in the sea are surveyed in a book designed primarily for younger readers, but far from childish. It is illustrated with 46 charming pen-and-ink drawings by Peter Parnall. Mr. Scheffer served over 30 years as a biologist with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service.
MILITARY AFFAIRS
American Defense Policy
John E. Endicott and Roy W. Stafford, Jr.
(Editors). Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1977. 626 pp. Bib. $22.50
($20.25), $7.95 ($7.16) for paper.
This massive documentary anthology, a text for the course in American defense policy at the U.S. Air Force Academy, contains readings covering just about every aspect of that large subject.
On Eagle’s Wings: The Personal Story of the Leading Commander of the Israeli Air Force
General Ezer Weizman, Israeli Defence Forces (Retired). New York: Macmillan, 1977. 302 pp. Illus. $8.95 ($8.06).
This fast-paced narrative is at once the autobiography of General Ezer Weizman,
one of Israel’s first nine fighter pilots, and an informal history of the Israeli Air Force. In 1966 the author succeeded Yitzhak Rabin as chief of the General Staff Section of the Israeli Armed Forces, in which capacity he served with distinction during the Six-Day War.
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
A New Treaty for Panama?
AEI Defense Review, Number Four. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1977. 34 pp. $1.50 ($1.35) paper.
The wisdom of a new canal treaty with Panama is debated. The case for a new
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treaty is put by Abraham Lowenthal, former director of studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, and Milton
The longest and most crucial campaign in War ll-and the one we almost lost
t is recreated here with stunning impact in this extraordinary new documentary book based on recently-released British, American and German documents, as well as dozens of eyewitness accounts. "The only thing that ever really frightened me during the war," said Winston Churchill, "was the U-Boat peril!’ Why that was so becomes graphically clear in a book that covers all five years, eight months of the battle, and includes more than 400 photographs, most never before published. The Dial Press/James Wade
Charlton; against it, by Hanson W. Baldwin, longtime military analyst for The New York Times.
Y-77
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