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In the current noncombat environment, it is readable to expect that a major proportion of Navy ^sources—money, men, and time—should go to Gaining. However, it must be borne in mind that Gaining is but one facet of military preparedness. In post-Vietnam War revitalization period, ships and aircraft must receive deferred, intensive rework, ^pply levels must be reestablished and brought into alance with depleted items being replenished. °ng-range, often very expensive, programs for acquisition of new weapons must be set in motion. All °f these actions are vital facets of readiness and all c°mpete with training for limited resources.
The demands of the complex modern naval ^npon systems require extensive shore-based train- mg. It is inconceivable that operating and repair
^ generation ago, bluejackets spoke wryly of the Old Navy, The New Navy . . . and This One!” There has always been but one U.S.
^avy, The faces change, the names change.
^ut the need for able, trained young men has ativays been there. It was there in 1888 when a quartet of alumni from the School of the ^hip” and the Apprentice Training System ^ad an informal class reunion somewhere in lhc Pacific in the old Mohican, and it is being ttlet today in such locales as the Radioman School at the Naval Station, San Diego.
skills for such systems could be effectively taught on board operating ships. Thus, we have a break with the past, for historically, navies have trained their men at sea in ships. From the time of the Continental Navy through the Civil War, there was little shore-based or formal education or training in the U.S. Navy. Navies used the “school of the ship” — now called on-the-job training. The first hint of a formal training system appeared with the establishing of a naval apprentice system in 1837. It was used at only token strength, however, until the Civil War. This small effort waned until construction of the new steel warships in the 1880s. Actually, it was in 1875 that an apprentice training system was established to support enlistees being brought into the Navy at ages 16 to 18. The first training station for recruits was set up as part of the U.S. Navy base complex at Newport, Rhode Island, in 1883. This station trained only “boys” for service at sea. It was not until after the Spanish-American War that the training of “landsmen” was initiated. (Such landsmen were individuals who served ashore and hence needed skills other than those used at sea.) In conjunction with creating the apprentice system, the first office to centrally oversee training was established in the Bureau of Equipment and Recruiting in 1879- Cognizance for training was transferred to the Bureau of Navigation in 1889, and there it remained for more than half a century.
In World War I, ships and equipment were basically “mechanical,” without the later complexes of interdependent systems. The training establishment in support thereof was comparably basic, consisting of recruit and basic skill training. The essentially one-ocean war and the Navy of that period were supported by training centers at Great Lakes, Illinois, and Norfolk, Virginia.
Soon after the beginning of the next war, the Bureau of Navigation became the Bureau of Naval Personnel in 1942. Rear Admiral Randall Jacobs
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headed the transition as chief of the bureau. It was the Bureau of Naval Personnel that supervised the recruitment, training, and design of the 4.2- million-man Navy of World War II. The physical plant for naval training at the start of the war was minimal. Essentially focused on recruit training, it was totally inadequate for either the number of trainees or variety of skills required. Thus, numerous training activities were rapidly developed to meet the expanding fleet’s needs for trained manpower. A lot of ingenuity was applied, both in developing the physical facilities and in structuring courses and curricula. Since the preemptive power and financial resources were practically without limit, direct, effective action was possible as in no other environment before or since. For example, the Tome School, a college preparatory boarding school for boys at Port Deposit, Maryland, evolved into the Naval Training Center, Bainbridge. A New England country club became a school of navigation. A Long Island estate became the Navy Training Device Center. Leading educators and training experts nationwide augmented the small Navy nucleus, either as reserve officers or in a civilian status. Pers-3, under an Assistant Chief of Naval Personnel for Training, directed the Navy’s nonaviation education and training programs.[1] Many innovations in training methodology and curriculum development came from the considerable talent concentrated in Pers-3, and the U.S. Navy earned a justly deserved reputation for its accomplishments in those areas during the war years. The atmosphere which prevailed during that period encouraged a number of young, energetic educators to stay with Pers-3- It was they who exerted a major influence in shaping naval training of the 1950s and 1960s.
Gradually, however, their impetus waned, and the training structure became an agglomerate not directly related to the fleet it supported. The introduction of the more complex weapon systems in the newer ships had caused new courses and new schools to be established. But this had been accomplished on a piecemeal basis for surface ship and submarine programs. Also, system acquisition programs were later found to lack necessary training support for their operators and maintenance personnel. The liaison between the material bureaus (now the systems commands) and the training community, necessary to build a reliable, ongoing training capability, was slow in being developed. The needed leadtime in the pr°' gramming and budgeting cycle was not being pr°" vided in the development and funding of training billets and training equipment. This meant crash programs and tradeoffs were forced upon those in the training community. They were required to repr°' gram funds and billets to new systems even though they were also needed for other programs already 10 existence. As a result, the material bureaus established training offices of considerable size within their own headquarters staffs. Their purpose was to ensure that training support for new weapons and | systems was developed. In some instances this wa* successful, but in others it was not, as we shall see later. This fragmented development of training Pr°' grams had an appreciable impact on the Bureau °* Naval Personnel. The BuPers training facility5 would be absorbing the workload incident to providing space, installing equipment, developing courses- and supporting them on a sustaining basis. And most important, the Bureau of Personnel would have to program the dollars and personnel these courses were to require.
The economics of general training were planned and managed by a small group of people within Pers-C. They were forced to serve as the principd advocates of the Navy-wide education and training programs year after year. It was those few who collected numerical requirements, program by program- and translated them into program elements within the overall Bureau of Naval Personnel budget re' quests, for all the appropriations needed, from mil1' tary pay through military construction to research- development, testing, and evaluation. This inform3' tion, which formed the total training budget, had t0 come from a multitude of sources. It had to include the new and planned programs as well as those sud1 as recruit training and basic skill training that were already firmly established.
Manpower strength created a major problem f°r the training planners. Changes in the numeric^ strength of the Navy and varying numbers of ne" enlistees and members of officer programs were fac' tors to which training planners had to respond promptly. Navy manpower strength plans controls accessions, advancements, and, in turn, education and training. Coordination among these plans "aS vital to achieve a balanced personnel structure, but i[ was the training plans in particular which had to be responsive to all the other major plans. Fluctuation5 in training requirements mean expanding or decreaS' ing training capabilities. The implications of this, the short range, are extremely difficult to accomm0' date and have frequently led to accusations of in'
^equate planning. There are any number of vari- akles, including such things as the world situation, number of first enlistments expiring, and the state of the national job market.
Over the years, the training programmers have had to react to such vicissitudes. They have been accused of uneconomic practices and of downright poor Planning. In reacting to appreciable increases and deCreases in training loads in short periods, training Planners must give consideration to longer-range requirements. A training establishment to accommo- hate such a fluctuating student load must indeed be adaptable. Inevitably, costly facilities cannot be op- Clrnally used for something else. Instructors and administrators must be assigned elsewhere during Periods of low student loads. But to inactivate Utilities and otherwise reduce student capacities '"ould be imprudent, based on previous experience in accornmodating the fluctuations in Navy personnel strength. As a result, a compromise is necessary, "■'herein instructors and staff are absorbed in other Gaining programs in the same geographic areas, facilities are kept essentially ready for use but not employed to capacity.
Through the 1950s and 1960s, well into the latter y&ars of the Vietnam conflict, general training man- a§ernent in the U.S. Navy was centrally managed by huPers —Pers-C. Various new systems were initiated and became operable in the fleet during this time. h°rne of these systems were adequately supported by Gaining, but others were not. Program sponsors in ^pNav, the material bureaus responsible for procurement, funding authorities, and the training managers in the Bureau of Naval Personnel too frequently did not coordinate program requirements to rhe extent that necessary training was ensured. The consequences of insufficient funding for basic systems aud for supporting hardware are clearly discernible early in program development; unfortunately, those of inadequate training are not so clear. Hence, reductions, deferments, and other decreases in programs tend to be directed toward the intangibles, particularly training.
Two exceptions to the general management of training by the Bureau of Naval Personnel are aviation training and nuclear power training. Both deserve special mention, not only because of their success, but also because of the way in which they have been managed.
The naval air training organization was established in 1943 in order to meet the overwhelming demands for aviators in World War II. The aviation effort—in material acquisition, in training, and in operations—was centrally coordinated and carefully
monitored. The Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air Warfare) was directly responsible for all aviation training. This included pilots, aircrewmen, and technical training of all aviation ratings. Training equipment and flight simulators were coordinated and monitored through the Aviation Training Divi' sion, directly under the DCNO (Air). Close working relationships were established and maintained between the officers of the DCNO (Air) and the material side, the Bureau of Aeronautics (which evolved into the Bureau of Naval Weapons and is now the Naval Air Systems Command). A secondary, and also very beneficial, close relationship has existed between the DCNO (Air) and the operating forces, through the Commanders, Naval Air Forces, Atlantic and Pacific Fleets. Much individual training in the aviatioo community is accomplished directly under fleet auspices and coordinated with the training administered by the shore commands.
The original concept and the responsive organization throughout the naval aviation establishment have continued to the present with only limited modification. The success of this organization is attributable to identifiable factors, primary among which have been the ability to concentrate on definable goals and to acquire the resources to achieve them. Over the years, naval aviation has been relatively inviolate as to its acquisition of resources and application of monies, personnel, and physical resources. This comes about because of the demanding performance required of practically all personnel >n aviation-associated activities. Simply stated, there Is a no-room-for-error philosophy. Requirements and priorities for training which were set by the aviation training division of the DCNO (Air) office were not to be adjusted or tinkered with by the training planners of the Bureau of Naval Personnel.
The second major exception to the management of training by the Bureau of Naval Personnel is in nuclear power. As an integral part of the complete control exercised over all facets of the nuclear power program in the U.S. Navy, the Nuclear Power D1' rectorate of the then Bureau of Ships established, and still controls, all training for programs under the aegis of that directorate. The schools are officially *n the same command chain as other Navy technic^ schools. However, their curricula, equipment- academic support, and programming are controlled by the Nuclear Power Directorate. The organization for this control is not delineated formally, but it lS clearly understood by all participants. Nuclear powef training, since its inception, has enjoyed the highest priority in the selection of personnel, obtaining °f resources, and in general emphasis. Nuclear opera-
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tlons, like flight operations, are unforgiving of human error.
In the late 1950s and through the 1960s, much tr,ticism was leveled at the general management of Gaining in the surface ship community. Several studies were conducted, all of which pointed to a *ac;k of a single, effective protagonist for training. Likewise, all commented favorably and at some L'ngth on the clearly identifiable organization, responsibility and command lines, and the effective functioning of aviation training. As early as 1955, the recommendation was made by the Hopwood Hoard that the position of Chief of Naval Training be tstablished, toward centralized control of training °ther than air. This theme appeared again in the j%l report of the Pride Board, stating in part that *Lhe Navy’s overall training effort is lacking in cen- ttal direction and strong support.” Again in 1962, the Dillon Board commented on the advisability of gating a separate training command. The Freeman tudy in 1966 recommended a phased reorganization °f training, with the final plan being the establishment of a Naval Training Command to encompass Professional, technical, and reserve training." That |Lese various boards and studies recognized the need °r a focal point for training, to set policy and state re9uirements on the OpNav level, was evidenced by fLe establishing of a Training Office, (OP-03T) in the t'arly 1960s. The office became a separate division Urider Fleet Operations and Readiness (OP-37) as a rtsult of the Freeman Study. This new division was J^oved under the aegis of the Deputy Chief of Naval
Orations, Manpower and Naval Reserve (OP-Ol) atlcI was designated OP-14 in 1970. Throughout the Sc‘ries of studies, two themes persisted. One was that 1)0 cohesive sponsorship for training existed at the CN)0 level. The second was that the aviation training
Th
e various boards mentioned were chaired by the following men: Ad- ^‘ral Herbert G. Hopwood served in BuPers from the beginning of 0rld War II until 1944. He was a commander and captain during that ^tr‘od. As Director of Planning and Control, he directed the personnel 'Sram which greatly expanded the Navy’s manning strength. As a rear
. ter Deputy CNO (Logistics), Commander First Fleet, and Commander Chief Pacific Fleet. Admiral Alfred M. Pride, who had retired in '' became a naval aviator during World War I. As a flag officer, he ^ a carrier division commander, Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics, inlander Seventh Fleet, and Commander Naval Air Force Pacific ^ '• C. Douglas Dillon was a Naval Reserve junior officer during ^ °rld War II. He later held a number of State Department posts, served ■j, sPe^iaI advisor to the Secretary of the Navy, and was Secretary of the reasury during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. Rear Ad- y lr‘1' Mason G. Freeman served as Assistant Chief of Naval Personnel for |7a'n‘ng and as such conducted a personnel/training requirements study p/ 'he Navy. He was later Commander Cruiser-Destroyer Force, Pacific eet and Superintendent of the Naval Postgraduate School.
organization was highly effective. In retrospect, the management of training for programs other than aviation and nuclear power suffered from the same organizational hamstringing as did personnel management in the Navy. Both personnel policy and training policy were largely within the purview of the Bureau of Naval Personnel, and to a lesser extent the office of the Chief of Naval Operations. This resulted from the organizational dichotomy which existed between the Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Manpower and Naval Reserve (OP-01), and the Bureau of Naval Personnel. The CNO, supported by OpNav as his staff, is charged with setting policy and stating requirements for those facets of naval matters involving personnel and training. The Bureau of Naval Personnel, a second echelon activity, administers and carries out the policy, provides program support, and, as a practical matter, provides much of the information which when consolidated became requirements. In practice, however, policy and execution became intermeshed. The DCNO, Manpower, and the Chief of Naval Personnel were, and are, a single individual, with two staffs. The tendency of incumbents over the years has been to concentrate staffing resources in the area in which there was the more freedom of action—at the bureau level rather than on the OpNav side where there was less maneuvering room. The result has been predictable. OP-01 served as a clearinghouse, with the bulk of staffing support coming from the bureau. In many instances, when OpNav-level approval was clearly required, an officer in the Bureau of Naval Personnel would prepare the supporting correspondence, then prepare the response to himself from OP-Ol. It certainly simplified the approval of policy, but it did not provide an adequate opportunity for participation in policy guidance by some of the cognizant senior OpNav officers whose areas of responsibility the policies would affect. In the area of training, except for aviation and nuclear training, policy generally originated in the Bureau of Naval Personnel, except for specific matters for which officers of OpNav had a high level of interest. This is not to imply that personnel and training policy matters were not coordinated with interested officers at the OpNav level. Policy and requirements were, however, being originated at an echelon not intended to perform the function and were entangled with execution of programs.
The boards and studies which periodically examined naval training ably identified its weaknesses, and they proposed remedies. Their major recommendations were implemented only partially, however, and never to the extent that would have provided for a single policy-level focal point or which would have severed training management from the Bureau of Naval Personnel. A precedent and an opportunity emerged in 1970 when the Navy Recruiting Command was established. This removed a major function from the Bureau of Naval Personnel for the first time since BuPers came into existence.
The Chief of Naval Operations and other senior officers of the Navy were justifiably concerned about the ability of the training establishment, in its existing hierarchical form, to provide the needed complexity of training programs and support to meet fleet needs. Get-well programs were forced upon the training community for several major programs in which high-performance systems could not be operated or maintained to achieve their predicted capabilities. Among them are the 1,200-pound steam propulsion systems, in use by combatants since the early 1950s. These systems were plagued with major casualties. The existing training available was minimal, and operation and maintenance personnel performance requirements not adequately recognized, hence not adequately met, within the technical training community. Another is the automated propulsion system built into several classes of ships. While initial crews were provided factory training by the manufacturer, no provision was made for training of replacement personnel. None of these systems was procured for training. Interim makeshift training was arranged with merchant marine interests, using a similar but not identical system. Procurement, involving a two-year lead time, was initiated for training equipment, with much greater expense than if the system for training had been contracted for at the same time as the ship installations. Other examples which highlight the lack of coordinated planning for training are the SQS-26 sonar, the amphibious force data system in the new LCCs, digital subscriber terminal equipment for shore communications stations, and the British-constructed salvage tugs (ATS). The program sponsors were either unaware or unwilling to sacrifice sound training support needs in the course of their program funding. There was no voice at the planning tables to speak clearly for training.
A secondary result of the lack of central policy coordination was lack of support for improving training methodology in Navy schools. The impetus of World War II, with its high priority given to training and its infusion of innovative young educators, had waned. Providing for continuing programs— obtaining resources, reviewing curricula, forecasting yearly requirements—was occupying the planners and managers of training in the Bureau of Naval Personnel to the limit of their available time. The result was that the civilian sector had developed new techniques, methods, and training equipment which were not adopted by the Navy. The business at hand demanded the attention of Navy training managers to the extent that such techniques as computer- assisted instruction, self-paced instruction, and curricula based on task analyses were given only peripheral attention. Basically, the organization under the Assistant Chief of Naval Personnel for Education and Training was no longer conditioned to give adequate emphasis to new initiatives.
It was in such a setting that the Chief of Naval Operations decided to revitalize naval training. On 29 January 1971, the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Manpower and Naval Reserve, signed the precept convening a board “. . . for the purpose of developing an implementation plan for a single Navy Training Command in the field, consolidating existing training structures to the extent necessary t0 achieve higher quality of individual, team, and functional training.” Elsewhere in the document, the board was advised to include in its examination a tightened organization in OpNav to establish policy- determine training objectives and priorities and r° support the manpower equipment, facilities and funding resources of the training establishment. Rear Admiral Malcolm W. Cagle was the senior member of the board, and its membership represented the complete spectrum of the warfare communities, the existing shore and fleet training organization, and the personnel and medical communities. The board collected information by interviews, field trips, and documentation. The resulting comprehensive plan included 69 recommendations, each substantiated by background and rationale for the specific matters under review. A hierarchy of command and adminis' tration for naval training was proposed, and it was buttressed by compelling logic. Alternate courses of action were discussed, pros and cons weighed, and conclusions defined. The delineation of personnel- monetary resource requirements for the recommended reorganization, and the specific identification of their sources provided an incentive and facil*' tated the actual implementation.
Reduced to its major components, the board provided for a major staff directorate on the OpNav level, under a Director of Naval Education and Training (OP-099), a single Naval Training Command, under a Chief of Naval Training, and under him component commanders for technical training- aviation training, and training support. The Director of Naval Education and Training and the Chief of Naval Training were one and the same person, a vice admiral.
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Training divisions under the surface, subsurface, an<f air DCNOs were proposed by the board as vehicles to ensure that training policy and requirements ^°r these warfare areas were adequately supported. Education programs and activities were to be man- a8ed and controlled by the Director, Naval Educa- t*°n and Training. These included institutions and Pr°grams such as the Naval War College, Naval ^cademy, NROTC, and NJROTC. They were consider! to be of such special interest to the CNO, his Seniors, and the Congress that to precipitously move cheir control to the field would have been inadvis- akle, probably unpalatable.
Pensacola was selected as the site for the headquar- Ctts of the new Chief of Naval Training, capitalizing <)ri the dual advantages of the staff personnel and Physical facilities available from the Chief of Naval ^'r Training brought about by concurrent consolida- tlon of air training staffs. In the previously existing artangement, the Chief of Naval Air Training, a vice admiral, had as subordinates a Chief of Naval Air Basic Training, a Chief of Naval Air Advanced Training, and Chief of Naval Air Technical Training, each a rear admiral.
The new arrangement provided for the three-star Chief of Naval Training. Previously existing two-star billets were available for the new positions of Deputy Director Naval Education and Training, Chief of Naval Technical Training, and Chief of Naval Air Training. Staffing for the new organization came from the billets of the OpNav Training Division (OP-14), the BuPers Training Divisions in Pers-C, and the staffs of the Chief of Naval Air Training and subordinate command staffs.
On the various staffs, more than 1,000 billets were specifically addressed by the board. In essence, by considering management and information flow as controlling factors, keeping the various staff echelons in relative perspective, a logical staffing plan evolved. It provided, appropriately, for policy, re-
a
quirements, and programming control on the OpNav level; broad program coordination and major claimant functions at the CNET level; and direct management of training at the functional commander level. This permitted movement of the expertise in the continuing management of training to be capitalized upon in the new organization. For two decades, a procession of study reports had recommended realignment of training management. Now it was done.
While the reorganization was being carried out, initiatives were under way to effect economies promised by the Cagle study. The actions included consolidation of courses being taught at more than one training center, elimination of courses not supporting current missions and equipment, closing of several schools, consolidation of related training at single training centers, and specific reduction of administrative overheads. The changes required more than three years to accomplish. Some of the actions, such as the move of the Nuclear Power School from Bainbridge, Maryland, to Orlando, Florida, affected civilian work forces and local economies, and thus required staving off considerable political pressures. There were some intended actions that, for a variety of reasons, never got off the ground.
The formative years of the Naval Training Command were turbulent and demanding for the participants on all levels. Applications of the techniques and equipments developed by industry, the civilian education and training community, and the other services were examined by Navy training in the early Seventies more intently than since World War II. As a result, computer-assisted training is now being widely used by the Navy; self-paced training is being applied to minimize time spent in schools; and common-coring of basic rating training is used whenever applicable, such as in electronics- electricity, artificer skills, and clerical skills.3 On the more esoteric side, flight simulators of ever greater sophistication are being used by the naval aviation community, minimizing the more expensive actual cockpit training required to produce naval aviators. Other extremely complex and realistic simulators are also in use for the training of many naval combat systems. It has become standard practice that these simulators be developed concurrently with the hardware they support.
Overall, education and training are being viewed as parts of an integrated system. The quality of
3Common-coring in training is the teaching of basic knowledge and skills requisite to two or more disciplines in a single course. An example is basic electricity/electronics for electronics technicians and fire control technicians.
product—the competency of course graduates—|S under constant examination. Feedback is provided to the Research and Program Development Division of the CNET staff, and, in turn, the program and course developers are advised of areas in which their course5 need to be strengthened.
As the changed organization for education an1 training management settled in and the respoO' sibilities of various echelons became understood, the turbulence caused by the reorganization subsided and the positive effects of the new thrusts became apparent. Over the past several years, the seni°r staffs, OP-099 and CNET have been reduced jud*' ciously, as has management at the field activity level’ Management of the education effort was transferred from the OpNav level to CNET in 1972.
Since the organizational changes, not unexpec' tedly, there have been several manpower studies conducted. Serious consideration is again being given 10 returning the OpNav level training policy and requirements functions to the DCNO (Manpower). The successive Chiefs of Naval Personnel/DCNOs (Man' power) have been proponents of this retrogress^’ move. Training is more, much more, than an ancil' lary personnel function. Training is too vital a key l° fleet readiness to be relegated a position of secondary visibility. Rather, the DNET (OP-099) staff should strengthened, and the ties with the Training Div1' sions of the DCNOs, Air, Submarine, and Surface Warfare reinforced. The training community mus[ be involved in systems acquisitions more deeply and consistently than is now the case. Lastly, there mus1 be adequate professional education and training management to give the fleet the officers and mcfl adequately trained to perform competently, and *c must be done economically.
Captain Oiler received a direct commission from civil' ian life in 1942 and served in the Pacific area during World War II, participating in the Solomon*’ Marianas, and Philippine campaigns. After p°st' graduate training in aerological engineering, he served m b°th the Arctic and Antarctic, then as aerologic^ ■ # officer of the USS Saipan (CVL-48). During the Korea*
War, Captain Oiler was aide and flag secretary to Commander Amphih1' ous Group Three in the assault on Inchon and later assaults on the ea*c coast of Korea. After serving in the USS Zellars (DD-777), USS Miss**' sippi (EAG-128), and USS Hermitage (LSD-34), he commanded the Allen Al. Sumner (DD-692), the USS Mispillion (AO-105), Service Squ* j ron Seven, and Service Group One. Other billets have included service o* the staff of Commander Training Commander, U.S. Atlantic Fleet’ Head, Enlisted Plans Branch, Bureau of Naval Personnel, study at ^ Army War College, operations officer for Commander South Atlanta Force, JCS staff, and Service Group One staff. Captain Oiler was exectf' • five assistant to Director Naval Education and Training from 1972 unt'I he retired from active duty in 1973. He is now a senior management analyst for an Arlington, Virginia research firm.
[1] Pers-3 was one of the numbered major subdivisions of the Bureau of Naval Personnel, having responsibility for all training planning and development except aviation. Included were such diverse activities as training curricula development and training base/station planning. The requirements fulfilled by Pers-3 were derived from many different segments of the Navy.