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Slnce the turn of the century, how Jj is little known beyond a few epigrams, the most famous S the oft repeated, “War is the
°n War
Carl
p VOn Clausewitz (Michael Howard and ter ^aret, Editors and Translators; ^““nentary by Bernard Brodie). pjlncet0n. New Jersey: Princeton niversity PresSi 1977. 711 pp. $18.50.
j^ausewitz and the State
ter Paret. New York: Oxford University ess' !976. 444 pp. $18.95.
p ^'e'Ved by Captain Paul R. Schratz,
' Navy (Retired)
graduate of the hi aval Academy, as a]n ^c^ratz sewed in the submarine force or 6. as P'dicy positions within such
of th'Zat'°nS at J°‘nt Staff and the Office
kt ‘ ^ss'stant Secretary of Defense for rJrnal‘onal Security Affairs. Since his bitfl^>!ent 'n 1968, he has distinguished at ^ ' as ar> expert in foreign affairs University of Missouri, White Qr ,Se'6‘0ngressiona/ Commission on the Qo,'j‘Zat‘on °f the Government for the Itstii^- ^on'Pn h>°ltcy, and the Brookings
netal Carl von Clausewitz’s On perhaps the most significant at- St 'n Western history to under- WaC was first published in in translation appeared
l °'3, but the work was little 'n the United States before °dd War I, even by scholars such as Lla ^ Thayer Mahan or Stephen B. ae' Clausewitz was a genius both as th^r°^eSS*onal soldier and a military s. e°r'st- Of all the philosophers of war als „'eC American naval profession-
Pith bein
^inuation of politics by other
‘Satis ”
•p .
Vp.cal of his era, Clausewitz en- ip military service at the age of 12 j 92. His military career to his spa^ aS a 8enerai officer in 1831 t|j p16^ almost exactly the era of ty, tench Revolution and Napoleonic ars- Even as a contemporary he had the genius to recognize the period as a transition between two major historical epochs. The rise of Napoleon brought to an end a European system of small wars waged by petty princes which had existed since the Peace of Westphalia, signed in 1648. After 1789 the French success under Napoleon was not because of new technology but rather a revolution which gave them a new capacity to mobilize the resources of the state, and a brilliant commander who, fighting with a national rather than a mercenary army, “set in motion new means and new forces with a degree of energy in war that otherwise would have been inconceivable.” The words belong to Clausewitz; his own Prussian forces were put to flight and his country occupied by the Gallic enemy. One learns more from defeat than from victory, and defeat in the field brought wisdom to recognize the war of total resources of the state, of war “as a prism in which all life is refracted.” For his accomplishments during a career prematurely terminated by cholera at age 5 1, Clausewitz became the prophet of the new international system.
Michael Howard, of All Souls College, Oxford, is a brilliant writer on modern strategy. Coauthor Peter Paret, professor of history at Stanford University, is the most authoritative Clausewitzian scholar on the contemporary scene. Paret wrote Clausewitz and the State not to evaluate Clausewitz’ theories of war but instead to develop their psychological and historical origins, to study the man and the era in which he lived. A valuable political and intellectual history of the period, it is important largely to understand the man and his times.
For almost a century and a half, On War has been the most important study on the relation of war to state policy. The first three (of eight) “books” discuss the nature and theory of war and strategy in general. The origin of virtually all standard military guides to principles of war, for example, can be found in book three. Books four through seven discuss tactical offense and defense in more detail. Of secondary importance, these sections are less well written and much less readable. Clausewitz referred to them as a “shapeless mass;” he was overcritical. Book eight offers a recapitulation or synthesis, a discussion of absolute and real war, a closer definition of the aims in war and the effect of political aims on military objectives. Readers will share Bernard Brodie’s view that most of it is pure gold.
The Clausewitzian doctrines today have a collateral importance in modern Soviet strategy. The primacy of the political aim in war became deeply
imbedded in orthodox Marxism- Leninism. Clausewitz’ observations on the interplay of statecraft and war fascinated the Marxists. Lenin especially appreciated the statement, “a conqueror is always a lover of peace; he would like to make his entry into our country unopposed.” Russian Communists passed Clausewitz’s teachings to their former Chinese allies who blended them with sometimes similar
its
doctrines of Oriental sages such as Sun Tzu. Clausewitz wrote, after all, for statesmen as well as soldiers.
When Lenin analyzed On War, he stressed that "Politics is the reason, and war is only the tool, not the other way around. Consequently it remains only to subordinate the military point of view to the political. . . . War is part of the whole and the whole is politics.” The Soviet interpretation of war and policy, consequently, bars control of strategy by the military when paramilitary operations are involved; these, equating with the class struggle, are reserved to the state or party rather than the military. Further, they maintain, if the purpose of war is political, the corollary purposes of politics may be sought by violent means.
A major source of difficulty for the modern reader of Clausewitz is the concept of total or absolute war, of a “war which must be carried to the absolute limit.” Can these words be a justification for nuclear war? Hardly. Clausewitz saw absolute war as a theoretical extreme, a point of reference against which real wars could be measured. Real wars fell short of the theoretical because of “fog” or “friction” of war, or what we would call the foulup factor: accidents of weather; poor intelligence; failures of discipline, morale, and leadership; forces exercised to less than their utmost capability. “Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult. . . . Friction ... is the force that makes the apparently easy so difficult.” Second, "absolute,” in his view, referred to people and not weapons; war in its absolute form drew upon the total population resources of the state. Third, and most important, even had the means for total war been available, such a form of war serves no political goal. A total war using nuclear weapons is apolitical, and it would have been inconceivable within the Clausewitz major premise on the essentiality of a political purpose. “War can never be divorced from political life; and whenever this occurs ... we are left with something pointless and devoid of sense.”
Among students of maritime war, particularly in the United States,
Clausewitz is probably the least appreciated of major military theoreticians. It is true that he writes of land warfare—and literally includes not one word about naval warfare—but the value is the relation of power and national policy, the political philosophy of war regardless of what particular form or means the power may take. Clausewitz was not read in the past because the writing style, though dotted with pithy epigrams, combines sometimes heavy Germanic prose and the Hegelian philosophical style: each idea (thesis) evokes its opposite (antithesis), producing a unified whole (synthesis) which in turn becomes a new thesis. Not surprisingly most Clausewitzian editions contain long, explanatory prefaces. Michael Howard, Peter Paret, and Bernard Brodie each contribute introductory essays; Brodie adds an extensive guide to reading On War, all of which total 140 pages of explanatory material for 563 pages of On War itself. But the Howard-Paret translation is superb.
Compare the clarity of prose in a paragraph chosen at random with the same thought in a popular paperback translation. The Anatol Rapoport edition, published by Pelican Books in 1968, states:
The Plan of the War comprehends the whole Military Act; through it that Act becomes a whole, which must have one final determinate object, in which all particular objects must become absorbed. No War is commenced, or, at least, no War should be commenced, if people acted wisely, without first seeking a reply to the question, What is to be attained by and in the same? The first is the final object; the other is the intermediate aim. By this chief consideration the whole course of the War is prescribed, the extent of the means and the measure of energy are determined; its influence manifests itself down to the smallest organ of action.
In the Howard-Paret edition:
War plans cover every aspect of a war, and weave them all into a single operation that must have a single, ultimate objective in which all particular aims are reconciled. No one starts a war—or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so'' without first being clear in h|S mind what he intends to achieve t>) that war and how he intends t0 conduct it. The former is its pofo1 cal purpose; the latter its oper;1 tional objective. This is the govef® ing principle which will set course, prescribe the scale of me^ and effort which is required, 3° make its influence felt through°uj down to the smallest operatic11'1 detail.
The Howard-Paret-Brodie text *s a magnificent work, authoritative 111 every respect, the definitive work °° the subject, and a very import3111 source of contemporary strateg) Clausewitz has always been import30' in Soviet doctrine. He has been red|S covered by Westerners in recent ye3tl Only the naval strategist continues11, aloofness to a proper appreciation 0 the political role of armamentS whether from the sea, the land, or the
Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe
Richard F. Staar. 3rd edition; Stanford California: Hoover Institution Press, 1977. 302 pp. Tables. Charts. $13-95 ($4.95 for paper).
Reviewed by Oscar M. Villarejo
(Dr. Villarejo is Professor of English at t^ U. S. Marine Corps Command and Staffs0 lege and also teaches courses in the humanity at George Washington University.)
The principal focus of attention 0 this new edition of Communist Regi1"1 in Eastern Europe is in the nature or ‘ \ warning to those who have hitheftl | been oblivious to the shape of thing to come in that part of the world.
The message which Professor St3,1 conveys is that the grip of the SoV*^ Union upon Communist bloc states growing stronger and stronger svn1 the total force of Soviet military p0"^ facing NATO troops in Europe is ei I calating to an unprecedented degfe£ The latest cold statistics which Pr | Staar has assembled in support of thesis are impressive as well as v°j j uminous. According to the data fom1 in one table, the Soviet Union no''
•nternational
UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL
e °f considerable internal opposi- g to Soviet domination in Eastern tr^°Pe, the so-called Brezhnev Doc- Con6 COnt‘nues m force without major cessions on the part of the Soviet th forces, although it is true
Qat tti one year alone 100,000 East biT)11*105 aPpl*ed for previously for- si |,en ex‘c Permits based on the Hel- n ' Agreement of 1 August 1975. In
as 31 combat-ready divisions in for- P* d Positions throughout Eastern ”^ere are a'so ^0 additional up divisions within the European s°rti°n of the U.S.S.R. which can e as reinforcements in the event of fro S-Ve military action along that
in fact, these Soviet divisions $n ronting the NATO forces are de- : e<a routinely in Soviet military
rnals as being among the best- ^nipped troops of the U.S.S.R. Al- st aH, if not all of these forces, so I . author says, are classified in the ,oXlCOn °f Soviet military power as begging t0 Category One. But, accords' to Professor Staar, the regimes of tjQ6 Warsaw Pact can furnish 51 addi- sj°nal divisions to the 3 1 Soviet divi- ^ s> thus creating a grand total of 82 batarSaW ^act divisions poised in com- streadiness as opposed to the under- NATO forces. Of these 82 st uat-ready divisions, Dr. Staar es that 37 are armored units. st^nterPreted in a different way, these l42*StlCS *USt cluotec^ sf'ow there are til'll.^arsaw Pact divisions with 1.3 ‘ l0n men facing 775,000 NATO etro°ps protecting all of West- ^ Europe.
As for the economic and political *ems which Professor Staar dis- cj es> quite a number of these con- fig Sl°ns should provoke thoughtful resPit *°n ^°f examP*e’ notes that in don other words, the Soviet Union threatens to move its tank divisions into the streets of Warsaw or East Berlin or Prague at any moment to suppress incipient revolt against Communist rule should the occasion arise; and in this connection, Dr. Staar notes that the occupying Soviet forces have dispersed twice as many armored divisions throughout Eastern Europe as they have allowed the client states to assemble within their indigenous armed forces. It goes without saying that the troops of the U.S.S.R. assigned to these tank cadres are equipped with the very latest weapon systems.
In other portions of his heavily documented study, Staar makes the point that the Communist secret police have added considerable sophistication to their previous methods of keeping detailed file cards on persons suspected of anti-regime feelings. He also emphasizes the fact that routine censorship of all printed and hand-written material in circulation, including newspapers, books, scientific articles, and even the lecture notes of university professors, continues to be an essential instrument of political intimidation.
On the other hand, Dr. Staar observes that “general stagnation” are probably the correct words to describe the state of agriculture in the countries of the Eastern European bloc, inasmuch as “the overall production deficit of agriculture [has] remained at about 6 to 7 percent” in that region for many years. In Czechoslovakia, indeed, the agricultural production deficit was 16% for 1976. In Poland, the stumbling agricultural economy proved to be such a serious problem to the government that widely publicized food riots broke out spontaneously throughout various cities in June
Will citizens of East European Communist nations rise up in violence as these did in 1953 in East Berlin, left, or will the presence of Soviet military might prevail as it did in the same city's May Day I960 celebrations?
1976. As Professor Staar points out, in contrast to the abundant harvests of the pre-war era in Eastern Europe, the entire geographic area of the Communist states can no longer deliver sufficient food to the people under the present system of collectivized or state-owned agriculture.
In the concluding chapter of his work, Dr. Staar shows marked pessimism as he contemplates the poor prospects for drastic reform within the political system which was imposed by force upon the diverse peoples living under the Communist regimes of Eastern Europe. He notes that a drive to stifle dissent on the question of human rights is part of current Soviet policy within the client states; and he seems to tell us, finally, that in spite of the inability of the Communist parties of those countries to overcome persistent food shortages or to quell chronic discontent on a large scale or to win over the youth to an enthusiastic espousal of Marxist-Leninist ideology, the present state of social stagnation in that part of the world can go on indefinitely. Yet one must acknowledge that Professor Staar’s views on this subject are not entirely negative, for in the final sentence of his book he says: "Perhaps the only hope for Eastern Europe must be sought in the long-range process governing the development of human society which, in fact, represents communism’s invincible enemy.”
ENOLA GAY
A Naval Institute Book Selection
It was quite probably the most important event of World War II. Its consequences were greater than those of any other event of the war. Yet the story of the bombing of Hiroshima, the momentous flight into the future of the B-29 Enola Gay, has never before been revealed from Firsthand sources. Here, then, is a reading experience you will not ever forget, from a book that has already received worldwide recognition.
Award-winning writers Gordon Thomas and Max Morgan Witts once again separate myth from reality as they retrace the steps that led the world into the atomic age. The pilot, Paul Tibbets, talked to the authors of this book for Fifty hours. The authors then talked to each surviving crew member, to the scientists and soldiers whose war effort pointed in
one direction, toward August 6, 1945, when the First aerial drop an atom bomb wiped out most ot a city but, ironically, did not stop the war.
In addition to their extensive interviews with participants, both American and Japanese, the authors have had access to private diaries and memoirs and to government documents until recently classiFied “top secret.” From these, they have reconstructed the unmatched drama of men racing t° perfect—and others learning t® safely drop—the untested and most feared bomb in the world, while in Japan, the Imperial Arrny planned a defense, centered 'n Hiroshima, that would take an estimated one million Allied lives.
1977. 327 pages. Illustrated. Maps. List price: $11.95 Member’s price: $9.55
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the Aonkan Prisoner ofW* Eupmcmc mi vk-rium, f%.i wm
bi|jDhnDHubbell
1976. 633 pages. Illustrated.
List price: $15.00 Member’s price: $12.00
P.O.W.
by John G. Hubbell
This powerful story of courage, hi face of terrifying multiple tortures " liness is the most complete acco American prisoners opwwiaVietn In vivid and agonizingly mamorabl ses the capture the~POWs\ their
inoi, past tipi\amingk threat!
" icontjVued e
inishment, t\ cShnmurilcse wit\ each
tai\ theirVo^or a\i huma thstarr
foil get Vietn POWs culmin being Ai
in the le lone- of the
intain
dignity;"
' ‘ rture.
^ adversity,a ^ each one’s dedi'
„__________________ ers and viewers who
d television accounts did not
______ servicemen and civilians in
ps. They owe it to themselves and the k. They will experience many emotions, of triumph against all odds and a pride in
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NaVal AFFAIRS
The
Ro’
e Army-Navy Game
„ —ton. Falmouth, Mass.: Volta
■npany, i977 263 pp ,13 00 ($11.70).
s*an account of the annual football clas- ^‘s *s the history of the little-known J 7e Paddy Navy” of Commander Milton JtedMary Miles, U.S. Navy, which oper- j ’ 2>500 men strong, ashore in China ha j.°r^ ^ar P- There is an old China v s introduction by Rear Admiral ernP Tolley, U.S. Navy (Retired).
'■pi
"e Coast Guardsman’s Manual
aP°lis, Md.: U.S. Naval Institute, 1976. pp- Plus. $8.50 ($6.80) paper.
Slxth edition of this standard refer- tevised through 30 June 1975, pro-
Ani
ence
vi<des , .
^ . d Practical guide to the work and r ir>gs of the U.S. Coast Guard.
L°i s0lo,
hely Vigil- Coastwatchers of the
mons
ter Lord. New York: The Viking Press,
Th,
322 pp. Maps. Illus. $12.50 ($11.25).
fan, aut^or °f the best-selling Day of In- <*e‘T£/t^e attac^ on Pearl Harbor) and In
tutns
Allied
e Victory (the Battle of Midway) re- t0 the Pacific to tell the story of the coastwatchers who operated behind
Japanese lines in the Solomon Islands in 1942-1943- The importance of their services becomes apparent in Admiral Halsey’s declaration that "The Coastwatchers saved Guadalcanal, and Guadalcanal saved the Pacific.” This book will be the subject of a full-length Proceedings review.
Fired By Manley Zeal: A Naval Fiasco of the American Revolution
Philip Chadwick Foster Smith. Salem, Mass.: Peabody Museum of Salem, 1977. 115 pp.
Map. Ulus. $10.00 ($9.00).
The discovery of four long-forgotten, contemporary paintings of the action sparked this investigation of the rout of the Continental frigates Hancock and Boston and the recapture of their prize frigate Fox by an inferior British force. The illustrations include fine, color reproductions of the four paintings.
The Republic’s Private Navy: The American Privateering Business as practiced by Baltimore during the War of 1812
Jerome R. Garitee. Middletown, Ct.: Published for Mystic Seaport, Inc., by Wesleyan University Press, 1977. 356 pp. Illus. Append. Bib. $17.50 ($15.75); $35.00 ($31.50) for limited edition.
The maritime exploits of American privateers in our two wars with Britain have attracted considerable historical attention, but relatively little has been written about the business end of what was, after all, a business. Professor Garitee’s scholarly study treats the investors and shipbuilders as well as the seamen involved in Baltimore privateering in the War of 1812. This is the eighth volume in the series.
Soviet Warships of the Second World War
Jiirg Meister. New York: Arco, 1977. 348 pp. Illus. $19.95 ($17.95).
The product of over 20 years’ research, this well-illustrated work is probably destined to become the definitive reference to the ships of the Soviet Navy in World War II. Vessels are grouped according to class, in a format similar to Jane's Fighting Ships, and there are detailed historical notes on their operations. This book will be the subject of a full-length Proceedings review.
World War II at Sea: A Bibliography of
Sources in English
Volume I: The European Theater
Myron J. Smith, Jr. Metuchen, N.J.: The
Scarecrow Press, 1976. 3.37 pp. $12.50
($11.25).
Volume II: The Pacific Theater
Publication details as above. 427 pp. $15.00 ($13.50).
Volume III, Part 1: General Works, Naval Hardware and the All Hands Chronology
Volume III, Part 2: Home Fronts and Special Studies
Publication details as above. 586 pp. $20.00 ($18.00); as a set, $35.00 ($31.50).
Over 10,000 non-fiction books and articles are listed (and often annotated) in an invaluable research aid.
MARITIME AFFAIRS
Economic Impacts of Extended Fisheries Jurisdiction
Lee G. Anderson (Editor). Ann Arbor, Mich.: Ann Arbor Science, 1977. 428 pp. $24.50 ($22.05).
In April 1976 the University of Delaware Sea Grant College Program and the National Marine Fisheries Service sponsored a symposium to examine the issues and problems involved in extending United States’ fishery management authority from 12 to 200 miles, in accordance with the Fishery Conservation and Management Act
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glue-and-bailing wire.
of 1976. This volume records the proceedings of the conference. The editor is associate professor of economics and marine studies at the University of Delaware.
H The Polar Voyagers: Explorers of the North
Frank Rasky. Toronto, Canada: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, Ltd., 1976. 320 pp. Map. Illus. Bib. $17.95 ($14.35).
An engrossing multiple biography of the major explorers traces the exploration of the Arctic, from the Vikings to the late 18th century fur-traders. The selection of illustrations is especially good.
The Racing Schooner Westward
C.P. Hamilton-Adams. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company, 1977. 108 pp. Illus. Append. $12.95 ($11.75).
The principal competitor of King George V’s Britannia during the interwar years, the Westward was one of the most striking and successful Big Class racing yachts ever built. Her career, spanning the period from 1910 to 1947, and that of her colorful owners are reviewed in this handsome pictorial.
The Sailing Pilots of the Bristol Channel
Peter J. Stuckey. North Pomfret, Vt.: David & Charles, 1977. 158 pp. Map. Illus. Append. $9.95 ($8.96).
The sailing pilot cutters of the Bristol Channel were among the most seaworthy
fore-and-aft sailing craft ever built. This book describes those sturdy boats and the stalwart men who manned them.
Seamanship: A Handbook for Oceanographers
Captain Carvel H. Blair, U.S. Navy (Retired). Cambridge, Md.: Cornell Maritime Press,
1977. 227 pp. Map. Illus. Append. Bib. $9.00
($8.10).
This manual of seamanship is designed to aid the beginning oceanographer in acquiring the maritime skills necessary to his profession.
Soviet Ocean Development
Prepared at the request of the Hon. Warren G. Magnuson, Chairman, Committee on Commerce, and Hon. Ernest F. Hollings, Chairman, National Ocean Policy Study for the Use of the Committee on Commerce and National Ocean Policy Study. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976. 646 pp. $5.25 (paper).
Prepared by the Congressional Research Service with the aid of 13 outside consultants, this publication represents the first attempt to analyze all aspects of Soviet ocean policy. Topics treated include the evolution of Soviet seapower; the development of the merchant marine; fisheries policy; scientific and technical developments in the oceans; and mineral exploitation. The concluding section compares Soviet and American ocean capabilities and addresses the issue of reorganization of U.S. ocean activities within the federal government.
MILITARY AFFAIRS “That’s My Bloody Plane!”
Major Cecil Montgomery-Moore, DFC, as tol<l to Peter Kilduff. Chester, Ct: Pequot Press, 1975. 157 pp. Maps. Illus. Append. $9.95 ($8.96).
The author of this engaging World War memoir, born in the United States an raised in Bermuda, volunteered for ^ Royal Flying Corps at the age of 17 an was flying patrols over the Western Fron[ a year later. His account of dogfights wi^1 Fokker tripes and Halberstadts are vinta)!£
The War Illustrators
Pat Hodgson. New York: Macmillan, 1977191 pp. Illus. $12.95 ($11.66).
Prior to the development of modern tography, the people at home receiv£ their views of war from the pens and pen cils of The War Illustrators 19th cental) newspapers and magazines sent to cov£f the world's conflicts. This annotated P‘ct0 rial presents selections from the work of ° of the best of them.
GENERAL
151 Service Etiquette
Oretha D. Swartz. Annapolis, Md.: Naval
Institute Press, 1977. 582 pp. Illus. $14.95 (
($11.95).
The armed services’ answer to Emily F°sl appears in a revised and considerably e" larged third edition.
Y-77
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