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How the Battleship Maine Was Destroyed
Admiral Hyman G. Rickover, U. S. Navy (Retired). Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office (Naval History Division), 1976. 190 pp. Illus. Append. Bib. $5.70.
Reviewed by Patrick Abbazia
(Professor Abbazia holds a master's degree from the University of California (Berkeley) and a Ph.D. from Columbia University. He is currently an Associate Professor of History at Kingsborough Community College of the City University of New York, where he has taught courses in military and naval history and the history of World War II. He is the author of the Naval Institute Press book, Mr. Roosevelt’s Navy: The Private War of the u. S. Atlantic Fleet, 1939-1942.)
The U. S. battleship Maine exploded *n Havana harbor at 2140 on the night of Tuesday, 15 February 1898, killing 266 Americans, and thus helping to precipitate the Spanish-American War and America’s emergence as a world power. Admiral Rickover, to paraphrase John Hay, has written a splendid little book—succinct, crisp, efficient—on the tragic loss of the Maine and the causes and consequences of that pivotal and mysterious event. Admiral Rickover concludes, convincingly, that the Maine was destroyed through accident: a magazine explosion caused by a fire started by spontaneous combustion of the coal >n an adjacent bunker.
Rickover, like most modern historians, depicts President William McKinley as a skilled political leader, trying to manage a complicated foreign policy crisis with firmness and consistency, not as a vacillating President drifting to war on a reckless tide of popular whim. McKinley realized that to allow Spain’s destructive war in Cuba to continue would be: (1) bad strategy, for it might lead to a wider war under more unfavorable conditions for the United States (such as that of Spain and Japan in alliance, presenting America with a most formidable two-ocean war); (2) bad politics, for it would give the opposing political party a significant and popular campaign issue; and (3) bad morality, an imposing factor to a crusading Victorian society.
President McKinley thus sought to pressure Spain to end the war soon; and as part of the policy of pressure, he used his Navy. In October, 1897, the Maine was sent south to Port Royal, South Carolina, and in December, moved to Key West, Florida. On 11 January 1898, the commander-in-chief of the European Station was ordered to retain men whose enlistments were about to expire. On 23 January 1898, the Navy’s most powerful force, the North Atlantic Squadron, arrived off Key West, preparatory to taking station at the ampler anchorage of the Dry Tortugas. On 24 January, the Maine was ordered to Havana to protect American lives. And on 11 February, the torpedo boat Cushing was sent on a brief trip to Havana, the first of many scheduled visits of American support ships to that port. President McKinley thus appears a very modern President, risking war to deter worse consequences, using his Navy, much as did Franklin Roosevelt in the Battle of the Atlantic in 1941 or Lyndon B. Johnson in the Vietnam War, to help put pressure on a stubborn foreign antagonist in a critical situation.
Rickover—using the evidence of the naval court of inquiry, which he explains was incomplete because of the poor diving conditions in Havana harbor, lack of technical expertise, and political and policy pressures for an immediate judgment, a second investigation by a naval board in 1911, and the skills of modern naval construction and underwater demolition experts—deftly reconstructs the loss of the Maine. His conclusion is that the wreckage of the Maine showed no specific evidence of the types of damage typical of an external explosion. He agrees with most historians that Spain had no motive to attack the Maine, and argues that neither Spanish nor Cuban terrorists had the opportunity or technical skills required to detonate an explosive charge of the magnitude necessary to set off the warship’s magazine(s). And, he summons circumstantial evidence—the lack of any report of a column of water such as might signify an underwater explosion at the time of the loss of the ship, the absence of dead fish in the area of the wreckage, and the failure of any individual or group ever afterward to claim credit or attribute blame for the destruction of the ship—to support his technical and deductive judgments. His conclusion is that the Maine was destroyed by "an accident which occurred inside the ship.”
Rickover’s conclusion is not new; historians have been teaching it for years. But in explaining the "probable cause” of the loss of the Maine, and, more for placing the destruction of the Maine in the context of larger events and historical forces, Admiral Rickover’s book earns a "Well Done! ”
The Strategic Balance in the Mediterranean
Jesse W. Lewis, Jr. (Foreword by Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., U. S. Navy [Retired]). Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1976. 169 pp. Maps. Append. Bib. $3.75 (paper).
Reviewed by Lieutenant Commander Miles A. Libbey, III, U. S. Navy
(A graduate of the U. S. Naval Academy, Class of 1967, Commander Libbey was a member of the Naval Institute Board of ' Control while serving as CNO Fellow, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, until becoming Executive Officer of the USS Spruance [DD-963].)
Few writers are willing to grapple with the mass of data associated with analyzing the significance of the Mediterranean Sea and its littoral countries. Jessie Lewis is an exception. He has examined this complex area and developed a study that is highly useful to the serious political-military student as well as the average Navy professional.
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NOTE TO READER: Locations of facilities are approximate. Only major facilities are shown. For example, there are more than 20 U.S.—Turkish Common Defense Installations in Turkey.
Dr. Lewis, former Washington Post correspondent and now political/ military affairs officer at the American Embassy in Saudi Arabia, describes the full range of the area’s economic conditions, political ideologies, religious and philosophic persuasions and concludes that we in the United States do not have a "Mediterranean consciousness.” He balks at the traditional geographic breakdowns, maintained by the Departments of State and Defense, the National Security Council, and others, which separate Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. In contrast to a piecemeal approach, Lewis looks at the similarities imposed by the common body of water that links the individual elements and their problems, and sees the Mediterranean as a single strategic area.
The traditional U. S. view that the Mediterranean is but a tenuous appendage of Europe hardly seems to be fitting for the area in which U. S. and Soviet naval forces confront one another every day of the year. Additionally, the relative East-West stalemate that generally has now been acknowledged in Europe has caused the Soviets to shift a major portion of their attention to the Mediterranean littoral, with the attendant peacetime penetration and subversion. Sampling the world’s three simmering cauldrons for potential hostilities which would pit U. S. forces against Soviet military forces in battle—the Middle East, Korea, and Southern Africa—suggests that the Middle East and the rest of the Mediterranean should be accorded a greater share of our attention.
While the thrust of the study concentrates on the presence and influence of the superpowers, the reader is treated to an outstanding geopolitical review of the seven countries that support U. S. presence in and around the Mediterranean. The author then traces the origins and organization of the Sixth Fleet, using several well-researched tables to illustrate his presentation. With the factual backdrop set, he moves into a discussion of the political uses of the U. S. Fleet, with particular attention paid to the insertion of Marines in Lebanon in 1958, the 1970 Jordan crisis, and the Suez Port and Canal mineclearing operations in 1974.
After establishing U. S. Mediterranean interests, objectives, and capabilities, Lewis examines "The Soviet Pres-
ence.” Nowhere is the dramaticgrowt h of Soviet maritime expansion more acutely felt than in NATO’s Southern Region. The high visibility of the Communist commitment provides the U.S.S.R. with great diplomatic and political flexibility in the area. Lewis details the background and composition of the Soviet Fifth Escadra in the Mediterranean, concentrating on the contrasts to the U. S. forces. His careful choice of documentation adds significantly to this superb study. For example, he supports his discussion of the important Montreux Convention by including the entire agreement in an appendix.
Turning to the political implications of the Soviet Fleet, Lewis concentrates on the 1969 Libyan coup and the 1973 Middle East crisis. He characterizes the
October 1973 posturing of U. S. and Soviet naval forces as being "poised to begin shooting at a moment’s notice.” The Soviet forces were arrayed in "... a preemptive position . . . prepared to open fire on the carriers . . The Sixth Fleet countered by keeping armed aircraft on station, supported by electronic warfare and long-range early-warning planes, and surface missile platforms and attack submarines at the ready. In his attempt to determine the probable outcome had a shooting war developed, Lewis recognizes the inherent limitations of using only unclassified sources, yet he still touches on the important points.
Lewis knows that a naval battle would not remain confined to just naval forces or to a limited region, yet he limits his analysis to the two superpower navies’ immediate situation. Discounting neither the U. S. Navy’s experience in the Vietnam War, nor the Soviet Navy’s capability to amass many missiles against U. S. forces, he concludes that: "If the Soviet warships had not succeeded in the first 15 minutes, they probably would not have succeeded at all.” The overt use of military power is not the only way in which the U.S.S.R. is expanding her influence in the area, however. Lewis’ description of the U.S.S.R.’s use of the finer arts in political meddling supports his plea for Western decision-makers and leaders to develop a unified look at the entire Mediterranean area.
Leaving the Middle East, Lewis discusses other potential problem areas in
the Mediterranean, including Spanish Sahara, the future of Malta, the Zone B dispute between Italy and Yugoslavia, and many more. Not all possible combinations or permutations are dealt with, but certainly the main issues and positions that surround the extraordinarily complex strategies of the area are developed.
Lewis’ predictions for this volatile area may not all come true—indeed in some cases events have already overtaken his postulations—yet his analysis remains sound. Lewis provides the background for understanding recent changes in the Mediterranean and for keeping future developments there in perspective.
Bodyguard of Lies
Anthony Cave Brown, New York: Harper and Row, 1975. 947 pp. Illus. Maps.
$15.95.
Reviewed by Lieutenant Commander John A. Gregoire, U. S. Navy
(Lieutenant Commander Gregoire is a restricted line officer, special duty intelligence. He has served on board Air Antisubmarine Squadron 33, USS John F. Kennedy (CVA-67), Fleet Intelligence Center Atlantic, Attack Carrier Air Wing Three, and the Defense Intelligence School. Presently, he is assigned to the Naval War College.)
Anthony Cave Brown tells the story of how the British secret services, with some help from the Americans and Russians, were able to deceive Hitler about the time and place of D-day. Information previously published in The Ultra Secret, The Man Who Never Was, Monty’s Double, The Double Cross System, and Cicero, along with unpublished accounts of fabrication, form the basis for this book. All were part of a master plan of deception which contributed decisively to the Allied success.
"Cover and deception” or "strate- gem,” a concept and practice normally relegated to a dim room, is exposed, developed, and to some extent evaluated in Bodyguard as a miraculous tool in the quest for gaining the advantage in the art of war. In the context of this book, lying, forging, sacrificing friendly human lives, deceiving, and other normally unacceptable behavior patterns become quite appropriate when applied to a recognized enemy. The revelations of World War deception operations, when coupled with the recently declassified Ultra information, prove that the reputations of many famous World War II leaders as supreme tacticians were due in large part to good tactical implementation based on sound intelligence and successful strategem.
Throughout his ten years of research, Cave Brown did not have access to classified records of deception operations. A year prior to publication, F. W. Winter- botham released his manuscript of The Ultra Secret, forcing Cave Brown into numerous and obvious revisions based upon the "new” Ultra information- intelligence derived from breaking Germany’s highest grade cryptosystem. Cave Brown’s deification of Sir Stewart Graham Menzies and MI-6 (British secret intelligence service) is a major distortion of fact which can only be explained by the fact that Cave Brown interviewed Menzies shortly before his image and career were shattered by the Philby defection. (Philby, a Soviet agent whose career progression in British Intelligence was rapid and attained the highest levels, was a protege of Menzies.)
According to the text, MI-6 had obtained a German Enigma (enciphering) machine and built a device which made it possible to decipher the most sensitive German communications. The intelligence gleaned was then used to support "double-cross” and other deception operations. In fact, the Enigma machine’s acquisition was the result of a brilliant operation, run by the French intelligence officer Gustave Betrand. And, the members of the British Code and Cipher School created the machine which deciphered the Enigma product and produced Ultra. The Inter-Service Committees used Ultra to carry out deception operations; MI-6 involvement can be attributed to security responsibilities and perhaps bureaucratic "cover” operations. Unfortunately, Cave Brown seizes upon MI-6 control as fact and reports it as history. This error, along with the "elevation” of Menzies, is woven throughout the book along with what seems to be confusion of the functions of Sir John C. Masterman’s XX Committee (MI-5 organization which controlled and manipulated double agents) and the
military service deception planners.
Perhaps the most significant error in this work centers around the coverage afforded the Schwarze Kapelle (—Black Orchestra—a loose confederation of German officers and civilians who allegedly began conspiring to overthrow Hitler in 1938 and attempted to assassinate him with a bomb in July 1944). Cave Brown maintains, none too persuasively, that the Schwarze Kapelle provided MI-6 with a valuable intelligence coup and supplement to Ultra. Though an Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, Chief of the Abwehr, Menzies of Mi-6, and Allen Dulles of the Office of Strategic Services connection is mentioned throughout the book, its contribution to the intelligence effort is neither demonstrated nor substantiated. The allegation that Canaris was a recruited MI-6 source is most probably false and may in part be attributed to the delusions of grandeur suffered by Menzies after the Philby defection. The many accounts of the Schwarze Kapelle all have a common link: contact through the Pope in Rome. Until the Papal archives are thoroughly researched by a credible professional, many accounts of peripheral World War II activity will remain as conjecture.
The unsupported allegations of the Schwarze Kapelle’s existence, activities, and MI-6 ties, the illusion that Admiral Canaris was not only in contact with, but was indeed a recruitee of Menzies, and the general overemphasis of undocumented deceptions are the major weaknesses of the book. Cave Brown does not give American operations much recognition, but certainly the British were the then current masters of both deception and foreign intelligence while Americans were their understudies.
Until all World War II deception files are released to the public domain by the British, the Vatican, and the Americans, Cave Brown’s contribution likely will stand as the most complete work on major Allied deception operations of World War II. There is a great deal in the Bodyguard's 947 pages to interest the casual reader. Cave Brown tells many good stories which are well documented and very readable. The errors, elaborate narratives of hearsay, and distortions of known fact, however, make this effort more of a documentary novel than a worthy revisionist history.
Books of Interest to the Professional
89
Compiled by Professor Jack Sweetman, Associate Editor
NAVAL AFFAIRS
Abandon Ship! Death of the USS Indianapolis
Richard F. Newcomb. Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1976. 305 pp. Map. Ulus. $10.95.
The loss of the cruiser Indianapolis has become one of the legends of World War II. Torpedoed and sunk by a Japanese submarine in the western Pacific on 30 July 1945, her disappearance went unnoticed until a patrol plane happened to spot her survivors 96 hours later. This well-written narrative, first published in 1958, describes her last voyage and the investigations which followed.
The Control of Naval Armaments: Prospects and Possibilities
Barry M. Blechman. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1976. 100 pp. Append. $2.50 (paper).
The author of the ninth of the Brookings Studies in Defense Policy argues for the inclusion of naval forces in the strategic arms limitations negotiations under way between the United States and the U.S.S.R. As starting points he proposes agreements limiting: (a) the number and tonnage of specified classes of warships, and (b) the size and duration of superpower deployments in the Indian Ocean.
BOOK ORDER SERVICE
Members may order books of other publishers through the Naval Institute at a 10% discount off list price. (Prices quoted in this column are subject to change and will be reflected in our billing.) The postage and handling fee for each such special order book of a United States publisher will be 75C; the fee for a book from a foreign publisher will be $1.00. When air mail or other special handling is requested, actual postage and handling cost will be billed to the member. Books marked are Naval Institute Press Books. Books marked S3 are Naval Institute Book Selections. All prices enclosed by parentheses are member prices. Please use the order blank in this section.
[Jj The Dauntless Dive Bomber of World War Two
Barrett Tillman. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1976. 232 pp. Maps. Ulus. Append. Bib. $14.50 ($11.60).
Although already considered obsolete and scheduled for replacement before the attack on Pearl Harbor, the slow but deadly Douglas Dauntless dive bomber (SBD) became
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the workhorse of U. S. carrier avation in World War II. The only plane to fly in all five air-only engagements with the Japanese fleet and the only prewar U. S. carrier aircraft still in service in 1945, it sank more enemy carriers than any other type. The author of this fast-moving account is the son of an SBD pilot.
Maverick Navy
Captain Alexander W. Moffat, U. S. Naval Reserve (Retired), Middletown, Ct.: Wesleyan University Press, 1976. 157 pp. Illus. Append. $8.95.
The story of a seaman’s World War I experiences "Aboard Subchaser 206” appeared in the September Proceedings. The author of this engaging memoir was the commander of one of her sister ships, SC-143. His account of the antisubmarine war, as seen through the eyes of a newly-minted ensign, U. S. Naval Reserve Forces, illuminates a little- known episode of American naval history.
Of Nautilus and Eagles: History of the Royal Australian Navy
Peter Firkins. Stanmore, New South Wales: Cassell Australia, 1975. 269 pp. Maps. Illus. Append. Bib. $14.95.
The ships, aircraft, and, above all, the men of the Royal Australian Navy served with distinction in both world wars, Korea, and Vietnam. This is the first book to trace its history from its foundation (1911) to the present. Among Mr. Firkin’s previous books is a military history of The Australians in Nine Wars.
ES The Naval Aviation Guide
Vice Admiral Malcolm W. Cagle, U. S. Navy (Retired). Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1976. 476 pp. Illus. Append. $16.95 ($13.50). ,
Compiled with the assistance of dozens of interested naval officers, the third edition of this standard reference provides a compendium of information, doctrine, techniques, and procedures pertinent to naval aviation. Thoroughly updated to reflect the changes which have taken place since the appearance of the second edition in 1969, it contains much new material, including a chapter on Marine Corps aviation. Vice Admiral Cagle is former chief of Naval Aviation and Training.
Reform in the Royal Navy: A Social History of the Lower Deck, 1850 to 1880
Eugene L. Rasor. Hamden, Ct.: Archon Books, 1976. 210 pp. Append. Bib. $12.50.
By 1850 the discontent and demoralization of the bluejackets below decks, evidenced by an unacceptable incidence of drunkeness, desertion, and veneral disease, had reached a point the Royal Navy could no longer ignore. The reforms successfully instituted during the course of the following three decades are the subject of this scholarly study. Dr. Rasor is an associate professor of history at Emory & Henry College.
Die Schiffe der deutschen Kriegsmarine und Luftwaffe 1939-45 und ihr Verbleib (The Ships of the German Navy and Air Force 1939-45 and their Dispositions)
Erich Groner. Munich: J. F. Lehmanns Veriag, 1976. 126 pp. Illus. (Approx. $13.00).
The revised, eighth edition of this standard reference gives the specifications and disposition of every vessel which belonged to the German navy and air force during World War II.
ES Shipboard Damage Control
Commander Allen M. Bissell, U. S. Navy, Lieutenant Commander E. James Oertel, U. S. Navy, and Lieutenant Commander Donald J. Livingston, U. S. Navy. Annapolis, Md: Naval Institute Press, 1976. 169 pp. Illus. Append. $15.95 ($12.75).
The seventh volume of the Naval Institute’s Fundamentals of Naval Science series, this guide is designed to impart a basic understanding of all aspects of shipboard damage control for division officers in the fleet, officer candidates, and midshipmen. Among the topics treated are principles of stability, organization, concepts and procedures, equipment, and the use of computer support in damage control.
The Story of the Navy
Anthony Hobbs. London: Wayland Publishers, 1974. 96 pp. Maps. Illus. Bib. £2.25 ($3.85).
This volume outlines the history of the British Navy from the 9th century to the present, with major emphasis on the years preceding World War I.
Victorian and Edwardian Navy from Old Photographs
John Fabb. London: Batsford (available in the U. S. from Hippocrene Books, Inc., New York), 1976. 144 pp. Illus. $12.50.
Brittania rules the waves once more in this nostalgic collection of 172 photographs from the early Victorian era to the eve of World War I. Its arrangement is thematic, with sections on life at sea, training, campaigns, the Royal Marines, leisure, uniforms, etc. There is an introduction by A. P. McGowan, Head of the Department of Ships and Deputy Keeper of the British National Maritime Museum.
MARITIME AFFAIRS A Cruising Guide to the Caribbean and the Bahamas, Including the North Coast of South America, Central America and Yucatan
Jcrems C. Hart and William T. Stone. New York: Dodd, Mead, 1976. 578 pp. Maps. Illus. Append. Bib. $20.00.
Two experienced yachtsmen and three area specialists collaborated on this comprehensive guide to the harbor facilities, routes, weather and sea conditions, charter services, and sights of the islands and coasts of the Caribbean.
A Night to Remember
Walter Lord. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1976. 232 pp. Illus. $12.95.
Walter Lord’s classic, minute-by-minute account of the sinking of the Titanic, first published in 1955, reappears in a larger, handsomely illustrated edition.
The Tall Ships
Philip McCutchan. New York: Crown Publishers, 1976. 160 pp. Illus. Bib. $12.95.
The Tall Ships were one of the most popular features of the Bicentennial celebration. This large format pictorial traces the history of the great sailing vessels from their 19th century heyday to their virtual disappearance. A number of the illustrations are in color.
MILITARY AFFAIRS
The Atlantic Wall: Hitler’s Defenses in the West, 1941-1944
Alan F. Wilt. Ames, Iowa: Iowa State University Press, 1976. 244 pp. Maps. Bib. $7.95 (paper).
Traditionally, fortifications that fail are relegated to an apparently well-deserved oblivion. This attitude tends to overlook the important influence they exert on the resource allocations and command decisions of their builders, as well as the obvious impact on the plans of their attackers. Hitler’s vaunted Atlantic Wall is a case in point. This richly-researched monograph examines its significance in the defense of Festung Europa. The author is an associate professor of history at Iowa State University.
Missiles and Rockets
Kenneth Garland. New York: Macmillan, 1975. 256 pp. Illus. $6.95.
Beginning with the "fire arrows” and fireworks of 13th century China, the history of rocketry is traced through to the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks of today, with primary coverage on the years since World War II. Mr. Gatland is the editor of the British magazine Spaceflight. His text is complemented by 80 pages of color illustrations.
Moshe Dayan: Story of My Life
Moshe Dayan. New York: William Morrow, 1976. 640 pp. Maps. Illus. $15.00.
The autobiography of one of the postwar years’ most distinguished and controversial soldiers could also serve as a military history of the state of Israel. Beginning with his experiences as a member of the Jewish Settlement Police in British-mandated Palestine in 1937, Dayan traces his career through the Mideast wars of 1948, 1956, 1967, and 1973 to his resignation as minister of defense in March 1974.
The System for Educating Military Officers in the U. S.
Laurence J. Korb (Editor). Pittsburgh, Pa.: International Studies Association, 1976. 172 pp. $4.75 (paper).
Questions of officer education at the service academies, in the ROTC, and the senior service colleges are discussed by civil and military educators, including a number of Academy graduates. Among the contributors are Adam Yarmolinsky, Josiah Bunting, and Colonel Peter Dawkins.
U. S. Fighters
Lloyd S. Jones. Fallbrook, Ca.: Aero Publishers, 1975. 352 pp. Illus. $14.95.
Every American aircraft ever to carry a "P”
(pursuit) or "F” (fighter) designation, from the Curtis P-1 of 1925 to the McDonnell Douglas/Northrop F-18 of 1976, is illustrated and described. Including those which never made it off the drawing board, or did not progress beyond experimental models, over 125 planes are covered. An index would have been welcome.
international affairs
A Peace Denied: The United States, Vietnam and the Paris Agreement
Gareth Porter. Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1975. 357 pp. Maps. Illus. Append. $15.00.
The history and consequences of the Paris Negotiations are analyzed in a book whose thesis is that American policy was persistently wrong-headed. The complete text of the January 1973 Paris Agreement is reproduced in an appendice. Currently Director of the IndoChina Resource Center in Washington, D.C., Mr. Porter was formerly a Saigon correspondent for Dispatch News Service International.
Documents on Disarmaments: 1974
Washington, D.C.: United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1976. 918 pp. $8.60 (paper).
The latest in a series of volumes which have been issued annually since 1960, this publication presents a chronological, documentary survey of arms control and disarmament developments in the course of 1974. It concludes with the 14th Annual Report of the U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 22 January 1975.
Embassy at War
Harold Joyce Noble (Edited by Frank Baldwin). Seattle, Wash.: University of Washington Press, 1975. Maps. Illus. Append. $12.50.
Born in Pyongyang, Korea, of missionary parents in 1903, the author earned a Ph.D. in Asian history and served as a Marine officer in the Southwest Pacific before being appointed first secretary in the American Embassy at Seoul on the eve of the outbreak of the Korean War. This posthumous personal narrative was completed just prior to his death in 1953- In it, he provides an insider’s view of embassy activities during the dramatic first three months of the war, from the North Korea invasion on 25 June 1950 to the embassy’s return ro Seoul on 29 September.
Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems
Klaus Knorr (Editor). Lawrence, Kan.: National Security Education Program, 1976. 387 pp.
$6.95 (paper).
Eight original essays by a distinguished group of historians and political scientists demonstrate ways of bringing historical knowledge to bear on current national security programs. Among the topics considered are threat perception, alliance systems, the strategic implications of technological change, and civil-military relations. The contributors include Bernard Brodie, Russell F.
Weigley, Peter Karsten, and Allan R. Millett.
The Modern Japanese Military System
James H. Buck (Editor). Beverly Hills, Ca.: Sage Publications, 1975. 253 pp. Append. Bib. $7.50 (paper).
The evolution, institutional characteristics, and security objectives of the Japanese SelfDefense Forces are surveyed in a series of essays by Asian specialists.
PERIODICALS
International Aerospace Specification Tables
The Editors of Aviation Week & Space Technology. New York: McGraw-Flill, 1976.
36 pp. $4.00 (paper).
Specifications and performance data on just about everything that flies anywhere, from personal planes to research rockets, as well as gas turbine engines, are presented in tabular form in a reprint from Aviation Week & Space Technology.
Salt 1-2
Editors of Aviation Week & Space Technology.
New York: McGraw-Hill, 1976. 115 pp. Illus. $5.95 (paper).
This Aviation Week & Space Technology special reprints the articles and editorials it has published on the subject of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) from March 1974 to March of last year. The magazine has been an outspoken critic of Secretary Kissinger’s conduct of the SALT negotiations.
Y-77
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