This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
being made on the condition of the inspected area. The height of absurdity came during the final "battle problem” in refresher training when an important area of the ship was inspected by a team headed by a lieutenant who had been twice passed-over for lieutenant commander. Hardly the "expert” one would expect to meet in such a situation.
Is there an answer to the problem of the diminution of trust and confidence in the commanding officer? Certainly communications capabilities are vital. But, there must be constant vigilance to ensure that the command and control capabilities therein provided are not overused to the point of abuse, either by military or civilian managers. Today’s warship commanding officer has reached that position only after a long and exhaustive process of repeated examination, screening, and selection. He is an expert.
The commanding officer should be accorded a greater role in the scheduling and conduct of most ship visits by outside activities. These inspections and "assist” visits must be coordinated and conducted only by well- qualified and above-average personnel.
The captain must not be treated as a cipher. If he is to be held completely accountable for his command, then he must be accorded equivalent trust and confidence.
Book Reviews
Strategic Weapons:
An Introduction
Norman Polmar. New York: Crane,
Russak and Company, Inc., 1975. Illus. Append. $7.50 ($6.00 for members).
Reviewed by Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, U. S. Navy (Retired)
{Admiral Moorer’s naval career spans 41 years. In that time he held some of the highest commands: CinC 7th Fleet {19621964); CinCPacFleet {1964); CinCLant and SacLant {1963-1967); Chief of Naval Operations {1967-1970); Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1970 to his retirement on 1 July 1974. Admiral Moorer served as President of the Board of Control, U. S.
Naval Institute, from 1967 to 1970.)
During and since the end of World War II and up to my retirement in 1974, I participated directly on almost a day- to-day basis in the decisional, operational, and conceptual progression of the development of nuclear weapons and plans for their possible use. Consequently, it was with extreme interest that I read Strategic Weapons: An Introduction, and thereby took a refresher course in the very unprecedented developments which have imposed a radically new dimension of warfare on mankind. Mr. Polmar, generally best known as the former editor of the U. S. sections of Jane’s Fighting Ships, has provided excellent source material for those who wish to explore in depth the specific aspects of the introduction of nuclear weapons up to the present time.
The real value of this book lies in the fact that it will serve to reduce the large-scale lack of understanding on the part of the public at large as well as the elite members of our society in regard to the characteristics and utilization of modern weapon systems. Even today, it is quite common to see in many reports and news articles serious mistakes in the description of modern weapons such as missiles, aircraft, ships, tanks, and in fact all other weapon systems which our great technological advances have produced.
Thus this relatively concise booklet is a very welcome and useful publication since it discusses all significant new strategic doctrines and weapon systems to implement these doctrines which have been developed since the explosion of the first atomic bomb on 16 July 1945. The author traces swiftly the development of strategic doctrine over the past several decades and then proceeds to discuss and explain the modern weapon systems which have played such key roles in this development—from the standpoint of the United States and the U.S.S.R. and also that of other countries. There is, for example, a very good discussion of British, French, Chinese, and even Indian nuclear developments. The author also discusses the important question of Israel’s present nuclear weapon status. He points out that as yet, despite some authoritative reports to the contrary, there has been "no official Israeli confirmation” of their having nuclear weapons.
What emerges is really a very valuable, accurate, and sophisticated primer on modern strategic weapon systems which should be read by all who are involved in commenting on and coping with the issues of modern military strategy, both in government and out. The book will be extremely valuable to those seeking to understand the weapon technology involved in the very complex issues of SALT I and II.
In a short review of this nature, it is impossible to go into details concerning the information and data included in this comprehensive volume, but the author has given an excellent discussion of Soviet and U. S. ICBMs as they relate to military policy and strategy in general, and the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks in particular. The volume contains a very good discussion and explanation of the characteristics of the MIRV (multiple independently-targeted reentry vehicle) warheads. Mr. Polmar also includes an excellent discussion of Soviet and U. S. nuclear missile submarines, again in a general strategic framework and also as measured against the context of SALT.
In addition, he treats the highly controversial questions which have arisen recently in regard to the cruise missile—i.e., what it is, what are its capabilities, what is the present state of development in the U.S.S.R. as well as in the United States, etc. All of this discussion takes place against the backdrop of a number of excellent photographs of many of the weapon systems discussed, which help to reinforce the value of the written material. Some of the photographs actually show the various kinds of ordnance discussed in actual operation (e.g. the testing of missiles, aircraft, etc.). Some excellent charts on the strategic weapon inventories of both the United States and the U.S.S.R. presented in the book are most informative.
A minor criticism of the book is that since it is so full of valuable and accurate information, one would hope to find a good index in the volume. To be sure there is an index, however it is somewhat inadequate. This is a minor flaw, however, in this otherwise excellent book.
Operation 'Menace’:
The Dakar Expedition and the Dudley North Affair
Arthur Marder. London: Oxford University Press, 1976. 289 pp. Maps.
Ulus. $15.00.
Reviewed by Commander Joseph Palmer, Royal Navy (Retired)
(Commander Palmer is Editor of Navy International. He served in the Royal Navy from 1926 until 1962, his war service including command of the destroyers Aldenham, Eglinton, and Zambesi. At the time of Operation Menace he was executive officer of HMS Wellington, a convoy escort on the Gibraltar/West Africa-United Kingdom run.)
This is the story of Dakar 1940: first, the Anglo-French expedition to win, by one means or another, French West Africa to the Free French (and hence the Allied) cause; second, one unhappy sequel, the sacking of Admiral Sir Dudley North, then commanding the North Atlantic Station from Gibraltar.
The operation itself is, of course, by far the more important subject, and Marder recognizes this by devoting three quarters of his text to answering those age-old questions on disaster: what went wrong, why, and who was to blame?
The short answer to the first is: almost everything, and right from the start. To those more familiar with the meticulous planning, immense resources, grueling practice, and clam- tight security of later amphibious operations, Menace might well seem crazy: unrealistically conceived, hastily mounted, and slapdash in execution. It was. But in the summer of 1940 the whole war had suddenly gone crazy. Then, in a few short weeks, the military might of France had crumbled before the astonished eyes of her British allies. The urgent need was for action; for something to answer the questions that the world—and especially the United States—was asking: What next? How resolute were the British? Were they now going to wage war a outrancel
Oran was the swift and bloody answer to this last, giving notice that the British would even fire on the ships of their erstwhile allies in the cause of ultimate victory.* Nevertheless, more was needed, and soon. Marder sums up the situation with his usual clarity: "Churchill was eager during July for a military adventure somewhere that might divert the Germans from the British Isles, enhance British prestige and raise morale at home.”
Dakar filled this bill. In addition, reports suggested that both civil and military authorities on the French Ivory Coast would welcome such an enterprise; optimistically, as it proved. But Dakar it was.
Marder duly records the trail of disaster. Much has been made of the bad luck that seemed to dog the venture (though he himself does not). How much can indeed be put down to sheer misfortune? Was it bad luck, for instance, that saw to it that the several commanders travelled in separate ships? Was it bad luck that brought the fog to rob the armada of its chance to overawe the Dakar garrison and inhabitants with the majesty of its approach—a picture so vividly painted by Churchill to his less- than-enthusiastic subordinates? Well, yes, in that everything that goes awry can be put in this category. But could not their affects have been avoided or surmounted by better initial coordination, less-hasty planning, and, in the * Marder himself concludes his From the Dardanelles to Oran with the sober judgment: "In the context of the situation on 3 July 1940, with the information available to the (British) Government, that action was both intelligible and defensible.” matter of fog, friends, and defenses, better intelligence more fully used?
From the military angle, Menace failed ignominiously. Nor can any comfort be drawn from "political advantage,” for there was none. Yet, as he does over Oran, Marder reminds the reader that this was 1940. With this ever in mind, he produces his own carefully considered and well-argued judgment; one that few today would—or could— reject. There is, however, one crumb of comfort: neither of the British commanders was in any way censured, then or later. From Churchill downwards, all realized that they had done their best. Marder comments: "I very much doubt that Nelson and Wellington could have done any better. ...” Most apposite when one recalls Santa Cruz in 1797.
Not so of Dudley North at Gibraltar. That the strong force of Vichy French cruisers and destroyers which had passed The Rock in broad daylight on 11 September had, on its arrival there, stiffened the will of the Dakar garrison to resist was widely believed at the time. So why had this junction not been prevented, and who was to blame? And, if to blame, to what extent: an error of judgment or a more serious "dereliction of duty?”
If only it had been kept as simple as that! Their lordships could have either relieved North, on the grounds that he no longer had their confidence (as was their undoubted right), or they could have accused him of failing in his duty and court-martialed him. Instead, they tried to compromise and, by charging him, gave him his equally undoubted and historic right to defend his actions; a point well made by Chatfield when the affair was finally wound up 17 years later.
Marder disentangles this one too and presents his admirable findings under the two headings of "Was justice done?” and "Was North made a scapegoat?”
These two case histories make fascinating reading. Students of British naval history—and the Royal Navy itself—are fortunate in having such an historian as Professor Arthur Marder: to find and tell the truth when this can be established; in matters of opinion or conjecture, to offer clear, authoritative, and, above all, dispassionate judgment; in prose that is a model of conciseness and precision.
List price: $10.00 Member’s price: $8.00
HOPE RIDER
Valour Fore &Aft
ADVENTURES OF THE SLOOP PROVIDENCE 1TTJ-17TV
Valour Fore & Aft
ADVENTURES OF THE SLOOP PROVIDENCE,
1772-1779
By Hope S. Rider
The saga of the Continental Sloop Providence, formerly Katy of the Navy of Rhode Island, is a compilation of historic “firsts”—the first colonial flagship, firing the first broadside of the war at sea, first choice of both George Washington and the Continental Congress to perform naval service, the first naval vessel to land the first marines, and the first to fly the Stars and Stripes over foreign territory. But the Providence perhaps provided a more significant service as a proving ground for her captains. From her broad quarterdeck were launched some of the proudest careers in the history of the early navy, including that of John Paul Jones.
While the Providence’s service in the cause of freedom ended with her destruction, this chronicle of her adventures serves to keep alive the memory of the men who dared to defy the British Navy, the mightiest in the world. The author has utilized hitherto unpublished little known material to create a stirring tribute to the unconquerable spirit of the men and ships in the days of fighting sail—a salute to valour fore and aft.
1976. 208 pages. 7 maps. 18 halftones. Frontispiece in color.
List price: $5.00 Member’s price: $4.00
Add 75<C to each order for postage and handling.
(Please use book order form in Books of Interest to the Professional section.)
Books of Interest to the Professional
Compiled by Professor Jack Sweetman, Associate Editor
NAVAL AFFAIRS
Grumman F-14 "Tomcat”
James Perry Stevenson. Fallbrook, Calif.: Aero Publishers, 1975. 104 pp. Illus. Append. $6.95 (paper).
The development, physical and aerodynamic characteristics, and weapon systems of the Navy’s F-14 fighter are described in an abundantly illustrated pictorial. The quality of both text and pictures is quite good.
EE The Influence of Law on Sea Power
D. P. O’Connell. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1975. 204 pp. Bib. $14.95 ($11.95).
The influence of international law on the exercise of sea power, especially since 1945, is analyzed, in part by the historical case-study method. The author is Chichele Professor of Public International Law at Oxford University and a commander in the Royal Navy Reserve.
The Karlsruhe Affair
Edwin P. Hoyt. London: Arthur Baker, Ltd., 1976. 156 pp. £3.50 (Approx. $7.00).
SMS Karlsruhe was one of the Imperial German Navy’s foreign cruisers. Present in the Caribbean at the outbreak of World
War I, she turned commerce raider and ran up a respectable score of British merchantmen before being destroyed by an internal explosion on the high seas in November 1914. The survivors managed to make it back to Germany in one of her colliers. The raider’s story is retold in a journalistic history whose reference value is limited by the lack of an index.
IE To Get the Job Done: Readings in Leadership and Management
Lieutenant John D. Wallace, USN (Compilor). Annapolis, Md.: U. S. Naval Institute, 1976.
174 pp. Illus. $8.50 ($6.80).
Conceived as a reading supplement for use by NROTC instructors, this collection of articles addresses itself to the nature and techniques of leadership and management, with specific applicability to a naval/military environment. The publications from which they were selected range from the Proceedings to Psychology Today, their authors from professional naval and military men to behavioral scientists.
Torpedoboote und Zerstorer im Einsatz 1939-1945 (Torpedo Boats and Destroyers in Action 1939-1945)
Volkmar Kuhn. Stuttgart, West Germany: Motorbuch Verlag, 1975. 382 pp. Illus. Append. Bib. 36.00 DM (Approx. $14.40).
Torpedo boat and destroyer operations in European waters in World War II are described in this well-researched and well-illustrated account. The emphasis, as might be expected, is on the German Navy, but British and Italian activities are also treated. The appendices, containing resumes of the operational history of each German destroyer and every torpedo boat flotilla, together with performance data, will be of especial interest to naval historians.
MARITIME AFFAIRS
The Drama of the Oceans
Elisabeth Mann Borgese. New York: Harry N. Abrams, 1975. 258 pp. Illus. Bib. $25.00.
Beautifully illustrated with over 100 color photographs, this work presents a geophysical and historical survey of the world ocean. Mrs. Borgese, the youngest daughter of Thomas Mann, is the organizer of the Pacem in Marihus (Peace in the Oceans) conferences and International Ocean Institute at Malta.
S A Mariner’s Guide to the Rules of the Road
William H. Tate. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1976. 135 pp. Illus. Append. $9.95 ($7.95).
The rules of the road for U. S. inland waters and the revised International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (International Rules of the Road) are fully explained. A preliminary edition, published by the Institute Press in 1974, was adopted as a text by the U. S. Naval Academy, the U. S. Coast Guard Academy, and the NROTC. The author, a 1967 Naval Academy graduate, is assistant professor of Nautical Science at the Florida Institute of Technology.
An experienced British multihull sailor discusses the handling of catamarans and trimarans. Especial emphasis is placed on heavy-weather seamanship, and there are a number of interesting postmortems of multihull accidents. Robin Knox-Johnson contributed the foreword.
National and International Law Enforcement in the Ocean
William T. Burke, Richard Legatski, William W. Woodhead. Seattle, Wash.: University of Washington Press, 1976. 244 pp. Append. $7.50 (paper).
Undertaken as part of the external research program of the Department of State, this study analyzes national and international processes of law enforcement at sea, with emphasis on the latter. Particular attention is paid to the ongoing law of the sea negotiations and the numerous enforcement proposals which have been advanced in these negotiations.
The Rage to Survive
Jacques Vignes (Translated by Mihailo Voukirchevitch). New York: William Morrow, 1976. 215 pp. Map. lllus. $6.95.
In September 1972, two young voyagers, 26-year-old Lucien Schiltz and 19-year-old Catherine Plessz, scrambled aboard an inflatable raft when their cutter was wrecked in a storm in the western Mediterranean. The raft soon capsized and, though they were able to right it and climb back aboard, nearly all their provisions were lost. For nearly two weeks they drifted aimlessly, with no food, next to no water, and no way to either sail or steer their raft. Both were near death when they were rescued by a passing freighter. The courage and resources with which they met their ordeal is described in a gripping narrative.
The Singlehanders
Peter Heaton. New York: Hastings House,
1976. 208 pp. Maps. Illus. Bib. $12.95.
Since Sir Francis Chichester’s solo circumnavigation in Gypsy Moth IV, singlehanded voyaging has become an increasingly prominent aspect of the sailing scene. Yet, as this book vividly recalls, it is by no means a postwar phenomenon. Beginning with the first certifiable singlehanded Atlantic crossing (by an American, Alfred Johnson, in the 20-foot gaff cutter Centennial in 1876), the narrative continues through the voyages of Joshua Slocum, Alain Gerbault, Harry Pid- geon, and others, down to today.
0 "Tell it Good-Bye, Kiddo:”
The Decline of the New England Offshore Fishery
David Boeri and James Gibson. Camden, Me.: International Marine, 1976. 154 pp. Map. Illus. Bib. $9.95 ($7.95).
The decline of the New England offshore fishing industry is analyzed in an unusual combination of scholarly research and personal narrative. Co-author Boeri sailed as a deckhand and cook on New England trawlers for four years following his graduation from college in 1971.
0 Western Wind Eastern Shore:
A Sailing Cruise around the Eastern Shore of Maryland, Delaware and Virginia
Robert de Gast. Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975. 177 pp. Maps. Illus. Bib. $14.95 ($11.90).
Dutch-born author-photographer Robert de
Gast’s charming record of a 24-day circumnavigation of the Delmarva Peninsula combines the qualities of cruising guide, travelogue, and photo essay. There is a foreword by John Barth.
MILITARY AFFAIRS
Ecological Consequences of the Second IndoChina War
Arthur H. Westing. Stockholm, Sweden: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, in collaboration with Almquist & Wiksell International, 1976. 119 pp. Maps.
Illus. Bib. Sw. kronor 76.50.
The ecological impact of the high-technology war the United States fought in Vietnam is discussed in scholarly detail. The author is professor of botany at Windham College in Putney, Vermont.
General Dynamics F-16
William G. Holder and William D. Siuru, Jr. Fallbrook, Ca.: Aero Publishers, 1976. 104 pp. Illus. $6.95 (paper).
This pictorial traces the development and final form of the U. S. Air Force’s new lightweight fighter. Among the illustrations are eight pages of fine color.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff: The First Twenty-five Years
Lawrence J. Korb. Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1976. 210 pp. Notes. $10.95.
The performance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff over the first quarter-century of that body’s existence is reviewed and assessed. The author concludes that "given the constraints placed upon them by their position in the Department of Defense and the American political system,” the successive Joint Chiefs have functioned reasonably well. Mr. Korb is professor of management at the U. S. Naval War College.
Memoirs of My Services in the World War 1917-1918
George C. Marshall. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1976. 268 pp. Maps. Illus. $10.00.
These memoirs, never before published, record the experiences of future Chief of Staff and Secretary of State George C. Marshall with the American Expeditionary Force in France in World War I. His varied services, initially in the First Division and later on General Pershing’s headquarters staff, gave him an unusually wide view of the war, in the course of which he was rapidly promoted from captain to colonel. His account is complemented by a foreword and notes by General James L. Collins, Jr., Chief of Military History for the Department of the Army.
A People Numerous & Armed: Reflections on the Military Struggle for American Independence
John Shy. New York: Oxford University Press, 1976. 304 pp. $12.95 ($3.95 for paper).
A distinguished military historian reexamines key aspects of the War of the Revolution in a collection of essays.
War and Society: A Yearbook of Military History
Brian Bond and Ian Roy, (Editors). New York: Holmes & Meier, 1975. 254 pp. $19.00.
The initial volume of a projected annual publication contains a variety of articles by 14 British and American authors, ranging from the Renaissance to the contemporary world. Both editors are lecturers at King’s College, London.
Who’s First in Defense—
The U. S. or the U.S.S.R.?
John Charles Daly (Moderator). Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1976. 39 pp. $2.00 (paper). This is the edited transcript of an American Enterprise Institute round-table discussion moderated by John Charles Daly, former ABC News chief, in Washington in June 1976. The participants were former Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird; Senator Thomas McIntyre, chairman of the Research and Development Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee; Senator Charles McC. Mathias, of the Appropriations Committee; and former deputy Secretary of Defense and SALT delegate Paul Nitze.
Who’s Who in Military History
John Keegan and Andrew Wheaton. New York: William Morrow, 1976. 367 pp. Maps. Illus. $25.00.
The careers of over 500 noted naval and
BOOK ORDER SERVICE
Members may order books of other publishers through the Naval Institute at a 10% discount off list price. (Prices quoted in this column are subject to change and will be reflected in our billing.) The postage and handling fee for each such special order book of a United States publisher will be 75C; the fee for a book from a foreign publisher will be $1.00. When air mail or other special handling is requested, actual postage and handling cost will be billed to the member. Books marked I ft-1 are Naval Institute Press Books. Books marked 0 are Naval Institute Book Selections. All prices enclosed by parentheses are member prices. Please use the order blank in this section.
Name ______________________________ Date ___
Address _______________ City______________ Zip _
Flag size(s) wanted -------------- Amount Enclosed $
Mail this coupon to Capt. J. Watson, NRA-11ND Treasurer,
936 First St., Hermosa Beach, CA 90254. Checks payable to NRA-11th NAVAL DISTRICT
SEWIM NYLON & APPLIQUE, TOP QUALITY #9 DEN OR BOAT SIZE 23 X 32 IN. $30.00
#7 HOME DISPLAY SIZE 32 X 46 IN. MINIMUM 35.00
#6 BUILDING SIZE 58 X 82 IN. CONTRIBUTION 45.00
BOAT SIZE, SCREENED NYLON 12 X 18 IN. 13.00
All proceeds benefit 11th Naval District Naval Reserve Assoc.
1775 CONTINENTAL NAVY JACK
military figures, mostly European and American, from 1453 to the present are chronicled in a lavish biographical dictionary. Illustrations include 16 color plates and some 300 halftone portraits. The authors are professional British military historians.
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
Behind the Middle East Conflict:
The Real Impasse Between Arab and Je'v
Gil Carl Alroy. New York: Putnam’s, 1975.
317 pp. Bib. *9.95.
The thesis of this scholarly study of the Mideast problem is that the antagonism between the two sides is due less to the objective reality of the situation than to the Arabs’ and Israelis’ perceptions of it. The author concludes that these could be reconciled by the creation of a federated state m which the Arabs would be satisfied by the shadow and the Israelis by the substance of sovereignty. Professor Alroy teaches political science at Hunter College, City University of New York.
Betrayal in Vietnam
Louis A. Fanning. New Rochelle, N.Y.: Arlington House, 1976. 256 pp. Map. Illus. Append. Bib. *8.95.
A right-wing interpretation of the unhappy outcome of the U. S. effort to preserve a non-Communist government in South Vietnam argues that "it was not the Hanoi Communists who won the war, but rather the American Congress that lost it.” The author is professor of history at the State University of New York at Farmingdale.
Y-7 6
Book Order Department
United States Naval Institute, Annapolis, Maryland 21402
Title Copies Price
$__________________________________________________________________________________________________________
For delivery in Maryland, add 4% tax ..................................................................................................
Add 75<t postage and handling, each order, Naval Institute books, Naval Institute book selections,
and Naval Institute imported books....................................................................................................
Add 75 C postage and handling, each special order book, other domestic publisher...........................................
Add $1.00 postage and handling, each special order, foreign publisher..............................................................................
Enclosed is my check or money order in the amount of TOTAL...................................................................
Name ___________________________________________________________________ Membership No. _________
Address ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ —----------------- --- -------------------
City, State, FPO ..................................................................................................................................... ....... — Zip Code