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U7,
sea
OOO tons of crude oil were lost to the ^ (due, in part, to ignorance in how to andle the problem), both vindicated and stimulated concern for the environ- ent, and that concern has been height- ed by several other less serious big
^ECC Aground: Everybody’s Problem
% Commander James A. Atkinson, U. S. R0ast Guard, Assistant Chief, Marine nvironmental Protection Division U. S. D0ast Guard Headquarters, Washington,
the growing world demand for f>etfoleum and the increasing reliance of matly countries on imported oil, so too ®resv the demand for greater efficiency in !ts shipment. This need was highlighted y the brief Suez Canal closure in 1956, ^htch spurred quantum changes in the Sl2e °f crude oil tankers—changes accel- etated by the heavy Japanese commit- rtlent to construction of mammoth tank- ^ts and clinched by the more decisive Uea closure in 1967. An analysis of §r°wth in demand for oil, the tankage re<Juired to supply that demand over Steatly lengthened shipping routes, limi- tat'°ns of ports, projected traffic conges- and a comparison of the economies srnall versus large ships in material ecjuirements, manning, fuel, and in ^any other cost areas, led logically to sly Se^ect'on largest practicable
UP as being the best investment.
The decisions made to take this path ■World oil shipment were economic ancT *n %ht of economics alone, ey were and remain valid. The chief °Pposing consideration is a concern for
thi
sh« s°m<
0 other vessels. Therefore, polluting ^Ualties are inevitable. The Toney any°n disaster of 1967, in which ship incidents since. The fact is that the Toney Canyon, at approximately 120,000 dwt., was a small vessel compared with those evolving since. It is also a fact that there is now a surfeit of VLCCs (very large crude carriers) on the world market. If then, the environmental concern is not likely to result in smaller tankers, it should demand, at least, a quick and effective response capability to tanker disasters everywhere, superior to what is now available anywhere.
Some lessons have been learned from the Toney Canyon and subsequent disasters. Environmentalist pressure has resulted in some regulatory legislation, forcing both governments and industries to seek technological solutions to such incidents, to prepare contingency plans, and to search for appropriate standards of design, construction, manning, operation, and insurance of tankers. It’s a beginning. These early disasters also convinced some of us that the threat posed by supertankers is of such a magnitude with respect to the amount of oil that might be discharged as to be truly an international problem, requiring an international solution both in preventing or minimizing the release of cargoes to the sea and in cleaning up the spilled oil when prevention fails.
The value of international cooperation in big ship casualties and of some recently developed anti-pollution equipment and techniques was demonstrated by the U. S. Coast Guard during the salvage of the Shell VLCC tanker Metula (206,719 dwt.) which had run aground in the Strait of Magellan in 1974. This incident easily could have outstripped the Toney Canyon, but, instead, was held to about half that scale and was the largest and most complex tanker refloating effort undertaken to date.
The Metula, en route to Quintero Bay, Chile with Persian Gulf crude, picked up two Chilean pilots at Bahia
of ^ ob-
tn
19 August, and I was Admiral Allen. The next day I boa1 the Metula and discussed with salvage team her condition, the com plexities of the situation, the equip111 available, and the salvage plans. The ^ before, four more cargo tanks opened to the sea, spilling a great more oil. New calculations were n
lica-
of «P
tion. These included cross-currents
on
the
unpleasant with frequent strong t0 £'
Posesion a short time before the grounding, and one of these pilots had the conn at 2216, 9 August 1974, when the Metula struck a rocky ledge at almost her full speed of 14.5 knots. She came to a halt in about 260 feet, opened up five of her forward compartments, including two cargo tanks, and initially lost about 6,000 tons of cargo. For some time, the Metula maintained her initial impact heading of 235° true; however, about 42 hours later, under the pressure of a strong tidal current, her stern swung to starboard and her afterbody grounded, holing the engine room, which filled up quickly and left her without power. The Metula was now lying starboard side to a steep submerged ledge on a heading of about 185° true. She was so firmly grounded that she maintained this position for the next 47 days, despite cross currents of up to eight knots.
The grounding occurred on Satellite Bank at the west end of the First Narrows, which lie in the eastern portion of the strait. The Chilean Navy determined the cause of the grounding to be a piloting error. While the casualty was under investigation, the Chilean Government placed a temporary suspension on tanker (80,000 dwt. and 50 feet in draft) traffic through the strait.
Upon learning of the Metula grounding, Shell Tankers quickly made salvage arrangements with Smit International Ocean Towage and Salvage, Rotterdam. The salvage tug Zwarte Zee (9,000 h.p.) was dispatched to the scene from Montevideo. Smit’s senior salvage inspector, Captain Cornelius J. Rom Colthoff, was designated salvage master. Several salvage experts, including divers and a naval architect, and some 14 tons of equipment, including 20 electric submersible pumps, an electric generator, a portable inert gas generator, and a supply of hoses, cables, etc., were flown into Chile.
The Zwarte Zee arrived in Punta Arenas, the port nearest to the grounding, on 15 August to pick up the men and equipment that had been flown in, and then proceeded to the Metula, which was 63 miles by sea from Punta Arenas. Upon arrival, the Zwarte Zee took the Metula’s crew on board, but due to high winds was delayed in securing alongside until 17 August—eight days after the grounding!
Once alongside, the salvage team swung into action. An assessment of the Metula's condition was made insofar as practicable (the currents were too strong for divers to work safely), and the formulation of refloating plans began. Several flotation calculations were made on scene and checked against computer solutions in Rotterdam.
In the meantime, Shell International Marine arranged for a lightering tanker small enough to go alongside the Metula and for a larger tanker into which the lightering tanker could discharge. The Argentine-flag Shell Capsa tanker Harvella (19,000 dwt.) and the Norwegian tanker Bergeland (of 96,000 dwt.) were selected for these tasks. Also, three Yokohama fenders were ordered from Texas. (Yokohama fenders are big pneumatic rubber cylindrical bumpers designed to prevent damage between two large ships lying alongside one another in choppy water.) These fenders, measuring 9% by 18 feet as rigged, proved to be the most difficult items to transport by air, and they did not arrive in Punta Arenas until 26 August.
Two other salvage tugs, the Smit Salvor (4,500 h.p.) and the new Japanese North Sea (11,000 h.p.), were dispatched to the scene. Both tugs transited along the Pacific coast from the Panama area, the Smit Salvor arriving on 1 September and the other soon afterward.
The Chilean Government designated Chilean Admiral Eduardo Allen, Commander-in-Chief of the Third Naval Zone, based in Punta Arenas, as the on-scene-commander (OSC). The Chilean Government decided not to participate in the salvage operation. However, the Chilean Navy performed several functions of assistance to the salvors. A small naval fleet tug was supplied to the salvors to be used for hauling men and equipment back and forth between Punta Arenas and the Metula. The Chileans also maintained air surveillance of the pollution and conducted a bottom survey around the Metula after Captain Colthoff determined that one was necessary. In addition to these tasks, the Chileans also made their own estimate as to the feasibility of a refloat effort. Ultimately, they agreed with the salvors’ calculations.
U. S. Coast Guard Headquarters, Washington, D.C., was first notified of
the Metula incident by message Caracas, Venezuela on 13 August. e message reported that the U. S. Law o the Sea Conference delegation had been approached by the Chilean delegat*0^ soliciting possible material and technic assistance in the case of a Shell v grounded in the Strait of Magellan. e U. S. delegation had mentioned : e
U. S. Coast Guard as being the 1110 ^ likely source of such assistance and a perceived the value of international c°0P^ eration. This view was quickly endorse by the U. S. Embassy, Santiago. ^ My superiors also saw many poten benefits growing from U. S. Coas Guard involvement. So, within the rine Environmental Protection Div'sl°n’ information gathering and contingent) planning began immediately under nff direction, coordinated with aviation p|a ning in the Search and Rescue Divis*°n_ Just two days after first learning incident, I was sent to Chile as an server. My primary assignment was ^ learn first-hand about problems assod ated with supertanker incidents. ^ I arrived in Punta Arenas ° briefed by ided
the
required.
There were several severe comp1 tions associated with the Metula's s*tu‘
to eight knots, a three-hour lag betwee^ high or low water and slack current,^ very brief slack water period, and tides six to seven meters during the spr tide cycles which occurred tw monthly. Of particular note was that ^ the high half of the tide range a fl°° current prevailed, pressing the broadside against the shoal; only on lower half of the tide was there a cnt(C£jt favorable for refloating. The strong adverse current occurred on high J and the most favorable current exis when there was the least water ^ refloating. The weather generally ^
kef
diffi
cult to handle and tend another tan
force winds, which would make it
best
an air-cooled diesel engine. The engine raws fuel from a collapsible fuel cell aiN is fitted with spark arresters, allow- it to be used on the deck of a ■eship or barge carrying flammable argo. The U. S. Coast Guard had devel- ^Ped these pumping systems after study the Torrey Canyon incident.
^Captain Colthoff said he wanted some cbe pumps and the minimal number 111611 necessary to operate them. I told lrtl that if the Chilean Government
should
JUard
^ongside. The situation was further a8gravated by the long lines of commu- Rations and by the very immensity of 6 volumes and weights to be dealt Wlth- On the other hand, there was no °cean swell, the presence of which w°uld have changed the picture and the °utc°me drastically.
1 told Captain Colthoff about the specific Coast Guard resources which 'v°uld be of most assistance in this Particular situation. My primary concern Was pollution, but it appeared that the constructive anti-pollution action
Way to do that, under the circum- S[ances, seemed to be to offload part of e cargo and then refloat the ship, ftl0ve her to a more hospitable site, and c°rnplete the offloading. I explained that °Ur National Strike Force (NSF), which c°nsists of three 18-man teams—one each on the Pacific, Atlantic, and Gulf c°asts—-is composed of people who are specially trained and equipped for antielution work. I also described the Air ,, epP°yable Anti-Pollution Transfer ^ystem (adapts) which I felt would be
great value in the Metula salvage effort.
ADAPTS package consists of a "ump designed to be passed through a ^n<^ard 14-inch tank-cleaning or utterworth” hole. It is driven by a ^yoraulic motor which is connected by °Ses to a hydraulic pump mounted on request our assistance, the Coast might respond on a government- Th^°Vernment’ cost"re'mhursahle basis. e next day the salvage team made a finest to the government of Chile, *ch quickly made its request to the
ffed States for Coast Guard assist- ar»ce.
^*n 27 August, a Coast Guard C-130 'tsport aircraft, loaded with six men
and equipment, including three ADAPTS systems, landed in Punta Arenas. The commanding officer of the Strike Force contingent, Lieutenant Commander William C. Park, III, and another officer had arrived earlier.
At the salvors’ request, only one pumping system and men to operate it were sent out to the Metula initially, arriving there in time for the first offloading of oil into the Harvella. The Zwarte Zee was already loaded to her limit with people; therefore, our Strike Force team had to be self-sufficient.
of bad
moved away due to a forecast
weather. The offloading was com;
to
They set up housekeeping on the Metula. Her diesel emergency generator furnished electricity for lights, a stove, and a few space heaters, but there was no running water or functioning bathroom facilities.
The first day (27 August) that the Harvella attempted to go alongside the Metula for offloading, her approaches were aborted due to high winds. The next day, however, she was successful in securing alongside the stricken ship—19 days after the grounding. For this first offloading, the Harvella was alongside for 36 hours, taking on about 15,000 tons. At first the salvors elected to use an eductor activated by one of the Harvella's main cargo pumps, and some electric submersible pumps for primary offloading, using the ADAPTS for pumping in seawater ballast to replace the oil being pumped off. They had planned to use the Metula's starboard steam stripping pump for this ballasting, with steam furnished by the Harvella. However, after losing some 11 tons of boiler water to condensate, the Harvella's chief engineer called a halt to this, and then the salvors had the other two ADAPTS pumps sent out. Thereafter, the ADAPTS equipment was fully integrated into all phases of cargo offloading, ballasting, and later into the refloating effort.
This first lightering operation was followed by three more. There were many delays due to weather, and on each spring tide cycle there were five days when the currents were too strong for the Harvella to work alongside the Metula. After each lightering, the Harvella discharged her cargo into the Bergeland, and after the fourth, the Bergeland departed to deliver this portion of the cargo—about 50,000 tons—to Quintero Bay, about 20 miles north of Valparaiso.
With the offloaded cargo replaced by seawater, water bottoms of at least 30 feet were provided in all cargo tanks. This ballast kept the Metula solidly aground until the refloating effort began, then allowed lightering of the vessel with little pollution.
An attempt at refloating was planned for 21 September, but due to high winds it was postponed until the 24th. That day an effort was made, using low- pressure air to "press down” the water in some of the forward damaged compartments, which had been made airtight on their tops and fitted with air connections and gauges. To provide a reservoir of safe, low-pressure air, ballast tank 7^3 port and the port and starboard slop tanks adjacent to the pump- room were used as "air flasks,” prepressurized to 0.75 atmosphere, utilizing the Metula’s fixed tank-cleaning piping to convey this air to any compartment needing it. During low tide, water was allowed to drain from all the intact tanks. During the strength of the ebb current, the three salvage tugs attempted to pull the Metula clear, two pulling on the bow and one on the stern; the Metula didn’t move. As the ebb tide died and the flood began, the three tugs continued pulling eastward, now stemming the flood current to prevent its driving the lightened tanker even further aground. It was determined that the intact tanks had not drained fast enough, and that this could be aided by putting a cap of low-pressure air on them. It was also decided to use all the available pumps to pump water overboard from one of the intact tanks.
So during the succeeding low tide, a full effort was made, "pressing down” both open and intact compartments with air pressure varying from about seven to ten pounds-per-square-inch, and pulling with the three tugs. At about 0100 the ebb tide died. As the ship had not refloated, the tugs again pulled eastward, stemming the incipient flood current. On the Metula, lightering operations had ceased. It had appeared that this effort too had failed; however, the tide was still rising, and at 0235 the Metula started moving and quickly came afloat. The tugs came right and started towing her southward, then slowly westward into Bahia Felipe. At 0915 she was anchored in a position about 11 miles from where she had been stranded.
After the refloating, cargo and ballast were transferred about on the Metula to adjust list and trim and to consolidate cargo to reduce or eliminate further pollution. For four days storm winds prevailed, attaining hurricane force. The Metula dragged anchor about 1,000 yards, then held thereafter.
The Bergeland returned on 28 September and put alongside the Metula on the 30th, after the winds abated. The remainder of the Metula's, cargo was pumped directly into the Bergeland, with one break when the Bergeland was pleted
on 10 October, and the Bergeland m°v^d clear on the 11th, taking our Stri c Team and their equipment with her to Punta Arenas. The Metula was later towed (stern first by two Smit tugs) t0 Ilha Grande, Brazil, where she was an chored until she was sold for scrapping and towed to Spain.
On her second load, the took on 90,500 tons of cargo. Thus, a total of 140,500 tons was saved from the original load. With about 2,000 tons le c in the Metula, some 51,500 tons of cargo had been lost, plus an unspecfoe quantity of Bunker C from her foe tanks. Most of this oil, except ft>r lts lighter fractions that had either evap orated or dissolved into the water column, appears to have gone onto the beaches, mostly on Tierra del Fuego- During the six weeks the Strike Team was on board the Metula, their wor consisted mostly of moving the pumps about, raising and lowering them in the tanks, connecting and disconnecting' fueling the engines, and performing maintenance and some small repairs on the equipment. In all, they made some 49 shifts of the pumps from tank t0 tank. £
The effects of the original oil loss about 6,000 tons were first observe mostly in the area of the First Narrows, the eastern portion of Bahia Felipe, a'1 in the water east of the First Narrow*' Oil was later observed on and along the southern shores of this area. For the firSt few days it appeared to be breaking UP rapidly under the action of currents an waves, whipped by frequent strong gale force winds.
Then came the much heavier release of 19 August. The next day oil slic * covered about 1,000 square miles 0 water—all of Bahia Felipe, the F'rS Narrows, and the bay east of there. Afiet a day of strong northwesterly win ’ almost all of this was pushed right nP against the beach in the same area ast previous release had gone. Thereafter the appearance of the beach and the 0 in the water was markedly different on each flight, seemingly affected by c conditions of wind and tide.
When the decision was made to send che NSF contingent and the ADAPTS Pumps to Chile, the Coast Guard de- ^ded to send Dr. Roy W. Hann, Jr. of exas A & M University to the scene so (hat a member of the U. S. academic c°mrnunity who had first-hand knowledge of the Metula incident would be available later to consult with the Coast uard and to furnish testimony to ongress or to scientific or other bodies, s °uld the need arise.
h>r. Hann arrived in Punta Arenas on 6 August and left with me on September. While there, he overflew e contaminated beaches and particiPated in a ground survey of the affected . °hes of Tierra del Fuego. His report 'udicates that the greater part of the ^pilled oil reached the beaches. A °Uow-up study of the area some five j^onths later, jointly conducted by the ■ S. Coast Guard, Environmental Proaction Agency, and National Oceanic Atmospheric Administration and eaded by Dr. Hann, found the oil was ^dl there, mostly down in the sand, and likely to be there for a long time. It is °Ped that a long-term study can be j;arried out on this spill, to determine its te> and possibly its effects. Such infor- ^tion would be of great value in future ccisions as to cleanup. This is a rare Scientific opportunity to study a massive sPdl left entirely to nature, since the °n'Scene-commander decided against canup. That decision was indubitably
affected by the factors of logistics, weather, equipment, manpower, legal considerations, and by the slight, direct impact of the spill on people.
Chilean concern with such disasters as the Metula manifested itself in a seminar on marine pollution held in Santiago in late September 1975 in which Dr. Hann and I participated. Chilean representatives stated their intention to develop a full environmental program, to improve the safety of navigation in the Strait of Magellan through better aids to navigation, and to provide a sound legislative base on which to act in future incidents.
Much can be learned from the Metula incident. First, the best way to reduce the damage from this sort of incident obviously is for it not to happen in the first place. This can be addressed through vessel control improvements, such as aids to navigation, vessel traffic control, better ship’s equipment and navigation/piloting methods. The next best method of prevention is through such structural provisions as will serve most practicably to reduce the leakage when the first measure, vessel control, has failed. And when these first two means have failed, the third important means is the one employed in this case (late though it may have been), removal of the remaining cargo, and, if it be the best measure, as it was with the Metula, salvage of the ship. But the means for doing this should be available without such an unconscionable delay!
In addition to being a superlative salvage operation, albeit a slow one, the Metula incident has certainly vindicated the U. S. Coast Guard development of the ADAPTS pumping systems, which are indisputably the best portable equipment available in the world for offloading damaged tankers. This incident also shows how inextricably intertwined are the interests of salvage and pollution- even when those interests may be in conflict—particularly now that the environment cannot be ignored.
Another important point highlighted by this incident is the value of an international approach to supertanker incidents. No country and no one enterprise is yet equipped to handle all phases of a serious big ship incident with its own resources alone, quickly, and in the best way, wherever it may occur. Although adequate money may be available, that money cannot always be translated into the men and material needed just when and where that need may exist.
The U. S. Coast Guard assistance in the Metula operation was of great value in helping to save 140,500 tons of cargo, and in refloating the ship, thus keeping this incident from attaining its full destructive potential. While I would hope that this action would be something of a pattern for response to future major pollution incidents, a way must be found to speed up the entire response process, and to handle all facets of such an incident at once.
't'h
e Glacier in Antarctica
B
At 261825ZFEB75 the USCGC Glade. ^GB-4) received a request for assist ^ from the Argentine icebreake: Satt Martin. The General Sat artin was beset in heavy ice in Erebu: ?.nd Terror Gulf 130 miles to the south t*6 Glacier turned into 45-knot wind ** again entered antarctic pack ice. The Glacier had departed Long Beach ahfornia on 17 November 1974 fo
Operation Deep Freeze 1975, under the operational control of Commander, Naval Support Force Antarctica, CTF 199. The primary mission for icebreakers assigned to Deep Freeze is to cut a channel through the fast ice (sea ice that generally remains in the position where originally formed) of McMurdo Sound to Winter Quarters at McMurdo Station. The Glacier and the USCGC Burton
Island (WAGB-283) opened this important supply channel during Deep Freeze 75. The Glacier also carried five members of the Antarctic Treaty Inspection Team, sponsored by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, to the British Station on the Argentine Islands, the Argentine station (Almirante Brown), the Soviet station (Bellinghausen), and Chilean station (Presidente Frei) for