This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
He arrived at the Naval Academy in the same year, 1873, as the Naval Institute. Having graduated at the head of his class and attained his lieutenancy, he used the pages of the Proceedings to declare a war—in which he quickly found allies—against the Marines.
he fired his first major salvo in the pages of the Proct^
ingS' . n to
Citing the abandonment of sail power as reason^
for
id e
the
fits
ob-
ith:
the
to
fof
A
JL JLt a press conference some years ago, a Southern governor dropped the offhand remark that one of his home state political bosses was "not all bad.” This comment electrified the audience and resulted in national headlines, for up to that point most reporters in the audience had regarded the politician in question as completely evil.
Marine Corps-oriented histories have tended to cast William Freeland Fullam, antagonist of not a few Marines around the turn of this century, as a similar devil. The case can be made, however, that Fullam was in fact a farsighted naval officer, abrasively persistent in his attempts to usher the U. S. Navy into the 20th century.
From the time of his graduation from the Naval Academy in 1877 until his retirement as a rear admiral in 1919, Fullam consistently lined up with the progressives. For most of his career he sought to restore power and authority to seagoing line officers. These qualities had begun to erode when the Navy acquired its first operational steam warship in 1822. More than 50 years later, Fullam entered a Navy which was still grappling with "steam’s unanswered problems:”1
► Top command: The creation of the bureau system in 1842 had developed into a situation in which neither the Secretary of the Navy nor any single senior naval officer could control or coordinate the activities of the independent-minded bureau chiefs.
► Manning the Navy: More than half the enlisted men were foreign-born. Many of these were not shining examples of their respective societies. The resultant problems in leadership, discipline, training, and general efficiency were numerous.
► Missions of the Marine Corps: This was a related issue. Since the days of sail, Marines—usually American-born, highly disciplined, and under strong leadership—had been used by ships’ captains to control their crews. The advent of steamships brought with it a sharper delineation between the shipboard duties of sailors and Marines and a reduction in berthing space available. This called into question the need for Marines to continue to take up part of that space. At the same time, the Navy’s growing reliance on far-flung coaling stations was generating interest in the capabilities of landing parties to seize and defend advance bases.
► Relationship between line and engineering officers: Reflecting more general antagonisms between line and staff corps officers, this problem was compounded by the fact that it was the engineers, not the line officers, who designed the ships and made them go.
For 13 years after graduation, Fullam watched and pondered, through duty in four ships and an instructor’s tour at the Naval Academy. Then, as a lieutenant,
change the way of training sailors, Fullam lost no in getting to "the real cause, direct and indirect, the absence of military instincts among men-of-^ ? men”—the presence of Marine guards on board ship- Because of the Marines, Fullam went on, sailors second-class citizens in their own ships, distrusted 1 their superiors and subject to search and physical re straint by the more trustworthy Marines. Fullam ^ citing a recognized principle of human behavior: t people tend to act in accordance with their self-imag^5' Sailors thus lived down to their low self-images ; circumventing the authorities wherever they cou Fullam saw devastating implications in this situati00
"The sailor is debased, and his interest and pn in the service are lessened by such teaching;
marine is brought under elevating influences, manliness is appealed to, and his efficiency is tained at the expense of the sailor.”3
Among other things, Fullam charged the Marines tvi
► Taking up much-needed room on board ship .
► Creating a "bulwark” between naval officers and thelt men ► Undermining the authority of petty officers to extent that commissioned officers were stepping i° perform petty officer duties
The fact that other navies kept Marines afloat ^ similar duties only proved the point, Fullam argfe ’ that such an arrangement was acceptable only to ddelj raised "under the monarchical forms of Europe” iin. that it ran counter to the need to attract more Amerl cans into the Navy. Finally, Fullam underscored tbe soundness of his proposal by citing a similar record mendation for the removal of Marines, made the prt’vl, ous year by Commodore James A. Greer’s Board 0 Organization. j
The essay drew a mixed response. Through publish commentary in the Proceedings, junior officers side with Fullam, but more senior officers took issue ofl the question of removing Marines, with the break P°inj appearing at the rank of commander. Most who differe with Fullam believed that he had overstated his cas£- One Marine respondent refused to get excited, seeing "nothing to blush for in the past and present of rbe navy, and nothing to despair of in its future.” Another conceded that Fullam had a powerful paper, if ^lS theory that marines are responsible for all evil is c°f rect.” A third fired back with a broadside of his o^d'
"The foundation of the navy was the Mari°e
Corps: they were the original fighting men of rbe
Pull
suffered
more at the hands of Commander Henry Glass,
Th
eSSay
bon.
from
LuCe:
shiP- The sailors, in my long experience, have always lrked military duty, and are now, and always will e> lax in everything pertaining to military discipline. They not only try to circumvent the marines °n duty, but also the officers and petty officers of fne ship.”4
arn’s thesis got a less emotional response, but
. Member of the Greer Board of Organization. After jcating that "all the suggestions made by Lieut, am were more or less fully discussed and recorn- the acl°Pt'on’” Glass went on to say, "Certainly
recornmendation of the Organization Board was ^ue to any feeling that the presence of marines n board vessels tended to degrade the seamen, or to ^ .er them less efficient in the performance of military ^ ties.”5 The aim was to increase the efficiency of armes by grouping them in larger bodies ashore for ning or landing parties when needed.
Glass was more emphatic in private. In a follow-up ers°nal letter to Fullam, he wrote:
"I think you put too much importance on the Withdrawal of Marines from ship duty and am afraid cbut some of your expressions were unnecessarily strong and provoked antagonism.”6
e rest of Fullam’s personal mail concerning the was generally supportive, with one major excep- His stand on the Marines generated some flak a real heavyweight, Rear Admiral Stephen B.
"I cannot agree with you, however, that the Ma- nne guard of our ships deter American sailors from entering the Navy. I have talked with many young men . . . but have yet to hear one of them assign ifre presence, on board ship, of the Marine guard as a cause of not reenlisting. The treatment they have mceived at the hands of officers and small inducements to remain in the Navy have been the principal eauses assigned.”7
, Although his support was not unanimous, Fullam ^a<a clearly started something. Further, his ideas were ^ginning to spread beyond military circles, as evinced by supportive comment from the head of the naval department of The New York Times.
. Respite this encouragement, and Fullam’s efforts in ,ls new role as spokesman for the line officers, the Infrial proposal to remove Marines from warships did ^°t make much headway. After more discussion, it was eafr a double blow in 1894 when the Congress rejected measure which incorporated the Fullam proposal and ^ben the policy of the Department of the Navy was r'ailed down in Special Circular No. 16:
"Advantage is taken of this opportunity to state that the Department, after maturely considering the subject, and particularly in view of the honorable record made by the United States Marine Corps, which has been a part of our Navy since its organization, is convinced of the usefulness of that corps, both ashore and afloat, and of the propriety of continuing it in service on shipboard.”8
The logic behind this policy was spelled out more clearly in the Secretary of the Navy’s annual report for 1895. In announcing his decision to put a Marine detachment of rwo officers and 60 men on board the newly-commissioned USS Indiana (BB-l) and further stating his intention to "put Marines on the other battle ships as they are severally commissioned,” the secretary stated his conviction that, "The modern battle ship is largely a floating fort” with' more requirement for gun and landing party drills than in the days of sail. These, he emphasized, were the province of the Marines. The secretary also saw "a proper spirit of
"As to the Marines—the name alone has long been a synonym for idleness, worthlessness, and vacuity of intellect. ”
Charles H. Davis
the spar and sail drills on board a well-dn^e ship.” 14
Fullam’s second essay was greeted by a more unlt£ ^ front of supportive commentary by the line officers the Navy, with the notable exception of Admiral u Some, like Lieutenant W. F. Halsey, father o World War II admiral, described personal experieIlC: at sea to backstop Fullam’s more theoretical discussi°n One officer even introduced a chart with figures
rivalry” between sailors and Marines as an additional advantage.9
The official putdown failed to slow Fullam, although it did cause him to change his tack. He was back the following year with another Proceedings essay, which drew honorable mention in the annual competition. It opened with an expression of regret over congressional inability to pass the previous year’s naval reorganization bill, citing self-serving testimony from factions with "vested rights” as the cause.10
As the paper developed, it became clear that Fullam identified two such factions as the engineers and the Marines. Speaking from the point of view of the seagoing line officer, Fullam argued that "there should be as few officers as possible on board whose duties are restricted within narrow limits” and that "the perfect system would require that every officer on board should be available for any service in connection with the offensive power of the ship.” Fullam’s solution for the problem of engineers was to reduce them in number and assign them "solely to the duty of superintending the machinery.” This could be done by machinists and warrant officers, providing more commissioned engineers for ship and engine design work ashore, possibly consolidated with the Construction Corps.11
Fullam had similar ideas about the Marines, stating, "The few duties now performed by marine officers afloat could be assigned to line officers, who would also be available for all other naval work.” Citing "a fact that infantry drill and guard duties in the Navy require less ability and less study than a hundred other duties that fall to a naval officer,” Fullam concluded that, "A simple drill-book and a simple guard manual are needed, that is all. Unnecessary complexity in these matters has been a great bugbear.” 12
In this second effort, Fullam played down the argument um ad misericordiam, the degraded sailor, which had drawn so much fire the first time. Instead, he struck a more positive note, calling on naval officers "to develop the petty officer and to trust the bluejacket.” This would result in a situation where there would be no differences in loyalty and discipline between bluejackets and Marines, which could lead to the removal of Marines from ships and the assumption of their duties by sailors, quickly trained by means of the simple drill book.13
Once again, in making his point, Fullam could not resist the temptation to rhapsodize:
"The assertion is ventured that there has never been a system of infantry tactics . . . which required on the part of men so high a state of discipline, so high an average of personal intelligence, and such quick, united action as was demanded of seamen in
that
showed that officers of the Marines and the eng>n did less work and took more annual leave than officers. Fullam’s complaint that shipboard Marines a group were underworked was taken up by sever ’ who showed considerable affinity for the term Only one, however, suggested that "they shoul turned over bodily to the Army.”
Two Marine officers wrote rebuttals. First Lieutena C. H. Lauchheimer attacked Fullam’s logic and tioned his honesty for "making statements unsupp°rte^ by facts, . . . which, when diagnosed, are show11 be but a personal opinion, clouded by bias, if n0t ignorance.” 15 Claiming that the Fullam paper itself ^ ^ an attempt to protect the "vested rights” of the * officers, he objected strenuously to the notion c Marine duties could easily be assimilated by sal10 citing a U. S. Army estimate that it took three ye^ ^ to train an infantryman well. Lauchheimer presente breakdown of work schedules at sea and in P°rt’ show that Marines were in no sense idlers, but that t worked alongside sailors by day and stood sentry d6 ^ while most of the crew slept at night. He defen the qualifications of Marine officers, especially commissioned from the Naval Academy, to petf°j ^ naval duties. He expressed amazement "that the Mafl is to have fault found with him because he is trU^ worthy and efficient. Is the fact that he is trustwoP any reason why other men should not be so?” He cite David G. Farragut, David D. Porter, John A. DahlgreI^ and other naval officers of the old school, as well * those of contemporary times who had gone on reco^ in support of the Marine position. Finally, he p°lnt£ out the successful British experience, in which the va of Royal Marines on board actually increased with c conversion to steam, and Navy-Marine ties strengthened accordingly.16
First Lieutenant Charles A. Doyen took umbrage Fullam’s comparison of infantry tactics to spar and & drills, charging Fullam with failure to appreciate f l difference between the requirements of the drill f>e and those of the battlefield:
"The merest tyro in military knowledge can sho11 orders from the drill-book and march a battali°9 around a field, but when it comes to handling troop’
lx} r^e presence of an enemy, I submit the statement at the average line officer, in making a judicious flection of ground, preparing it hastily for defense, lsposing of his forces to the best advantage, provid- lng for the security and the information of the
^hole, would be as much at sea as the essayist is . »17
a hi °"V'en had a point, and he may well have detected p ind spot in Fullam. As W. H. Russell relates, am had already lent a hand in writing a "simple /' book” back in 1891.18 Published as Instructions r infantry and Artillery, United States Navy, the book as based on Major General Emory Upton’s Tactics, lch in turn was based upon the rigid and outdated tlcs of Frederick the Great. As watered down by j artl and other contributors, it proved to be a book ev°id of complexities, a guide for organizing and ^n8 troops, and little else, j Vleanwhile, the Marines were developing tactical p^trine along lines suggested by Navy Lieutenant k Crin's H. Mahan, an able tactician long overshadowed ^ bis older brother Alfred. Mahan had proposed a re flexible set of tactics, based on developments in b century European armies, and employing a trian- ar organization. Mahan’s 1888 Proceedings essay, en- U eb "Three Considered as a Tactical Unit,” was °mptly attacked by Fullam and his collaborators on tQC brill manual as impractical, unsound, and irrelevent the type of fighting the Navy would be doing
ashore.
p, "bhe Marines were to sharpen Mahan’s tactics at
tpUantanamo and in the Philippines, during and after
e bpanish-American War. However, as Russell points °Ut;
"The first clear triumph of the Mahan tactics over bullam’s came in 1914. Flexible, mobile and aggres- Slve Marine units . . . moved steadily through sniper-infested Vera Cruz with few casualties. On their right, rigidly massed units of seamen suffered tttore heavily. Trained to fight in a hollow square • • • , the bluejackets needed help from ships’ guns t° pass isolated positions that Marines had infiltrated.”19
^ Marine Colonel Commandant Charles Heywood was p 0 invited to comment on Fullam’s second paper, but to ^ec^nech Instead, he tried to put Fullam on report the Secretary of the Navy:
"I do not attempt to discuss Lieutenant Fullam’s article, or to reply to any of his remarks concerning fay Corps, but that the Department may be informed as to the persistency with which this officer attacks tts policy in keeping Marines afloat, where their presence is deemed necessary and has been ordered, I regard it my duty to refer this pamphlet for such action as may be deemed proper.”20
Heywood was barking up the wrong tree. Less than a week later, Fullam heard from one of his friends in the office of the Secretary:
"I see that Heywood has reported you to the Dept, for presuming to express your opinion about the Corps. Don’t bother your head about it. Coghlan has written a "discussion” of your article—which he sent to the Dept, to enquire if the law was to be transgressed by his sending it to the N.A. for publication. The Secretary decided that it could go . . . I went so far as to tell the Secretary that it was a very able paper and advised him to read it. You will find Coghlan enthusiastic in your favor.”21
At this point, the issue of removing Marines from service on warships appeared to have deteriorated to a zero-sum battle between the Marines and a growing number of Navy line officers, one in which either side
"The Marines are very strong in Washington, and we will find it hard work getting rid of them. ”
Richard Wainwright
WaS
by Commander Wm-
The memorandum painted a picture of overwhel^ ing support for the move, stymied only by a sing Marine:
"I am reliably informed that Admiral PillsbnO has repeatedly attempted to have the Marines sv'1 drawn, but that General Elliot [Major General Con’1 mandant] goes to the Secretary and successfm) combats the proposition. That is, one man, a genefa' can defy the sentiment of the whole military branc of the Navy, and perpetuate a condition we ha'e long since outgrown, if, indeed there was ever afl'? necessity for it.”28
could win only at the other’s expense. It was a highly personalized, emotionally charged battle which touched the deepest feelings of personal worth. The depth of feeling is reflected in the following comments, addressed to Fullam in 1896 by a friend in the Department of the Navy:
"As to the Marines—the name alone has long been a synonym for idleness, worthlessness, and vacuity of intellect. I should think that about the best thing that could happen to you would be to be reported by the Colonel Commandant. As to the report, it may be possible to cause you some annoyance under a feeble and vicious administration like the present—but you must remember that this administration is not in to stay, that we have the strongest possible friends in Congress.”22
Another wrote, "The Marines are very strong in Washington, and we will find it hard work getting rid of them.”23
In spite of the impasse, however, the seeds of an eventual accommodation between the Navy and the Marines were sown by Fullam’s 1896 essay:
"There should be at least six permanently organized battalions of marines, two on the Pacific coast and four on the Atlantic . . . There should be a transport on each coast ready to transport these battalions to any threatened point.”24
To be sure, the idea had been discussed before, by the Greer Board of Organization, among others, but Fullam gave it fresh impetus. America’s wartime experience at the turn of the century provided the backdrop for a 1902 essay by Marine Captain Dion Williams. Noting that, "Four years ago the territory of the United States was entirely contained in the continental limits of North America,” Williams proceeded to acknowledge America’s growing international role.25 This new role, he argued, called for the capability to seize and maintain outlying coaling stations by naval forces led by a naval commander, implying a use of Marines, rather than the Army, in garrisons ashore. Clearly, Williams was spelling out a new mission for the Marines, even to the point of advocating a strength increase to carry out that mission.
In the inevitable "discussion” which followed publication of Williams’ essay, Fullam concurred, raising his earlier requirement for six Marine battalions to seven (East Coast, two; West Coast, two; Pacific, three) in light of international developments. Characteristically, Fullam attached his own "rider,” however, suggesting that the Marines find at least 3,500 of their needed personnel by breaking up the ships’ detachments and letting the Navy develop its seamen and petty officers
without the coercive influence of the Marines.
Major George Barnett, destined to become the Cofl1 mandant of the Marine Corps a dozen years later’ summed it up well:
"The time has passed when the marine corps sva simply considered as a police guard ashore or afloat it must be considered a naval expeditionary f°rce’ always ready for instant duty ashore or afloat in an^ part of the world, and particularly wherever Commander-in-Chief finds it necessary to lan troops, or where it is necessary to guard naval ba or coaling stations.”27
C Ilf*
From these early stirrings, the development of c advance base concept continued, through the delit>e7 ations of the newly created (in 1900) General B°at ’ eventually leading to the establishment of an Advan Base School in 1910.
Meanwhile, the issue of removal of Marines n on board ships began to draw to a head. By 1906> ^ years after the first Proceedings essay touched off c 1 controversy, many of the line officers who had Fullam’s original supporters were reaching positions command, and their influence within the Navy growing steadily. .
First to be influenced was Rear Admiral George Converse, Chief of the Bureau of Navigation. In a annual report for 1906, with strong backing from 1 . battle fleet, he strongly recommended withdrawal 0 the Marines. In October 1908, Rear Admiral John Pillsbury, a subsequent Chief of the Bureau of Navig3 tion, repeated that recommendation to Secretary ofc . Navy Victor H. Metcalf, who in turn took it to PreSl dent Theodore Roosevelt.
Roosevelt had been prepared for the secretary’s ^ ommendation. The skids were greased a month eat 1 by the President’s naval aide, who had prepared a mefI^ orandum "upon the subject of Marines being empl°ye on board ship as police.” Included was an extract ft®111 the Bureau of Navigation report of 1906, with official comment thereon ' ^ J~~ w7"’
Fullam, USN.”
Th
ne memorandum went on to suggest that the ter could be resolved quickly by Roosevelt in his ft) Clty aS EMmmander-in-Chief, with no requirement appropriations or congressional approval of any 31 October 1908, Fullam received the word ^ had long awaited, in a letter from Commander ham S. Sims, Roosevelt’s naval aide:
Here is a yarn that will rejoice your vindictive s°ul Yesterday, General Elliott made an appointment with me and gave me the usual song- jh'd-dance as to why the Marines should remain on °ard • . . he said such a matter should be decided °nly by the President, and he intended to ask for an interview, and have the pressure stopped, etc . . . lrt str>ct confidence, for the present, the order has Steady been approved to take all of the Marines off ships. . . . Apparently, General Elliott did not now of this decision when he talked to me yester- daX, or if he did he kept it dark and intends to fight ^he decision. . . . This is a well deserved triumph °r you, and you should have credit for it all.”29
ne only immediate reaction of Elliott and the Ma- ^ es to the Presidential order was an, "Aye, aye, Sir!” eanwhile, Fullam rejoiced in his moment of triumph, as replied to Sims:
I wish you could represent to the President that rfie order to withdraw Marines from ships will be failed by the enlisted men of the Navy as a veritable Emancipation Proclamation,’ . . ,”30
*n a subsequent letter to a friend, Fullam’s tone was raci°us and forward-looking:
"My one idea has been to raise the standard of rfie bluejacket, as high as possible. 'If that be treason, ^ake the most of it.’
. a few years ago, Dion Williams wrote an article on Marines and I commented on it, outlining a scheme for the organization and employment of cEe Corps which I believed then, and still believe, w°uld benefit the Marine, the bluejacket, and the ^avy. ... It has been sent to the General Board l°ng ago. It is doubtless in one of their capacious P*geon-holes now.”31
'Ellis apparently softened mood soon changed, how- «■ By the first of the year, it became evident that e Marines were gearing up for a fight in Congress. am tested the water with an old friend in the House Representatives, John W.. Weeks of Massachusetts, replied:
"The President is apparently in favor of turning cfie Marines over to the Army. I am opposed to that, and if I believed that the destruction of the Corps would be brought about by taking it off ships, I should be almost disposed to vote to put them back where they were. If they can be used in other fields, where they have been most successful in the past, I see no particular reason why they should be put back aboard ship.”32
Ironically, Weeks later served as Secretary of War from 1921 to 1925.
The issue was aired through investigative hearings held by the House Naval Affairs Committee. To Fullam, it must have seemed like a kangaroo court. As he saw it, overwhelming testimony from the Navy’s hierarchy, the secretary and the bureau chiefs down through the fleet commanders, was rejected in favor of testimony from the beach. This testimony came from Marine colonels and retired naval officers whom Fullam considered out of touch with modern conditions, and who would probably never have anything to do with the fleet.
Fullam had cause for frustration, in light of the atmosphere of the hearings:
The order has already been approved to take all of the Marines off the ships . . . This is a well deserved triumph for you, and you should have credit for it all. ”
William S. Sims
► The committee was chaired by the father of the Marine Medal of Honor winner Smedley D. Butler.
► The clerk of the committee was a Marine officer.
► The Commandant and three colonels of his staff were present at every session to prompt the committee and to cross-examine witnesses.
After the dust had settled and the committee had reported out in favor of restoring Marines to shipboard duty, Fullam complained bitterly to Admiral of the Navy George Dewey, the respected head of the General Board: ". . . it is not right to create a privileged class by force of law.”33 Dewey agreed, but the matter was out of his hands by then.
In the last analysis, the fight of nearly two decades over shipboard Marines would boil down to the debate over a short proviso, tacked on to H.R. 26394, a naval appropriations bill:
"Provided. That no part of the appropriations herein made for the Marine Corps shall be expended for the purposes for which said appropriations are made unless officers and enlisted men shall serve as heretofore on board all battleships and armored cruisers, and also upon such other vessels of the Navy as the President may direct, in detachments
of not less than 8 per cent of the strength of 1 e enlisted men of the Navy on said vessels.”
The final debate took place in the Senate. ^enat° Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts presented J complete set of Fullam’s arguments. As the deo progressed, however, a new issue, possibly the deci 1 one, crept in:
"Mr. LODGE. Mr. President, I desire to put the Record an executive order which I thin have heard called 'violent’ and 'tyrannical’ this noon. I will read it: [Reads Roosevelt’s Executec Order Defining the Duties of the Marine CorpsJ ^
"Mr. LODGE. That is the whole of the 'violet and 'tyrannical’ order. .
"Mr. RAYNER [Maryland], 'Despotic,’ not 'violent.’
"Mr. LODGE. The 'despotic’ order, then. D°e the Senator deny that the President had the rig^1, under the Constitution, to make that order? .
"Mr. RAYNER. I repeat that that is a desp°tlC and tyrannical order, although he has the right do it. A man can exercise a right and still exerc it as a despot and a tyrant.”35
With latent congressional feelings about Theod°r^ Roosevelt now a matter of record, Lodge attempt^ to shift the debate to the question of creating "privileged class by force of law,” but it was too The debate’s center of gravity had shifted. The issU^ of Marines serving on board ship had become one 0 balance between an abrupt Chief Executive and a rest* Congress. The end of Fullam’s effort of nearly decades was near, and it came swiftly, as the amen ment restoring Marines to shipboard duty was appr°ve^ by a vote of 51 to 12. The matter had been settle as an exercise of power—not on its merits.
Fullam was good for one more try. In 1913, as c , Department of the Navy’s Aid for Inspections, he n e a report attacking the competence of the Marines run the Advance Base School, resurrecting, as a 51 issue, the continued presence of Marines on board shff Admiral Dewey’s reply, on behalf of the Genet3 Board, contained a note of weariness:
"The General Board regrets the renewed agitati°5 of the question of removal of Marines from ship of the Navy . . . and it further believes that t^lS action, if persisted in, may eventually cause the l°s' of the Marine Corps to the Navy and its absorpt'011 by the Army.”36
The Marine issue was truly a dead horse, and Full3111 finally stopped beating it, even in his personal cot[£ spondence.
ullam’s story is filled with irony. His attacks on ^ Stines, though supported by mounting numbers naval line officers, in the long run served only to Provide the Marines a chance to beat their own drum.
Is recourse to political means eventually caused his Pet project to become ensnared in the web of Washing- t0n Political intrigue, and politicians finally pushed him °ut of the limelight and kept him there for the last ", rs °f his career. Finally, despite years of unmatched Wication to duty, his ability to influence the course rhe Navy onlv really began to be felt after he left
'heNavy. y y y *
. fullam’s contribution to the Marine Corps was an 'rect one. In the very necessity of rejecting Fullam’s ^eas, the Marines were spurred to develop their own. e served as a catalyst for badly needed self-examination within the Corps, leading to the development of concepts which in turn would shape the 20th century role that Marines would eventually play.
In the last analysis, then, William Freeland Fullam emerges not as a devil, but a devil’s advocate of the first order.
A 1957 graduate of Yale University, Lieutenant Colonel Miller spent his early years of service with Marine infantry battalions in California and the Western Pacific. After a three-year tour at the Eighth and Eye Barracks in Washington, D.C., he attended the Army’s Infantry and Airborne Schools at Fort Benning, Georgia, before going to Vietnam as a rifle company commander in 1965. He returned to serve on the staff of the Comander-in- Chief, Atlantic, later attending the Armed Forces Staff College. In 1970, he was back in Vietnam as an advisor to the Vietnamese Marine Corps at battalion, brigade, and division level. He is currently assigned to the staff of the Commandant of the Marine Corps.
Vh.
Russell, "The Genesis of FMF Doctrine: 1789-1899,” Marine Corps
Juf
'aze“e, April, 1951, pp. 52-59; May 1951, pp. 48-53; June 1951, pp. 50-56;
y 1951,
pp. 52-59.
*L'
^ leutenant W. F. Fullam, USN, "The System of Naval Training and ^lsc>pline Required to Promote Efficiency and Attract Americans,” U. S. aval Institute Proceedings, No. 4, 1890, p. 475.
V p. 477.
Captain
r°seed,
Henry A. Bartlett, USMC, "Discussion,” U. S. Naval Institute
"”gs, No. 4, 1890, pp. 532-3.
Coi
’Umander Henry Glass, USN, "Discussion,” U. S. Naval Institute Pro- :eed'ngs, No. 4, 1890, pp. 514, 516.
^Glass letter to W. F. Fullam dated 7 December 1890, Fullam Papers, Naval lstorical Foundation Collection, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.
^ear Admiral Stephen B. Luce, USN, letter to W. F. Fullam, dated 24 0vernber 1890, Fullam Papers.
Quoted in First Lieutenant C. H. Lauchheimer, USMC, "Discussion,” U. S. aval Institute Proceedings, No. 1, 1896, p. 193.
Hilary A Herbert, Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy for the Year kt/’ (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1895), p. XXXVIII.
hdlam, "The Organization, Training, and Discipline of the Navy Personas Viewed from the Ship,” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, No. 1,
lei,
1896
Hid, 2Uid„ 3 Hid.,
PP- 83-116. pp. 88-89. P- 91.
Pp. 108-109.
p.
P- 109.
b^chheimer, op. cit., pp. 187-8.
'Und.
P- 190.
20Commandant of the Marine Corps letter to Secretary of the Navy, dated 14 April 1896, Fullam Papers.
21 {Signature unintelligible) letter to Fullam dated 20 April 1896, Fullam Papers.
22Commander C. H. Davis, USN, letter to Fullam dated 22 April 1896, Fullam Papers.
23 Captain Richard Wainwright, USN, letter to Fullam dated 11 April 1896, Fullam Papers.
24Fullam, op. cit., pp. 113-4.
25Captain Dion Williams, USMC, 'The Defense of Our New Naval Stations,” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, No. 2, 1902, pp. 181-94.
26Fullam, "Discussion,” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, No. 3, 1902, pp. 589-92.
27Major George Barnett, USMC, "Discussion,” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, No. 3, 1902, p. 594.
28Commander William S. Sims, USN, memorandum to President Theodore Roosevelt, dated 16 September 1908, Fullam Papers.
29Sims letter to Fullam, dated 31 October 1908, Fullam Papers.
30 Fullam letter to Sims, dated 4 November 1908, Fullam Papers.
31 Fullam letter to Lieutenant Commander Edward L. Beach, USN, dated 21 November 1908, Fullam Papers.
32John W. Weeks letter to Fullam dated 11 January 1909, Fullam Papers
33 Fullam letter to Admiral of the Navy George Dewey dated 7 January 1909, Fullam Papers.
34Congressional Record, 16 February 1909, p. 2507.
35Ibid., p. 2515.
36Admiral of the Navy George Dewey, USN, (President, General Board) letter to Secretary of the Navy dated 21 July 1913.
^rst Lieutenant Charles A. Doyen, USMC, "Discussion,” U. S. Naval lSfitute Proceedings, No. 1, 1896, p. 163.
Bussell, op. cit., June 1951, pp. 50-56.
Ib'd, June 1951, p. 56.
*n-