This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
Does NATO really need a Baltic Squadron?
The answer is complex. For geographical, military, and political reasons, the situation in the Baltic differs fundamentally from that in all other sea areas of the NATO alliance, with the possible exception of the Black Sea. In the five years since I analyzed the naval strategic situation of the Baltic in detail for Naval Review 1969, the balance of forces in the Baltic has continued to shift to the disadvantage of NATO. Nevertheless, on the whole, that analysis still appears to be sound.
The Baltic constitutes an internal sea which is connected with the ocean only by way of the Danish Straits and the Kiel Canal.[1] The territories which dominate the Straits—Denmark and Schleswig-Holstein—
constitute a key naval strategic position of the first order. As long as they remain in the hands of NATO, the Baltic Fleet of the Soviet Union cannot, in case of war, venture outside the Baltic Approaches. If the Soviets seize the Straits—either by the occupation of Denmark or by the political integration of that country into the Soviet power sphere—the Baltic Fleet could advance to Denmark’s present position. It could then unite with the Soviet Northern Fleet and could participate in a naval war in the North Sea, in the Arctic Sea, and in the Atlantic. The big shipyards within the Baltic and the logistic and training potential located there would be available to the united fleets. There is no need to depict in detail what Soviet naval warfare based on the Danish position would mean. It is perfectly obvious that the consequences would be disastrous for NATO.
The Straits not only play a key role in terms of naval strategy, they are equally important in the framework of overall strategy. A Soviet-occupied Denmark would render the defense of southern Norway impossible. The NATO front in Central Europe, all along the Iron Curtain, would be outflanked from the North. It would have to be drawn back far to the West. Sweden would be cut off from the open seas, and would have to bow to Soviet might.
The Baltic is narrow and shallow—narrow in the sense that the distances between opposite coasts are small. To the west the two coastlines converge. Surveillance of the sea areas adjacent to the Soviet-controlled part of the coast (which reaches from the extreme north of the Gulf of Bothnia to the vicinity of Liibeck) is, therefore, practically total. For two thirds of this distance, Sweden forms the opposite coast. Only one third of this coast is NATO territory, i.e. Denmark. And
only in the westernmost corner of the Baltic, by and large around Kiel Bay, does either coast belong to the NATO area. In terms of naval strategy, the Baltic may thus be divided in three distinct zones:
► The sea area east of Bornholm. It is entirely under Soviet control.
► The sea area to the west of Bornholm, up to the limits of Kiel Bay. It is subdivided by the particularly shallow Gedser Narrows into the Arcona Basin, and the Bay of Mecklenburg. This area constitutes the "glacis” for the defense of the German and the Danish coasts.
► Kiel Bay and the Danish Straits proper—the Sound, the Great Belt, and the Little Belt.
In order to force the Baltic Approaches, the Soviets would have to occupy Denmark and Schleswig- Holstein. While it is an open question whether such an occupation would take place merely by means of an amphibious attack, or, simultaneously, by land operations against Schleswig-Holstein, it can safely be assumed that amphibious operations will play a decisive wartime role in the Baltic. The amphibious potential of the Warsaw Pact countries in the Baltic is sufficient, for example, to transport 8,000 army troops, fully equipped, in a single lift. Given the small distances in the Baltic, the same amphibious craft could easily supply troops for several successive attacks. Army units and parachute troops for amphibious operations are available to the East in great numbers. The mission assigned to the combat units of the Warsaw Pact navies is to provide cover for such amphibious operations against NATO.
It would not be feasible to repel amphibious landings of Eastern forces directly from the specific coastal area. From Liibeck to the Skaw, NATO coast lines which, including the islands, measure approximately 3,000 kilometers, are almost entirely suitable for amphibious operations. It is evident that NATO is unable to provide sufficient troops to defend this extensive coast line. Also, redeploying troops which are situated farther back in order to intervene at the point of an amphibious landing is impossible, since the coast is cut up almost everywhere by inlets of the sea. Artillery and guided missile batteries for coastal defense are lacking.
Under these circumstances, the defense against amphibious attacks from the East devolves almost entirely upon NATO naval forces. This is indeed their principal mission. Only the meager navies of Denmark and of the Federal Republic of Germany—NATO’s two Baltic countries—are there to fulfill it. They are inferior to the Communist bloc sea and air forces in every category.
In view of the different strategic missions of the Eastern and the Western side, a category-by-category
comparison of naval forces and, even more so, a comparison between the total numbers of units, would not make much sense. A fair indication of the quantitative balance of forces is, however, obtained from the ratio of naval personnel. It stands at approximately 1:6. In addition, the quality of material and the level of training are considerably higher on the Eastern side—a fact not reflected in this figure.
In the "glacis” zone west of Bornholm—the Arcona Basin and Mecklenburg Bay—the deployment of larger NATO surface units is not possible today. Soviet naval aircraft, fast patrol boats (FPB), Soviet corvettes of the Nanuchka class, and antiship guided missile batteries along the Warsaw Pact coasts constitute too much of a threat for them. In the shallow waters, mines are an additional danger. Thus, on the NATO side, only smaller types of surface ships can usefully be employed.
However, it is doubtful whether the Soviets for their
part consider using their big destroyers and cruisers for convoy duty with amphibious units in, for instance, the Arcona Basin. For them, too, deployment of these units in narrow, shallow, and mine-infested waters would mean a high risk in the face of NATO FPBs equipped with modern torpedoes and antiship guided missiles, NATO submarines, and NATO naval aircraft. Soviet corvettes could very well be substituted for these larger units. The hypothesis that the use of big ships in these waters is no longer envisaged is supported by the fact that the number of cruisers and destroyers stationed with the Soviet Baltic Fleet has lately gone down.
L
A Baltic Squadron for NATO? 65
Submarine warfare plays an unusual role in the Baltic. West of the Gedser Narrows, and even in some parts of the Arcona Basin, water depths are so reduced that even the smallest types of submarines presently available to the Soviets could not operate there. Ac-
cordingly, NATO naval forces have no ASW tasks to fulfill in this area. In the central part of the Arcona Basin, the use of Soviet submarines is conceivable but not very likely. East of the island of Bornholm, some areas are sufficiently deep to permit the use of submarines. Since, however, Soviet control of the sea is complete in that zone, there are neither targets for Soviet submarines, nor, of course, ASW activities by NATO surface ships or aircraft. In the Baltic, then, the ASW mission on the NATO side is extremely limited —a situation unique in the total NATO context.
The ASW situation for the Soviet Union is different. The Baltic submarines of the Federal German Navy have a displacement of less than 500 tons. They can operate in relatively shallow waters, e.g., in the Arcona Basin, and a fortiori east of Bornholm. Against them, the Soviets dispose an overwhelming fleet of ASW surface ships—DDs, DEs, corvettes and subchasers, as well as ASW aircraft, both fixed wing and helicopter.
Shallow waters are the ideal arena for the defensive and offensive use of mines. One must therefore reckon with intensive mine warfare on either side. Of course NATO is prepared to respond to amphibious attacks by mining operations. However, in this context the time factor is absolutely essential. The question is whether, in the case of an actual attack, enough time remains to lay minefields. The answer may well be negative if it is a Pearl Harbor type attack.
On the NATO side, only small, fast ships or possibly submarines can be used for minelaying of a tactical or offensive nature. There are no aircraft with a minelaying capability. For minesweeping and minehunting operations, too, only small craft can be employed. Such operations can only be conducted in the sea areas adjacent to NATO country coasts. In view of the length of its coast line, the easy surveillance of the sea areas off its coasts, and the superiority in numbers of its minesweeping units, the Warsaw Pact is at a definite advantage with respect to mine counter measures.
A final'handicap for the West must be mentioned: the Baltic is a nuclear-free zone. Tactical atomic weapons with their inherent usefulness, and because of their role within the atomic escalation process, create or increase the deterrence value of conventional forces on land. However, no nuclear weapons are available either on board NATO ships or within the naval air force. This gap could only be filled by the intervention of external forces in the form of carrier-borne aircraft. At what point such assistance could be brought to bear is problematic. The absence of atomic weapons in the area could, more than anything else, induce the Soviet Union to effect a sudden coup against Denmark in peacetime, providing, of course, that the overall political situation warrants it.
From this concise description of the naval strategic situation in the Baltic, the following conclusions may be drawn:
► In case of war in the Baltic, NATO has immediately available only the weak forces of the Danish and Federal German navies.
► The naval forces of the Warsaw Pact countries are vastly superior in both surface ships and air capability-
► On the NATO side, no reinforcements are planned which could make up for Eastern superiority at sea-
in light of these unfavorable circumstances, the strengthening of NATO naval forces in case of war by a Baltic Squadron, would naturally be highly desirable- However, as only small, specially constructed ships without emphasis on ASW capability could be considered for action in the Baltic, it is hard to see from which non-Baltic NATO nation such units could come- One cannot realistically expect other NATO countries, with no direct responsibility for this sea area, to design and maintain special units suitable for the particular circumstances of the Baltic.
From a strictly military viewpoint, it thus appears that a call for a Baltic Squadron—as a means of reinforcing NATO surface naval forces in case of war— is not supportable. A reinforcement of naval air power could, on the other hand, be of real usefulness, especially if equipped with tactical nuclear weapons. The deterrent effect of existing NATO units in the Baltic area could be considerably increased with such assistance. However, under present political circumstances the permanent transfer of, e.g., a U. S. naval air wing to Europe may not be realistic. Earmarking one air wing or at least one air squadron of the U. S. Navy for deployment in the Baltic might be more realistic. Preparations fot such an assignment, and the accompanying infrastructure measures,* or—even better—occasional participation in NATO naval exercises in the Baltic, would by themselves produce a deterrent effect and thereby distinctly improve the security and the political stature of the Baltic NATO countries in peacetime.
Let us now ask: Does NATO need a Baltic squadron in peacetime, for political reasons? The political effect of military armament resides, it is true, mainly in its actual effectiveness in a potential war. But, especially with respect to naval forces, we must also note an immediate peacetime political effect. Permanent or frequent presence in a particular sea area can generate a political impact, even though use of the force in war may not take place there at all. In the Baltic, such peacetime presence could be of particular significance.
*Only air fields in the Federal Republic of Germany can be considered since stockpiling of nuclear weapons in peacetime is forbidden by Danish law
north Sea
NORWAY
THE\ \ KATTEGAT1
SWEDEN
Stockholm
GOTLAND
SKANE Karlskr°na- PENINSULA T*—N/
Klaipeda
tRNHOLM
Liibeck
iverniinde
Danzig
Swinemunde (Swinoujscie)
Stettin (Szczecin)
V EAST GERMANY
POLAND
Netherlands (' west Germany
FINLAND
Tallinn
Pillau (Baltiisk)
* • Konigsberg (Kaliningrad)
—____ \
**cne
WHITE SEA
Leningrad
U.S.S.R.
NORTH SEA
NETH.
NORWAY
• Goteborg
.
SWEDEN
Aalborg
Aarhus
JUTLAND
• Esbjerg
SKANE PENINSULA
DENM,
;nhagen
GREAT
Malmo
ZEALAND
LOLLAND
FEHMARN
MECKLENBURG BAY''"
SOUND
FATHOMS'
BORNHOLM
ARCONA BASIN
S«snH*
RUGEN
^OAf
« • Warnemunde • Rostock
Lubeck
Hamburg
WEST GERMANY
Pi raverru
Swinemunde
EAST GERMANY
POLAND
A Baltic Squadron for NATO? 69
To make dear why this is so, a brief review of historical developments in the Baltic area in the last several centuries may prove useful.
Russia’s naval aspirations have their origin in the Baltic. Peter the Great directed his efforts at constructing a fleet towards that area. On a small strip of land, painfully conquered from the Neva swamps, the only spot where the then Russian Empire bordered on the Baltic, Peter created St. Petersburg in 1703. It was to be his capital, but, more, it was an ideal strategic center for his fleet.
Peter hoped to seize the Baltic provinces from the Swedes, and to incorporate them into his Empire. However, this short-term interest was by no means his principal motive in creating a fleet. He aimed higher. Peter dreamed of breaking Sweden’s predominance in the Baltic, and replacing it by Russian hegemony at sea. The Baltic was to become a Russian sea. Peter recognized clearly that control of the Baltic Approaches was necessary towards that end and, logically enough, took a close look at the situation in Denmark. He paid a visit to Zealand and Copenhagen, and cast a covetous glance at the fortress of Kronburg near Helsingore from where he meant to control the Sound. His concept of the Baltic as a "mare clausum russicum” was not to be realized in his lifetime. The Scandinavian countries were as yet too strong. But his ambitious goal survived him. His successors clung to it, through the ups and downs of Russian history, pursuing their aims openly or discreetly with the aid of political, diplomatic or legal instruments, whichever came in handy.
As the Scandinavian countries continued to fall back into secondary positions, it was logical that Russia’s claims to the Baltic should encounter resistance on the part of England. Under Britain’s conception of the freedom of the seas, the Baltic was to remain open for English trade and English ships. This maxim was the very basis of the relationship between England and Denmark, from the Napoleonic Wars on. England extended her protective hand to Denmark which thus was able to control the Baltic Approaches. In modern times, this relationship has found its natural continuation in Denmark’s membership in NATO.
In 1918, Russia suffered the worst blow to her Baltic power position. She was thrown back upon the original basis of her naval history, Kronstadt Bay, at the innermost point of the Gulf of Finland. Neither this catastrophe nor the changeover from the Czars to the Soviet system, however, altered Russia’s Baltic ambitions. The Soviet Union unflinchingly adopted Peter’s historic claim, now modified to read: "The Baltic must become a neutral sea.” This theme made its debut in the peace treaties with Estonia and Lithuania in 1920. In 1924, at the Conference on the Law of the Sea in Rome,
the Soviet Union insisted upon the neutralization of the Baltic.
But Stalin never abandoned the claim to hegemony in the Baltic. Negotiating with the Allies in 1939, he demanded Soviet naval bases in Jutland, the same demand he later addressed to Hitler in 1940. In Teheran, Stalin insisted upon a naval base in Denmark and, in 1945, at the Yalta Conference, he demanded the establishment of a separate Kiel Canal State under a Soviet protectorate. Then, when the zonal borders were fixed in Germany, he tried to include the island of Fehmarn in the Soviet-occupied zone. In all these cases, he failed because the British were adamant. Similarly, his attempt to shortchange the Western powers by occupying the Danish island of Bornholm was unsuccessful; the Soviets had to vacate the island. But, soon after 1945, before the Soviets had even rebuilt a fleet to speak of, they solemnly declared that the Baltic must now become a "Sea of Peace,” a proposition which was nothing but a new, psychologically embellished, version of the old neutrality claim to a mare clausum.
The idea behind neutralization of the Baltic is to transform it into a sea area which is inaccessible to warships of non-Baltic nations in war as well as in peace. If, and as long as, this aim cannot be realized by physical occupation of the territories adjacent to the Baltic Straits (in the Soviet view undoubtedly the ideal solution!), the Soviet Union continues to promote an international convention on the Baltic Straits. The Diplomatic Dictionary of the U.S.S.R. (Nov. 1971) which is co-edited by Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, formulates this demand in the most specific terms.
Considering the immense superiority of the Soviet Baltic Fleet over the navies of all other Baltic countries, such as convention would amount to an international, legal recognition of unlimited Soviet hegemony at sea in the Baltic. Once enjoying the benefits of its new power position, the Soviet Union would immediately impose rules designed to give unfair advantage to its own shipping. At the same time, her position of hegemony would open the door to boundless political intervention and the exercise of more or less subtle pressures upon the other Baltic countries. In case of war, NATO assistance from outside would be much more difficult.
We can reasonably expect that the Soviets will continue to press their plan of a Baltic Straits Convention, and the slogan of the "Sea of Peace” with their habitual perseverance. Soviet propagandists and Soviet international lawyers will assist their diplomats and delegations to international conferences, as they have in the past. In the process, they will skillfully employ the notions of custom and customary law. Whenever they can prove that one of their claims in the maritime field
has been tacitly accepted in practice by seafaring nations over a certain length of time, they are quick to use this to bolster their demands—so far unfounded in law—by invoking customary law. All too frequently they are rewarded by success.
For political, economic, and strategic reasons, the Baltic must remain free. The West must not bow to Soviet claims, and must fight them on all those levels in which the Soviets make their attack: in international legal science, in diplomacy, in propaganda. Most important, the Soviet Union must be prevented from invoking customary law with any chance of success. That implies: warships of the West must make a showing in the Baltic regularly and, if possible, with some degree of permanence.
The situation in the Black Sea provides a good illustration for the value of "showing the flag” regularly. This is an area where the Soviets make the same claims as in the Baltic. Here, also, they push the idea of a mare clausum to be sanctioned by a Straits convention, in this case by a Montreux Convention amended to suit their needs. The purpose, again, is to exclude all non-riparian countries from the Black Sea. Customary law is cited in support of their claims. But the Black Sea is, in fact, an open sea and must remain just that. Western naval forces must be allowed to cruise there as in any other sea, especially since its entire southern coast is a NATO coast. This is why the United States, from time to time, dispatches destroyers into the Black Sea. Regularly, the Soviet Union reacts with violent outbursts of propaganda, pretending that the appearance of the U. S. units, in reality a perfectly legal act, constitutes a breach of international law or aggressive conduct.
If NATO naval forces cruise in the Baltic and call at NATO ports, there is thus more to it than a mere courtesy call. Such visits have an important political dimension. They should therefore not be limited to the western Baltic. The Western powers should make it a point to cruise frequently in the Soviet-controlled sea areas east of Bornholm. The West must make it clear that this part of the Baltic is as free as any other, and that the Soviets have no privileges there whatsoever. How far their arrogation goes even now appears from their indignant outcries whenever a destroyer of the Federal German Navy shows up in the eastern Baltic, even though the Federal Republic is one of the Baltic riparians.
Under the present auspices of detente, Western politicians are often inclined to retreat when faced with violent Soviet propaganda. Some scheduled missions of NATO warships—including American units—into the eastern Baltic have already been cancelled on the grounds that the climate of detente might suffer. One
cannot be stern enough in counseling against such arguments. A position of right is at stake, and any failure to exercise these rights will be unscrupulously interpreted by the Soviets as a tacit recognition of their claims.
We have justly concluded that warships from non- Baltic NATO countries—especially U. S. Navy units— must show their flag throughout the Baltic. Yet, such occasional presence would still lack a necessary element of duration. The full political effect of refuting Soviet claims can obtain only by stationing a NATO destroyer squadron in the Baltic on a long-term, or better still, on a permanent basis. Ideally, the squadron would be composed multinationally after the model of the Standing Naval Force Atlantic. Gradually, the Soviets would get used to the presence of NATO, and their propaganda instruments would surely become blunt in the long run.
We have now assembled the elements to give a final reply to the question: Does NATO need a Baltic Squadron? The answer is in the affirmative. A permanent destroyer squadron, by its peaceful presence in the entire Baltic area, would refute Soviet claims to a "Sea of Peace” and demonstrate NATO solidarity.
Yet, desirable as any increase in NATO combat potential in the Baltic may seem, under the particular constraints of naval warfare in the Baltic, the West may not have one—not even in the eventuality of armed conflict. It would therefore be important to concentrate—at the very least—on earmarking for the Baltic, a land-based naval air wing with tactical nuclear weapons. This would be a precious help. In a period of tension, the wing would have to be transferred to suitable, well-prepared airfields at an early point.
Admiral Wegener was Commander NATO Naval Forces, Baltic Approaches, from 1963 to 1965. He entered the German Navy in 1923 and specialized in ordnance. After tours aboard cruisers and destroyers he commanded the small destroyers Greif and Kondor in 1936 and 1937. After some months in the Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine in Berlin in 1938, he served as gunnery officer aboard the heavy cruiser Admiral Hipper through all her war action, until February 1943. At the time of the Normandy invasion, he was operations officer on the Naval Staff, West, in Paris. From October 1944 till the end of the war, when the main activities of the German surface forces took place in the Baltic, he was staff operations officer in the Fleet Command. After the war, he was in the rubber industry' until he joined the new navy of the Federal Republic in August 1956. From 1957 through I960, he served as naval attache with the embassy in Washington, D.C. He became director of the section for plans and policies on the Naval Staff of the Ministry of Defense, and then assumed his duties as NATO Commander of the Baltic Approaches in January 1963. Since retirement in 1965, he has been active in domestic politics and as a writer on naval subjects. He is the author of "A Strategic Analysis of the Baltic Sea and the Danish Straits” in Naval Review 1969 and of "Theory of Naval Strategy in the Nuclear Age” in Naval Review 1972.
[1]The Canal linking Leningrad with the White Sea is of little strategic significance. It is closed by ice about six months a year. The numerous locks are vulnerable to air attacks, and do not permit the passage of modern submarines and large destroyers.