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A confrontation is the opposing of one element of military power with another element of military power. The object is to accomplish this in such a way as to prevent the first power from succeeding in whatever he set out to do, without combat. It is to prevent an undesired action, by threat. Confrontation includes such tactics as interposition, the placing of one element of power between two others.
Confrontation as a technique of sub-limited war thus involves the usually rapid build-up of a significant military force in what is considered an endangered area. While this force is generally much smaller than that which would probably have to be committed if fighting actually broke out, it should at least be able to fight
a delaying action pending reinforcement. The threat of larger force, of controlled escalation, is implicit in its presence.
If a confrontation is badly handled, or if the task was impossible to start with, the outcome could well be limited war. When major powers are involved, even by proxy, escalation into general war is always possible. The problem is therefore always a touchy one.
In this kind of operation, as in other sub-limited efforts, three levels of foreign policy objectives influence our conduct: long-range basic policy objectives (the avoidance of general war, for example); immediate political objectives; and potential battlefield (military) objectives. Regarding the military deployment of tacti-
44 U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, January 1974
cal nuclear weapons, for instance, we would consider not only the potential battlefield costs and gains, but also the ever-present political danger of unwanted escalation and what the immediate local political trade-offs might be. Each case is different, somehow, in its details.
We shall here examine the British deployment to Kuwait in 1961 as an example of such an employment of military power.
Located at the head of the Persian Gulf, the small, hot, dry Sheikhdom of Kuwait has an area of nearly 6,000 square miles (mostly desert). It had a 1961 population of 320,000, predominantly Moslem Sunni Arabs, ruled by a Sheikh, Sir Abdullah al Salim al Subah. Most of the other offices of state were held traditionally by members of the ruling family. Measures had, however, recently been enacted to provide a modern judiciary and civil service.
The Sheikhdom’s chief town and port, also called Kuwait, was founded about the beginning of the 18th century by settlers from central Arabia. During the next two centuries, it rivaled Basra as an entrepot for the trade between India and parts of the Middle East. Kuwait exports pearls, wool, and hides; its imports include almost every type of consumer goods and numerous kinds of equipment. There is no agriculture. In the past, Kuwaitis derived their living from the sea—from pearl-diving, fishing, boat-building—and from the entrepot trade. But the economy is now dominated by the oil industry.
One of the world’s foremost oil producers, tiny Kuwait almost literally floats on oil. Production in I960 was 81,860,000 tons. In the 12 months ended 31 May 1961, almost 40% of the United Kingdom’s oil imports came from Kuwait. The concession was granted to the Kuwait Oil Company, formed by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (now British Petroleum) and the Gulf Oil Corporation of the United States, in 1934, and oil was struck in 1938. Production did not begin until after World War II, but increased rapidly from 1947’s initial two million tons. Reserves may be the largest in the world, and, since the oil lies near to the surface, they are especially easy to tap.
Oil has made Kuwait rich, and a tempting prize for its neighbors.
In 1961, then, Kuwait and its oil were important to the United Kingdom, not only for the oil itself, but also, since Kuwait operated within the sterling bloc, as vital factors in maintaining the stability of the British pound.
For most of modern history, Kuwait has been a British-protected state. The original Anglo-Kuwaiti Agreement was concluded in 1899. A response to an
appeal for support made some years earlier by the Sheikh of Kuwait (who feared a Turkish attempt to seize his territory), this agreement formed the common basis of the Anglo-Kuwaiti relationship for 60 years. In the agreement, and in exchange for British protection, Kuwait gave the United Kingdom control of its foreign relations. Kuwait undertook not to receive representatives of other powers or to dispose of its territory without the prior agreement of the U.K. government.
Kuwait formed an important item on the agendas of much subsequent area diplomacy. Its status was discussed in the Anglo-Turkish negotiations which culminated in the Draft Convention of 1913; in the latter, Kuwait was recognized as an autonomous gaza of the Ottoman Empire and its frontiers were roughly defined, while Turkey accepted the validity of the agreements between the Sheikh and the United Kingdom. On 3 November 1914, when the Sheikh offered to assist in the war against the Turks, who were then aligned with the Central Powers, the United Kingdom declared its recognition of Kuwait as "an independent Government under British protection.” The frontiers of Kuwait—with Saudi Arabia and Iraq—were finally fixed through Britain’s good offices in 1922-23.
On 19 June 1961, an exchange of notes was signed by the Sheikh of Kuwait and the British Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, on behalf of the United Kingdom. For some time past, Kuwait had possessed entire responsibility for the conduct of its own international relations. Kuwait had already joined a number of international organizations as an independent sovereign state, with the full support of the United Kingdom. This development rendered obsolete and inappropriate the terms of the Anglo-Kuwaiti Agreement of 1899- The United Kingdom and the ruler therefore agreed, as a matter of course, that the necessary formal step should be taken to cancel this agreement. The exchange of notes which achieved this also stated that relations between the two countries would continue to be governed by a spirit of close friendship and that, when appropriate, the two governments would consult together on matters of common interest. The notes concluded by reaffirming Britain’s readiness to assist in the defense of Kuwait if the government of Kuwait so requested.
Iraqi Claim—Kuwaiti Reaction On 25 June 1961, the Iraqi Prime Minister, Major General Abdul Qarim Qasim, formally revived an old Iraqi claim to Kuwait. He stated at a stormy press conference that Kuwait was and always had been legally an integral part of Iraq. He based this claim on the fact that it had been part of the Ottoman vilayet of Basra; he described the
The Kuwait Confrontation of 1061 45
Anglo-Kuwaiti Agreement of 1899 as "illegal;” and he rejected the agreement contained in the recent exchange of notes between the United Kingdom and Kuwait. Qasim threatened Kuwait’s Sheikh with punishment as a rebel if he refused to become in effect an Iraqi district governor. This crude claim to Kuwait came just six days after the announcement of the exchange of notes which cancelled the Anglo-Kuwaiti Agreement of 1899.
Iraq immediately banned the shipment of food to Kuwait from the port of Basra, and began interfering with shipments from Iran. Some boats were reported to have been fired upon, in Kuwaiti waters.
Although there was no hard evidence of concrete Iraqi military moves to back up their claim, rumors of Iraqi troop movements toward the Kuwait frontier were rife. The Iraqi army, which numbered an overwhelming 60,000 or more, was known to have at least one infantry brigade and supporting armor stationed in nearby Basra, within striking distance of the frontier. Kuwait’s regular army totalled in all only 2,400 officers and men (although these were backed by several thousand tribal irregulars). In the face of Iraqi threats and many rumors, the Sheikh was forced to invoke, therefore, the defense terms of the exchange of notes. This he did formally on 30 June, mobilizing his own tiny army and declaring a state of emergency.
British Response On 29 June, Great Britain, alarmed by various indications of impending trouble and as a precautionary measure, had ordered an aircraft carrier, a commando carrier, and other warships from various stations in the Middle and Far East toward Kuwait. It had also alerted other air and ground forces for movement to the threatened Sheikhdom. The Victorious, a 30,500-ton aircraft carrier, was summoned from the Far East. The Bulwark, a 22,000-ton commando carrier with 600 Royal Marine commandos, helicopters, and landing craft on board, was already in the Middle East doing hot-weather trials, and would be off the Kuwaiti coast within 48 hours. A small force of armor was already afloat in the Persian Gulf, in an I.ST. In Kenya, the Twenty-Fourth Infantry Brigade Group, trained in desert fighting, was readied for movement north by air. So were two battalions already at Bahrain.
The British government announced publicly and repeatedly in the House of Commons that it was fully prepared to assist Kuwait if requested. It confirmed that an expeditionary force was being assembled. What could have been done was done. Britain’s ally was encouraged, Britain’s opposition warned. The United States quietly expressed its support.
The first British warships appeared off Kuwait between 8:00 and 9:00 on the morning of 1 July, only
24 hours after the formal Kuwaiti request for assistance was made. Landing operations were to commence at once. At 10:45 a.m., local time, the Kuwait government went on the radio to announce that British forces were about to arrive. It explained that Britain had pledged their withdrawal as soon as the crisis was over. The British actually began to land a few minutes later, in the midst of a howling sandstorm.
As Kuwaiti troops policed the landing sites and, from Mutla Ridge, covered the approaches from the frontier north of the capital, the 600 men of the Bulwark's No. 42 Royal Marine Commandos were carried ashore in the ship’s helicopters. By nightfall, they had secured for use as an airhead an unused, uncompleted airstrip ten miles outside the city. A squadron of 12 jet fighter bombers moved up from Bahrain, as did two companies of infantry, by air. Standing just offshore in Kuwait Bay with the Bulwark were a headquarters frigate and another frigate carrying supplies. The LST unloaded her armor over a beach in the harbor. The Victorious was yet to arrive but did so shortly.
The British rapidly assembled reinforcements. Additional men, supplies, and equipment were moved in by sea and air from the bases at Bahrain, Aden, and in Kenya, and from the strategic reserve in Britain itself. Aircraft—another squadron of fighter bombers and two of bombers—were brought into the Gulf area from as far away as Germany and Australia. As troop strength built up, and the Kuwait base was secure, the British themselves moved out, first to Mutla Ridge, then to the frontier. Within two weeks, the British had concentrated approximately 5,000 men in Kuwait, forming a balanced force of infantry, armor, and artillery in a strong, reinforced brigade group, with some land- based air support, backed by naval gunfire if needed, and by carrier air.
The build-up of British forces in Kuwait had so far followed the expected plan. The speed of deployment and the size of the force suggests that it was hoped, by demonstrating great strength, to convince General Qasim of the futility of any armed action against Kuwait. The strength that the British put in Kuwait was carefully calculated. Lord Home, the Foreign Secretary, declared in a London address on 4 July 1961 to the Foreign Press Association, that what was wanted, "is a force big enough to insure the independence of Kuwait, but no bigger than that.” The object was deterrence, not combat.
Throughout, and at some effort, the British military presence was kept as subdued as possible. Arab nationalism was not to be exacerbated. British aircraft used only the isolated, uncompleted strip outside of Kuwait city, not the busy civil airfield except by accident or in real emergency. The port was blocked off, so that
Only 24 hours after the formal Kuwaiti request for assistance was made, the 600 men of the Bulwark’s Royal Marine Commando unit were carried ashore in the carrier's helicopters and, by nightfall, the Marines had secured an unused, uncompleted airstrip ten mites outside the capital city for use as an airhead.
ALL PHOTOGRAPHS COURTESY OF THE IMPERIAL WAR MUSEUM
few civilians were exposed to British naval off-loading operations. The sometimes ill-acclimated troops were kept in the field. In fact, few Kuwaitis saw the British during the first days.
As early as 8 July, there were signs that the intervention was a success. Iraq’s Qasim called another press conference, and explained that all he had wanted to do was establish a formal claim to Kuwait. He refused to withdraw the claim, but offered assurances that he would not try to enforce it by arms.
As soon as the crisis subsided, Britain began to draw down its force ashore in Kuwait. Some units had been held in Bahrain. Some additional units arrived in the
Gulf, but were not landed in Kuwait. By the 18th, a few units from Kuwait had even been withdrawn to Bahrain. Others went to Aden. But complete withdrawal, both the United Kingdom and Kuwait made clear, was dependent on final settlement of the crisis. A new theater reserve was built up in the meantime in Kenya.
The Suez Transit At the height of the Kuwait force’s build-up, the United Kingdom took the occasion to test a major element in imperial defense strategy—its use of the Egyptian-controlled Suez Canal in time of Middle East emergency. This test had implications far
The Kuwait Confrontation of 1901 47
beyond Kuwait, and for more than just the British.
In London, the British Foreign Office carefully first, on 4 July, announced that its naval flotilla off Kuwait was to be reinforced from its Mediterranean fleet. Naval forces then available on station in the Mediterranean could be most quickly deployed to Aden and the Persian Gulf. Primarily, these forces consisted of the 22,000-ton aircraft carrier Centaur, the 1st Destroyer Squadron, a minesweeper squadron, and various auxiliaries. But, to be of use, these ships had to pass southward (eastward) through the Suez Canal. The initial six-ship reinforcing task group was to include the Centaur, the fleet oiler Olna, an LST, and three accompanying destroyers.
Although warships of many nations, including Britain, had passed through the canal since it was nationalized by Nasser’s Egypt in 1956, this was the first time the transiting ships were directed against the interests of another Arab country, as they obviously were. It was also the first British naval movement of such magnitude through the canal since 1956. Many in the far-off Admiralty must have waited tensely as the task group neared the northern entrance to the canal at Port Said.
The United Arab Republic was formally notified of the ships’ passage, as a regular "matter of courtesy,” but there was no official reaction from Cairo. Officials of the Suez Canal authority, however, promised that all necessary facilities would be extended to the ships, and they were. The ships, for instance, were allowed the courtesy of steaming directly into the canal from Port Said Roads without having first to anchor in the harbor. They even took on fresh provisions and water. Port Said was calm.
On the night of 5 July, the six ships cleared the canal without major incident, passing with the regular midnight southbound convoy. The only attention the ships received was from bumboatmen selling souvenirs and fruit. By noon of the 6th, they were on their way down the Red Sea toward Aden.
Partly as the result of considerable concern over the threat of mines in shallow Gulf waters, five more British naval vessels—four coastal minesweepers and a tug—were sent through the canal on the day following, with the morning convoy. Two more minesweepers followed soon after. The canal was used by the Royal Navy regularly from then on, always without incident.
Diplomats originally had been convinced that as much as Egypt’s Nasser might resent the movement of a British task force through the canal, his hostility toward Iraq’s Qasim would overcome any thoughts of obstructing it. Should there have been Egyptian objections, there were many opportunities for "technical difficulties” to delay the task force’s movement, but none occurred. The new canal administration’s reputa
tion for efficiency and "courtesy” went unmarred.
A test had been successfully made, and a precedent had been set.
The United Nations and the Arab League Neither the United Kingdom nor Kuwait confined their efforts to end the crisis to the military arena alone. The British, on Kuwait’s behalf, immediately requested an emergency meeting of the U.N. Security Council to consider an "urgent” Kuwaiti complaint that Iraq was threatening its independence. The Council convened on 2 July. It proved unable to act because of continued Egyptian and Soviet efforts to first force the withdrawal of the British Kuwait force. A draft British resolution calling for the Security Council to guarantee Kuwait’s independence was finally defeated by a Soviet veto on 7 July. The Council then tacitly turned the affair over to the Arab League.
The Sheikh of Kuwait had in fact turned for help first to the Arab League, even before he invoked his defense agreement with Britain. But the ten-nation Arab League, too, opinion divided, was at first unable to act. Iraq’s move had indeed found no support among its Arab neighbors. Neither Egypt nor Saudi Arabia could view Iraq’s seizure of Kuwait with favor, although for different reasons. The rivalry between Cairo and Baghdad for leadership of the Arab world was long-standing. Saudi Arabia wanted only to keep the Iraqis at arm’s length. On its own initiative, it had sent a token force to support the Kuwaitis during the early days of the crisis. Lebanon and Jordan, however, which have sought to remain clear of the major Arab conflicts, were noncommittal on the Kuwait issue, too.
Finally, the Arab League admitted Kuwait to membership, and produced a force of its own to replace the British. On 10 September, the first elements of a theoretically 3,300-man Arab force (drawn from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Republic, the Sudan, Jordan, and Tunisia, under a Saudi commander) began at long last to arrive in Kuwait.
Upon the arrival of an adequate Arab force, on 19 September, the British duly began their final withdrawal and they were gone entirely within a month. On the night of 11 October, 145 (Maiwand) Field Battery—which had been responsible for covering the withdrawal of the entire British force—left on the last flight of three aircraft. The Bulwark had left some time before.
The new Arab force began immediately to lose first one and then another national contingent, each withdrawn for pressing domestic reasons, but an Arab military presence of some sort remained in Kuwait until the force was officially dissolved in February 1963. By this time, the crisis had long since passed.
The concentration and deployment of British forces to Kuwait is an example of joint politico-military planning and inter-service cooperation at its best. For this kind of operation, the British, with two centuries of experience, had developed an apparently nearly ideal organization. There was adequate centralization of overall command and control in London. There were also both decentralization of essential authority and responsibility from London to the field and, at the same time, local unity of command of all elements of power concerned.
Key to the regular local command and control structure in this instance was a civilian, part diplomat, part political advisor, part military commander. Called the British Political Resident for the Persian Gulf (this included Kuwait), he was stationed in Bahrain. Under him worked a number of assistants, political agents, located in other key centers. The Resident chaired a group called the British Military Coordinating Committee for the Persian Gulf, responsible among other things for the defense of Kuwait, albeit only if and when British assistance was requested. The three senior British Army, Navy, and Air Force officers present in the Persian Gulf sat as ex officio members of the committee. Naval forces in the Gulf came under the local subcommand of the Senior Naval Officer, Persian Gulf, based in Bahrain. Behind the Resident’s forces militarily
stood the whole of the rest of British Middle East command, with headquarters in Aden. Overall responsibility for the operation and general direction remained with the Prime Minister, cabinet and defense staffs in London, of course.
At the time of the 1961 crisis, the local mechanics of Anglo-Kuwaiti relations were still in process of transition, adjusting to the Sheikhdom’s new status. The former Political Agency in Kuwait, under John Richmond, responsible to the Political Resident, Sir William Luce, was in the process of being converted into an embassy, reporting directly to London. No ambassador had yet presented his credentials, however. Once military assistance was requested, and the terms of the exchange of notes invoked, as they were, and for this purpose, much of the old relationship was temporarily reinstated.
Although the preliminary decision to ask for British assistance had probably been made as early as 25 June, the formal request for assistance was made by the Kuwaitis on D minus 1. It came in a letter from Sheikh Abdullah delivered to Richmond, still Political Agent, and still in Kuwait. Both agreed that the British and Kuwait forces would operate under joint command, with the British responsible for the plan of action, if action were to be necessary. The British were committed to remain as long as Kuwait’s independence was threatened, or until requested to leave by the ruler.
At 8:00 a.m., local time, on D-day, Kuwait’s Sheikh Abdullah called, for a second morning in succession, on Richmond, now Her Majesty’s Consul General. A few minutes later, a helicopter rose from the consulate’s garden and headed out to sea. Shortly thereafter, British warships began to appear on the horizon. It is assumed that during the Sheikh’s last call, he confirmed his previous request for assistance, and completed last- minute arrangements, before the Royal Navy was actually ordered into Kuwaiti territorial waters. Contact with the Sheikh was continuous.
The military aspect of the confrontation was carried off with professionalism. All British ground troops ashore in Kuwait were commanded by Brigadier, 24 Infantry Brigade Group (reinforced). To him were subordinate, at one point, two Royal Marine Commandos. Command arrangements were here clear. The Navy’s arrangements were thrown momentarily askew by the arrival of a quite senior admiral in the Victorious> but this was soon set right.
Kuwaiti regulars secured the landing areas and screened the initial British troop deployments. They either arranged for or provided themselves various kinds of logistic support. They sealed off the port area. Various civilian facilities—part of the hospital, for instance—were made available to the arriving troops-
The Kuwait Confrontation of 1961 49
There was close and continuous cooperation between the two countries’ forces, marred only occasionally by the inevitable minor confusions of crisis.
Towards the end of July, when it seemed that Kuwait would finally come under the protection of the Arab League, the British were quick to react. It was Luce, the Resident, who came to Kuwait from Bahrain to see the Sheikh, to discuss taking away the core of the remaining British troops. The last would go when the promised composite Arab force actually materialized. Agreement was soon reached.
Whether Iraq was ever in this instance militarily serious in its threat to Kuwait has remained a political mystery. Qasim immediately denied it. The Iraqi Army, as far as can be determined, never actually undertook any large-scale hostile movements at any time. In retrospect, the whole Kuwait affair may have been prompted by the mistaken belief that the bulk of the Kuwaitis were just waiting the opportunity—any opportunity—to acclaim Qasim as their liberator. If so, his expectation was rapidly proven false. The real answer, however, now may never be known.
For the British, merely to have responded with a naval force to stand guard off Kuwait would not have been sufficient. The Iraqis could too easily have sent an overwhelming armored column racing into the city of Kuwait, only 60 miles from the Iraq border, in just a few hours. The British then would have faced the far more difficult task of throwing the Iraqis out, of undoing a fait accompli. This, neither the British nor the Kuwaitis could risk.
The setting at Kuwait of a dangerous precedent—the seizure by force of the territory being evacuated by the cautiously consolidating British—had been avoided. The Persian Gulf area is a congeries of old territorial claims and counter-claims, of ambitions, fear, and anger. If all outside restraint were removed, order would soon vanish. Kuwait demonstrated that if the British were gone, they were not far away.
The Kuwait confrontation thus showed once again that "gunboat diplomacy” is not dead. It showed once again that military power can sometimes be used quite effectively in such situations to maintain the status quo. The requirement for a continued British presence in the Persian Gulf was well demonstrated to both the British and Arab rulers of the area. Nothing has since occurred to change this view.
Throughout the confrontation, all three levels of foreign policy objectives—long-range policy (secure oil source), immediate political (minimum presence), potential battlefield (secure frontier)—influenced British conduct. All three were important, and all three levels will remain important no matter where the problem.
There are two other specific conclusions supported by the study that are well worth pointing out:
► In some brush fire areas and sub-limited war situations, America’s allies may sometimes be able to operate much more effectively than America itself can. In Kuwait, the British had the political connections, the military presence, the primary responsibility, and the know-how. For the United States openly to have intervened would only have unnecessarily stirred up the Arabs and provoked their Russian allies to more than criticism. As it was, the Russians were neutralized, caught between Iraq and Egypt, with both of whom they had strong ties. We refrained from actual intervention, and Russian harassment was kept to a minimum. In the often politically confused Cold War, these circumstances could well repeat themselves.
► While internationalization of such disputes is often beneficial, it is probably wrong to expect international organizations to act meaningfully with enough speed to prevent a rapidly executed take-over, be it coup d’etat or coup de main. If there is serious risk of irreparable damage being done within, say, 48 hours (international diplomacy’s apparent minimum reaction time), then we will sometimes have to be prepared to act unilaterally. We will have to provide the initial stabilizing force, to act the policeman when it is in our interest, until internationalization of the dispute can be arranged, or a settlement is otherwise arranged.
Force can sometimes be confronted with force, and aggression deterred. The problem is to determine the circumstances under which military power could be effective, and then, when nothing else will do, to use the force deftly. As we have seen, the answer to this problem lies at least in part in carefully decentralized organization, in having field as well as national unity of politico-military command, and an appropriate sharing of authority/responsibility between them.
Commander Koburgcr received a B.S. in Foreign Service from Georgetown University in 1943, an M.A. in History from Niagara University in 1956, and an M.A. in Political Science from the University of Oregon in 1963. By profession a consultant (research analyst) in maritime affairs, the author is at present on active duty in the Office of Research and Develop ment. Headquarters, U.S. Coast Guard. In 1972 he was employed by IMCO as an oil pollution expert, working in Syria and Egypt. Commander Koburger has previously contributed to the Proceedings (international law), Military Review, Foreign Service Journal, Naval War College Review, Naval Engineers’ Journal, and numerous other professional journals. He is a Companion of the (British) Nautical Institute.