The apparent present policy of reducing time in command at sea seems to contravene the fundamental precept that a navy exists to fight at sea. Such a fighting navy must he led and, if need be, fought, by commanders who are, first and foremost, eminently qualified in the art of naval warfare and, secondly, specially trained in the tactical application of advanced ship and weapon systems.
The unrestricted line officer is spending an increasingly greater percentage of his career ashore, often in pursuits that, although probably related to naval matters, are unrelated to the art of naval warfare. Such career patterns undoubtedly can lead to the development of naval officers, eminently qualified as program managers and technicians, who will be able to develop and produce highly effective ship and weapons systems at minimum cost. But such career patterns also can lead to a dearth of naval officers who are qualified in the art of naval warfare and possessed of a “battle-mindedness,” nurtured by a habit of “keeping the sea.”
It has been a long-accepted fact that the Navy needs both good operators and good managers. What has not been accepted or fully recognized is that, in the current technological, strategic, and tactical environment—given the complexities of nuclear ships and weapons systems, coupled with the relatively short span of an officer’s career—it is no longer possible to develop both within a single individual.
The Chief of Naval Operations recognized this fact of life in the directive Z-69 which states, in part, that unrestricted line officers are no longer required to have a major command at sea in order to be considered eligible for promotion to flag-rank—they may, instead, command a major shore establishment or serve a tour as a program manager. This policy certainly is a step in the right direction in that it recognizes the dual importance of managerial and operational expertise within our flag ranks. However, it does not recognize an already critical situation that has developed in the career patterns of far too many unrestricted line officers. This crisis is a result of the lack of a well-defined naval warfare specialist program (as opposed to a well-defined subspecialty program in the managerial areas), burgeoning technical and procurement problems, and substantial Fleet reductions. The result of all this is that many unrestricted line officers are being assigned repeated and extended tours ashore in technical and management fields—to the detriment of their primary specialty, naval warfare and command at sea.
For example, statistics compiled in November 1969 indicate that, of the approximately 2,400 surface commander billets, only 25% were at sea, 25% in Washington, 25% elsewhere in ConUS, and 25% overseas or miscellaneous. As a result of that imbalance of sea and shore billets, surface commanders could then expect to spend at least half of their time-in-grade ashore. That situation has been exacerbated by recent and continued reductions in naval forces which has only been partially offset by the commissioning of new construction. Further compounding the problem is the fact that these reductions have resulted in an appreciable shrinking in the opportunity for command at sea, especially in the surface commander area where the eventual command opportunity would have been reduced to 50% from a past average of about 75%. However, in order to preclude that eventuality, and strongly influenced by an alleged need to give command experience to a broader segment of officers from whom the captains and admirals of the future will be drawn, a decision was made to reduce the normal command tour for surface commanders from 24 months to 18 months. The net result of that decision is that today, surface commanders can expect to spend over half of their time-in-grade ashore and only 18 months in a command tour at sea. But they are not alone. Non-aviation captains in the future will no longer be eligible for command of both a deep-draft and a major command at sea, i.e., three years in command at sea, but will get only one two-year command tour at sea in the grade of captain.
The apparent general policy of reducing time in command at sea, particularly in areas where time at sea is already marginal for the proper development of maritime skills, in order to provide an opportunity for command experience to a broader segment of officers from which to select those for promotion (or for any similar rationale) does not correlate with the fundamental precept that a navy exists to fight at sea. Such a fighting navy must be led and fought, if need be, by officers who are, first and foremost, eminently qualified in the art of naval warfare and, secondly, specially trained in the tactical application of advanced ship and weapons systems in an age of nuclear power and missiles. These men, through confidence in their maritime skills, must have developed within themselves a “battle-mindedness” which will require only that they “. . . await the appearance of the enemy’s topsails on the horizon to ensure victory over an equal or somewhat superior force.” To say that this goal can be met by further reducing the time unrestricted line officers spend at sea, particularly in command, is to ignore the lessons of history, at great peril.
In proposing changes to the command structure of the British Navy in 1694, George Savile, in response to his own rhetorical question as to what sort of men are most proper to command at sea, concluded,
“The Gentlemen shall not be capable of bearing office at Sea except they be Tarpaulins [seamen] too; that is to say, except they are . . . trained up by a continued habit of living at sea . . . .”
The Serapis was doomed to defeat long before being sighted by the Bonhomme Richard off Flamborough Head in 1779 because John Paul Jones willed it so. His defiant, “I have not yet begun to fight!,” resounds through history as the epitome of a naval commander’s credo, irrespective of certain events in more recent history.
And the Battle of Tsushima in 1905 was won long before Togo crossed Rozhdestvenski’s bows. Togo’s stirring flag hoist, “. . . Let every man do his utmost,” is too similar to the signal flown by the immortal Nelson almost a hundred years earlier to leave any doubt that Togo was not only imbued with the spirit of the samurai, but also steeped in the Nelsonian tradition of “battle-mindedness.”
This same spirit carried on into World War II where, at the Battle of Savo Island in August 1942, the Allied naval forces suffered a staggering defeat at the hands of Admiral Mikawa. (Allied losses: 4 cruisers sunk; 1 cruiser, 1 destroyer damaged. Japanese losses: minor damage to 4 cruisers). Admiral Chester Nimitz, reviewing the investigation that followed, concluded that, many errors of omission and commission notwithstanding, the primary cause of the debacle was the lack of “battle-mindedness”—in spite of the fact that the battle was fought eight months after Pearl Harbor.
Almost exactly a year later, the U. S. Navy partially repaid the debt of Savo at the brilliant Battle of Vella Gulf, where Commander Frederick Moosbrugger sank three Japanese destroyers of the latest class and damaged one, at the cost of no losses or damage to his own forces. Admiral Nimitz, who also reviewed the records of this action, concluded that the one-sided victory most probably was the result of “training, training, training,” i.e., “battle-mindedness.”
History shows that victories are won at sea by men who have developed within themselves a “battle-mindedness,” which is the result of a continued development and practice of naval skills at sea. But history notwithstanding, there has emerged in recent years within the U. S. Navy a career pattern for unrestricted line officers which is short on naval warfare tours at sea, especially in command, and long on management and technical tours ashore. This situation can only be worsened by a recent decision to limit, in the future, non-aviation captains of the unrestricted line to one two-year tour in command at sea in grade. This same situation, however, could be sharply reversed if, recognizing as Z-69 does that both good operators and good managers are required in this highly technical age, there were to be established and implemented a formal program which would provide for essentially independent, but parallel, career paths to flag rank for unrestricted line officers in either the operations or the management field, i.e., Operations Specialist or Management Specialist. Given the conflicting necessities to develop both operational and managerial expertise within the stringent confines of a burgeoning technology and the relatively short time span of an individual officer’s career, we might wonder, just as in the case of the Surface Warfare School, why we have not adopted such a program sooner. After all, essentially that same philosophy was adopted in World War II when Admirals Ernest King and Chester Nimitz remained ashore throughout the war as the top strategists and managers while Admirals William Halsey and Raymond Spruance (among many others) remained at sea as tactical and operational commanders. The other Services adopted basically the same modus operandi, e.g., Generals George Marshall and Dwight Eisenhower were complemented by Generals Omar Bradley and George Patton. In the profession of arms, there is hardly a better precedent than one proven in time of war.
Figure 1 is a graphic presentation of the concept. All unrestricted line officers up to the grade of lieutenant commander would receive a sound foundation in at least one naval warfare specialty through a combination of technical training and shipboard experience. At that point, according to personal preference and the needs of the service, individual officer career paths would be directed towards specialization in either operations or management.
Officers who, by preference or detailing, specialize in operations would not necessarily be destined to spend interminable periods at sea like Nelson off Toulon. On the contrary, the operations specialist career pattern would be in many respects the same as it is now, i.e., consisting of shore tours and advanced education in the PG program and at service colleges as well as sea duty. However, shore tours would be in billets directly related to naval warfare specialties. Junior shore tours would be in billets such as service on the faculty of fleet schools (ASW, AAW, SUB, DD, Flight, etc.). Senior shore tours would be in such billets as Office of CNO (NavOp), on the faculty of senior service colleges (National War College), on joint staffs (OJCS) or on fleet and force staffs (CinCLantFlt)—but always in billets directly related to naval warfare or politico-military affairs.
The benefits that might accrue from the development of such a cadre of professional sea fighters are many. Given proper career planning and detailing, one can safely predict that one such benefit could be the development of Operations Specialist career patterns which, from a personal point of view alone, would be more rewarding and less disruptive than current unrestricted line officer patterns. Of one thing we can be sure, such a program eventually will lead to the emergence of a breed of officers—cut to the Jones-Nelson-Halsey-Spruance pattern—to command, and fight if necessary, our ships at sea.
Needless to say, the adoption of this concept will require a complete overhaul of the current billet structure—for a structure that provides for only 25% sea billets for surface commanders needs an overhaul. In the process, serious consideration should be given to increasing the efficiency of available manpower by establishing for the Operations Specialist shore billets that relate to naval warfare rather than some form of unrelated endeavor, the sole purpose of which is to provide a shore billet.
[Figure 1 graphic]
As to command at sea, the emphasis must be on selecting the fittest, and then detailing them to command tours of sufficient duration (with multiple command tours for the best) to both sharpen their naval warfare skills and enhance the combat readiness of the commands to which assigned. We can no longer afford the luxury of using command at sea—frequently of short duration—primarily as a milestone for selection. It must, in fact, be what it was always intended to be, the ultimate goal of the unrestricted line officer, but attainable only by the fittest. To establish an egalitarian policy which bases selection for command at sea upon some form of equitable distribution of command opportunity—at the cost of reduced command tours—rather than upon fitness to command, will not, cannot, develop within the Navy a breed of naval leader which is eminently qualified in the art of naval warfare at sea and imbued with a spirit of “battle-mindedness.” Accepting the fact that the reduced size of the Fleet is going to reduce proportionately command opportunity, we must bite the bullet and recognize that a policy of the fittest serving multiple tours in command will greatly reduce or in some cases even eliminate command opportunity for some.
The concept of a dual path to flag officer could be implemented in four phases:
Phase I—Policy. The Chief of Naval Operations would establish the policy that all unrestricted line officers specialize in either Operations or Management, with the understanding that both specialties will provide equal but parallel paths to selection for flag rank in the unrestricted line. The Chief of Naval Personnel would restore the length of command tour for surface commanders to 24 months, and continue the policy of providing non-aviation captains with the opportunity for at least two command-at-sea tours during time-in-grade.
Phase II—Short Term.
► Identify those billets currently occupied by Program Managers which obviously meet the critical criteria established by Mr. David Packard and the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel. Extend incumbents in those billets as necessary to meet the requirements of the projects involved.
► Poll the unrestricted line officer community to determine how many would voluntarily remain on sea duty or equivalent to fill the gaps caused by those officers who will be extended in managerial billets ashore and to form a nucleus for the establishment of an Operations Specialist cadre.
Phase III—Long Term. The Chief of Naval Personnel would:
► Establish requirement for all unrestricted line officers to specialize in either Operations or Management no later than upon selection to lieutenant commander.
► Establish a training program for Program Managers.
► Establish a Naval Warfare Specialist Program.
► Review the current billet structure (this could include officer segments other than the unrestricted line for possible overlap) and establish a new structure based upon whether a billet is primarily oriented toward, or exists in support of, the Operations Specialist or the Management Specialist area. Give particular attention to the establishment of meaningful shore billets for Operations Specialists. Old billets which served no useful purpose other than providing a shore billet would be eliminated. Conversely, new billets should be established which will effectively employ the Operations Specialist during shore tours. Innovative concepts such as permanent ships’ crews in shipyards and ship repair facilities should not be discarded, but given serious consideration.
► Through the Career Planning Board, establish career patterns for Operations and Management Specialists.
Phase IV—Implementation. The concept could be implemented immediately by extending the tours of some easily recognized vital Program Managers. In the long term, unrestricted line officers would be required upon selection for lieutenant commanders to specialize in either Operations or Management. Thereafter, their careers would be patterned by repeated tours in their assigned specialty. This will not mean, however, that the Operations Specialist will never receive any exposure to management and that the Management Specialist will never receive any exposure to operations. On the contrary, both programs should provide for periodic cross-training of short duration in the other specialty area where the unique talents of an individual in one discipline will complement those of the individuals in the other to the mutal [sic] benefit of all.
The current trend towards over-emphasis upon the technical and managerial aspects of naval warfare as it adversely affects the development of maritime skills by unrestricted line officers must be reversed for at least a cadre of such officers; otherwise they will become unskillful and their want of skill will make them timid in an era when our supremacy on the sea is faced by an unprecedented and unrelenting challenge which might have to be met sooner than we think.
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A graduate of the U. S. Naval Academy with the Class of 1946, having served as an enlisted man in the U. S. Navy from 1940 to 1942, Captain Bowling successively commanded the USS YMS-419, the USS YMS-463, and the USS Magpie (AMS-25). Since his graduation from submarine school in 1947, he has served in three submarines and commanded another, the USS Cutlass (SS-478), from 1957 to 1959. He also commanded the USS Tringa (ASR-16), from 1954 to 1956; served on the Staff of ASWGRU3, from 1962 to 1964; served as ASW Officer, Staff, ComFirstFlt, 1965-1966; commanded USS Mount McKinley (AGC-7), 1966-1968; and served in the General Operations Division (J-3) of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C. 1968-1971. He currently is Commander Service Group One.