“Aftermath of the Elath”
(See R. D. Colvin, pp. 60-67, October 1969 PROCEEDINGS)
Vice Admiral B. B. Schofield, Royal Navy (Retired)—Commander Colvin very rightly draws attention to the threat posed by the Styx missile with which the Soviet “Komar” and “Osa” class patrol boats are armed. But when he suggests that the smaller navies should acquire “. . . a capability to neutralize the threat through a combination of speed and missile air defense,” he seems to be unaware of the extent to which the latter part of this suggestion has already been met in the navies of Australia, Argentina, Brazil, Britain, Chile, Federal Germany, Iran, Malaysia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and Sweden by the adoption of the British sea-to-air, dose-range missile Seacat.
It is admirably suited to the antimissile role, because of its instant readiness and quick reaction time. Admittedly, the Seacat Mark I with its speed of Mach 0.8 was rather slow. However, the Mark II version, now in service, compares very favorably with the Sea Sparrow III, which has a speed of Mach 2.5, being adapted for use in the U. S. Navy. The fact that it has been accepted by so many navies is proof of its merit.
The only cause for concern is the fact that most ships carry only one Seacat mounting. We learned in the last war, in dealing with dive-bombing attacks, that a four-cornered defense is essential. This would be very much the case in trying to cope with simultaneous attacks from a number of missiles, such as could be fired by a squadron of fast patrol boats.
It is interesting to note that we are confronted with a situation similar to that at the turn of the last century, when the fast torpedo boat made its appearance. This led to the construction of the torpedo boat destroyer. Clearly it is better to destroy the attacker before he launches his missiles. For this, aircraft are necessary. However, since these cannot give 100 per cent security, it is necessary to have a second line of defense—an anti-missile missile, be it Seacat or Sea Sparrow. High speed in itself is no defense against a missile carrying a homing warhead.
Captain Howard Bucknell, U. S. Navy—The Elath incident is not simply something that requires us to re-examine what sort of aid we should provide allies. It is a happening that requires us to profoundly reassess our basic naval posture and development program because:
The sinking of Elath only incidentally highlights the capability of small and relatively coast-bound ships or craft to sink larger and more valuable ocean going ships. More germane is the demonstrated ability of any homing missile-equipped ships to attack non-missile-equipped ships with impunity unless these ships are supported by aircraft carriers.
The modification of air defense missiles to the anti-ship role does not bear close scrutiny when gamed between armored ships of the destroyer category and larger. Nor is this application supportable at long range with fire control concepts most suitable for the anti-air mission. Attempts to “make do” with modified anti-aircraft missiles in ship-to- ship actions can be justified only at short range and against light craft without any armor.
The vulnerability of attacking missiles to anti-air attack is not significantly (if at all) greater than the vulnerability of manned aircraft to anti-air weapons—and one would expect warships of the Soviet Union (if not of their poorer relations) to be equipped with air defense weapons of a relatively advanced quality. The advantages postulated for the United States in Commander Colvin’s article derive therefore from our numerical superiority in ships and flying machines—not from any qualitative comparison of armaments. We are hence doubly jeopardized by any reduction in the size of our fleets and acutely dependent upon the advanced and practiced capability of our attack aircraft to sink warships.
The lack of missile applicability to the gunfire support mission (shore bombardment) is not germane to the Elath problem. We have already learned in a rather expensive fashion that it may be economical to provide a gun or two to ships previously configured with missiles exclusively designed for the anti-aircraft mission. Air support and gunfire support are more profitably considered as complementary rather than competitive.
Defensive measures and equipment, while required in a “missile environment,” are poor substitutes for a given ship’s ability to engage offensively at equivalent ranges an otherwise comparable adversary. For that matter, defensive measures currently evolved appear to place far too much reliance on passive systems or electronic miracles and should be supplemented by active point destruction systems of a very reliable and simplistic nature.
The thesis that sufficient numbers of ships will be available to the United States to respond defensively in task force fashion to a concentrated ship-to-ship missile attack is not sustained by current events and trends in either our Navy or that of the U.S.S.R.
The concept that carrier aviation provides by itself the offensive capability necessary for our Navy to respond to anti-ship missile attacks is not supported by the following:
(1) The range and extent of current and predictable U. S. naval operations on the high seas matched against the number of attack carriers currently requested by the Navy. As Admiral Thomas Moorer, U. S. Navy, stated:
In any future major conflict the naval struggle would be world wide—it would be a series of widely dispersed encounters . . . .
(2) The weapons and tactics currently available to, or projected for, attack carrier aviation when potential enemy ship-board air-defense capabilities are considered. (This point may have been obscured by our prolonged experience in the bombing of land targets defended by the “hand-me-down” anti-air weapons which the U.S.S.R. provides their “poor relations”).
It is concluded that the U. S. Navy is faced with more than a “paper-missile gap.” If this is true, it would appear that this gap should be overcome by the rapid development of a viable anti-ship missile capability in the fleet. Prudently conducted, such a development is well within the existing state of the art in this country. If directed with regard to both the types of ship which we have (and will have) the most of, as well as the needs of carrier aviation, our efforts could conceivably result in a conventionally armed anti-ship missile system generically meeting surface ship, submarine, and aviation requirements for a number of years.
In the interim, it might be well to review anti-ship missile systems presently available in other (more or less) friendly navies. We were forced to do this in the anti-aircraft field once before during very desperate days when it was found expedient to buy Bofors and Oerlikon machine guns from abroad as quick substitutes for a very unworkable 1.1-inch U. S.-produced gun designed in an era when the offensive power of carrier-based aircraft had been grossly underestimated. While we now understand and must improve upon our attack aviation capability, we cannot afford to ignore the implications to our Navy of the guided missile in conventional war.
“‘Sever’ and the Baltic Bottleneck”
(See C. L. Parnell, pp. 26-36, August 1969 PROCEEDINGS)
Commander U. Mahrenholtz, Federal German Navy—This was a most notable article, especially when the spotlight seems to be on the Mediterranean. The wide publicity given to Soviet maritime activities in the Med of late, tends to scale down the threat in the Baltic where a precarious imbalance of military power is apparent. The disproportion of NATO naval presence in the northern and southern flank, created by the weak and limited naval forces existent in the Baltic against sufficient naval strength in the Med, is even more aggravated by the fact that the major part of Soviet sea power is located in the Baltic. Thus, it remains unopposed, whereas Soviet naval presence in the Med is well offset by the Allies.
This disadvantageous situation in NATO’s Northern European Command Area, which renders deterrence less credible, could very well induce the Soviets to escalate a crisis to limited aggression, in order to test the response of the West as the author pointed out. NATO’s very objective, “to deter aggression by credible deterrent power and if deterrence fails to repel the aggressor” may then be at stake, for seizure of the key Baltic approaches may collapse NATO’s entire northern defense and make the course of events irreversible.
I should like to comment briefly on Lieutenant Parnell’s suggestions to remedy the situation.
Modernization of the West German and Danish Navies, with a view to the introduction of missiles, is in the process, though at a rather slow pace. It seems that there is only a reaction to Soviet weapons systems advancement which keeps the lead and NATO navies in the Baltic lagging years behind. This is especially true for the surface-to-surface missile development.
Even after completion of the modernization program, both navies will be outmatched by sheer numbers. The ratio of Soviet naval forces in the Baltic against those of NATO is presently 4 to 1. If the West cannot muster equal forces, then what should be done, quickly, in this Warsaw Pact missile-saturated area, is operational research, testing, and installation of anti-missile weapons systems concurrent with the development of antimissile tactics.
The idea of establishing a NATO naval force and deploying to the Baltic Sea is undoubtedly a good and effective measure. The concept and assignment of such a unit would be similar to the Standing Naval Forces, Atlantic (StaNavForLant), which could be routed to the Baltic occasionally. The Soviets more or less consider the Baltic Sea among other free waters contiguous to their interest as their own maritime domain, and they will exploit their sea power sovereignty as far as the Free World tolerance will permit. This has been permitted, if not supported, by the West for much too long a time.
There have been countless incidents of Soviet infractions of the international rules of the sea, of harassment of allied ships, of the establishment of restricted areas in international waters, and of interference with NATO naval exercises. There has been no appropriate response from the West for reasons of fearing diplomatic entanglement, or because of some nations’ susceptibility to the illusion of détente.
History should have taught that acceding to Soviet challenges and a behavior of uneasiness has never impressed the Soviets, let alone been honored by them, nor will it ever be. NATO nations should assert their rights to the use of international waters and give up their reservations to conduct exercises in the central and eastern Baltic, while Warsaw Pact forces do so at our own doorstep. The Baltic Sea must not be an “out-of-bounds” area for the West, even if there is a vast Soviet Union naval predominance.
In consonance with this, I should like to stress the importance of the appearance of ships from other NATO navies in the Baltic. The recent show-the-flag-tour of the USS Newport News (CA-148) is an example of the kind of visit which cannot happen often enough.
As to the reaffirmation of the nuclear risk in this area it may be held that contingency plans provide for the engagement of other NATO troops as was recently demonstrated by the deployment of NATO’s AMF to Zealand (Denmark) in exercise Green Express.
In addition to these measures it would seem that a NATO reinforcement of existing surveilance [sic] efforts over Soviet naval activities in the area is imperative. Complete information and up-to-date knowledge on Warsaw Pact movements in the Baltic Sea’s restricted and closed waters is of paramount importance for the correct assessment of the situation and hence timely arrival at correct conclusions. The establishment of a facility of something in the order of the recently activated ComAirMed charged with the continuous collection and dissemination of intelligence on Warsaw Pact shipping and maritime air operations could be the solution.
Another step in the right direction would be a rapid increase of naval air power with high performance, all-weather weapons systems, as naval aircraft are one of the major and most effective combatant instruments available. Moreover, they would have a fair rate of survivability against Soviet naval preponderance in the land contained waters of the Baltic and where practically no deployments can remain undetected.
But all these improvements would not be sufficient in themselves to overcome the deficiencies in our force posture. Additional measures have to be taken and these, of course, are contingent on the Alliance member nations’ political will and ability to comprehend the Warsaw Pact capabilities and intentions and their determination to live up to their pledge to NATO.
“A Lump Sum Retirement Payment”
(See S. Dombroff, pp. 120-121, September 1969; and p. 97, February 1970 PROCEEDINGS)
Commander Robert E. May, U. S. Navy (Retired)—Captain Dombroff’s suggestion for a lump sum retirement payment may have merit as an optional alternative, however, this is hardly the time for entertaining such ideas. After all, the retired military personnel who led the nation to victory in World War II are presently losing nearly a third of the retired pay they had been led to believe was their right to expect. Until these long-standing obligations or commitments for retirement benefits are met, it is in the interest of all military personnel, active and retired, to limit their attention to rectifying the injustices of the last decade.
What strength does a retired military man have once he enters retirement? Practically none. Who needs him? The only reason we have retirement benefits is because they are a necessary part of the comprehensive military manpower package. It is therefore logical that there be strong links between the active and the retired. When times are good for the active, they should be reflected upon the retired. This is the essential wisdom of the old system.
Why did the system change? In the mid-1950s, Civil Service was becoming better organized and was about to make giant strides towards achieving salary goals. It was becoming most obvious that pressures would build to increase the military man’s share of the national income. Such a plan would be more saleable to the public if it could be arranged that only active personnel would share in this gain. Thus the system was changed so that a man’s share in the national income would be determined at the moment of his retirement, with his retired pay adjusted periodically to keep that share constant.
The new system is superficially fair. But consider how it is working today—to the detriment of the oldest retirees. It is wrong in principle, in that these retirement benefits were changed unilaterally without benefit of option or recourse.
Captain Dombroff offered as a reason for lump sum retirement benefits the idea that “our career personnel are essentially responsible money managers.” However, the fact that our military leadership quietly let slip away retirement benefits which now amount to nearly a billion dollars a year clearly demonstrates that career military personnel are rather frivolous in their knowledge of how to handle finances over a long period. It should be noted that the change in retired pay came at a time when the military was most conscious of fringe benefits as inducements for a military career. The military leadership, as those closest to retirement, had the greatest potential loss. One might wonder why they were not sufficiently astute to recognize it.
It is most likely that active personnel today are interested in the “short haul” and do not see their stake in retirement plans. Aside from the fact that they no longer have a solemn commitment from the nation for other than a unilaterally determined slice of national poverty among the aged, why should they become concerned? There is more and more talk about doing away with the draft and establishing a purely voluntary military force. The basis of this plan must be an ability to compete in the labor market. If the nation is really serious about this plan, it can only mean higher salaries for military personnel. The logical plan would be to separate active and retired pay plans completely. Then, when the new increases are legislated to create the volunteer force, retired pay will not be affected. Each will be handled separately. The Hubbell Plan almost made this split.
One hears a lot about retirement benefits, that they are more than enough to compensate. I tended to share that view while I was on active duty. When I retired, I found that I had given away something by serving in the military—years of maximum promotability. When I took a job as a civilian engineer, I was offered little more than a new college graduate of similar education. While I had more experience, I was also hindered because “retired military men invariably try to use military methods which just don’t work in the outside world.” This has not been compensated for in my retirement pay. Most military personnel do retire in the prime of life, and so must work for many more years.
I believe it would be unwise to give retirees a lump sum. Their situation will change many times, and they will be exposed to many opportunities to gamble away their lump sum. On the other hand, an assured income provides the opportunity to survive and recoup from life’s misfortunes. The man who buys and the man who sells are both smart until history shows that one was right and the other wrong. The fact that each was a winner and a loser does not mean that the world is half winners and half losers. It means that someone loses on every deal, however, I feel the odds are really against handling a lump sum.
Captain Dombroff is right when he names retirement benefits as one of the two major benefits of a military career. I felt the loss of security when the retirement benefits were changed in 1958. It was a major factor in my decision to retire at the first opportunity. I’m sure many others saw the situation the same way.
One of the major inflationary pressures, the reason why retirees are losing today, has been the success of labor groups to organize and demand a greater share of the economy. It is time for the military, as citizens, to organize group pressures to fight for the retention of their fair share.
Book Review on Naval Policy Between the Wars
(See R. G. O’Connor, pp. 112-117, January; and p. 106, August 1969 PROCEEDINGS)
Captain S. W. Roskill, Royal Navy—I read with great interest Professor O’Connor’s review of my book. Although there were points over which I disagreed—notably, his remarks about the “Anglo-French compromise” of 1928—I recognize that such issues could justifiably be regarded differently in the United States and Great Britain. I therefore made no response to his criticisms.
Perhaps now, however, I may draw his attention to the fact that as early as 12 September 1928, the U. S. Embassy in London sent a cable to the State Department referring to the compromise, “We now see a molehill where we saw a mountain.” This is in the National Archives Record Group 80, Box 171. The same source contains much evidence of the way anti-British feeling in the United States was whipped up on this issue.
While I merely took note of Professor O’Connor’s views, though wondering whether he had gone right through the U. S. Navy’s records of the period as I have done, I really cannot allow Ernest Andrade’s remarks to pass unchallenged. It is sheer nonsense for him to write:
Not only does Roskill slight the American Navy’s awareness of the Japanese menance [sic] in the 1920s, he also slights the British Navy’s concern over the same menace.
On page 20, I wrote:
The United States regarded the risk of Japanese sea power as a serious threat to her interests in the Far East, and the containment of Japanese ambitions soon became a cardinal purpose of American naval policy. From 1922 until about 1936 Britain also regarded Japan as the most likely challenger to her position in the world.
Taking a look through the book’s index will also show how frequently those themes occur.
Reverting back to Professor O’Connor’s review, I am sorry that he found my assessments of American naval leaders more critical than those on their British counterparts. I did not think this quite fair. For example, on page 45 of the book, I drew attention to Admiral Beatty’s “arrogance”—a description I applied to no American. On page 43, I called Admiral Wemyss’s attitude over honors “rather petty.”
In my view, it was a tragic misfortune that in the period I was writing about, two of the U. S. Navy’s top officers—W. S. Benson and H. P. Jones—were strongly Anglophobe. I have much evidence gathered on both sides of the Atlantic to support that description. Not until Admiral W. V. Pratt became Chief of Naval Operations was there a real change of heart in the Navy Department. In his final summing up of the world situation on 19 May 1933, Pratt wrote to the Secretary’ of the Navy, with a copy to the Secretary of State:
Coming to the final analysis the best hope of peace. . . is that the United States and the United Kingdom must stand firmly side by side, shoulder to shoulder, 50-50 in all things.
And Admiral Pratt also said:
In the case of a break [i.e., war], the mutual interests of Great Britain and ourselves in sea power will draw us inevitably closer together, provided we take care not to let economic and other matters drive a rift between us.
This information is available in the Pratt papers at the U. S. Navy Classified Archives. These words came from a statesman as well as a fine officer. History would have taken a different course had his advice been followed. I discuss this in the forthcoming second volume of Naval Policy.
“Two Birds in the Hand”
(See K. N. Duff, pp. 60-63, September 1969 PROCEEDINGS)
Lieutenant Albert H. Robbins, U. S. Navy—Lieutenant Commander Duff, as officer-in-charge of the Hydrofoil Special Trials Unit (HYSTU), is justifiably proud of his unit’s performance with these prototype hydrofoils. But, regardless of the complexity and sophistication of its stabilization system, any boat which carries its gunner fully exposed on the bow is pretty primitive.
Availability, whether in 18 or 80 months, is no justification for buying quantities of such hydrofoils which, admittedly, do not match mission requirements. The Sea Legs’ submerged foil technology appears to have gone directly from infancy to senility; superceded by the invention of the air cushion vehicle (ACV).
On 25 July 1959, the 50th anniversary of Bleriot’s flight across the English Channel, the world’s first ACV left Calais bound for Dover. Saunders-Roe’s SR.N1 made the flight in two hours three minutes. In 1969, the SR.N4s, carrying up to 254 passengers and 30 automobiles, routinely made 40-minute crossings.
ACVs have demonstrated their ability to work with and from ships. They have been launched, recovered, and supported by LSDs, Coast Guard cutters, and cruise ships. Aboard ship they require a clear deck space; ashore they require only the most primitive beaching facilities. No special deep channels, piers, or drydock facilities are necessary.
An ACV expressly designed for open ocean operations—low center of gravity, large, lightly loaded platform (30-50 pounds per square foot cushion pressure), and a tall, wave-clearing skirt—does not exist, and none have been ordered. However, such a machine could be built if all we are after is a 40-plus-knot ACV capable of carrying a 40-mm. gun, machine guns, and possibly a torpedo or two. And it could be available in the PGH 18-month time frame. It could be built at lower cost, with no complex foils, or novel ship support requirements.
In the ten years since the first ACV flight, ACVs have caught and probably passed hydrofoils. Comparing relative investment and probability of useful return, I think it is time to cook Mr. Duff’s two birds to feed a really promising young fighting cock.
“Down the Chain Pipe”
(See B. Sunderland, pp. 149-151, November 1969 PROCEEDINGS)
William V. Kielhorn, Office of Naval Research—Commander Sunderland’s Professional Note raised some interesting points as to how in the world things are originated and perpetuated in the Navy. Perhaps unequal chain-lengths do make sense in some way, and perhaps someone else will offer such an explanation. On the other hand, it really doesn’t have to make sense, so long as it is policy.
In his last sentence, obviously with tongue-in-cheek, Commander Sunderland mentions reversal of the heeling magnets upon crossing the aclinic line. This, too, is an utter myth, which has been perpetuated along with an amazing number of minor (and a few major) errors contained in the “Holy” Bowditch chapter on magnetic compasses.
“Campus Unrest”
(See D. Caldwell, pp. 58-62, June; and pp. 101-103, October 1969 PROCEEDINGS)
Lieutenant R. S. Cloward, U. S. Navy—The comments of Rear Admiral Davis reflect most graphically the communication gap between seniors and juniors in today’s Navy. Admiral Davis seems to worry that “the idealist willing to go to prison or otherwise sacrifice himself for his ideals” is a danger to the future U. S. Navy. He asks how the Navy would fare:
. . . with a scattering of self-regarded martyrs who have come to regard abnegations in terms of prison walls as old hat and who would seek to further energize their Utopian compulsions in even more vital sectors in the armed forces.
The idealist described by Midshipman Caldwell seems to me a completely different type, one who, in the majority of instances, would make an excellent officer. As they mature from the college atmosphere and have the responsibilities of the world imposed upon them, their initial idealism is remolded, adapted, and reutilized. To me, the idealism of youth seems the perfect platform on which to launch a career into the pragmatic world of today. Granted it is a long trip from one pole to the other, but it is a truly educational voyage.
As for the scattered self-martyrs of Admiral Davis’ type, few are interested in obligated military service, let alone volunteer service. The causes of idealism are not strong enough to attract the dedicated revolutionary.
“The Encircling Sea”
(See J. J. Clark, pp. 26-35, March; and pp. 116-117, September 1969 PROCEEDINGS)
Lieutenant Robert W. Sherer, U. S. Navy, Department of State (Geneva)—Commander Martin rightly emphasizes the need for a capability to implement options of one’s own choosing. I don’t agree, however, that intervention will elicit the support of International Law. In the Corfu Channel incident, referred to by Commander Martin, the International Court of Justice did rule in favor of the United Kingdom in finding Albania responsible for the mine damage suffered by British destroyers. On the other hand, the Court ruled against the United Kingdom concerning the subsequent operations in Albanian waters:
The Court can only regard the alleged right of intervention as the manifestation of a policy of force, such as cannot, whatever be the present defects in international organisation find a place in international law. (ICJ Reports, 1949, p. 32)
The United States is in a weak position to invoke the prestige of the World Court anyway since, contrary to the Statute of the Court, our government claims the right to determine whether or not a given case to which the United States is a party, falls within the jurisdiction of the Court.
Intervention has its strategic merits, but let us not count on the support of international legal opinion for it.
“The Navy—A Retention Gap”
(See J. G. McGarry, pp. 105-107, February; p. 113, July; pp. 114-115, August; and pp. 113-114 October 1969; and p. 90 February 1970 PROCEEDINGS)
Lieutenant Douglas M. Norton, U. S. Navy, USS Davidson (DE-1045)—Commander Hewett’s proposal to split the advancement path into separate divisions—Professional (P) and Military (M)—would not do justice to either requirement.
The fact that a man can pass an examination on military leadership and related topics does not mean that he will, in fact, be an effective leader. It is not enough that a man know how to lead, he must simultaneously be willing to exercise the faculty of leadership. This, I submit, is the critical factor in the making of either a petty officer or a commissioned officer. It cannot be evaluated by a Navy-wide examination alone. It can, and must, be evaluated by the individual’s immediate superiors during daily observation.
Once a man has actually demonstrated the desire to lead, the broadening of his knowledge of leadership techniques, which would result from studying for an exam on the subject, would undoubtedly be helpful. However, proven motivation is the key factor.
The Navy has already separated advancement into two parts. In order to be eligible for advancement, a man must complete certain “Practical Factors” which include both P and M skills. He must also complete separate correspondence courses covering both P and M facets of the next pay grade. There already exist two Navy-wide exams on leadership: the military/leadership exam for petty officer third and second, and that for petty officer first and chief. Passing these tests is prerequisite to eligibility to participate in the Navy-wide Examination for Advancement in Rate, from which promotion actually comes.
This existing advancement structure gives, I feel, more than adequate separation of military and technical/professional skills.
There is an additional drawback to the proposed P and M system of advancement and pay. The line between P and M areas would often be very difficult to draw. Thus, repeatedly, there is the question, “Who’s in charge?” It would be relatively simple to establish in the case of, say, a ten-man working party to police the pier—the senior M grade present would run the show. But what about within the daily working environment of a technical rating, such as the sonar technician (ST)? By listing some typical daily tasks of an ST and setting in italics those tasks or portions of tasks which experience has shown require firm guidance from the supervisor if they are to be properly accomplished, I believe one may demonstrate the difficulty and impracticality of separating the professional and military aspects of a good day’s work:
Perform equipment repairs and complete the necessary 3M systems paperwork.
Repair malfunctions, but troubleshoot thoroughly so that only the minimum number of costly repair parts are used.
Clean up the working area when through. “Button up” the equipment completely to keep out dust and moisture.
Stand an alert sonar watch, being able to differentiate accurately between submarine and nonsubmarine contacts.
If the petty officer in charge of these tasks was, for instance, a P-9/M-4 under the proposed system, I doubt that many of the items would be accomplished with any degree of consistency. The factors that would motivate an individual to advance along the P path, while largely ignoring the M path, would be unlikely to produce firm supervision on his part. If the situation were reversed, the P-4/M-9 in charge might often find himself unable to guide and evaluate his subordinates due to his comparative lack of technical knowledge.
The Navy needs petty officers who are effective supervisors. I am sure that others will be able to add additional qualities, but it would appear that any listing of the elements of effective supervision must include both knowledge of the task at hand and the willing exercise of leadership. When either quality gets significantly out of balance with the other, the effectiveness of the supervisor will decline. I feel that the P and M system would be detrimental in its overall effect on the Navy, because it would not only allow but encourage such an imbalance between professional and military abilities of petty officers.
The retention problem is complex, and certainly the wider the range of comment and attention to it, the sooner the Navy’s batting average in this critical area will improve. I would hope, however, that any consideration of the problem would include among its premises, the man the Navy must attract and retain is the versatile man—the fellow who is willing and able not only to fix the fire control radar, but also to put in a tour on the MAA force, be an effective shore patrolman, and stand a taut watch on the quarterdeck in port. The Navy, or at least the small ship segment of it, just couldn’t function effectively without this versatility under the present philosophy of shipboard organization and manning.
“Night Fight Off Oran”
(See H. Sanders, pp. 56-63, January; and pp 114-115 May 1969 PROCEEDINGS)
Vice Admiral Harry Sanders, U. S. Navy (Retired)—It is pertinent that Kapitänleutnant Merzhauser has directed attention to the Laconia incident and to the order which Grand Admiral Dönitz issued immediately thereafter. This order, which figured so prominently in the Nuremberg trials, forbade German submarines to come to the surface to rescue survivors.
In general, the conduct of German submarine warfare during World War II was, although not in accord with the Geneva Convention of 1907, dictated by the exigencies and dangers of total war.
During the Nuremberg trials, Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, U. S. Navy, noted that U. S. submarines generally refrained from rescuing the shipwrecked as soon as this operation exposed them, to needless risks, or when rescue work stopped them from carrying out another mission.
Prior to the torpedoing of the Laconia, 600 miles south of the Azores, on 12 September 1942, German submarines tried to pick up the captain and chief engineer of torpedoed ships. The U-156 was trying to do this, making slow speed on the surface in the dark. The sea was covered with wreckage, survivors in lifeboats and rafts, men swimming, and corpses. Women and children were on boats and on rafts. Before the Laconia went down, people on the bridge of the U-156 heard cries of “help, help” in Italian. Captain Hartenstein dispatched the following message to Admiral Dönitz:
Sunk British Laconia unfortunately with 1,500 Italian prisoners. 90 rescued so far.
Admiral Dönitz, a man of great character who had said “no” to Hitler himself, ordered three other submarines to join Hartenstein and to assist in the rescue operations. As Kapitanleutnant Merzhauser says, the submarines were bombed by American aircraft during the rescue operations. Later investigation indicated that no U. S. Navy or U. S. Army Air Forces personnel participated in the Laconia incident. American aircraft were, however, flown by Allied personnel.
In any event, Admiral Dönitz then issued his famous order to all German submarines:
(1) No attempt of any kind must be made at rescuing the crews of ships sunk. This prohibition applies to the picking up of men in the water and putting them in life boats, righting capsized lifeboats, and handing over food and water. Rescue runs counter to the primary demands of warfare for the destruction of enemy ships and their crews.
(2) Orders for bringing in captains and chief engineers still apply.
(3) Rescue the shipwrecked only if their statements will be important for your boats.
(4) Be harsh, bearing in mind that the enemy takes no regard of women and children in his bombing attacks on German cities.
Admiral Dönitz was tried at Nuremberg and sentenced to ten years imprisonment. His order was, in my opinion, justified by the terrible losses suffered by German submarines at the hands of the formidable Allied antisubmarine air forces. I consider that the deposition made by Fleet Admiral Nimitz supports this view. I felt that the sentence of Admiral Dönitz was unjust and, upon invitation, I said so. Admiral Dönitz replied to me in a kind letter.
It was unfortunate that Admiral Dönitz used the phrase “be harsh” in his order. The order was censured at Nuremberg for its ambiguity. It was also unfortunate that one—and only one—U-boat captain, Eck, after sinking the Greek steamer Peleus, machine-gunned the crew on their rafts.
It must therefore be concluded that Admiral Dönitz conducted the submarine war as dictated by the exigencies of total war. Certainly the sinking of merchant ships without warning, and without rescuing survivors, is no worse than the terrible bombing of cities. Happily, the days of the Nazis are over, and Germans and Americans are now firm friends.
“The Function of the Navy”
(See J. D. Chase, pp. 27-33, October 1969 PROCEEDINGS)
Captain Thomas D. McGrath, U. S. Navy (Retired)—I finished reading the article by Rear Admiral Chase with a feeling of dissatisfaction. This did not stem from any lack of appreciation of the article, which is an excellent exposition of the evolution of the functions of the Navy. On further reflection, I concluded that this dissatisfaction arose from several causes:
A personal tendency to consider is that such writing should at least provide some basis for further extension or projection of the writer’s ideas. That is, I was left with the feeling that this is how the functions of the Navy came to be, so we can continue to observe with interest any further development. To me it would be preferable if a possibility of influencing such development was indicated.
A habit of thought is one that considers objectives, missions, and tasks. In this context, “Commanding the Sea” is an objective; implementing foreign policy and social reforms are missions; and the remainder, as stated, are tasks. Under such a breakdown, however, several other missions and tasks would be added. For instance, it seems that at least as good a case could be made for a function (mission) of implementing technological change as is made for implementing social reform.
It is, of course, realized that within the limitations of space imposed on any article in the PROCEEDINGS, it is not possible to cover in depth any but narrow subjects and, for the subject discussed, a book might be more appropriate. Support of the merchant marine and oceanography are generally accepted as Navy functions, but they do not appear to fit into the functions as delineated. Hopefully, Rear Admiral Chase may find time to explore his subject to greater length and eliminate my vague dissatisfactions, which probably resulted from the space limitations imposed by the PROCEEDINGS.
“Efficient Utilization of Time”
Lieutenant A. T. Dunn, U. S. Navy—While going through my personal file, I ran across the following memo, which was published some six or seven years ago. I will not attempt to explain the circumstances which brought it about.
USS No Name
Fleet Post Office
New York, New York
From: Commanding Officer
To: All Officers
Subj: Efficient utilization of time
1. In the interest of saving both my and your valuable time it is requested that in the future all officers when making reports or explanations shall utilize the listing in paragraph 2.
2. Please be specific by number. To save both our times, give your excuse by specific number or numbers. The following is the list which will be used in order of their current popularity among excuses:
a. I thought I told you.
b. That’s the way we’ve always done it.
c. No one told me to go ahead.
d. I didn’t think it was very important.
e. I’m so busy, I just haven’t gotten around to it.
f. Jones was supposed to check with the tender on it.
g. I didn’t know you were in a hurry for it.
h. That is Smith’s job, not mine.
i. I’m waiting for an O.K..
j. That’s not my department.
k. How did I know this was different?
l. That was a yard job. They do good work.
m. Broum is the only one who knows, and he’s on leave.
n. I told Williams to do it. He must have forgotten.
o.
p.
q. I forgot.
3. Several blanks are provided for the more imaginative officers. It should be pointed out that the letter “q” should only be used in dire emergencies when you are caught short and have limited maneuvering room.
Signed
Commanding Officer
“The Paper Torpedo”
(See R. J. Hanks, pp. 26-34, May; pp. 114-115, October, and pp. 125-126, November 1969 PROCEEDINGS)
Captain Robert J. Hanks, U. S. Navy—I am indebted to Vice Admiral Schofield for correcting a bit of misinformation which I had extracted from the writings of a couple of rather prominent American historians.
Nevertheless, the story of the events leading to the Conference is neither so simple nor so clear cut as either he or I described it. It is true that the United States did issue the formal invitations which got the idea of a conference off the ground. The background and the pre-conference maneuvering, however, are most interesting, and they serve to illuminate the motivations—both manifest and concealed—of the British and the American governments alike.
As the Admiral suggests, Senator William E. Borah did embark upon an unswerving campaign to force the President to take positive action with regard to arms limitations. The Senator seized Congressional leadership of this endeavor in December 1920, by pushing a joint resolution which requested the Chief Executive to initiate naval limitations negotiations with Great Britain and Japan. Borah’s proposal drew immediate and vociferous support in the United States, some of it from a large group of prominent and influential Americans. By mid-January, Congressional hearings were in full swing, and this historic sounding board reverberated with thundering oratory.
While the Senator was waging his campaign, Warren G. Harding took office. Borah’s efforts did not, however, meet with a “ready ear.” Contrary to the inferences many people had drawn from Harding’s campaign for the Presidency, he did not dash off forthwith in pursuit of disarmament—unilateral, multilateral, naval. . . or any other kind. Little more than a month after his inauguration he bluntly shoved arms limitations well down the priority ladder by announcing that peace with Germany came first. He then let it be known that, moreover, his Administration opposed any cut-back in the 1916 naval shipbuilding program.
Harding’s actions goaded the enraged proponents of naval limitations to renewed efforts. But by 28 April, the President had won: the Administration’s naval bill had passed the House of Representatives without any crippling amendments. President Harding then launched an attack on the Borah Resolution and issued a thinly-veiled warning about Congressional attempts to pressure the Executive.
The opponents of navalism once more renewed their attacks and, as popular sentiment mounted, the President began to retreat. Senate amendments to the naval appropriations bill (including the Borah Resolution itself) flew thick and fast around Capitol Hill. Trading future promises for continued current construction, Harding withdrew his objections to the Borah Resolution and it was attached to the naval bill as an amendment. The Administration tried one last time to torpedo the Borah Resolution/Amendment when the bill went back to the House for ratification, but the effort failed.
Internal pressures were not the only ones working on the President. The main outside source was Great Britain. David Lloyd George may have recognized, as Admiral Schofield implies, that direct competition with the United States was out of the question. Lloyd George, of course, had a problem—the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. He could not negotiate a bilateral naval agreement with the United States while that Alliance stood. Nor could he take the lead in three-power talks—which would jeopardize the Alliance—without risking trouble with the Japanese. Moreover, a British initiative would almost certainly provoke a wave of Anglophobia in America. What he really needed was a three-power conference called at the behest of the United States. And in early January of 1921, the British government began scattering suitable hints around the international arena; most of them directed at the United States.
Ambassador Geddes was called home from Washington for consultations, and he subsequently returned to America amidst appropriate disarmament conference publicity. Lord Fee, a well-known Atlanticist, became First Lord of the Admiralty. In mid-March, he made a speech extolling the naval limitations “hint” in Harding’s inaugural address. In April, Fee arranged a meeting with the publisher of The New York Times and used him as an unofficial messenger to the U. S. government. British pressure continued to build until early July. Concurrently, American internal pressures were playing directly into British hands and, with the passage of the Borah Resolution/Amendment on 21 June 1921, the British government pulled out the stops.
On 5 July 1921, Britain’s Foreign Secretary suggested to American Ambassador Harvey that President Harding should invite the Powers (Great Britain and Japan) to Washington for a disarmament conference. Lloyd George intensified the pressure on 5 July by issuing a virtual ultimatum during a questioning in Parliament. He essentially committed the British government to take the initiative unless the American President acted within the next four days. On 8 July, an agitated Harvey sent a cable to Washington, relaying the British suggestion, adding his own opinion that unless the President moved quickly, the British would abscond with his “rightful credit.”
Recognizing that the political cost—domestic and foreign—of further foot-dragging could bankrupt him, the President capitulated. He released a press statement that the United States would ask that an arms limitations conference be held in Washington.
Thus, Admiral Schofield quite rightly takes issue with me for laying the blame for proposing the Washington Conference at the feet of the British Lion. Clearly, this was not the case. The invitations were issued by the United States. His Majesty’s government merely “suggested” that the United States propose one. But throughout, the British played their diplomatic cards very cleverly, bending every effort to ensure that the President followed that suggestion.
“Men in the Middle”
(See J. M, Purtell, pp. 61-69, August; and pp. 107-108, December 1969; pp. 104-105, January; and p. 99, February 1970 PROCEEDINGS)
Captain W. J. Maddocks, U. S. Navy—Military professionalism today, as in other years, flourishes and wanes in response to prevailing conditions that either allow or discourage unrestrained dedication to the profession. A large influx of temporary officers, a trend toward early retirements and a second career, preoccupation with personal or family security, uncertainty as to the future, concern with non-military aspirations, all tend to weaken professionalism. On the other hand, concentration of the officer corps into a single-purposed group, relatively unhampered by nonprofessional diversions or concern about the future encourages and strengthens those qualities that enhance professionalism.
Since World War II, a significant challenge to military professionalism has appeared in the decaying authority of the military vis-à-vis the civilian in government and primarily in the Department of Defense (DoD), and the remarkably increased differential between the emoluments of government employees relative to the military.
The officer structure of the Navy has remained relatively stable while the number of higher grades of civil service in the Naval Establishment and DoD, as a whole, has ballooned in an astounding fashion. Although it might be argued that in an altruistic sense, relative financial reward and levels of grade structure are minor ingredients in the achievement of a dignified calling, the practical exigencies of where and how the military live in the community, the social level at which their families are able to take their place, the educational opportunity afforded their children, the social and financial attractiveness of the military to the superior youth of the nation, are not minor considerations.
As the expertise and the dignity of military professionalism are eroded, so too, is the spirit of the profession; perhaps here is the greatest danger, for it is this intangible, the professional military spirit, that must provide the resilience and toughness to ride out the storm. The preservation of this spirit is the task of the senior officers in the military and it is apparent by the actions of these officers in recent years that they are determined to do so.
It is essential, however, that political leaders recognize the importance of the professional military spirit for, by the very laws and customs of our democracy, the military stands naked and vulnerable to passing whims and emotional extremes of the civilian sector—particularly when a public figure chooses to “make hay” at the expense of the military.
The military has, to a greater or lesser degree, down through the years possessed a quality of corporateness; a knowledge of their special category apart from the civilian world with a kinship almost to a religious order. This corporateness, this sense of being held separate from the hubbub of daily life has been an important element in the achievement of professionalism, for along with it went the feeling that the military had no need to scratch and haggle for a livelihood, for status, for a reasonable standard of living, for security in old age—that our statesmen recognized “the integrity of the profession.”
In this atmosphere, the military professional could and did dedicate his life to the highest ideals of professionalism, content that he need not keep a wary eye on the civilian sector. With the knowledge that his contract with his country would be honored to the letter, he willingly devoted full energies to his profession with little concern for a reserve to carry him over unanticipated pitfalls. The forces that tend to erode the atmosphere of corporateness seem more vigorous than ever before. Starting with the general reaction of the disbanded World War II citizen soldiery and its popularized criticism of things professional, followed closely by the publicity-centered political attacks on parts of the military, the constant whittling away of long-standing military “privileges,” political dabbling with promotion lists, the downhill-sliding pay scales, the jeopardizing of time-honored pension systems, the emergence of the scientist-strategist, the great shift of military control to multi-tiered civilian offices and agencies—all have weakened the quality of corporateness that was a key to achieving total dedication to professionalism.
A factor which looms greater each year is the tendency of many to not view the military as a lifetime career. Traditionally, a liberal retirement system with security and benefits has been the reward for the soldier who devoted his life to his country, who exposed himself to danger on a routine basis, and endured hardships during his career not expected of the civilian. This retirement was bestowed gladly, and with appreciation, in years gone by. The retired Service man did not have to think too deeply about a vocation after retirement. With the greater part of his career spent, he more often than not needed a real physical holiday. In these circumstances, his military career could be viewed as a lifetime effort with little following but idle retirement. In the post-World War II era, we find much that has changed but the pattern of early retirement remains fundamentally the same—an anachronism which drags at professionalism. The combination of longer life and improved health, shrinking retirement benefits, increasing living costs, lowered military status, high attrition levels, inflexibility of the rank structure, all have tended to foster the feeling in the military that theirs was not a lifetime career and that they were in effect, in a transitional period leading to a permanent career after retirement from the military.
The time-honored military organizational structure is essentially a pyramid that reflects the fundamental line type of command chain necessary for effective tactical control. Today, however, the military is responsible for, and engaged in a multitude of functions that are superimposed on the hard core tactical function. It is in this complex of other functions that responsibilities must mesh with and be responsive to civilian organizational structures both in government and in industry.
In an era when science, technical acumen, sophisticated comptrollership, and political understanding all figure strongly in military matters and when economy and cost effectiveness are in the forefront, flexibility of organizational structure would seem mandatory. The military cannot afford to turn loose particularly talented officers just because they will not become flag officers and generals. The country cannot afford to retire capable individuals on pensions when, for a little more, their full services can be retained. Industry doesn’t work that way nor does government. It is equally important that the military function so that the same return on manpower is realized as in other businesses.
The present organizational concept with totals in-grade fixed by law and the stringent selection-out practiced by the Navy, to ensure a healthy promotion flow quickly establishes that the average career officer will be forced to leave active service before his 50th birthday. This average officer is highly trained, with a depth of experience that can be of great value to the service. More often than not he has advanced education both in service colleges and in civilian institutions and is likely to have an advanced degree. He is often a real authority in some specialized field, and even more than that, he is used to accepting responsibility and exercising authority. This is the officer who is forced to leave the service, not because of professional shortcomings, poor performance, or specific weakness, but rather because the machinery of the system has to be served. It is done at the expense of a growing pension burden primarily to make room for younger officers entering at the base of the pyramid who will be in the same predicament in time to come. And probably more painful than all of this is that the experience and background that these retirees possess cannot be purchased for “love nor money.” This certainly seems like an area for more flexibility and fresh thinking.
A fresh look may very well have as its objective, the development of a system which provides a full career opportunity for those who do not make the top grades of the service. Such a system might well have provisions for individuals to stop at certain levels if their talents so suggest, without the stigma of being selected out. It would also seem advantageous to develop a closer tie between the uniformed members of the military department and the non-uniformed sector so that full use and exploitation of trained and experienced military personnel could be realized. If it is necessary for an individual “to take off his uniform” because of the need to promote more operationally and command-suited personnel, that “professional” might well be fitted into the civilian side of the department. Professionalism is the basis of military effectiveness and at a time when national security depends on this effectiveness, we find much that produces erosion.
Much can be done by the services themselves. The needed strengthening of expertise, of enhancement of prestige, of strengthened spirit and corporateness, of improved economic and social status important to professionalism, while dependent on external influences and opinions, can in the final analysis only go the course that the services themselves set, be it purposefully or accidentally. We should consider some basic departures from our way of doing business regardless of how deep-seated they are. Dynamic, imaginative, and even daring policies can elevate the factors that make for stronger professionalism. Let us not hesitate to break the bonds of time-worn concepts in organization and structure when necessary, casting aside numerical expediencies in particular, and realizing that what we really must do is to attract whole lives, not just parts of these lives.
Professionalism will be in its ascendency when the military fully believe and practice the axiom of quality rather than quantity, and when pride in military professionalism equals that of other professions.
“Bloodless Weapons”
(See D. P. Wyckoff, pp. 64-69, September 1969; and pp. 93-94, January 1970 PROCEEDINGS)
Lieutenant Commander C. C. Battaglia, U. S. Navy—As former Force Psyops officer for the Commander, U. S. Naval Forces, Vietnam, I will readily testify to the Navy’s very limited capability in PsyOps. In a counterinsurgency environment—and Vietnam is still and has always been basically a counter-insurgency environment—PsyOps is not only necessary, but integral to the execution of this type of warfare.
The three critical interfaces—enemy, indigenous populace, and Vietnamese sailors—are areas in which our knowledge and expertise are limited. Although Game Warden forces in the Delta in 1968 were able, with their limited capability, to induce, influence, or assist in the defection of 150 Viet Cong (VC), I was often disturbed at the results.
Colonel Wyckoff’s statement to the effect that every ship and aircraft is a potential psychological instrument will continue to receive lip service by commanders who basically do not understand how that intangible instrument works, or fail to recognize its effectiveness. When the USS New Jersey (BB-62) was en route to the waters off North Vietnam, attempts to exploit her psychologically were not only ignored, but also were rejected by the Navy side of the house. It took the pressure of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) PsyOps Directorate (now PsyOps Division) to forge ahead with media development and dissemination vehicles.
The revolutionary changes in military technology and communications, in the strategic behavior of major powers and in the condition, attitudes, and aspirations of peoples in undeveloped states, have radically altered the strategic environment since World War II. With the four-ocean challenge now fragmented into a near infinite number of challenges in national or regional gulfs, coastlines, and rivers, it is time to recognize some basic facts of life. First, the blue-water Navy’s capacity as an instrument of our foreign policy is rapidly being reduced as a result of age, lack of funds, and present public opinion. What we have will have to be carefully deployed for the greatest PsyOp effect. Secondly, Communist-inspired attempts-to-control wars, or controlled wars of liberation are achieving refinement in underdeveloped nations in a majority of which riverine and coastal operations are necessary. In this regard, Vietnam has taught that for our military assistance to succeed, hardware is not the crucial answer, but rather the interface between the U. S. bluejacket attempting to impart skills and concepts and the indigenous bluejacket who must learn. Call this interface, PsyOps, ideological warfare, or personal response, the result must be the same.
Finally, the dramatic increase in the numbers of people and influence of communications throughout underdeveloped area, accentuates the impact and need for the Navy-Marine “white” propaganda capability in these inevitable areas of assistance, be it nation-building, counterinsurgency, or simply deterrence.
Our Precarious Force Balance
Commander James A. Winnefield, U. S. Navy—The traditional mission of navies throughout history has been control of the seas. For smaller navies, the mission has been limited to specific sea areas or has been based on the corollary of denying control to any potential enemy. For the large navies of history, control of the seas has encompassed the potential to dominate the great ocean areas of the world and the choke points granting access to and egress from the continental seas and coastal waters. The Royal Navy exercised such control for over two centuries, or roughly up until the 1920s. The U. S. Navy has exercised similar control of the seas since the latter part of World War II.
Today, the exercise of that control is in jeopardy from within and without. The threat from without, in the form of expanding Soviet seapower, has been well publicized and is not the subject of this discussion. The threat from within is more insidious, for its source lies within the American people and our view of national priorities and within the U. S. Navy and our view of force level priorities.
There are unmistakable signs that we as a people are becoming weary of the world peace-keeping responsibilities that we have carried since 1945 and that we are becoming more concerned with domestic problems. The defense funding climate has been affected and all military programs including naval forces are under critical scrutiny and varying forms of attack, paralleling that experienced in 1945-1950. This scrutiny has had as one of its results a reduction in the size of our Navy at a time when the threat is generally conceded to be increasing. The reduced funding has forced the Navy to make some very difficult force level decisions—which, in some cases, have suggested the legendary quandary facing the mother who must decide which child to throw to the wolves to save the remainder of her brood. The focus of this essay is on these difficult decisions and to suggest a perspective for establishing priorities.
Fundamentally, naval forces can be divided into two groups: those forces whose primary mission is control of the sea, and those forces whose primary mission is projecting power from the sea over adjacent land areas. It is recognized that the fundamental flexibility of naval forces enables such forces in many instances to do both missions, and indeed, the ability to project power over adjacent land areas does in many cases directly enhance control of the sea. The converse is also true. Nevertheless, naval forces in general are designed primarily to do one or the other of the aforementioned missions. And most have in practice been employed principally in only one of these missions.
Our sea control forces consist generally of all of our ASW forces, all of our surface escorts, mine forces, and of the service force necessary to support them. Our other forces including amphibious ships, Polaris submarines, and our CVAs, have been justified principally on the basis of their ability to project power over adjacent land areas. Our attack carrier forces, of course, represent our principal counter to potential enemy missile-equipped surface naval forces. As important as may be the threat represented by these forces, they are generally conceded to be second to the threat posed by hostile missile equipped nuclear submarines. If one accepts the foregoing categorization of naval forces by mission, it is useful to examine the impact of force level reductions over the past five years.
Sea Control Forces |
||
---|---|---|
|
1965 |
1969 |
CVS/CVSG |
9 |
6 |
Patrol Squadrons |
29 |
26 |
Surface escorts |
221 |
208 |
SS/SSN |
104 |
99 |
Sea Power Projection Forces |
||
|
1965 |
1969 |
CVA/CVW |
15 |
*16 |
SSBN |
29 |
41 |
Amphib Vessels |
136 |
135 |
* Including a CVS in a CVA role, but not including a CVA in extended conversion.
From the foregoing it is readily apparent that force level cuts have been concentrated in the Sea Control Forces. Except for CVS/CVSG, there has been a qualitative upgrading of all forces with the phase-in of new ships and aircraft. However, this upgrading has been most pronounced in the Sea Power Projection Forces.
The imbalance in development of the two forces over the past five years implies Navy acceptance of the concept that the threat to our control of the sea has not developed as rapidly as other threats derived from potential enemy land power and strategic missile power. However, public utterances by high defense officials including the Secretary of Defense suggest that the threat to our control of the sea posed by Soviet naval forces is the most serious threat faced by our country.
The divergence of threat development and force development has serious implications for our Navy and for our national security. It is difficult to escape the judgment that in spite of the increase in expenditures for the modernization of our Sea Control Forces (principally ASW forces) over recent years, most of the money still goes to the Sea Power Projection Forces and that the gap may even be opening. The risk we run is that our Sea Control Forces may not be adequate in number or quality to provide access by our Sea Power Projection Forces to say nothing of our merchant marine. If the present trend continues in the face of the known threat we appear to be running grave risks.
In developing force level objectives within alternative funding levels, we must give primary consideration to our Sea Control Forces. In the real world, we will never get all that we believe we require, but we should split the money pie in such a way that sea control is not jeopardized in order to maintain our ability to project our power ashore. In a very austere funding climate, this may require that we sacrifice some of our CVA/CVWs, SSBNs, or amphibious lift (even though they can be fully justified at present or at greater force levels) if by so doing we retain the capability to maintain sea control at an acceptable level of risk.
Under the administration of Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, force level requirements were in theory, and to some degree in practice, derived from an appraisal of the threat and a systems analysis approach to buying or developing the required forces. Unfortunately, in practice, this meant all too often using systems analysis to defend predetermined force levels. Nevertheless, some programs gained funding support which they might not have obtained in the absence of Department of Defense (DoD) systems analysis support. With the present administration, there appears to be a greater reliance on the military force level judgments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)—but within the context of rather closely specified funding levels or within the context of specific budget cuts applied to current expenditure levels. The net effect is to give the Services a greater say on how to slice the pie, but DoD still determines the approximate size of the pie available. Although the current approach resembles that used before 1960, it has the virtue of permitting the Service chiefs to determine force composition necessary to best counter the threat. Its weakness is that the fundamental defense decisions are generated by fiscal constraints rather than threat development. In announcing cutbacks in naval forces in August 1969, the Secretary of Defense acknowledged that they were dictated by budget cuts and that the Soviet naval threat was indeed increasing.
This change in the defense decision-making process calls for changes in determining force composition. Thus, while CVA/CVW force requirements must continue to be defined within total national tactical air requirements, they must now also be related to such things as CVS/CVSG, VP, DD force levels as well. For example, in the interest of force balance, we should be prepared to examine alternatives to the present CVA/CVW force level which buy us more or less sea control forces.
If the threat becomes of such size that our authorized sea control forces cannot cope with it, our sea power projection forces will be able to operate effectively only in a permissive environment or only in specified areas where our limited sea control forces can afford the required degree of protection.
There are indications that, in view of an increasing threat, decreased funding, and a changed force level decision-making process, we are losing force balance and that we are protecting our “capital ship” force levels in the budget battle at the expense of the sea control forces, which are vitally necessary in the face of a determined and well-armed enemy. The determined Navy effort to obtain a VSX and new escorts is evidence that we realize our jeopardy. However, the arrival of these new forces is years away. In the interim, we must have enough sea control forces—even old forces if necessary—to face an increasing threat which few deny.
Pictorial—“The Mobile Riverine Force”
(See D. Dodd, pp. 80-95, June 1969; and pp. 115-118, November 1969 PROCEEDINGS)
Commander James C. Froid, U. S. Navy—Chief Dodd’s pictorial photographs of the Mobile Riverine Force are certainly some of the best available of riverine assault operations in Vietnam.
Lieutenant (j.g.) Stephens points out that as a result of the turnover of River Assault Squadron (RAS) Nine and Eleven to the Vietnamese, the article was “painfully outdated.” The officers and men who rode the older boats were fiercely proud of their craft and would not agree fully with that statement.
Long discussions were frequently held on how much of a significant improvement in capabilities the newer boats represented. The newer craft are certainly more habitable, but not necessarily better equipped to carry out their mission. The heavy new landing platforms, which replace the old lightweight platform on the armored troop carriers (ATC) have reduced stability and severely hampered visibility from the coxswain’s flat. The 105-mm. howitzer, which replaced the 40-mm. cannon, sacrifices rate of fire for greater penetration. The command and communications boat (CCB) has lost its 40-mm. cannon which made it interchangeable with a monitor. “Intricate navigation equipment” installed on board the CCB is not needed or used. The “Zippo” flame monitor has changed very little and remains one of the River Strike Forces most valuable weapons. Although the new assault craft all represent general improvements over the older craft, they do not make the older Vietnamese craft obsolete.
I agree with Commander Horowitz that a complete definitive history of the Mobile Riverine Force (MRF) would be desirable now that the MRF has been disestablished and the Navy’s role in Vietnam is rapidly becoming advisory in nature.
Perhaps because of the MRF’s unique association with the Army, it has been one of the least understood of the naval forces in Vietnam. The role of the Riverine Assault Craft in Vietnam, as well as that of the river patrol boats (PBR) and “Swift” boats (PCF), fill a fascinating and exciting page in our Navy’s history' which should not go unrecorded or buried in official records. The exploits of our American sailors in the canals and rivers of Vietnam were vital to the successful defeat of the Viet Cong (VC) takeover of the Delta. They should serve as a constant inspiration to the sailors of the future, engaged in more conventional naval operations. In River Assault Squadron Nine alone, over 414 Purple Heart medals were awarded, while ten enlisted men and one officer made the final sacrifice with their lives. Numerous heroic action awards were issued during its short history.
Whereas Commander Horowitz was the first commander of River Assault Squadron Nine, I was the last. RAS Nine was organized using borrowed Vietnamese boats, and appropriately ended its history by having all its assets turned over to the Vietnamese Navy.* From the time I assumed command on 3 October 1968 until December of the same year, the squadron conducted normal riverine assault operations during the pacification of Kien Hoa province. These included the first penetration deep into the Binh Dai Secret Zone, two major resupply operations of allied forces on the upper Vam Co Tay River at Moc Hoa during operations Cactus Fire II and III, and over 30 enemy-initiated fire fights.
Commencing on 6 December 1968, the squadron became increasingly involved in the interdiction efforts of “Operation Giant Slingshot” on the Vam Co Tay and Vam Co Dong Rivers. This was probably the first time during the war where the river assault craft and PBRs worked closely together in mutual support, using the special capabilities of both type of craft.
It was also during this time that RAS Nine embarked on its last major project—the training of the Vietnamese crews to take over the assault craft.
Although the Vietnamese Navy has been faced with immense problems while increasing its size to absorb the transfer of U. S. assets from the assault craft, PBRs, and PCFs, they have met the challenge with energy and imagination. The officers they selected for this task ate professional, capable individuals. The enlisted personnel are intelligent and eager to learn. The high caliber of the Vietnamese crews may be judged by the fact that many of our enlisted men and officers requested transfer to the Advisory Group to serve on the same boats with the crews they had just trained.
When I left Vietnam last August, I had few doubts that the Vietnamese Navy would be able to carry on in the tradition of the Mobile Riverine Force. I disagree strongly with those persons who deprecate the Vietnamese Navy’s ability to eventually replace the U. S. effort in the Delta.
Although one is always saddened to decommission an outstanding fighting organization, it is heartening to know its tasks are being carried on by capable officers and enlisted men of the Vietnamese Navy who have already proven their abilities in battle.
*See J. M. White, “AcToV—The U. S. Navy’s Accelerated Turnover Program, pp. 107-109 February 1969 PROCEEDINGS.
“The Feasibility of the Franklin Piloting Technique”
(See E. B. Brown, pp. 144-148, October; and p. 92, February 1970 PROCEEDINGS)
Commander W. E. May, Royal Navy {Emergency List)—The Franklin Piloting Technique might be useful in some emergencies but, in the example which is described, why not observe the bearing of “Z” when in transit with “B” or “C?” It is not clear in which direction the ship is moving, but, if from right to left, a bearing of “Z” in transit with “A” would be even better. The actual error of the compass would then be obtained instantly.
If I had been in such a position, I would have had the bearings in my notebook ready for use. By taking another bearing or bearings at the same time as the transit, an instant and reliable fix would have been obtained and the navigator would have known whether or not he was on his line of advance.
If the gyro compass was wandering, this error would not, of course, be of any use for subsequent fixes, but if it was known to be so unreliable, sextant fixes should have been relied upon. Of course, as a former surveyor, I am no doubt prejudiced in favor of the sextant, but I have never been able to understand the difficulties which are attributed to it. After all, if a navigator is accustomed to using a sextant for taking sun and star sights, he should find a sextant comes readily to the hand.
There used to be a saying: “different ships, different long splices,” but when I navigated one of His Majesty’s ships (I swallowed the anchor long before the accession of our present Sovereign), I would not have tolerated a compass, gyro or magnetic, which might have an unknown error of unknown sign as high as four degrees. With proper maintenance, a gyro compass should not wander that amount, and if you know what you are doing, you should be able to keep the deviations of a magnetic compass down also in a surface ship. Of course, a magnetic compass in a submarine, where deviations are bound to be affected by the heavy electric currents flowing, is a different proposition.
“The Continuing Strategic Importance of Simonstown”
(See D. C. Watt, pp. 51-54, October 1969 PROCEEDINGS)
Anthony H. Harrigan, Assistant Editor, News and Courier, Charleston, South Carolina—Readers of the PROCEEDINGS surely would be interested in the fact that the Simonstown base is being expanded and modernized to handle the new ships of the South African Navy. The most significant changes include extension of piers and building of a pneumatic lift to handle the submarines South Africa is building in France. Purchase of three Daphne-class submarines has been announced, and South African crews currently are in training at Toulon. Simonstown will handle all repairs on these submarines in future. In addition, the yard outfitted a commercial tanker as a fleet oiler and replenishment vessel and partially rebuilt older frigates as helicopter-carrying ASW vessels.
In acknowledging French assistance in developing an undersea force, Vice Admiral H. H. Biermann, Chief of the South African Navy, said that the submarine and service base being constructed at Simonstown would be made available to France and other “friendly nations for the maintenance of their submarines in peace and war.” Therefore, part of the significance of the Simonstown base is that it will be the only submarine repair base which is available to Western nations between Europe and Australia.
Commercial ship repair facilities at nearby Cape Town regularly work on vessels of up to 150,000 tons. The Bar-ship yard at Durban, on South Africa’s east coast, currently is building a 20,000-ton bulk carrier and has an internationally-recruited force of shipyard construction and repair personnel.
Simonstown has to be seen as part of a complex of naval and maritime air facilities in the Cape area. Mr. Watt mentioned Youngsfield. This is the heart of the South African ship-plotting operation, which keeps track of the vast numbers of vessels moving around the Cape. The manual set-up at Youngsfield is scheduled for replacement in the near future, with a computerized operation planned.
Admiral Biermann estimated that in any ten-day period, there are almost 2,000 ships traveling the sea routes off South Africa’s shores. These include the mammoth tankers that transport Middle East oil to European refineries. Approximately 15 Soviet and East Bloc vessels pass the Cape every day. All the NATO countries have a vital interest in the movement of Soviet warships and many Soviet merchant ships. Photographs of cargo carried by some Soviet ships is important intelligence material. South African ships and aircraft (and new Italian-made maritime aircraft are to be introduced shortly) produce intelligence data essential to a balanced, accurate, worldwide report on Soviet naval operations and supporting mercantile moves.
The Simonstown base also plays an important role in maritime disaster planning. In the event of a major disaster in the South Atlantic or southern Indian Ocean, the ships based at Simonstown and the planes located at Youngsfield and elsewhere in the Republic would be the key to search and rescue operations.
Finally, the significance of the Simonstown base has to be seen in terms of increasing ocean commerce in the Indian Ocean. Within a few years, Japanese bulk carriers of 150,000-tons will be calling at the new seaport of Richard’s Bay, north of Durban, hauling iron ore to Japan. The security of these and other ships moving across the Indian Ocean is highly important.
The communications facilities at Simonstown are a vital factor in maintaining security. The recent exchange of visits by South African and Argentine naval and defense leaders also points up concern for commerce protection in the South Atlantic. In every respect, therefore, Simonstown seems destined to play an important strategic role in the 1970s and later.
A. S. Pomeroy, Department of Oceanology, University of Cape Town, South Africa—Mr. Watt evidently has good historical knowledge concerning the Simonstown Agreement and is well qualified to write on the political aspects of the affair. However, it is not easy for me to accept that anybody with an insight into the rationale of naval war can write a four-page article on the strategic importance of Simonstown without once using the noun “submarine.”
I suppose the politician’s approach to strategy causes the concept “. . . Simonstown is, geographically speaking, an Atlantic rather than an Indian Ocean port . . . .” I find it difficult to believe, though, that such a hair-splitting legalistic view prevails in the inner courts of Whitehall when sea strategy is being considered. Nor can I believe that Their Lordships have put Mahan’s analysis of seapower in the wastepaper basket because of the new 20th century scientific developments.
I do not want to belittle Mr. Watt’s very interesting article, mis-titled though it is (it is more about South African pressure on the British Foreign Office than on the real strategic importance of Simonstown), but the more one becomes acquainted with the circumstances surrounding the whole business, the more one is convinced that strategic reality is deliberately submerged, with malice aforethought, in the interests of political ideology.