“Effective Writing, Navy or Civilian”
(See C. Blair, pp. 131-134, July; and p. 110, December 1968; pp. 116-117, February; pp. 113-114, April; and pp. 105-106, July 1969 PROCEEDINGS)
Commander Roger C. Taylor, U. S. Naval Reserve—The discussion of effective writing that has gone on for the past year in the PROCEEDINGS is too interesting to let drop.
Naval officers who are interested in effective writing make a mistake, it seems to me, when they start one-man, or even one-command, crusades for better writing. The pleas of the crusader fall mostly on deaf ears, and the result is often merely a frustrated knight, who, finding he cannot change the system, joins it. He becomes a jargon-slinger himself.
I submit that the only way a writer of Navy directives and letters, who cares about language, can change the system is to be sure that the language used in his own writing and that prepared for his signature is clear, brief, and, perhaps, even interesting. Even among those indifferent to the use of language, such writing usually finds favor. The same commanding officer who reacted adversely to John T. Gotjen’s oral complaint about naval writing might well have applauded clear, brief, interesting naval writing prepared by Mr. Gotjen. In any case, the CO probably would not have demanded that such writing be translated into Pentagonese before it was released.
Isn’t part of the problem with Navy writing a setting of low standards? I was frankly appalled that the Navy Speaker’s Guide, as quoted by my good friend Dave Woods of the Navy Department Speech Bureau, would recommend such a rule as “Write like you talk.” Apparently, the Winston cigarette people are getting considerable help with their little language corruption project. Far more important than nitpicking the grammar of this rule, however, is refuting the idea it expresses.
I am firmly committed to the opposite view, that far from accepting conversational standards in our naval writing, we should strive for the very clearest, briefest, and most interesting use of language that the relatively slow pace of writing allows. Surely we can and should write better than we talk.
Seapower—Two Sides to the Coin
Captain G. W. Rahill, U. S. Navy, Commander, MSTS Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean—Seapower consists of naval combatant strength and merchant cargo ships capability. Both are required, because they are interdependent. I believe that a closer working relationship, at all echelons, between our Navy and merchant marine would be in the best interest of the United States.
How many Navy captains and commanders, now serving in command at sea, have ever visited an American-flag merchant ship, even in a foreign port? How many have ever invited the Master of an American-flag merchant ship aboard? I believe a survey would find the percentage surprisingly low.
Merchant marine officers are more skilled in some aspects of our own profession than many naval officers. They spend more time at sea. Their views are worth listening to, and their experiences and sea stories are worth sharing. Their problems are, in part, our problems.
I believe we can strengthen America by preaching the importance of seapower to our fellow citizens. I also believe we can strengthen our seapower by more direct support of our merchant marine—by getting better acquainted with our opposite numbers. We must recognize the vital nature of their contribution to American seapower.
“Navigation Fixes From Random Bearings”
(See S. S. Seteroff, pp. 147-148, September 1969 PROCEEDINGS)
Captain Roland E. Krause, U. S. Navy, (Retired)—This is an excellent radar navigation method, but it is not new. In fact, I used it 26 years ago during the Salerno assault landing.
While I was Eighth Fleet flag navigator we were returning singly in the USS Ancon, our flagship, to the assault area. A pall of smoke hung over it as we approached; no land was visible. The location of a German minefield was accurately known. Naturally, we wished to avoid tangling with the mines.
The position I got with five radar bearings and distances resulted in pinpoint accuracy. It placed us on the corner of the minefield, and we actually sighted one submerged mine.
None of the bearings came from a point that could be definitely identified. I favored giving the minefield a wider berth, but the captain had confidence in his own navigator. After this experience, the latter became a firm supporter of the random bearing method.
“The Navy—A Retention Gap”
(See J. G. McGarry, pp. 105-107, February; p. 113, July; pp. 114-115, August; and pp. 113-114, October 1969 PROCEEDINGS)
Midshipman First Class Tobias R. Philbin, U. S. Naval Reserve, NROTC, University of Pennsylvania—Ensign Keith makes some good points in the August issue. The Navy is indeed dealing with the America of today in its recruiting.
He is correct in stating that the input of officer candidates will be from that group whose ambitions start three or four years from now. Cold statistics indicate that the chances of becoming cannon fodder are far less in the Navy than anywhere else. This constitutes the most valid argument for an NROTC recruiter.
With additional Vietnam drawdowns imminent and a concomitant reduction of draft calls not far around the corner, this argument will become less persuasive to the entering college freshman. Social pressures to remain out of NROTC will remain high on campuses (especially in Ivy League schools) until the aftertaste of Vietnam dies away. In any case, the dual problem of recruiting and retention will become even more acute in the near future.
Here are some suggestions to NROTC recruiting and retention problems:
Authorize the wearing of the National Defense Service Medal by all members of NROTC units. This would cost nothing. Additionally, authorize an NROTC Naval Reserve Service Medal. Both would have a positive effect on morale of units and the graduates of units.
Extend summer cruises to 12 weeks with an eye to qualification of midshipmen as officers of the deck. The result would be harder application to studies in the junior year.
Credit NROTC as time in service.
Double the pay. Higher pay brings and keeps better people.
An assignment as NROTC Professor of Naval Science (PNS) should be one of the requirements for consideration to flag rank. The benefits of that course to the students and the Navy would be obvious.
For drills ashore, substitute drill on board naval ships, perhaps two yard patrol craft might be provided for each unit. Many NROTC first classman have never been on board a ship, much less at sea, before their first class cruise.
Retention after commissioning is a much more difficult problem. People coming into the Navy for a short time are highly impressionable. It is up to the young professionals within, who were often reservists themselves a short time before, to provide competent and inspirational leadership. They must also provide a level-headed approach to personnel problems if the Navy is to keep good men. Fires, disasters, ship captures, notwithstanding, we still have, historically speaking, a good Navy. But there is not exactly a large proportion of the press that would agree with that. In future Defense budget battles, if it comes to a decision between one more nuclear guided missile frigate or better treatment of the people—take the people. They are the Navy.
G. A. Dieckman, Lithographer Third Class, U. S. Navy, USS Grand Canyon (AD-28)—The enlisted rating structure and advancement within this, are subjects of constant debate among both enlisted men and officers. It has been my experience that most are in favor of abolishing the discriminatory proficiency pay as a re-enlistment and retention incentive. Although not in discussion here, we should also consider the variable re-enlistment bonus (VRB), available to some “critical” and “technical” rates.
I believe that, while Lieutenant Commander Hewett is taking a step towards fairness in rate qualifications, he does not see the need for all personnel, especially those in sea duty billets, to be knowledgeable and experienced in the military aspects of the Navy.
Should the electronics technician (ET) or the sonar technician (ST), for example, be allowed either total or partial advancement solely on the basis of his technical abilities, even if his rate designation indicates his proficiency or lack of it? The answer is a strong no. In the event of a shipboard emergency, the ET as well as the boatswain’s mate (BM) or damage controlman (DC) should be familiar with the means for repairing ruptured fire mains, handling fire-fighting equipment, and application of first aid. Perhaps, most important, he must have the necessary military discipline to conduct himself in a calm and orderly fashion during such an emergency.
I submit that the Record of Practical Factors (NavPers 760), now in use, would acquaint each man with military functions, if properly used. At present, many factors are signed off by a man’s superior regardless of whether or not the task can be performed. And while it is theoretically necessary for each man to prove his ability for field-stripping the .45-caliber service pistol, or to be capable of recognizing standard signal flags, even for advancement to petty officer third class, very few men can actually do these things. Thus, the Navy is not as prepared as we would like to think.
Therefore, a simple solution to the present lack of military knowledge and capabilities on the part of the individual sailor (which, for the sake of a combat ready fleet, is a necessity) is to put more stress on the Record of Practical Factors, a system already in use.
The Prinz Eugen
(See P. S. Schmalenbach and J. E. Wise, Jr., pp 87-102; G. L Dickey, Jr., pp. 148-151, August; and pp. 111-113, December 1969 PROCEEDINGS)
Lieutenant Robert O. Dulin, Jr., U. S. Navy, and William H. Garzke, Jr.—The Prinz Eugen played a more important role in the Bismarck episode than is generally credited. Blast damage on 23 May 1941 disabled the Bismarck’s forward radar set while the battleship was engaging the cruiser Norfolk. As a result, the Prinz Eugen was assigned a station ahead of the battleship to permit her radar equipment to scan the Bismarck’s blind sector. HMS Hood’s first salvo was directed at the Prinz Eugen, and the German cruiser responded effectively, scoring a hit on the Hood in the vicinity of relatively unprotected ready service lockers for unrotated projectile launchers mounted on the Hood for antiaircraft purposes. The explosion and resultant fire greatly facilitated the Bismarck’s fire control solution, which soon led to the devastation of the old battle cruiser. It took the Bismarck only five salvos to destroy the Hood.
HMS Prince of Wales was hit by four 8-inch projectiles. Three hits aft caused serious flooding just forward of the steering gear room, while a fourth shell (fortunately a dud) penetrated the protective casemate for one of the starboard 5.25-inch gun mounts.
The Channel dash, in February 1942, was mounted despite objections both by some German admirals and the Luftwaffe. The naval authorities thought the risk too great and the crews lacking in recent battle experience due to the prolonged stay in Brest. Rather, the admirals felt the chances were good for commerce raiding out of Brest in early 1942, while, it was supposed, major British and American ships would be committed to the Pacific. Hitler overrode the objections.
The Prinz Eugen and the battle cruiser Gneisenau severely damaged the British destroyer Worcester during the Channel dash.
Both articles failed to mention the heavy damage suffered by the Prinz Eugen during a 2 July 1940 British air raid on the Germaniawerft Yard. A 500-pound bomb struck near amidships on the port side outboard and just forward of the superstructure. A hole, about a foot in diameter, was punched in the deck, and the subsequent explosion bulged the deck over a 12-by-26-foot area. The adjoining structure was heavily damaged, the catapult was damaged, and a 4.1-inch gun mount was disabled.
The 2 July 1941 bomb hit in Brest inflicted severe damage on the Prinz Eugen, as described in the pictorial. One of the men killed was the son of Hermann Burckhardt, a consultant during the development of the design of the Prinz Eugen.
The 23 February 1942 torpedoing by HMS Trident caused the collapse of the stern structure. The severe shock response caused such a whipping of the hull structure that cracks opened in the vicinity of turrets Anton and Dora (turrets 1 and 4), causing some flooding.
The Prinz Eugen was driven by three sets of geared turbines, which provided about 130,000 s.h.p., sufficient for speeds of about 32 knots. Earlier German cruisers, also with three shafts, had mixed diesel and turbine plants to obtain long ranges, while retaining moderately high speeds.
Pictorial—“The NC-4: History Preserved”
(See J. Johnston, pp. 94-105, May; pp. 106-107, September; and p. 128, November 1969 PROCEEDINGS)
Captain Robert E. Bassler, Civil Engineering Corps, U. S. Navy (Retired)—Thanks for the NC-4 history. May I contribute? Upon graduation from Cornell in 1917, I went into the aviation section of Bureau of Naval Construction (BuCon). At that time, there were very few in aviation; Captain Chambers in OpNav, Stott in BuOrd (later succeeded by Commander Stone and Lieutenant Boettcher), Commander Atkins, Bureau of Engineering and Lieutenant Commander J. C. Hunsaker, Construction Corps, U. S. Navy, in BuCon. The chief draftsman was W. C. Clarke. Others were Starr Truscott and later C. P. Burgess, Rex Beisel (later chief Engineer, Consolidated, Fort Worth, Texas), and about four others.
We produced the first performance charts from available files. These comprised the H-16, HS-1, and Mod. F. Flying Boats, the Aeromarine, and R-6 Seaplanes. Later additions were the Mod. MF, HS-1-L, F-5-L, and NC-1.
Then there were the experimental planes, the Gallaudet, with a revolving propeller in the fuselage between the pilot and the tail section. (Needless to say, most pilots wanted to steer clear of such a revolutionary design, since the tail section was supported by struts from the pontoons and by a couple of wires through the revolving propeller ring.) Others were the HA fighter, the Sperry night fighter, the Kirkham Triplane, and the Bureau-designed N-9 seaplane.
I don’t recall exactly how Lieutenant E. F. Stone, U. S. Coast Guard, got the job, but everytime a contractor concluded a plane was ready for test, Stone got the job of test pilot. He was one of the most courageous men I ever knew.
Naturally, when crews for the Atlantic flight were considered, Stone’s name was on the list.
Then came the question of navigation. Admiral R. E. Byrd, at the time a lieutenant commander, came up with a special sextant. He instructed the crews in the use of this new sextant. After training the group, he made a prophetic pronouncement to the effect that, based on his instruction, he thought A. C. Read would have the best chance of getting through in poor observation weather.
I am hoping that Captain J. C. Hunsaker, U. S. Navy (Retired), will comment on the NC flight, and on Stone and his test pilot flights for the Navy. I am sure Captain Hunsaker knows more about E. F. Stone and his Navy tour than any other person alive today. Hunsaker was always generous in giving credit for the development of the NC boats to his boss, Admiral D. W. Taylor, Construction Corps, U. S. Navy, Chief of BuCon, but to my view, Captain Hunsaker deserves far more credit for the Atlantic flight than he ever received.
The PROCEEDINGS should invite comments from those still alive—Beisel in Sarasota, Florida, and Mayer in Fort Worth, Texas.
“Navy Sailing Programs”
(See R. D. McWethy, pp. 112-113, September 1969 PROCEEDINGS)
Lieutenant (j.g.) Richard J. Goy, U. S. Navy— Captain McWethy, in his discussion of naval sailing associations, states that “Our professional sailors—enlisted deck rates and junior line officers—are conspicuous by their small numbers” in sailing programs ashore.
It should be pointed out that this lack of interest of the professional sailors is not entirely of their own choosing. Both junior officers and deck rates are basically seagoing sailors, and as such have little time available to spend on activities ashore. Long deployments, Fleet exercises, type training, and yard periods mean that these men may spend as little as two or three months in their home-ports each year.
With a constant diet of going to sea, very few are interested in sacrificing their limited time at home for a busman’s holiday of sailing small craft. The people Captain McWethy praises for filling many of the key volunteer billets in the sailing associations, are probably serving at shore activities and have minimal duty-standing requirements, and therefore have the time available to be active in these programs.
Since deck ratings and junior line officers are carrying the greatest share of the load at sea, I feel they deserve more than to be belittled for their lack of participation in what is basically a luxury of shore duty.
“The Feasibility of the Franklin Piloting Technique”
(See E. B. Brown, pp. 144-148, October 1969 PROCEEDINGS)
Commander Raymond P. Eyman, U. S. Coast & Geodetic Survey (Retired)—This system is unique, and probably gives satisfactory results of closely approximate compass corrections and fixes. The procedure simply boils down to a quick means of obtaining an approximate, although generally adequate, correction to be applied to “almost simultaneously” observed cross bearings for a suitable fix while in pilot waters.
Later, however, the author concedes:
. . . horizontal sextant angles, or the solution of the three-point problem, is the most accurate means generally available to the navigator for fixing in pilot waters, this method fails the feasibility test. The conditions under which horizontal sextant angles may be observed are too restricted.
Why and how? He does not elaborate. Admittedly, the classical three-point solution requires appreciably more time for a complete solution. The method described is really a kin [sic] to it and could be considered a bobtailed version, resulting in a relatively close approximation.
Horizontal sextant angles to well chosen objects, taken simultaneously, contrasted to bearings taken “nearly” so, will give a firm fix much more rapidly than the plotting of several bearings, especially if the latter may have had to be corrected. From the sextant fix a compass correction can then be found for that particular heading.
The sextant fix procedure has the advantage of furnishing a fix immediately, followed, if desirable, and after a very short interval, with a compass correction, rather than the reverse—compass correction followed by corrected bearings to give a valid fix.
In my experience, all prudent navigators about to enter close quarters or possible “hazardous navigation situations” would, in all probability, exercise more than ordinary precaution. They would have “broken out sextants and the three-arm protractor, redirected the tasks of the piloting team” well in advance, so that all necessary facilities would be ready at hand, thus avoiding any delay or confusion at a critical period. This would also provide a means of steering a selected path through hazardous waters, by setting a suitably preselected angle on the arc and then so maneuvering the vessel to maintain that angle as closely as necessary.
(See C. L Parnell, pp. 26-31, June; and pp. 116-117, November 1969 PROCEEDINGS)
Lieutenant Commander B. M. Simpson, III, U. S. Navy— Lieutenant Parnell answers the question of how to fight a limited war successfully by advocating its prosecution to “victory,” which he defines as changing the contrary will of the enemy to compliance with our will. There is more to a limited war than this.
A limited war is one limited in scope (theater of operations, tactics employed) for limited objectives. Clausewitz was right in perceiving war to be an extension of politics. The first requirement for a limited war is a conception of the goals or objectives to be achieved. The second requirement is an awareness of the acceptable price, in terms of the extent of military operations and their possible adverse political effects, that we are willing to pay.
In this respect, “victory” is an elusive concept, if it is applicable at all. It certainly does not mean unconditional surrender in the World War II sense. It may not even have anything to do with bending the enemy’s will, provided the objective is only to deny the enemy something by taking it away from him or by keeping it ourselves, so long as we do not want to compel him to do something.
The main point about a limited war is that it is essentially a political war, in which political considerations take precedence over military (including tactical) considerations. limited wars are not military exercises to be fought to “victory,” but rather to achieve well-defined political objectives. Otherwise war becomes absurd and pointless.
Unfortunately, Lieutenant Parnell confuses limited war with an insurgency or revolutionary war, to use the current term. A limited war is the classic extension of politics to the battlefield in an open and usually unambiguous manner. Revolutionary war, on the other hand, is distinguished by its radical departure from necessarily fixed positions and easily identified participants. It relies on the ambiguities of hit-and-run tactics, support, or at least acquiesence [sic] of the local population and the difficulty of identifying the enemy unless he choses [sic] to identify himself. The North Vietnamese have shown how revolutionary war can be used as an instrument of aggression.
Engaging in a revolutionary war, involving outside assistance to the insurgents, requires application not only of the techniques, concepts and perceptions normally associated with the classical limited war. It also requires an awareness of the social, economic, and political conditions and history of the state unfortunately suffering a revolutionary war. If the government of that state is unable to gain the support of its own people by one means or another, then its chances of surviving the revolutionary war are not particularly good, even with massive outside help.
The idea of nipping trouble in the bud is sound, as Lieutenant Parnell suggests. The amount of resistance offered and the extent of the enemy’s involvement will depend on his perception of his vital interests and of our threat to them, as well as on his own dedication to his cause.
Apparently, the point that Lieutenant Parnell was groping for is not how to achieve “victory” in a limited war, but how to wage a limited war and then to reap political benefits from that war. If the purpose of engaging in a limited war is to extend politics to the battlefield, then it is necessary to translate action on the battlefield into political gain. Statesmanship of the highest order is needed, which includes acumen, timing, knowledge, nerve, and the ability to capitalize on the fortunes of war. This is the nub of the warnings about winning the war but losing the peace at the conference table.
We should not confuse the purpose of a limited war with the more risky use of threats of all-out war. First of all, the chances of a limited war being deliberately fought between the United States and the Soviet Union tend to be diminished, if only because of the uncertainties involved and the risk that they might lead to an all-out nuclear exchange. This risk is one that neither country can afford to take lightly. The chances of becoming involved in a limited war with a lesser power, however, are greater. This situation must be clearly distinguished from a direct confrontation with the Soviet Union. The lesser power may or may not be a proxy of the Soviet Union. In any case, possible gains from brinksmanship extended to the Soviet Union on an issue of secondary importance cannot possibly outweigh the risks of either side unwittingly stumbling into a nuclear exchange. The moral here is don’t play with fire unless you have to.
Who is the enemy? Lieutenant Parnell refers to Communists and “Communist imperialism” against whom a limited war should be prosecuted to “victory.” Apparently, he assumes a Communist monolith. But this is a misleading, if not a dangerous, oversimplification. True, the Communist states express a certain amount of socialist fraternity and support each other under certain circumstances. However, it cannot be said that the troubles of one are the troubles of all. The Sino-Soviet disputes are the most notable examples of socialist discord. The Yugoslavs, Albanians, and Romanians provide others.
Fishing in troubled waters can be dangerous and even counterproductive. But it would be foolish not to take advantage of the rifts in the Communist world when we can. We should not lump all Communist states into one group and then deal with all in the same way. I do not think Lieutenant Parnell implied as much, but such a conclusion could be reached if we seek only “victory” in a limited war with a Communist state. Rather, we should view such a limited war as a means to attain certain political goals, which certainly does not preclude the use of politics to achieve those goals.
In discussing the appropriate attitude towards negotiations, Lieutenant Parnell virtually throws the baby out with the bath water. He confuses negotiations in principle with the details surrounding their conduct. Naturally, if we are unduly eager to enter into negotiations, an enemy may interpret this as a sign of weakness, rather than of magnanimity. It is a truism that each set of negotiations is different. But in negotiating with a Communist adversary, we must realize that, to him, the conference table is only another locus of the conflict that so far has extended to the battlefield. There is nothing inherently wrong with such a concept, although it may be different from that which we know and apply in our dealings with other states.
Whether we talk or fight, do both, or agree to a truce, should be based on what is most advantageous for us under the circumstances. What will work to our advantage should be our guide, rather than any preconceived, rigid notion. Similarly, our conduct of the negotiations should be based on the course that will bring the most advantage to us. The fact that we have not in the past derived as much gain as we would have liked from negotiations is not necessarily the fault of the negotiations per se. There is no reason we cannot be as skillful as our adversaries. We would do well to rid ourselves of unreasonable fears of dealing with wily foreigners, while remaining alert to the political implications of what we do and say.
Whatever mistakes, lost opportunities, and lack of success we may have experienced in past negotiations with the Communists cannot be ascribed solely to limited wars or to negotiations. They describe our inability to translate success on the battlefield and our military preponderance into political achievements.
Pictorial—“Remembrance of My Cruise”
(See C. A. Focht, pp. 88-103, August; and pp. 109-110, December 1968; pp. 112-113, May; and p. 107, September 1969 PROCEEDINGS)
B. Franklin Cooling, Curator-Historian, Cruiser Olympia Association, Inc.—As Mr. Serlick suggests, the Olympia is not on the verge of passing beneath the waves. While the recent restoration campaign netted less than the anticipated sum of $250,000, donations have enabled the Association to discharge the original debt incurred in 1958. But, as is often the case in the preservation field, the solution of one problem leaves many others unresolved. A new deck remains imperative since leakage during wet weather endangers other areas of the gun and berth decks and museum displays.
The cost to repair the deck will approach $60,000.
In addition, highway construction in Philadelphia threatens to hinder visitation over the next two or three years.
The resultant decline in revenue will affect major restoration of such areas as “officer’s country,” laundry, brig, and storekeeper compartments. Even replacement of rotted woodwork topside must be delayed once more.
The ship continues to offer much to the visitor. The modern American can gain a good picture of just what it was like on board the first steel warships in the “New Navy of the 1890s.” If he has a good imagination, he can sweat with the “black gang” for the Olympia’s starboard engine still exists. The visitor can run gunnery drills beside the 5-inch guns of the ship’s secondary battery (the 8-inch turret guns no longer exist). He can sympathize with the sailor, swinging in his hammock before the advent of air conditioning.
The shipboard museum portrays not only the Olympia, but also the whole Navy in the period 1890 to 1920. We seek items in this area and are steadily re-shaping the collections accordingly. Vandalism and theft complicate the activity, but in time, modern museum techniques will be introduced.
So, lacking the normal ship’s complement, a sizable endowment, or a coterie of patrons at the state house or in Washington, the Olympia continues to serve the nation as an historic shrine. As Mr. Serlick says, the scrap heap is not the next step for Dewey’s flagship—hopefully!
“The Bureaus Go On Forever . . .”
(See T. W. Ray, pp. 50-63, January; pp. 105-106 May; and p. 111, September 1968 PROCEEDINGS)
Data Systems Technician First Class Dennis M. Greene, U. S. Navy (Retired)—While looking through some old issues of the PROCEEDINGS, I came to Mr. Ray’s interesting article. My attention was drawn to the picture on pages 50 and 51.
Of the ten gentlemen pictured, the first seven (from the left) were honored as namesakes for U. S. Navy ships. Two admirals—Taylor and Benson—had both destroyers and transports named for them.
Quite an honored group!
Hydrography in the Royal Navy
Lawrence Phillips, Directorate of Public Relations, Royal Navy—The oldest and smallest operational department of the Ministry of Defence (Royal Navy), that of the Hydrographer of the Navy, was founded in 1795. It is under the control of Rear Admiral Stephen Richie, Royal Navy, the 19th holder of this office. His department is responsible for the actual surveying of British waters and those within the sphere of British influence, such as the Persian Gulf, Malaysia, and the British West Indies.
The first Hydrographer was Alexander Dalrymple, who had previously been Hydrographer to the Honourable East India Company. At that time there was a mass of information available to the Board of Admiralty, but none suitable for use by the Fleet. Dalrymple was “. . . entrusted with the care of such charts, etc., as are now in office, or may hereafter be deposited, and to be charged with the duty of collecting and compiling all information requisite for improving navigation, for the guidance of commanders of HM Ships.” The Hydrographer of the Navy commands a fleet of 13 survey vessels, and a department of more than 700 naval and civilian personnel.
Survey ships “send in” data to the Chart Compilation and Printing Department at Taunton in Somerset, England, where specialists transform the new information into the British Admiralty 3,500 charts. The Hydrographic headquarters is located in Taunton, but there is a small liaison staff at the Ministry of Defence under the Assistant Hydrographer. The Archives Section holds tons of documents, many of priceless value, including charts by Captain James Cook.
The increasing number of container ships, large tankers, and deep-draft shipping has necessitated a closer examination of the sea areas and depths likely to be used by these vessels. Combining this with a rapidly expanding maritime world trade, has made “signposting of the seas” of great importance. Many nations have established their own survey units because of this, and exchange hydrographic data for everyone’s safety of the seas.
The Royal Navy’s survey fleet is probably the most modern in the world. They are manned by regular naval personnel and, in accordance with international custom, are painted white with buff funnels, and they are unarmed. The most sophisticated are the three, 2,800- ton, diesel-powered Hecla-class: HMS Hecate, Hecla, and Hydra, all completed during 1965 and 1966. Manned by 14 officers and 104 enlisted men, they are the first survey ships to be designed for a combined oceanographic and hydrographic role, and the first without a supplementary naval function. Their hulls are strengthened for service in polar regions. The superstructure incorporates a garage for a land-rover. There is also a helicopter hangar and flight deck for carrying and launching a Wasp aircraft.
HMS Vidal, displacing 2,200 tons, is older, but was designed by the Royal Navy for hydrographic surveying and chart production. She was the first survey ship to be equipped with a helicopter flight deck and hangar, designed for a helicopter to land and take off for air survey photography and transporting of personnel to shore observation stations. The ship carries three survey motor launches, equipped with echo sounding apparatus. She is manned by a crew of 191 men.
A new class of coastal survey ships for the charting and recharting of shallow waters are now in service. They are the four ships of the Fawn class: HMS Beagle, Bulldog, Fox, and Fawn—displacing 990 tons full load, and carrying a complement of four officers and 34 enlisted men. They are also intended for work on the Continental Shelf. They have Lister diesels, with controllable-pitch propellers for a maximum speed of 15 knots.
For inshore work, the Hydrographer of the Navy has three 160-ton survey craft: HMS Echo, Egeria, and Enterprise. They are powered by twin Paxman diesels, giving them a speed of 14 knots. The “inshores” are of all-wood construction, designed for coastal and harbor survey work around the British coast. They can navigate in shoal waters to obtain depths and detect wrecks on the sea bed and are equipped with modern echo sounders and sonar equipment.
Two former inshore minesweepers, the 160-ton HMS Waterwitch and Woodlark, complete the naval hydrographic fleet.
Officers of the Royal Navy receive most of their hydrographic training at sea, while actually carrying out surveys. However, the Hydrographic School at Devonport, gives both officers and enlisted men an excellent background. Officers become specialists in hydrographic surveying while enlisted men are designated “surveying recorders.”
It was decided, in 1967, to move toward the national policy of the general adoption of the metric system.* Conversion began with the depths and heights on Admiralty charts, from fathoms and feet to meters and decimeters. The first of these charts, termed “New Metric Charts,” was issued in May 1968.
Unlike terrestrial maps, on which changes of features are unlikely to be of major importance, navigational charts are constantly amended by notices to mariners to keep them up to date for safety. There is also a system of navigational warnings to give immediate notice of any newly-discovered danger. Waves, wind, currents, and tides all combine to result in the shifting of shallow mud banks which require constant resurveying and subsequent amendments to the chart. Surveying ships will always be required to keep our sea lanes accurately charted.
Veterans on the Campus
Lieutenant George T. Atwood, U. S. Naval Reserve—A veteran returning to school after an absence of two or three years is apt to be shocked by the extent to which anti-military feeling has grown in American colleges and Universities.
Americans traditionally have shown considerable animosity towards military organizations, and the academic community usually has been particularly hostile. Today, however, this hostility is increasing at an alarming rate. Draft avoidance counseling, in some cases supported by college funds, is a major fixture at schools with which I am currently acquainted. In some courses, anti-military ideas are treated as unquestioned facts which are to be learned as part of the course material.
I have heard statements such as “if any officer brings an accusation against any enlisted man, an automatic court-martial conviction results” or “Marine Corps policy encourages torture as a means of punishment.” They go unchallenged, not only by the revolutionary element, but by numbers of otherwise sober and circumspect students as well. It is small wonder, then, that many students view military service as the very worst thing that could happen to them and, in some cases, see prison as the easier way out.
A primary reason for the growth of this anti-military attitude seems to be that it has been allowed to go unchallenged. Thus, an anti-military speaker with little or no military experience and very little knowledge about the subjects in which he claims expertise, can gain acceptance as an authority because nobody else has enough knowledge to question him. Of course, once an attitude is widespread, it feeds upon itself, and rumors of the sort “everybody knows that the Army does such and such” can spread by themselves.
The veteran on campus is in a unique position to counter the spread of unreasonable anti-military feeling. Some have become involved in the anti-revolutionary campus groups that are developing, but others prefer to avoid these essentially political organizations. Working alone or with other veterans, they have entered into debate with the self-styled military experts. In most cases, the veterans’ greater knowledge can carry the day. Most students are still glad to listen to someone who can tell them the truth about the military. Recent veterans are also welcomed as speakers by high schools and civic groups.
I should like to suggest that an office either under the Department of Defense or a non-official group, such as the Navy League, be set up to aid veterans getting out of the Service. It could give current information about campus military attitudes to returning veterans, and provide information to veterans or other people for campus debates on the military.
Unless the armed services do a better job of presenting themselves, the antimilitary attitudes on campus will continue to grow. The veteran on campus is a resource we cannot afford to waste.
“A Lump Sum Retirement Payment”
(See S. Dombroff, pp. 120-121, September 1969 PROCEEDINGS)
Ronald L. Kathren—The lump sum retirement payment proposal of Captain Dombroff, while not without merit, neglects a very important fiscal fact. The contention that this method of payment would cost the government no more is erroneous.
Although the total sum paid to the retiree is the same irrespective of whether the payment is made all at once or spread out over a number of years, the use of the money as well as earning capability is lost as soon as it is disbursed. For the deficit spending economy of recent decades, in which the government must actually borrow to pay off its debts, the cost of such a practice is easily demonstrated by a simple example.
Petty officers “A” and “B,” of identical age and service career, retire; each has a life expectancy of 32 years. “A” elects to receive his pension in the standard manner—$4,000 per year. “B,” however, selects the 50-50 proposition—12,000 annually and a lump sum of $64,000. Assuming that the government is able to borrow money at 5 per cent or about the rate it pays on savings bonds, the cost is approximately $50,000 greater for “B,” even though the total amount dispersed to both “A” and “B” is the same.
Moreover, were “B” to deposit his lump sum in a savings and loan association paying the standard rate of 5 per cent, he could withdraw $800 quarterly, giving him an income of $5,200 a year, or some 30 per cent greater than “A.” Or, “B” could buy an insurance-type annuity and realize an addition of $220 each month, plus a quantity of life instrument. And, to add insult to injury, “B” could buy U. S. government bonds, thereby loaning back to the government his retirement to distribute to some other retiring petty officer.
“Overhaul for the USS John A. Bole (DD-755)”
(See W. F. Fahey, pp. 106-110, October 1969 PROCEEDINGS)
Lieutenant James F. Keefer, U. S. Navy—I was particularly interested in the “Manpower Availability” section of Lieutenant Commander Fahey’s discussion in which he quoted that portion of CinCPacFltlnst 4710.5A which states:
Ship’s force work during regular overhaul shall be planned on the basis of a standard work week for enlisted personnel not exceeding 45 hours per week for watchstanders and 41 hours per week for nonwatchstanders.
He then refers to this standard work week as a Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet (CinCPacFlt), criterion, which is not a true statement.
The Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Manpower and Naval Reserve) (OP-01) is currently embarked on a manning documentation effort designed to identify and justify Navy manpower requirements. One phase of this effort is the Ship Manning Document (SMD) program.
The best way to describe the SMD, is that it tabulates the workload associated with all facets of operating and maintaining an effective unit of the U. S. Fleet. It then translates that workload into manpower requirements.
Proceeding from gross workload data to finite manpower requirements demands the existence of a common denominator. This common denominator has been established and is titled the Navy Standard Work Week Afloat. It is actually four work weeks rather than one, since it distinguishes between watchstanders and non-watchstanders, and also between at-sea periods and in port periods. The Navy Standard Work Week Afloat (in port) happens to be 45 hours per week for watchstanders and 41 hours per week for non-watchstanders, which coincides with the standard work week referred to in CinCPacFltlnst 4710.5A.
Lieutenant Commander Fahey further stated that the John A. Bole applied certain non-productive factors called “diversions” to those work week figures. The Navy Standard Work Week Afloat (in port) is considered to be a five day work week, with a half-day off on Wednesday and a half-day work on Saturday. Allowances are made for inspections, watches, training, service diversions (including such items as quarters, pay line, haircuts, and the Like), which detract from an individual’s capacity to perform productive work. These allowances have been derived through activity sampling and other analytical techniques.
The USS John A. Bole (DD-755) is a FRAM Mark II Sumner-class destroyer. The Ship Manning Document was promulgated for that class on 31 October 1968. Lieutenant Commander Fahey does not mention when the John A. Bole went through her regular overhaul, but if it was any time after receipt of the DD-692 SMD, his Overhaul Planning Committee would have found it to be a useful managerial tool in scheduling the efficient use of the ship’s manpower resources.
One last item should be mentioned. The Navy Standard Work Week Afloat is intended for use as a planning factor which is not to be exceeded. This does not imply that it will never be exceeded in any particular week. Many of the factors used in the compilation of productive work (such as working parties) are tabulated and averaged over a period of time. This averaging will cause some weeks to exceed those figures and others to be less.
This technique also does not distinguish between the various types of import periods. The unusual demands placed upon a ship by a regular overhaul would make the effort expended by the John A. Bole's Overhaul Planning Committee very worthwhile. This would be necessitated by the increase in personnel off-ship at schools, on leave, and for various other reasons.
Manpower is the Navy’s most critical, yet frequently abused, resource. The fact that it is receiving increased managerial attention at all levels of command is indicative of the fact that its importance is becoming more evident throughout the Navy.
PROCEEDINGS Advertisement
(See p. 14, August 1969 PROCEEDINGS)
Captain Roy C. Smith, III, U. S. Naval Reserve (Retired)—The advertisement quoting the famous challenge by Captain Dacres of HMS Guerriere for Commodore John Rodgers on board the USS President to come out and fight him ship to ship, was very clever. That challenge, with all the wit for which Dacres was noted, is an interesting vignette of history. Even more interesting is the account of the events that caused and followed it, both for the coincidental chain of relationships between Dacres, Rodgers, and Hull—and for some of the best examples of spirit and humor that grew into our naval traditions.
On 1 May 1811, the Guerriere stopped the American brig Spitfire off Sandy Hook and impressed one of her passengers, a native of the United States. This had been going on for years and was nothing new but, for the first time, the United States reacted. Commodore Rodgers was ordered to take out the frigate President, find the Guerriere, and recover the impressed citizen.
While cruising off Cape Henry on the dark, misty night of 16 May, he sighted topsails on three masts but could not make out the ship’s identity. Assuming her to be a frigate and probably British, he cleared for action and hailed. When there was no answer, Rodgers hailed again, and got round shot for a reply. Broadsides were exchanged, with the President battering what turned out to be the smaller sloop-of-war HMS Little Belt. Rodgers offered assistance to the ship and 30 plus wounded crewmen, but the British captain declined and made his way to base at Halifax. He reported that the ship had been fired upon first and without warning by the President. When Captain Dacres heard this, he stopped the first American ship he encountered, wrote the challenge in her log, and sent her into New York to deliver it.
When Rodgers heard of Dacres’ challenge, he wrote an official letter to the Secretary of the Navy, requesting permission to paint the name President on the ship’s foresail, in red letters eight feet high, because he said, “I understand the British are looking for me and I do not wish to be hard to find!” However, the two ships never met.
On 19 August, Captain Isaac Hull on board the USS Constitution met the Guerriere about 750 miles east of Boston. Whether or not Dacres remembered his challenge, it was about to be accepted. As Hull approached and observed Dacres’ willingness, he said to his officers, “If that fellow wants a fight, we won’t disappoint him.”
As the action opened, a spent British shot bounced off the stout oak hull of the Constitution and fell back into the sea. One of her gunners gave her then the glorious name by which she has been known ever since, when he shouted, “Huzzah, boys, her sides are made of iron.”
It took Hull’s seamanship and his gunners only 30 minutes of action at close quarters to leave the Guerriere a dismasted, helpless wreck that was beyond fighting or salvage. When Dacres, wounded, came aboard to surrender his sword, Hull, recognized him as a pre-war friend. At a dinner one evening the two had discussed the relative merits of their ships and had laughingly bet a fine hat on the outcome should they ever meet in action. Hull now held out his hand and said, “I’ll not take the sword-of such a gallant officer, but I’ll thank you for that hat!”
One wonders whether Captain Dacres ever regretted issuing that challenge in the cold war days of 1811.
“Honors Rendered—And Returned”
(See S. B. Mockford, pp. 111-112, October 1969 PROCEEDINGS)
Commander J. F. Kelly, Jr., U. S. Navy, Commanding Officer, USS Parsons (DDG-33)—Mr. Mockford of the Portland Yacht Club paid tribute to “Tail-end Charley,” the last ship in a column of U. S. Navy ships standing out to sea in the Straits of Juan De Fuca on the afternoon of 5 July. Rejoicing in the realization that courtesy at sea is not dead, Mr. Mockford stated that the 40-foot ketch in which he was crewing, dipped the ensign to the ships in the formation and “Tail-end Charley,” alone, returned the dip.
I am pleased to identify “Tail-end Charley” as the guided missile destroyer USS Parsons (DDG-33), flagship of Commander Destroyer Squadron 31 and a unit of Cruiser Destroyer Flotilla 9. The Parsons was, on that occasion, commanded by Commander Robert E. Morris, U. S. Navy.
We on board the Parsons appreciate the kind words and assure Mr. Mockford that courtesy, custom, and tradition at sea are indeed very much alive—and well.
“Men in the Middle”
(See J. M. Purtell, pp. 61-69, August; and pp. 107-108, December 1969; and pp. 104-105, January 1970 PROCEEDINGS)
S. A. Swarztrauber—Man’s most basic need in an occupation is confidence that he is accomplishing something important—that he is producing a needed product or service. He may not even recognize the source of his vexations. He may seek quantifiable reasons to explain them—too many days away from home, for example, or not enough dollars, and the like. And, however well justified these specific complaints may be, they may be only symptomatic of his far more serious ailment, job dissatisfaction.
In recent years, many of us in the Navy have watched with an agonizing—almost fearful—frustration, the progressive disuse of our product, seapower. Commander Purtell nails it down when he speaks of flagging prestige. How can a man cut a prestigious figure when he is unable to market his product. . . or to practice the trade he has learned? How can he hope to command respect in his community when he realizes that the news media carry only embarrassing accounts of Navy mishaps—for lack of opportunity to report creditable Navy accomplishments advancing the national interest?
Admiral Cagle, in his article, “The Most Silent Service,” in the same issue, speaks of the Korean War, Cuba, and Vietnam as examples wherein our seapower was not used to full advantage. And of course, now we have an even more recent example. This writer believes that the failure to dispatch a task force to forcibly extricate the pirated Pueblo and crew, will exact an incalculably greater toll on career retention and attraction than all the other factors—family separation, pay, and the like—combined.
Lieutenant (j.g.) S. A. Mohsberg, III, U. S. Navy, River Assault Division 131—If the Navy is to “renew the professionalism of the officer corps by providing more responsibility to junior officers,” we must reverse our current trend of accelerating promotions.
Promoting an officer to lieutenant (j.g.) at 12 rather than 18 months of service accomplishes very little. It raises the pay of the officer and then de-values the ranks of ensign and lieutenant (j.g.). Most significantly, it does not increase his assigned responsibilities. The new j.g. simply does a job formerly handled by an ensign.
When this process is continued upward through the chain of command, each grade suffers in turn. An extra stripe on a man’s sleeve is a source of pride only when it is a real symbol of increased responsibility—not merely of increased pay.
*See Notebook “Royal Navy Charts Go to Metric System” pp. 134-135, January 1970 PROCEEDINGS.