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Seven Views of Vietnam
Black Flags in Vietnam
By Henry McAleavy. New York: Macmillan, 1968. 296 pp. Illus. $6.95.
Up Front in Vietnam
By David Reed. New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1967. 216 pp. $3.95.
G. I. Diary
By David Parks. New York: Harper and Row, 1968. 133 pp. Illus. $4.95.
The American Crisis in Vietnam
By Vance Hartke. New York: Bobbs- Merrill, 1968. 163 pp. $5.95.
The Secret Search For Peace in Vietnam
By David Kraslow and Stuart H. Loory. New York: Random House, 1968. 247 pp. $5.95.
Can We Win in Vietnam?
By Frank E. Armbruster, Raymond D. Gatsil, Herman Kahn, William Pfaff, and Edmund Stillman. New York: Praeger, 1968. 427 pp. $7.95.
The Betrayal
By William R. Corson. New York: Norton, 1968. 317 pp. $5.95.
Reviewed by
Lieutenant Colonel Leon N. Utter, U. S. Marine Corps
(Colonel Utter began his career during World War II, in enlisted ranks, as a rifleman, machine gunner, and finally^ a gunnery sergeant. He was commissioned in 1948, and has served with various Marine units. While in Vietnam 1n 1965-1966, he was Commanding Officer, 2nd Battalion, lh Marines, 1st Division.)
Everyone is writing books nowadays about Vietnam, with points of view obtained all the
way from the foxhole, through the intellectual exercises of various institutional studies, to the Committee Rooms of the U. S. Congress.
Offered here are the reviewer’s reactions to seven such books. No claim is made for objectivity—a special position reserved only for the non-involved. And, battalion commanders have a way of getting involved in the Vietnamese war, professionally, personally, and emotionally. On the other hand, involvement generates a certain level of knowledge, if not expertise, and knowledge, too, is prerequisite to critique.
More than a year of patrols, ambushes, big operations, and pacification, all served to convince me of one thing: anyone in authority, with a scheme for winning in Vietnam, would get a chance to see his scheme tried. Now, after 30 months back in the States, a further observation is in order: anyone who can write about Vietnam will see his ideas printed, bound, and placed on the sales counter. And, whether or not they have merit, they will sell because they are timely.
With those two points made—emotional bias for the reviewer, opportunism for the authors—let us look at these seven books.
First comes Black Flags in Vietnam. The jacket asserts that this is a story of Chinese intervention. In the very last paragraph of his 296 pages, McAleavy makes this point: “If there is one lesson for China to draw from the events of the last century and a quarter, it is that military weakness on her part constitutes an irresistible invitation to aggression from abroad, and that Vietnam, under the control of a potential enemy, must always form a peculiarly lethal threat to her national security.”
China might have gained such a lesson from the few skirmishes, and many atrocities, carried on between Chinese bandits and French soldiers during the so-called Tonkin War of 1884-85. Although the real fighting, such as it was by today’s standards, took place along the Chinese coast, the author has capitalized on the current struggle in Vietnam to tie a sideshow of the 1880s to the present. France was building her empire in the Far East then, and a band of Chinese brigands carrying black flags (hence the title), chose to resist encroachment of the territory they were then exploiting for themselves. This somewhat ignoble state of affairs can hardly be termed Chinese intervention, even if it did take place in what is now known as North Vietnam.
The hero is a Chinese bandit, in the best tradition of the old war lord, named Liu Yung-fu. Uneducated, he was, nonetheless, a splendid soldier for the same reasons today’s Viet Cong is one. That is to say, he was motivated; he adapted his tactics to the terrain; he blended with, and was nourished by, the people inhabiting the region where he fought.
If you are curious about beheadings; if you want to learn how sex and sadism are frequently mixed in the Orient; if you can connect minor clashes between bandits and French imperialists into something resembling military history; or, if you simply want to read some obscure part of the North Vietnamese past; then this book is worth reading. Frankly, I found it dull. I would venture that the author, assigned to the British Embassy in Shanghai during the early 1940s, stumbled across Liu’s dictated memoirs. Being a good scholar, he wrote the book for lack of something better to do. Now, suddenly, more than 20 years later, it has a remote connection with events of today. So, the book is on the market with a copyright of 1968.
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Of much greater interest is David Reed’s Up Front in Vietnam. Reed says, “I am deeply indebted to several hundred brave and good men, some of whom have probably fallen in combat by now.” And he is. For it is obvious that all his vignettes, less two, are secondhand. Still, they have the smell of cordite and sweat, for, as the dust jacket says, “Most of the stories were written in the field camps in the evening, with the typewriter balanced on a pile of sandbags or C-ration boxes.” There are 216 pages of these sea stories. All are good, and practically all ring true, though it is obvious that a couple of tail-tale tellers managed to bend Reed’s ear for a little fun.
The longest of these tales is four pages; the shortest, one paragraph; the average just a page. Consequently, the book can be read in snatched moments of relaxation and still deliver its message. That message is the story of the fighting man in Vietnam, not the guy in the rear echelon. That alone makes it gratifying. Still, as has been noted, a couple of the stories just might have been developed by some yarn spinner in the rear. For example: three men from a crashed helicopter, making their way to friendly territory, stumble into the midst of two enemy battalions. Lying still to avoid detection, they are driven mad by mosquitoes. “Fortunately,” says the story teller, “our own artillery chooses that moment to shell the enemy camp. The three men take advantage of the noise of bombardment to tear their T-shirts into strips, with which they wrap their faces and hands, making the tearing sounds coincide with the noise of the shell bursts.” This yarn will never sell to the guy who has been there, for three reasons. In the midst of the enemy, you do not worry about mosquitoes. In the midst of an artillery bombardment, you are concerned about wounds much worse than mosquito bites. And in the midst of mosquitoes, you just don’t set about tearing your clothing—you are grateful for whatever protective integrity it might have.
Then there was the smoker who waited for the bomb bursts during an air strike, so he could gain the blessed relief of a cough. This, too, was supposed to be in the midst of the enemy. If a smoker could give his hack on cue, it seems odd that he would wait for bombs during an air strike, since a good deal of cover- up noise comes from those jet engines them-
Ik
selves. And, it lasts longer than an explosion.
Still, these stories are good. Some are funny, some exciting, some ridiculous, and a few are poignant. The military system is shown to be, paradoxically, the system with no heart, which is the system with the biggest heart of all. There is a story here for everybody, and about everybody who fights in war—infantryman, pilot, cannoneer, medic, and small-boat crewmen. They are all in here for their share of the action.
Author Reed employs the familiar device of recording names and home towns, and with that philosophy, he could have produced the book about fighting men in Vietnam, particularly, since he reached back to World War II and borrowed the style that brought fame to Ernie Pyle, and also the title once used by Bill Mauldin. Reed’s stories and format may well be secondhand, but they make for highly entertaining reading.
For a firsthand view of the war, at the foxhole level, you can turn to G. I. Diary. The book contains those entries from his personal diary which author David Parks chose to place in print.
Parks was once a Negro soldier, a draftee, and a crew member of an armored personnel carrier. Today, he is a student and writer, who speaks his mind, hoping to become a photo-journalist after college. This little book will probably help him reach that goal, since he tells it “like it is,” or at least like he thinks it is.
Today, generals frequently say that the “youngsters in Vietnam are the most highly motivated we’ve ever sent to war.” David Parks doesn’t address this matter directly. But, then he doesn’t have to. You can tell he wasn’t exactly “highly motivated.” But he did his job, bitter or not, and he did it well. There is a certain element of glory in that approach, too. The cover jacket says that the two major problems confronting America today—the war in Vietnam and the racial crisis at home—merge in this book. They do, since both problems are personified by the author.
David Parks went to war because his government told him to go. He tells us about his part in that war, in simple words, written on the spot, and with several good photographs. Yes, a cause was there, and a high degree of motivation was to be had. But something ugly always came between young Parks and the cause, the motivation: the simple fact that he was a Negro being led by white men. This, I think, is regrettable. For David Parks comes across in his book as a fine and sensitive
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soul, and not the stereotype soul brother. He had his taste of glory, but found it bitter with the white man’s seasoning.
Turning now from the war itself to the battle that it set off within the Democratic Party, we find The American Crisis in Vietnam. This book was written by a U. S. Senator, the Honorable Vance Hartke, Democrat, of Indiana, who provided some of the first Congressional opposition to the Administration’s conduct of the war, finally putting them on paper. They make both good reading and a powerful indictment of the Johnson Administration—whether or not you agree.
During his campaign of 1964, President L.B. Johnson spoke those now familiar words about “Asian boys” and “American boys”; he condemned “reckless action which would risk the lives of millions, engulf much of Asia, and threaten the peace of the entire world.” If ever words haunt their speaker, these must be the ones. Hartke uses them without mercy, in his introduction, in his conclusion, and all other places in between. But his arguments embrace much more than this apparent reversal of Presidential policy. He takes aim and fires salvo after salvo at the entire policy concerning Vietnam, engaging every target within range. The trouble is, he never bothers to change his sight settings, so some of his shots fall short or go wide. For instance, in the first chapter, he states that since Vietnam was resisting Chinese domination well over 2,000 years ago, it wants no part of it now. But he does cite, with considerable accuracy, the shortcomings of French colonialism, and locates the roots of today’s struggle in the fertile soil of the years between 1945 and 1954.
Parts of the book seem to sanction the considerable investment of American advisors, and dollars, which President John F. Kennedy sent to South Vietnam. Yet, President Dwight D. Eisenhower is condemned for starting the initial involvement. Such double vision seems to spring from Ike’s letter to Diem, which offered assistance, provided we could be assured of its proper application. Hartke then directs attention to the fact that, although the U. S. commitment went from 750 advisors in 1961 to more than 17,000 in 1963, these were advisors solely, not combat forces. One wonders if an advisor, lying wounded in the Delta’s muck, could make such a fine distinction.
Escalation is condemned on the basis that it only breeds more of the same. Military men will agree with that conclusion, since “measured response” cuts across the grain of what we once learned as the Principles of War—say, for instance, Mass, Offensive, and Objective.
But the Capitol dome is really the Senator’s observation post, and he focuses squarely on the Washington scene for his best fight. He explains and condemns the “credibility gap,” laying a vicious crossfire on former Assistant Secretary of Defense Arthur Sylvester. The reader may recall that it was Sylvester who once said, “It’s the inherent right of the Government to lie to save itself.” There, too, lies a ghost from the past, which helps Hartke’s thesis that maybe we haven’t done quite the job in Vietnam that we say we have.
From Washington, the Senator sees the guerrilla as strictly an unhappy South Vietnamese rather than a man recruited (perhaps) in the South, but trained, motivated, sustained, and given heavy assistance by the North. This opinion is expressed in Chapter
Six. Later on, in Chapter Ten, he drives home the point that most South Vietnamese could not care less who wins the war, they simply want to be left alone. For this reviewer, the proposition—that a man can be so unhappy he will fight against overwhelming odds but really doesn’t care who wins—is a little hard to square.
The bombing of the North; the destructive effects of U. S. firepower in the South; the hopeless corruption and graft of the South Vietnamese government; all these are heavily scored. In short, the Senator puts all the popular arguments against the war on his firing line.
Finally, in the closing chapter, come his solutions, called “Principles for a Peace Policy.” Close reading shows them to be repetitive summations of his previous condemnations; then, he proposes two courses of action. Solve Vietnam’s dilemma through the United Nations; correct the bankrupt regime in Saigon by example, rather than with military power. Somehow, in my admittedly biased and limited view, these just don’t sound like solutions. International negotiations (the Geneva Accords of 1954) brought about the present mess, and if we don’t settle what was left undone, the Communists will. As for his example—he says policemen don’t prevent crime by merely being good citizens themselves, by setting the example—Hartke says, “We must not react to this intransigence °t the other side with an intransigence and iack of moderation of our own.” One doubts that aggression will ever be stopped by the example of moderation and nonintervention.
For those who would build a case against U. S. presence in Vietnam without doing their °Wn research, this book is a gold mine. For the Military speaker who wants to be prepared to counter all the popular arguments against his Performance of duty in Vietnam, this book Vvdl show him what to expect. Whatever the VvaY they are used, these are good arguments by Senator Hartke. And, win, lose, or draw in South Vietna m, his book is a splendid ex- atnple of democracy in action.
For diplomacy in action, you would think ^ he Secret Search For Peace in Vietnam would tell lbe story. Unfortunately, David Kraslow and Stuart H. Loory have merely put together 200-odd pages of sensationalism. It is pub
lished as “the Untold story, in dramatic detail, of the behind-the-scenes maneuvers to negotiate an end to the war in Vietnam.” It is, truly, “behind-the-scenes.” In fact, to this reviewer, it is completely off-stage.
The first untold story comes with a so- called “plan for peace,” known as “Marigold.” Here is what happened: three diplomats sat down one evening in Saigon; an American named Lodge, a Polish Communist named Lewandowski, and a neutral third party from Italy named D’Orlandi. The meeting was not official, but a “drink-inhand, feet-on-the-desk” affair which led to an exercise in diplomatic gaming. The game played that evening began with a question on the order of, “What do you suppose would happen if . . . ?” and proceeded from there with other assumptions. On that sand foundation, the three players built a fictional solution to the war in Vietnam, which was acceptable to both Lodge and Lewandowski. Trouble was, neither man represented Ho Chi Minh or Lyndon Johnson, nor did either bear the responsibilities of the man whose part he played. The entire affair was a social evening passed with completely idle, albeit wellmeaning, and hopeful talk. Lodge dutifully reported his version to Washington, where it was filed under the name “Marigold.” More than six months later, at a dinner in Rome, the Italian, D’Orlandi mentioned the talks to Ambassador Averell Harriman, who expressed, probably out of courtesy, some interest. With that hazy background, the two authors manage to convey the idea that “Marigold” was a plan for peace which the United States rudely shattered by bombing Hanoi on 2 December 1966.
So much for appetizers. Next, the reader is offered a full course of the “innermost secrets” of official Washington. Sample entries: the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) prepares briefings for the President of the United States; neither the President nor his Secretary of State personally read all the mail which comes to their respective offices; underlings and staff assistants have influence on our national and foreign policies; the White House “leaks” information to the press at times, on other occasions, there are sessions conducted in absolute secrecy. The authors seem to capitalize on the fact that some people will accept, as gospel, anything in print. Their clever technique, to avoid making flat statements in areas where they have no proof, is, to use all the well-known, but seldom noticed, caveats: “therefore, it can be assumed . . . “This is indicative . . . “leading to the conclusion . . . “There is evidence to the effect . . . “probably . . . “According to normal routine . . . and so on, and on, and on. Thus, the reader discovers the “probable” fact that “Marigold” failed because “it can be assumed” there is “no evidence of’ coordination between the bombers and the peace seekers.
Open conduct of diplomacy is severely criticized, and this is followed promptly by the contradiction that diplomacy needs more Madison Avenue “Pizzazz,” if it is to compete for public attention. Diplomats are both evil, sinister men who plot in secret, and buffoons who conduct the public business in the open. Every person in Washington officialdom is criticized. Why? Because none of them played the real game with Hanoi according to the script written that “drink-in-hand, feet-on- the-desk” evening in Saigon. The fact that Hanoi never heard of the game called “Marigold,” much less agreed to play it, is completely ignored.
That covers Part I of the book. Part II gives the same treatment to another “plan for peace” brought back from Hanoi by an Italian mathematics professor. According to him, both Ho and Pham Van Dong considered that he represented the Western Powers and tacitly agreed to his proposal for peace talks. (Oddly enough, both Secretaries Rusk and Goldberg did follow up on this possibility.) But a newsman in St. Louis trumpeted the story. So Hanoi, showing more intelligence and care about who speaks for whom than do the authors, denied giving consent to any proposals other than their own. The world can hardly blame the United States for wrecking a peace plan here, but the book does.
And what about the “Peace Offensive” waged by the Administration, when it sent peace envoys all over the world? Well, say the authors, that’s a “Texas fandangle,” a pure play for publicity, and was never meant to produce results in spite of the concurrent bombing halt. Proof of this, the authors add,
lies in the fact that the Joint Chiefs of Staff went right on planning which targets to hit when the truce was over. Finally, as the authors tell it, bombing was resumed and, therefore, Hanoi refused to talk. As I recall, the chronology was the other way around.
Part III carries on, this time with hopes for ' peace brought back from Hanoi by three clergymen. The reader is expected to assume they spoke for Ho Chi Minh. But, in spite of this wonderful opportunity, President Johnson dared to deliver a “State of the Union” address, in which he asked the Congress for money to fight the war and enjoined Americans to gird themselves for the long haul. These two things proved once again to Hanoi that this country had no intention of making peace. The list goes on and on. Reading between the lines, one comes to admire the patience and persistence of the Administration. Every hope for peace was pursued, no matter how far-fetched. By the very length of its list of criticisms, this book goes far in proving the sincerity of President Johnson’s search for “almost any step” leading to the end of the war.
Even so, this is journalism at its most irresponsible, and freedom of the press at its worst. But every man in uniform should read this book for its unintended lesson: a clear display of how half-truths, quotations out of context, jumbled chronology, assumptions, and innuendo can all be carefully laid to build a case completely out of step with the truth. ,
For more factual writings, an excellent series is bound together under the title Can We 1 Win in Vietnam? In them, Herman Kahn and four of his colleagues from the Hudson Institute write separate papers on the war.
As Director of the Institute, and therefore leader of the group, Kahn sets the pace in a rather lengthy introduction. Developing ten scenarios (a technique of analysis for which he has become famous), Kahn ranges from outright abandonment of South Vietnam by the United States, to a complete takeover of the little country. One of them is bound to be close to the ultimate decision. With that “scattergun” approach, Mr. Kahn will, no doubt, one day be credited with foreseeing the end of the war. He is of the opinion that we can win, and sets forth concrete political, economic, and military gains we have made to
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date—all supporting his well-developed case.
Raymond Gatsil follows with a paper treating the ancient social and political life of Vietnam—tracing it up to the present. While he doesn’t address, really, “Can we win?”, he strikes squarely at “Should we win?”, and concludes that we should. Why? In order to give political stability to the nation and to free the people from totalitarian control.
Frank Armbruster speaks next, taking a healthy swing at the Viet Cong guerrilla. They are the same breed of men, he says, as were Cole Younger’s men and those of A1 Capone—gangsters. And they use the same tactic to gain their ends and control the people— terrorism. This resort to terror proves the Viet Cong do not have popular support, says Armbruster, and therefore, they must be eliminated. He uses historical examples—our own Indian wars, Greece, the Philippines, Korea, Malaya—to show that it can be done.
At this point, three of the five authors have come across rather well with the stand that We can, and should win, in Vietnam. Then the opposition takes over. Edmund Stillman Questions our ability to win, and our right to try. Focusing on the differences in American and Oriental political thought, he pooh- poohs, impartially, the “World Revolution” speech of Lin Piao and the “yellow peril” Warning of Dean Rusk. Unlike Armbruster, he is sure that the Viet Cong have popular support, and cites the Tet Offensive as proof. All in all, says Stillman, we are losing.
William Pfaff throws in with Stillman and goes a bit further. He has a plan for settlement. In a few short words, it is this: we can’t win in Vietnam, so let’s settle for a coalition government. However, he continues, it is doubtful that Hanoi will settle even for that, s° let’s just get out.
Now that each author has had his say, Kahn re-enters the text and probes their Writings. He picks and chooses points which Seem to favor or deter our winning, then again Proceeds to analyze via the scenario method— this time using an optimistic, step-by-step development, which travels through initial Allied success to eventual victory.
In Part II, Armbruster and Gatsil offer a c°uple of specific plans for doing the job of Winning in a better way. The military reader Will spot some ten-cent ideas dressed up in 50-
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cent vocabularies, and presented as ways to win the war. The first develops a police and security plan, which eliminates the gangster- guerrilla behind an ever-expanding, militarily-executed, “ambush belt.” The second offers a warmed-over version of the now familiar “ink-blot” theory for expansion of Government of South Vietnam (GVN) control of the countryside. Kahn then evaluates these schemes and offers advice of his own. His most valid counsel is that, even after nearly four years of combat by the United States, we still need to have an over-all, coordinated, strategic plan for running the war.
Finally, there is a transcript of a roundtable discussion. The five authors discuss, they do not debate, the moral, military, and political issues of the war. All in all, this is an excellent work from either side of the “win-no-win” fence, and it is well worth the time devoted to its 427 pages.
Now we come to the last, and best, of these seven books—this one written by a Marine who has since retired from the Corps. In his extremely bitter account of the war, which bears the title of The Betrayal, Lieutenant Colonel William R. Corson delivers the hard view that our efforts at pacification in Vietnam—the “other war”—have been completely sabotaged. He blames U. S. ignorance, coupled with the opportunistic corruption of South Vietnamese officials. But the book isn’t simply several pages of “sour grapes.” It is creditable criticism of some of the more glaring shortcomings in the conduct of the war.
The publisher had the book on the stands only five days after Corson’s retirement. That’s timing! So the things Corson has to say are still very appropriate to the war’s problems. He begins with the thought that the very real struggle being waged in South Vietnam is the one to get the peasant villagers to support their own government. But this is doomed to fail, says Corson, since the real enemy of the people is not the Viet Cong, but the government itself. Furthermore, in its naivete, the United States is playing right into the hands of the “blood-sucking” high-ups in Saigon, their underlings down at the district level, and every place in between. If that sounds like strong medicine, wait until you’ve had the full dose.
Corson starts, as do most authors, with the recent history of Vietnam—since 1954, to be exact. In all these years, he alleges, the GVN has never had any concern for the people who inhabit the countryside. He next condemns the cruel and corrupt Vietnamese military
and the National Police, labeling them “Machiavellis in Khaki.” The U. S. advisors, he asserts flatly, are forced to play along with all these despots, since it is our firm policy that every effort made to improve the lot of the people must be carried out through recognized Vietnamese governmental channels. Consequently, very little of the money, and material, which we pour unceasingly through the U. S. Agency for International Development (USAID) ever finds its way to the peasant. It is “raked off” all along the line. And we give silent sanction to such graft by propping up the regime at every level.
Most people hailed the elections of September 1967 as solid evidence of a mandate from the Vietnamese people to their Saigon government. Not Corson. He explains it this way: every voter’s registration card was stamped at the polls. The people, wise in the ways of their oppressors, knew that those who turned up after the elections without a stamped card would be considered sympathetic to the enemy. So they stood in line for hours—not to vote, but to get that precious stamp.
Vice President Ky, Ambassador Kromer, General Westmoreland—everyone in a position of authority—is subjected to a blistering attack of words. Corson berates all for maltreatment of the unfortunate refugees; Saigon for exploiting them; U. S. officials for first Providing the means for refugee relief, but letting the GVN administer those means—no matter how crookedly—and saying, “It’s not °ur problem.” Double damnation is due those who exhibit the refugees as having come over to the government’s side,” when all the poor souls were trying to do was get out °f the line of fire.
There is a splendidly reasoned chapter on Miat makes the Viet Cong guerrilla such a good soldier. He is fighting in and for the terrain he knows so well; he is the “kid next door” who is tired of being worked to death and taxed to starvation. When the GVN forces return to control of his area, that means the heavy-handed landlord will come back, too. As for the Americans, their presence merely guarantees that this will come about sooner or later, unless they can be worn down. Meanwhile, even while the war goes on, the guerrilla and his family are getting more of
what their labor produces, even though some of that goes to support other Viet Cong, through their system of taxation.
There is an accurate description, too, of how the Marines integrate themselves with the local militia—the Popular Forces—which fights in and for its own village. The Marines provide training, example, medical assistance, (backbone)—and they capitalize on the motivation of the Popular Forces to defend their own homes and families. However, I just don’t subscribe to the statement of the dust jacket that this is the only significant victory we have won in Vietnam.
On the minus side is the acerbic Chapter 11, entitled “Birdwatching in Vietnam.” This part isn’t simple satire, it’s closer to character defamation. Every visitor to Vietnam is labeled a breed of bird in “Westy’s Aviary.” There are the “vultures,” who swoop over Vietnam as if it were one large corpse to be picked clean—the heartless researchers, who consider the war a wonderful opportunity to study in one vast laboratory of human suffering. Then, there are the congressmen, with few exceptions, who are “dodos,” who merely want to strut around the aviary to impress their constituents at home. The “peacocks”— the professional entertainers, such as Martha Raye and Bob Hope—are considered to be fine birds. I agree with the last. They are.
Like the thorough staff officer he always was, Bill Corson doesn’t stop with mere griping about the problem. He struggles with a solution, and his has six steps: (1) stop the bombing; (2) eliminate the graft in spite of the GVN, and quit trying to do it through the GVN; (3) send the kids to school—Americanized schools; (4) have the United States care directly for the refugees; (5) get USAID money and materials directly to the Vietnamese people and out of the hands of the grafters; and (6) come up with a co-ordinated military effort to win the war and quit piddling around with bits and pieces.
This is a highly readable book, and its pages are full of startling accusations. Furthermore, the author has offered a plan to win the war. As a writer, Corson is highly motivated, emotional, and goes straight to the point, just as he did when he was a battalion commander. Consequently, battalion commanders will understand, as I did, exactly what he is talking about, when he deals at battalion level. But what they will wonder is, “Just where did he obtain all that high-level information?”
To his credit, Corson does not dilute his acid with caveats, as did Kraslow and Loory. He makes unqualified statements and accusations. The Betrayal is a most comprehensive, but uncompromising, account of the state of affairs in Vietnam, as seen by one qualified observer. It is full of real meat. Too bad it had to be salted with plain, ordinary, if highly articulate, bitching.
Room 39
By Donald McLachlan. New York: Athen- eum, 1968. 438 pp. $7.50.
REVIEWED BY
Captain W. H. Packard, U. S. Navy (Retired)
(Captain Packard was, until his retirement in 1965, Deputy Director of the Office of Naval Intelligence. A member of the Naval Academy class of 1935, he has served aboard various ships in both the Atlantic and Pacific during his career in communications, operations, and intelligence. He is now a consultant and writer on technical subjects, and has written articles for the U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings.)
After reading about the British capture of German weather reporting trawlers on the high seas in World War II, one may wonder if the capture of the USS Pueblo by the Korean Communists on the high seas in peacetime, may not have been for the same purpose, i.e., to obtain documents and equipment of intelligence value. Similarly, the numerous other narratives in Donald McLachlan’s Room 39, make it a very thought-provoking book, to say the least.
Room 39 was the outer office of the British Director of Naval Intelligence (DNl), through which passed all direction for the many and varied activities performed by the Naval Intelligence Division (NID), Admiralty. The personal staff that occupied this room were knowledgeable on all internal workings of NID and on all external contacts. They represented DNI on numerous inter-agency committees, and they served as DNIs “co-ordinating section.” The “most vivid and (ultimately) best known personality” in this section was Ian Fleming, creator of James Bond, but then a Lieutenant Commander, Royal
Navy Volunteer Reserve. Through Room 39, one views the rest of NID, its problems, its adventures, and the activities of its customers and other organizations with which it maintained working relationships.
One of the long term values of this book will be its contribution to the better understanding of the events (both naval and military) of World War II in the Atlantic and Mediterranean areas. Of course, there are many other books on the more sensational facets of intelligence in World War II, but this one is the most fundamentally factual of those known to the reviewer.
Intelligence, good and bad, has such a vital effect on both the development, implementation and results of all plans, operations and command decisions, that to ignore it, as most histories do, is like ignoring sex in a study of the life cycle of vertebrates. Room 39 answers many of the questions why certain decisions led to tragedy, others to success. It even answers why certain decisions were needed and made in the first place. Was Chamberlain’s Munich decision the product of a weak and neglected Intelligence Service? The author says: “Rumours planted by enemy agents . . . went up to the highest level. . . • There was no constant check . . . (by any intelligence organization) on the credibility of information. . . . Appeasement, whatever one may say, for and against it, as a policy, was rooted ... in ignorance.” Was Chamberlain unknowingly misled by unevaluated rumors? The author implies that such was the case.
As an historical reference work, Room 39 has its weaknesses. It has been written to be read. Consequently, while keeping the reader’s interest at a simmer by the introduction of anecdotes and observations by, or involving, well known personalities, and adding the journalists’ proclivity for hiding the essential details (McLachlan is a journalist of international renown), the historical researcher is kept breathless, jumping back and forth between time periods, and ends up with considerable uncertainty about the timing and sequence of related events. Perhaps the author didn’t know either, and found no official documentation to clarify the uncertainties in his correlation of time.
As an historical work, it is also weakened by some of the editorial comment which ex-
poses to view a lack of objectivity by the author, or by some of his sources, in respect to selected subjects. For example, there are several statements on U. S. Ambassador Joseph Kennedy, which show that the author’s opinion of Mr. Kennedy was anything but complimentary. He reports that Colonel Bill Donovan (subsequently the head of OSS) was sent over to London by President Franklin D. Roosevelt in August 1940, to find out if the British had the means to “continue to fight on alone, as Churchill had promised,” or whether the “doubts and fears” expressed by Ambassador Kennedy were correct. The author states that Donovan’s report to the President tvas “very different from those sent by Kennedy, who reckoned the big German attack must come shortly and regarded his mission as over.” Donovan reportedly, “urged the aPpointment of a sensible ambassador . . . someone who could detect ways of making concessions without condescension.”
In another section of the book, he reports that in June 1940, Captain Alan Kirk, U. S. Navy, the U. S. Naval Attache in London, voiced the opinion to the British DNI “that Britain would be defeated before 4 August un- Rss the Americans came in on her side,” and the author notes this as “only one symptom of the defeatism then prevailing in Ambassador Kennedy’s Embassy.”
According to a later chapter, in mid-1940, Brime Minister Churchill “was doing everything in his power to sharpen anxiety in the Dnited States about the fate of Britain and 'Be possibility that its fleet might fall into Kitler’s hands. . . . Harry Hopkins was telling Roosevelt in December 1940, from London, that ‘most of the Cabinet and all the military eaders here believe invasion is imminent’.” therefore, Harry Hopkins’ reports were similar in context to those of Ambassador Kennedy, but without the author’s censure, t !s probable that the American Embassy had derived its defeatism from Churchill’s well- Known persuasiveness and from its contacts With the Churchill government. In any case, 'he author has violated one of his rules, against (nixing personal opinion (or emotion) with "itelligence, when he reports that the “pessi- ttiistic and defeatist Joe Kennedy” was Sllcceeded by John G. Winant.
One other area in which he exposes his
The American full-rigged ship Aristides painting by Mr. Robert Salmon which appeared on the cover of the Proceedings for April 1965 is available in full color as a large- size print (26"X22") suitable for framing. List price $5.00 per print. Member’s price $4.00 per print.
Prints Available
bias, is on the subject of career officers in Intelligence. This shows up very clearly in the last chapter, but should not prejudice the acceptability of the valuable data which permeates the rest of the book. His thesis is that “the best men in the fighting forces still shun a position (such as intelligence) in which their careers are likely to come to a premature close. ...” Also, “the most promising men in the Services have rarely been appointed to intelligence duties at any stage (of their career) ...” He continues, “But the case for civilian predominance in this work is based not merely on the Services’ low regard for it. It has to do also with the wartime lesson that it is the lawyer, the scholar, the traveler, the banker, even the journalist, who shows the ability to resist where the career men tend to bend. Career officers and politicians have a strong interest in cooking raw intelligence to make their masters’ favourite dishes.” Of course, the grouping of all career officers under one personality trait, and all journalists under another, is not a very accurate or objective
observation, and makes one wonder what master is influencing the author’s cooking. He has previously noted, correctly, the wide variety of experience, training, and knowledge that is needed to fulfill the broad requirements for the highest grade of intelligence. He should have included in this wide variety of qualifications needed in a Naval Intelligence organization, the naval experience and knowledge necessary to assist in the evaluation of information received on naval subjects, and to assist in identifying intelligence of value to naval customers.
The primary value of the book is considered to be its authoritative discussions of the various aspects of intelligence work in support of all levels of planning and operations. For those who are not too young, or too old to learn from the experiences of history, Room 39 contains almost a lesson per page, and they are as applicable today as they were then, particularly to the users of intelligence. The author clearly specifies the position of intelligence as “the voice of conscience to a staff or cabinet.” It is a supporting element of command, but never in command.
American and British Naval Intelligence collaborated closely during World War II and, consequently, many of the intelligence support efforts and lessons will have an added interest to those of the U. S. Navy, who participated in combined naval operations in the European and Mediterranean areas, particularly to those who were involved in convoy escort work and in preparations for landings in North Africa and Normandy. Why did the Allies decide to land in North Africa, Italy, or Southern France, before Normandy? An interesting and logical answer is presented from the point of view of the German intelligence problem.
The experiences of British Naval Intelligence in antisubmarine efforts in the Atlantic, in the period prior to the entry of the United States into the war, were made available to the U. S. Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI). One whole chapter is devoted to British efforts to help the American pre-wartime intelligence offices get organized and prepared for wartime conditions. The British DNI, Admiral Godfrey, accompanied by Ian Fleming, came to Washington in May 1941 “to persuade the Americans to pool their
intelligence” with the British and “to adopt those . . . methods which had been proved by nearly two years’ experience. . . . The intelligence we could give them would make them far more effective allies, if they should eventually join us.” While this chapter contains some inaccuracies and the usual number of good-natured jibes, it is basically accurate as to the scope of, and benefit from, collaboration. It is also consistent with other writings concerning the weaknesses of the U. S. Intelligence setup in the summer of 1941.
Their experiences in the development of 1 an Operational Intelligence Center (OIC), where the German submarine plot and British ship and convoy plot were maintained for convenient cross-check and cross-reference by Operations and Intelligence, provided procedural guidance for the Operational 1 Intelligence Plot eventually established in The Commander in Chief’s (COMINCH) \ headquarters in Washington. The description of the co-operation between Operations and Intelligence in the Admiralty’s OIC is worthy of repeating here:
In OIC at the bottom of the Admiralty Citadel, Commander Rodger Winn, Royal Navy Volunteer Reserve, plotted and tracked the U-boats; Commander Richard Hall,
Royal Navy, plotted the mass of allied shipping in the Atlantic and gave orders for evasive action. Hall gave Winn estimated positions for all merchant ships in the Atlantic from Admiralty Plot; Winn gave Hall known and suspected U-boat positions. ... no ship left Britain without a route from Hall . . . which had been checked with Winn. This was one of the great and most cordial partnerships of the war.
The sequential developments leading up to the Joint Intelligence Bureau (JIB), and the ’ ultimate integration of Naval Military and , Air Intelligence into a single intelligence department within the Ministry of Defense, are well covered. The author approves of this segregation of Intelligence, but, on the other hand, in many parts of the book, he . extols the results achieved when Intelligence was able to work closely (organizationally and geographically) with its customers. The benefits of such closeness, i.e., more complete and timely understanding, by the intelligence producers, of the customers’ needs, and the
customers’ better understanding and greater confidence in Intelligence products and capabilities, applies in all command arrangements—single service, joint, or combined. Each Service is different, because its re-
Isponsibilities, the environment in which it operates, and its weapon systems are different m many respects. Consequently, the intelligence requirements differ in many respects. Even within each Service, the intelligence requirements of different commands and activities are unique in some respects. The i Joint Intelligence Bureau was established by the British, in 1945, outside the Service ’ -Ministries. It was based on the lessons learned front collaboration in the production intelligence of common interest during the 'var and on the recognition of the need by all Services for technical, industrial, and economic intelligence beyond the capacity of any one Service to produce. This was an effective and efficient arrangement. It left With each Service, the capability to produce that intelligence needed to meet its unique requirements, which it was best qualified to Produce and most interested in making of high reliability.
Throughout Room 39, the author frequently compares the methodology of NID in World ^ar II, with that under Admiral Sir “Blinker” Hall in World War I:
The methods and results of Room 40’s Work in World War I, had been known to only a few.
Churchill (in 1939) may still have asso
ciated Naval Intelligence with the kind of horse’s mouth, sensational but factual evidence that Room 40 had given the Admiralty and Foreign Office when he was First Lord, twenty-five years before.
There was on both sides of the Atlantic the still vivid memory of how Hall had worked with Page (U. S. Ambassador to London) to bring the United States into the First World War ....
The Epilogue covers the end and the beginning of NID. In 1965, as previously mentioned, the three Service Intelligence organizations and JIB were combined. This may have brought maximum efficiency, but it is doubted that it is more effective in meeting the needs of the individual Services or that it will provide the close intelligence support achieved by the organization described in Room 39.
For those interested in following up on the much more sensational activities of NID in World War I, The Code Breakers of Room 40, by Admiral Sir William James (St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1956) is recommended. Like Room 39, Room 40 uses the outlook from one room to witness the acts and activities of the rest of the Naval Intelligence Division. However, Room 40 is basically a biography of Admiral Sir William Reginald Hall, Royal Navy, and nine of the 12 chapters are concerned with events while he was Director of Naval Intelligence. They are focused on the intelligence and counter-intelligence operations which he conceived, guided, and in which he sometimes participated.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------- —★ --------------------------- '
Home, Sweet Home
At the Naval Base in Norfolk, three newly commissioned ensigns decided to seek an evening's entertainment at the Officers Club, which stands in the midst of a row of mansions, which were gifts of many states for the Jamestown Exposition of 1907, and which are now used as Senior Officers Quarters. Upon entering the club, they were given a very friendly greeting and made to feel at home by an older gentleman whom they took to be the waiter. After chatting a few minutes, they ordered drinks, which the waiter hastened to obtain. After the drinks were served, one of the young officers played the piano for the ■ listening pleasure of the other two, while the waiter took his ease in an adjacent chair;
albeit a somewhat puzzled look on his face.
After considerable time had been spent in this manner, the officers decided the club was a pretty dead place and called for the check. Whereupon the “waiter” very coldly informed them that he was not in the habit of charging his guests for their refreshments, that he was the District Commandant, and they were in the living room of his quarters.
------------------------------- Contributed by Lieutenant Commander Winston W. Cornelius, U. S. Navy
Professional Reading
Compiled by Robert A. Lambert Associate Editor
The Accused
Donald Grey Brownlow. New York: Vantage, '968. 190 pp. Illus. $4.95.
The well known ordeal of Rear Admiral Husband K'mmel, Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet at lhe time of Pearl Harbor, is reviewed in a most sympathetic fashion by a professor of history at Pennsylvania State University. Though many personal opinions are expressed, nothing new in the way of evidence directly rc-lated to the 7 December 1941 circumstances and the ,ri°re important ones immediately preceding that date is displayed. The author deliberately does not attempt any interpretation of personalities and events.
The American Civil War
Sir Winston Churchill. New York: Dodd, Mead, 961- 145 pp. Illus. $1.95. (paper).
Dfst published in A History of the English Speaking eoples, this is a selection of chapters from that monu- e_ntal series which tells in some of the finest prose ''r,tten on the subject of the disaster that befell the American nation.
American Defense Policy, 2d Edition
jdark E. Smith, III, and Claude J. Johns, Jr. (eds.). _ altimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1968. 551 PP- $12.00.
Go •
..'attributions by Herman Kahn, Henry Kissinger, obert McNamara, Maxwell Taylor, and others of e stature have been gathered into an interesting urce book on the political machinery and complex Problems involved in national defense.
Art and the Seafarer
Jurgen Hansen (ed.). New York: Viking, l968-296 pp. Illus. $28.00.
J^hile this handsome volume, with its clear photo- r Phs and color plates, is a sumptuously produced c°rd 0f works 0f art associated with the sea, des- mg the development of naval architecture and
shipbuilding, the art of making ship models, decorative carving, oil painting, and scrimshaw, there are many annoying aspects of print size and picture captions which definitely detract from both the information given and the graphic esthetics. Also, the chapter on old ships’ flags, which is mentioned on the front flap of the dust cover, is nowhere to be found in the book itself, and at times, the prose teases rather than informs. In spite of the effort that went into producing this reference work, it is a most disappointing volume especially at this price.
Brassey’s Annual: The Armed Forces Year-Book 1968
J. L. Moulton, C. N. Barclay, W. M. Wool (eds.). New York: Praeger, 1968. 360 pp. Illus. $16.50.
The papers in this 79th volume cover the usual wide range of theoretical and practical military issues, and of special note to American naval interest are the separate discussions of Russian naval policy and Soviet strategy in the 1970s, and a review of the U. S. Navy’s Deep Submergence System Project.
By Their Works Ye Shall Know Them
Frank O. Braynard. New York: Gibbs & Cox, 1968. 200 pp. Illus. $14.70.
The life and work of a noted naval architect, William Francis Gibbs, is told mainly through photographs of the ships he designed or converted. Privately printed and limited to 2,000 copies, they are available from South Street Seaport and Museum, 16 Fulton Street, New York 10004.
Chemical Warfare: A Study in Restraints
Frederic J. Brown. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1968. 353 pp. $9.00.
Organized into three parts—the development of gas warfare during World War I; the evolution of restraints on gas warfare during the interwar period; and, finally, a discussion of toxic agent capabilities versus restraint philosophy at various times during World War II. The author investigates the nature of the 128
restraints—political, military, economic, psychological—which operated during the years between 1915 and 1945, when U. S. chemical warfare was being developed. It is only when the conclusions concerning chemical warfare restraints are reached and stretched to cover nuclear warfare that the discussion becomes too simplified and the implications less than startling.
The China Cloud
William L. Ryan and Sam Summerline. Boston: Little, Brown, 1968. 309 pp. $7.95.
After telling the story of how 80 Chinese scientists, trained in the United States at leading engineering and technical schools, were driven from this country on a wave of politically inspired Communist “witch hunting,” the authors describe the lives of these scientists inside China and how they brought China into the nuclear club.
China in the Throes of the Cultural Revolution
Louis Barcata. New York: Hart, 1968. 320 pp. Illus. $8.95.
While there is some information here, it is badly displayed in this overblown, poorly organized document, which is an eyewitness account by a German journalist who has visited China three times.
Death Row: Spain 1936
Patricio Pedro Escobal. New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1968. 277 pp. $6.50.
Though the author, who now lives in New York City, spent two years in Falangist prisons on false charges, this is a remarkably restrained documentation of his jail experiences and an unusual view of the Spanish Civil War.
The Fall of Khrushchev
William Hyland and Richard W. Shryock. New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1968. 209 pp. $4.95.
Considering the natural reliance on secondary sources, this book represents a creditable effort at following the events and decisions—both foreign and domestic— that led to the coup which so surprised the world.
The Great Air War
Aaron Norman. New York: Macmillan, 1968. 558 pp. Illus. $10.00.
This is a comprehensive account of the evolution of aerial warfare during World War I, as it follows the development of aircraft and tactics, and provides short biographies of the top aces of many nations.
The Great Terror
Robert Conquest. New York: Macmillan, 1968. 633 pp. Illus. $9.95.
Chilling, well documented, and of reference quality, the book records in the most complete detail possible, the Stalin purges of the 1930s.
Groups Under Stress
Roland Radloff and Robert Helinerich. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1968. 259 pp. Illus. $5.50.
This is an assessment of the psychological stresses, and the resultant behavior, exhibited by the aquanauts of Project Sealab II during a two-week stay in a hostile environment 205 feet beneath the surface of the Pacific Ocean.
A History of American Marine Painting
John Wilmerding. Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, 1968. 279 pp. Illus. $25.00.
Of the 184 paintings illustrated, only 16 are color ' plates; the remainder are, in general, excellent black- and-white, full-page illustrations representing the > works of more than 60 painters from colonial times to the present. For the most part, this handsome volume is arranged by time period, with the greatest emphasis on the 19th century, as it surveys an interesting segment of American maritime and artistic history.
Hitler
George H. Stein (ed.). Englewood Cliffs, N. Prentice-Hall, 1968. 183 pp. $1.95 (paper).
This small book attempts to reconstruct Adolf Hitler’s life, his personality, and his ideas, in order to evaluate his role in history through a three-part presentation- first, there are selections from his own spoken and written words; second, are the first-hand impressions by people acquainted with Hitler, and third, are the historical appraisals by leading scholars.
Horrido!
Trevor J. Constable and Raymond F. Tolivei- New York: Macmillan, 1968. 348 pp. Illus. $7.95-
This victory cry of Luftwaffe fighter pilots, heard so I often at the start of World War II, was heard with less frequency as the Allied weight of numbers an the incompetence and derelictions of German leaders took their toll. This volume concentrates on the pet' sonal exploits of the fighter aces, some of whom ha over 200 kills, and as such, it has a much narrower focus than Cajus Bekker’s The Luftwaffe War Diaries. L makes equally fine reading and reference.
Identified Flying Saucers
Richard Loftin. New York: McKay, 1968. 245 pP' Illus. $5.95.
This is a catalog of reports, concerning flying sauce1 sightings, from 1860 through 1967.
The Ides of May •
John Williams. New York: Knopf, 1968. 385 pP' ( Illus. $7.95.
f
A detailed military picture of the 1940 defeat ° France is shown against the political and social factoi* which had weakened that country. A solid piece 0 scholarship, backed by an extensive bibliography.
The Long Charade
Richard Critchfield. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1968. 401 pp. $6.95.
Written by a journalist with nearly ten years of Asian experience, who reports on the U. S. failure to understand the political nature of the Vietnam war, and of the political subversion practiced by the generals and Politicians who lead South Vietnam. This book, in conjunction with William Corson’s The Betrayal, is as interesting as it is disturbing reading.
Midway 4 June 1942
Chester Leo Smith. Los Angeles, Calif.: The Bede i Press, 1968. 65 pp. $3.00.
Poems and short essays purport to focus on the “absolute essentials” of this World War II sea battle; not really worth purchasing.
Napoleon After Waterloo
Michael John Thornton. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1968. 241 pp. $6.95.
After his final defeat, Napoleon spent two weeks in British warships, while the English Cabinet debated his fate. This is an account of those days, delving into details of the former emperor’s treatment by British jraval officers; the personal fears of Napoleon’s retinue; rumors of escape and suicide; and the Cabinet’s discussions, which ultimately led to the exile on the 'stand of St. Helena.
Negotiating with the Chinese Communists
Renneth T. Young. New York: McGraw-Hill, !968. 461 pp. $10.95.
A diplomat, who acquired firsthand experience at foinmunjom, has provided an important contribution to understanding current diplomacy. He has amassed an impressive amount of detail and documentation to background his tracing and evaluating the experiences of the United States in dealing with the Red Chinese from 1953 to 1967.
Pacifism in the United States
Peter Brock. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1968. 1,005 pp. $18.50.
A much neglected piece of American history is brought under scrutiny in this massive study, tracing Pacifism as an idea and a way of life from colonial t'mes to the start of World War I.
Panzerkampfwagen VI—Tiger I and II Konigstiger”
Walter J. Speilberger and Uwe Feist. Berkeley, Calif.; Feist, 1968. 76 pp. Illus. $4.50 (paper).
Profusely illustrated with photographs and scale rawings, this large-size book follows the development of the Tiger tank series which, through the 1940— j45 period, were the most heavily armed and armored fighting vehicles to see action.
Professional Reading 129
Rebels in the Riff
David S. Wool man. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1968. 257 pp. Illus. $6.95.
A detailed account of the five-year rebellion of Berber tribesmen against their Spanish rulers in the 1920s.
The Red Book and the Great Wall
Alberto Moravia. New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1968. 170 pp. $4.95.
This thought-provoking attempt, by a Western man to interpret Eastern man, reports the author’s impressions of Red China gained from his own extended visits to that country.
Revolution in the Sky
Richard Sanders Allen. Brattleboro, Vt.: Stephen Green Press, 1967. 232 pp. Illus. $12.95.
Many photographs help tell the history of the classic Lockheed airplanes and the pilots who flew them, in aviation’s Golden Age—1927 to 1937. Unfortunately for the modeler, there are too few 3-view drawings, but the appendixes include physical specifications and performance data. The short introduction is by Charles A. Lindbergh.
Sea and Air
Jerome Williams, John J. Higginson, John D. Rohrbough. Annapolis, Md.: U. S. Naval Institute, 1968. 338 pp. Illus. $11.50.
Useful at several early academic levels, this is an introductory text to the subjects of oceanography and meteorology, which presents the seas and the atmosphere as a single fluid that varies only as their respective densities, which permits interesting comparisons and contrasts of their individual characteristics.
Silence on Monte Sole
Jack Olsen. New York: Putnam, 1968. 374 pp. $6.95.
As the Allied armies pushed the Germans up the Italian boot, the German supply convoys were harried by partisans headquartered on Monte Sole, and with the authorization of Field Marshal Kesselrmg, the regular army, with SS reinforcements, set out to neutralize Monte Sole. That neutralization resulted in the massacre of 1,800 men, women, and children, and it is that massacre that forms the core of this book, which recounts, in unexpectedly spare tones, the life and death of this little community.
Steamships and Motorships of the West Coast
Richard M. Benson. Seattle, Wash.: Superior Publishing Co., 1968. 175 pp. Illus. $12.95.
Not limited only to American and Canadian vessels, this large-format volume illustrates virtually all the large cargo and passenger ships, domestic and for-
eign, as well as the ferries, tugs, and special purpose boats that have operated, and continue to operate, on the Pacific coast. The book covers the history of powered ships from their beginnings to the present, and shows the latest ships working on the West Coast.
The Tangled Web
Philippe Ganier-Raymond. New York: Pantheon, 1968. 203 pp. $4.95.
The fast-paced, yet sympathetic style, enhances this story of one of the great failures, in terms of lives lost, of Allied espionage that took place in Holland during World Wat II.
"There I Was ...”
Bod Stevens. Fallbrook, Calif.: Aero, 1968. 96 pp. Illus. $2.95 (paper).
With a foreword by Milton Caniff, this large-format book provides, via cartoons and commentary, an amusing and nostalgic look at the U. S. Air Force of World War II.
Thirteen Days
Robert F. Kennedy, New York: Norton, 1968. 224 pp. Illus. $5.50.
As dramatic as it is controversial, the late Senator’s memoir describes, from a participant’s vantage point, the decision-making process and personalities, especially the actions and attitude of his brother, as the world’s two most powerful nations confronted one another during the Cuban missile crisis.
This Is Communist China
Robert Trumbull (ed.). New York: McKay, 1968. 274 pp. Illus. $5.95.
A long-time Far East correspondent, for The New York Times, has taken the writings of Japanese journalists, who were in China in 1966 and 1967, and combined their detailed dispatches into a picture of the Chinese people, their problems, politics, and economy.
A Time of War—A Time of Peace
George McGovern. New York: Random House, 1968. 203 pp. $5.95.
Arms reduction, with the concomitant economic problem of switching from a war to a peace economy: reassessment of the draft in terms of a completely volunteer army; the need for drastic changes in foreign policy; race problems, poverty, and hunger are all discussed in this book, which is an expanded form of speeches and previous writings by Senator McGovern in the past six years.
The War To End All Wars
Edward M. Coffman. New York: Oxford University Press, 1968. 412 pp. Illus. $9.75.
Though this volume is extremely wide-ranging in the variety of military, political, social, and economic topics covered, the main thrust is on the military
aspects of America’s World War I experience, and I provides many fine prose portraits of famous personalities, who were to become even better known in the larger war that followed.
Young Man in Vietnam
Charles Coe. New York: Four Winds Press, 1968. i 112 pp. $3.95.
Quickly read, and simply told in vignette style, this is the author’s story of his year in Vietnam as a lieutenant in the Marine Corps.
PERIODICALS
Advanced Avionics Visible on Russian Ships *
Aviation Week, 9 December 1968. pp. 61-63. Ilus. $1.00. 330 West 42nd Street, New York, N. Y. 10036.
Seven photographs, cf Kynda-class guided missile destroyers, illustrate the recent practice of outfitting ships with advanced avionics modified for shipboard use with surface-to-air and surface-to-surface missiles. Arrays shown in photographs are clearly numbered and keyed to the commentary.
Decision Time for Tactical Air Power
Charles J. V. Murphy in Fortune, December 1968. pp. 142-145+. Illus. $1.50. Fortune, 540 N. Michigan Ave., Chicago, Illinois 60611.
In the wake of the F-l 11 fiasco, the author predicts second-class status for the Air Force, unless the Air Force adapts the Navy’s VFX-1 as an interim aircraft. But even that approach will give the country an unpleasant interval before a new generation of tactical aircraft becomes operational.
Mutiny at Wilhelmshaven, 1918
David Woodward in History Today, November 1 1968. pp. 779-785. Illus. 3s. 6d. U. S. A. $.75. Bracken House, 10 Cannon Street, London, E. C. ' 4, England.
Background, including details of “The Admirals Mutiny;” personalities and command decisions, which resulted in the German fleet mutiny in the closing days of World War I, are reviewed.
The Navy Navigation Satellite System: Description and Status
Thomas A. Stansell, Jr. in Navigation, Fall 1968. pp. 229-243. Illus. $4.00. The Institute of Navigation, Suite 912, 711 14th St., N. W., Washington,
D. C. 20005.
Transit has been in continuous operation since 1964, but only a limited number of shipboard navigation sets have been available. This article, which describes the complete system, emphasizes the user’s equipment, computation requirements, accuracy considerations, and takes a look at the system’s future, including expanded applications.
Special postpaid price to members of the U. S. Naval Institute, both regular and associate, is shown in parentheses. Prices subject to change without notice. On orders for Maryland delivery, please add 3 per cent sales tax. These books may be ordered from the
U. S. Naval Institute, Annapolis, Maryland
HISTORY—BIOGRAPHY
Aboard the USS Florida: 1863-65 ........................................................................................ $8.50 ($6.80)
Edited by Prof. R. W. Daly, U. S. Naval Academy. Vol. 2 in the Naval Letters Series. Letters written by Paymaster W. F. Keeler to his wife, Anna, while aboard the USS Florida. 1968. 272 pages. Illustrated.
Aboard the USS Florida and Aboard the USS Monitor, as a set............................................... $13.00 ($9.00)
Aboard the USS Monitor: 1862 ............................................................................................ $6.50 ($5.20)
Edited by Prof. R. W. Daly, U. S. Naval Academy. The story of the Union’s first ironclad told through the letters of Paymaster W. F. Keeler, USN to his wife, Anna. 1964,278 pages. Maps.
The Airships Akron & Macon, Flying Aircraft Carriers of the U. S. Navy . . $12.50 ($10.00)
By Richard K. Smith. An examination of the rigid airship’s place in naval history in the period 1919-1940. 228 pages. Illustrated.
B. F. Isherwood, Naval Engineer: The Years as Engineer in Chief, 1861-1869 . . $7.50 ($6.00)
By Edward W. Sloan, III. 1965. 299 pages. Illustrated.
Commodore John Rodgers, 1773-1838 ............................................................................ $10.00 ($8.00)
By Charles O. Paullin. 1967 (reissue of 1910 original edition). 436 pages.
Commodore John Rodgers, 1773-1838, and Rear Admiral John Rodgers,
1812-1882, as a set................................................................................................................. $17.30 ($14.00)
David Glasgow Farragut
By Prof. C. L. Lewis, U. S. Naval Academy
Vol. I, Admiral in the Making. 1941. 372 pages. Illustrated................................... $3.75 ($3.00)
Vol. II, Our First Admiral. 1943. 513 pages. Illustrated........................................... $4.50 ($3.60)
Flush Decks and Four Pipes...................................................................................................... $7.50 ($6.00)
By Cdr. John D. Alden, USN. History of the World War I flush-deck destroyers from 1917 to 1955. 1965. 108 pages. Illustrated. Paperbotind.
Greyhounds of the Sea........................................................................................................... $12.50 ($10.00)
By Carl C. Cutler. The classic work on clipper ships. 1961. 592 pages.
63 illustrations, ships’ lines and sail plans. Queens of the Western Ocean
and Greyhounds of the Sea, both volumes as a set................................................................. $20.00 ($16.00)
Gunboats Down the Mississippi................................................................................................. $7.50 ($6.00)
By John D. Milligan. The Civil War actions of the Federal fresh water navy on the western rivers, 1861 to 1863. 1965. 217 pages. Illustrated.
The Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Navy................................................................ $16.50 ($12.00)
By Anthony E. Sokol. First English language history of the Austro- Hungarian Navy. 184 pages. 1968.
John P. Holland, 1841-1914, Inventor of the Modern Submarine..................................... $8.50 ($6.80)
By Richard Knowles Morris. 1966. 211 pages. Illustrated.
John Roach, Maritime Entrepreneur: . . . Naval Contractor, 1862-1886 .... $7.50 ($6.00)
By Leonard A. Swann, Jr. 1965. 303 pages. Illustrated.
The Landing at Veracruz: 1914................................................................................................ $8.50 ($6.80)
By Jack Sweetman. 1968. xvi, 224 pages. Illustrated.
A Long Line of Ships.............................................................................................................. $5.00 ($4.00)
By Lt. Cdr. A. S. Lott, USN. Centennial history of the Mare Island Naval Shipyard. 1954. 268 pages. Illustrated.
Paullin’s History of Naval Administration........................................................... $8.50 ($6.80)
By Charles Oscar Paullin. A collection of fifteen articles published in the Proceedings between 1906 and 1914 covering the politics and personalities involved in managing the Navy from the Revolutionary War through the Spanish-American War. 1968. 480 pages. Paperback.
Queens of the Western Ocean................................................................................................ $12.50 ($10.00)
By C. C. Cutler. Mail and passenger packets in the transatlantic and U. S. coastal service. 1961. 672 pages. 69 illustrations, ships’ lines and sail plans.
Queens of the Western Ocean and Greyhounds of the Sea, as a set . . . $20.00 ($16.00)
Rear Admiral John Rodgers, 1812-1882 ............................................................................... $10.00 ($8.00)
By Robert E. Johnson. 1967. 468 pages. Rear Admiral John Rodgers, 18121882, and Commodore John Rodgers, 1773-1839, as a set $17.50 ($14.00)
Sea of the Bear............................................................................... $5.00 ($4.00)
By Lt. Cdr. M. A. Ransom, USCG (Ret.), with Eloise Engle. On board the Coast Guard Cutter Bear forty years ago, a young sailor describes his first cruise to the Arctic Ocean. 1964. 119 pages. Illustrated.
Soldiers of the Sea...................................................................... $14.00 ($11.20)
By Col. R. D. Heinl, Jr., USMC. A definitive history of the U. S. Marine Corps, 1775-1962. 693 pages. Illustrated.
Thence Round Cape Horn........................................................... $7.50 ($6.00)
By R. E. Johnson. The story of U. S. Naval Forces in the Pacific Ocean during the period 1818-1923. 1964. 276 pages. Illustrated.
Torpedoboat Sailor........................................................................ $7.50 ($6.00)
By Charles Blackford. 1968, xiii. 160 pages.
Uniforms of the Sea Services........................................................ $24.50 ($19.60)
By Col. R. H. Rankin, USMC. 1962. 324 pages. Special collector’s copies, signed by the author—$30.00
The United States Coast Guard, 1790-1915 ............................. $7.00 ($5.00)
By Capt. S. H. Evans, USCG. A definitive history (With a Postscript: 19151949). 1949. 228 pages. Illustrated.
Wings for the Fleet: . . . Naval Aviation’s Early Development, 1910-1916 . . . $12.50 ($10.00)
By Rear Adm. George van Deurs, USN (Ret.). 1966. 185 pages. Illustrated.
World war ii—korea (u. s.)
Most Dangerous Sea...................................................................... $6.00 ($4.80)
By Lt. Cdr. A. S. Lott, USN. A history of mine warfare and U. S. mine warfare operations in World War II and Korea. 1959. 322 pages. Illustrated.
The Sea War in Korea................................................................... $6.00 ($4.80)
By Cdr. M. W. Cagle, USN, and Cdr. F. A. Manson, USN. 1957. 555 pages.
Illustrated.
The United States Coast Guard in World War II........................ $7.50 ($6.00)
By M. F. Willoughby. 1957. 347 pages. Illustrated.
United States Destroyer Operations in World War II................. $15.00 ($12.00)
By Theodore Roscoe. 1953. 581 pages. Illustrated.
United States Submarine Operations in World War II............... $15.00 ($12.00)
By Theodore Roscoe. 1949. 577 pages. Illustrated.
Special Price—2-volume set: Destroyer and Submarine books $25.00 ($20.00)
World war ii—(other nations)
Der Scekrieg, The German Navy’s Story 1939-1945 ............... $7.00 ($5.60)
By Vice Admiral Friedrich Ruge, German Navy. 1957. 440 pages. Illustrated.
The French Navy in World War II................................................. $6.00 ($4.80)
By Rear Adm. Paul Auphan, French Navy (Ret.), and Jacques Mordal.
Capt. A. C. J. Sabalot, USN (Ret.), translator. 1959. 413 pages. Ulus.
The Hunters and the Hunted........................................................ $3.50 ($2.80)
By Rear Adm. Aldo Cocchia, Italian Navy (Reserve). An account of Italian Submarines in World War II. 1958. 180 pages. Illustrated.
The Italian Navy in World War II.................................................. $5.75 ($4.60)
By Cdr. Marc’Antonio Bragadin, Italian Navy. 1957. 380 pages. Illustrated.
Midway, The Battle That Doomed Japan, The Japanese Navy’s Story .... $7.50 ($6.00)
By Mitsuo Fuchida and Masatake Okumiya, former Imperial Japanese Navy.
Edited by Roger Pineau and Clarke Kawakami. 1955. 266 pages. Illustrated.
VVhite Ensign, The British Navy at War, 1939-1945 ............... $7.50 ($6.00)
By Capt. S. W. Roskill, D.S.C., RN (Ret.). 1960. 480 pages. Illustrated.
SEA POWER
Air Operation in Naval Warfare Reading Supplement............. $2.00 ($1.60)
Edited by Cdr. W. C. Blattmann, USN. 1957. 185 pages. Paperbound.
Geography and National Power.................................................. $3.50 ($2.80)
Edited by Prof. IV. W. Jeffries, U. S. Naval Academy. A summary of the physical, economic, and political geography of the world. 4th ed., 1967.
184 pages. Softbound.
Naval Logistics............................................................................... $7.50 ($6.00)
By Vice Adm. G. C. Dyer, USN (Ret.). 2nd ed., 1962. 367 pages. Illustrated.
Naval Operations Analysis..................................................................................................... $7.50 ($(i.OO)
By Naval Science Dept., U. S. Naval Academy. 1968.
327 pages. Illustrated.
Naval Review 1962-1963 ............................................................................. $10.00 ($8.00)
14 essays. 3 appendixes. 1962. 373 pages. Illustrated. Maps.
Naval Review 1964 ............................................... ............................................................... $10.00 ($8.00)
12 essays. 5 appendixes. 1963. 393 pages. Illustrated. Maps.
Naval Review 1966 ............................................................................................................ $12.50 ($10.00)
11 essays. 4 appendixes. 1965. 353 pages. Illustrated. Maps.
Naval Review 1967 ................................................................................................................. $12.50 ($10.00)
12 essays. 4 appendixes. 1966. 335 pages. Illustrated. Maps.
Soviet Naval Strategy................................................................................................................ $9.00 ($7.20)
By Robert W. Herrick. 1968. 250 pages. Illustrated. Index.
SEAMANSHIP
The Art of Knotting and Splicing........................................................................................... $7.50 ($6.00)
By Cyrus Day. Step-by-step pictures and text. 2nd cd. 1955. 224 pages.
Heavy Weather Guide............................................................................................................... $7.00 ($5.60)
By Capt. E. T. Harding, USN, and Capt. W. J. Kotsch, USN. 1965. 210 pages.
Illustrated.
Naval Shiphandling................................................................................................................ $7.00 ($5.60)
By Capt. R. S. Crenshaw, Jr., USN. 3rd ed., 1965.533 pages. Illustrated.
Sail and Power (Clothbound).................................................................................................... $9.50 ($7.00)
By Richard Henderson and Lt. Bartlett Dunbar, USN. 1967. 304 pages.
Illustrated. (Softbound)............................................................................................................. $7.00 ($5.60)
NAVIGATION—PILOTING
Dutton’s Navigation and Piloting.............................................................................................. $8.00 ($6.40)
Prepared by Cdr. J. C. Hill, II, USN, Lt. Cdr. T. F. Utegaard, USN, and Gerard Riordan. 1st ed., 1958. 771 pages. Illustrated.
Farwell’s Rules of the Nautical Road...................................................................................... $12.00 ($9.60)
By Capt. R. F. Farwell, USNR. Revised by Lt. Alfred Prunski, USCG.
4th ed., 1967. 516 pages. Illustrated.
Simplified Rules of the Nautical Road..................................................... $3.50 ($2.80)
By Cdr. O. W. Will, III, USN. 1968.2nd ed. 120 pages. Ulus. Paperbound.
PROFESSIONAL HANDBOOKS
The Bluejacket’s Manual, U. S. Navy............................................................................ $4.00 ($3.20)
Revised by Capt. J. V. Noel, Jr., USN, and W. J. Miller, JOCM, USN (Ret.).
17th ed., 1964. 684 pages. Illustrated.
The Coast Guardsman’s Manual............................................................................................... $4.75 ($3.80)
Prepared under the supervision of The Chief, Training and Procurement Division, Commandant, U. S. Coast Guard. Original edition prepared by Capt. W. C. Hogan, USCG. 5th ed., 1967. 885 pages. Illus. Softbound.
Command at Sea........................................................................................................................ $6.50 ($5.20)
By Rear Adm. H. F. Cope, USN (Ret.). Revised by Capt. H. Bucknell, III,
USN. 3rd ed., 1966. 540 pages.
Division Officer’s Guide............................................................................................................ $3.75 ($3.00)
By Capt. J. V. Noel, Jr., USN. 5th ed., 1962.282 pages.
The Marine Officer’s Guide....................................................................................................... $8.75 ($7.00)
Revised by Rear Adm. A. A. Ageton, USN (Ret.), and Col. R. D. Heinl, Jr.,
USMC (Ret.). 3rd ed., 1967.625 pages. Illustrated.
The Naval Aviation Guide......................................................................................................... $3.50 ($2.80)
By Capt. M. W. Cagle, USN. 1963. 305 pages. Illustrated.
The Naval Officer’s Guide......................................................................................................... $7.75 ($6.20)
By Rear Adm. A. A. Ageton, USN (Ret.), with Rear Adm. IV. P. Mack, USN.
7th ed., 1967. 650 pages. Illustrated.
Watch Officer’s Guide.......................................................................................................... $3.75 ($3.00)
Revised by Capt. J. V. Noel, Jr., USN. 9th ed., 1961. 302 pages. Illustrated.
REFERENCE
Almanac of Naval Facts............................................................................................................ $3.50 ($2.80)
1964. 305 pages. Paperbound.
Dictionary o£ Military anti Naval Quotations............................... $15.00 ($12.00)
Compiled and edited by Col. R. D. Heinl, Jr., USMC (Ret.). 1966, 367 pages.
List of Rubrics (800). Index of Sources (1,200).
Weyer’s Warships of the World 1969 .......................................... $17.50 ($12.50)
Compiled by Alexander Bredt. 1968. Over 400 pages.
The Henry Huddleston Rogers Collection of Ship Models....... $3.00 ($2.40)
U.S. Naval Academy Museum. 2nd ed., 1958. 117 pages. Illustrated.
Naval Terms Dictionary.................................................................. $5.50 ($4.40)
By Capt. J. V. Noel, Jr., USN (Ret.), and Cdr. T. J. Bush, USNR. 1966.
379 pages. Paperbound.
The Ships and Aircraft of the U. S. Fleet..................................... $3.50 ($2.80)
By James C. Fahey. 8th ed., 1965. 64 pages. Illustrated. Paperbound.
Professional Reading Guide (No discount)................................ $1.00 ($1.00)
LEADERSHIP
Naval Leadership, 2nd edition............................................................. $4.50 ($3.60)
Compiled by Cdr. M. E. Wolfe, USN; Capt. F. J. Mulholland, USMC; Cdr.
J. M. Laudenslager, MSC, USNR; Lt. H. J. Connery, MSC, USN; R. Adm.
Bruce McCandless, USN; and Assoc. Prof. G. J. Mann. 1959. 301 pages.
Selected Readings in Leadership................................................ $2.50 ($2.00)
Compiled by Cdr. M. E. Wolfe, USN, and Capt. F. J. Mulholland, USMC.
Revised by Leadership Committee, Command Department, U. S. Naval Academy. 1960. 126 pages. Paperbound.
ENGINEERING
Descriptive Analysis of Naval Turbine Propulsion Plants........ $6.00 ($4.80)
By Cdr. C. N. Payne, USN. 1958. 187 pages. Illustrated.
Fundamentals of Construction and Stability of Naval Ships.... $6.00 ($4.80)
By Prof. T. C. Gillmer, U. S. Naval Academy. 2nd ed., 1959. 373 pages.
Illustrated.
Internal Combustion Engines........................................................ $6.00 ($4.80)
By Cdr. P. W. Gill, USN; Cdr. J. H. Smith, Jr„ USN; and Prof. E. J. Ziurys.
4th ed., 1959. 570 pages. Illustrated.
Introduction to Marine Engineering.............................................. $6.00 ($4.80)
By Prof. R. F. Latham, U. S. Naval Academy. 1958. 208 pages. Illustrated.
SCIENCES
By Prof. R. M. Johnston, U. S. Naval Academy; Capt. W. A. Brockett, USN; and Prof. A. E. Bock, U. S. Naval Academy. 3rd ed., 1958. 496 pages. Illustrated.
BOOK
ORDER
DEPT.
U. S. Naval Institute, Annapolis, Maryland 21402
Title
Copies Price
$
Elements of Applied Thermodynamics................................. $6.00 ($4.80)
Zip Code
TOTAL $
$
(For delivery in Maryland, please add 3% tax) Enclosed is check ( ) postal note ( ) in the amount of
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Fundamentals o£ Sonar.......................................................................................................... $10.00 ($8.00)
By Dr. J. W. Horton. 2nd ed., 1959.417 pages. Illustrated.
The Human Machine, Biological Science for the Armed Services............................................ $7.50 ($6.00)
By Capt. C. W. Shilling, MC. USN. 2nd ed., 1965. 307 pages. Illustrated.
Logarithmic and Trigonometric Tables.................................................................................... $1.65 ($1.32)
By the Department of Mathematics, U. S. Naval Academy. 1945. 89 pages.
Marine Fouling and Its Prevention......................................................................................... $10.00 ($8.00)
Prepared for Bureau of Ships, Navy Department, by Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution. 1952. 388 pages. Illustrated.
Ocean Sciences........................................................................................................................ $10.00 ($8.00)
Edited by Capt. E. J. Long, USNR (Ret.). Written by 18 eminent oceanographers. Fills the gap between popular and technical writing. 1964. 304 pages. Illustrated.
The Rule of Nine.......................................................................................................................... $.75 ($.60)
By William Wallace, Jr. An easy, speedy way to check addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division. 1959. 27 pages. Paperbound.
By Assoc. Prof. Jerome Williams, Lt. Cdr. John Higginson, USN, and Lt. Cdr. John Rohrbough, USN. An introductory text in the environmental sciences. 1968. 360 pages. Illustrated. Charts.
Sea and Air: The Naval Environment............................................................................ $11.50 ($9.00)
LAW
A Brief History of Courts-Martial......................................................................................... $.50 ($.40)
By Brig. Gen. James Snedeker, USMC (Ret.). 1954. 65 pages. Paperbound.
International Law for Seagoing Officers............................................................................... $6.00 ($4.80)
By Cdr. B. H. Brittin, USN, and Dr. Liselotte B. Watson, 2nd ed., 1960.
318 pages. Illustrated.
Military Law........................................................................................................................... $2.00 ($1.60)
Compiled by Capt. J. K. Taussig, Jr., USN (Ret.) and Cdr. H. B. Sweitzer,
USN. Edited by Cdr. M. E. Wolfe, USN, and Lt. Cdr. R. I. Gulick, USN.
Revised by Lt. Cdr. J. W. Des Jardin, USN. 2nd ed., 1963. 94 pages.
LANGUAGES
Dialogues on Russian Culture................................................................................................... $2.00 ($1.60)
By Assoc. Prof. W. H. Buffum, Assoc. Prof. H. R. Keller, and Prof. C. P.
Lemieux, U. S. Naval Academy. In Russian with English notes for rapid reading at the second-year level. 1956, 97 pages. Illustrated. Paperbound.
Introduction to Brazilian Portuguese....................................................................................... $4.50 ($3.60)
By Assoc. Prof. J. Riccio, U. S. Naval Academy. 1957.299 pages. Paperbound.
Naval Phraseology.................................................................................................................... $4.00 ($3.20)
Common naval terms and phrases in English-French-Spanish-Italian-Ger- man-Portuguese. 1953. 326 pages. Paperbound.
Russian Conversation and Grammar, 3rd edition, 1960 By Prof. C. P. Lemieux, U. S. Naval Academy
Vol. One—109 pages. Paperbound....................................................................................... $2.50 ($2.00)
Vol. Two—121 pages. Paperbound........................................................................................... $2.50 ($2.00)
Russian Supplement to Naval Phraseology............................................................................... $4.50 ($3.60)
SERVICE LIFE
The Best of Taste, The Finest Food of Fifteen Nations............................................... $5.00 ($4.00)
Edited by the SACLANT-NATO Cookbook Committee. 1957. 244 pages.
Naval Customs, Traditions, and Usage......................................................................... $6.50 ($5.20)
By Vice Adm. L. P. Lovette, USN (Ret.). 4th ed., 1959. 358 pages. Illustrated.
Prayers at Sea.......................................................................................................... . . $3.50 ($2.80)
By Chaplain Joseph F. Parker, USN. 1961. 287 pages.
The Sailor’s Wife....................................................................................................................... $1.50 ($1.20)
By Lucy Wright. Practical explanations of daily problems facing Navy wives and how to solve them. 2nd ed., 1967. 103 pages. Illustrated. Paperbound.
Service Etiquette....................................................................................................................... $6.50 ($5.20)
By Capt. Brooks J. Harral, USN, and Oretha D. Swartz. Revised by Oretha D. Swartz. Guide to correct social usage on official and unofficial occasions for men and women in all the services. 2nd ed., 1963. 447 pages. Illustrated.
Welcome Aboard....................................................................................................................... $6.00 ($4.80)
By Florence Ridgely Johnson. A guide for the naval officers bride. 6th ed.,
1968.263 pages.
Intramural Programs . . . $4.00
SPORTS—ATHLETICS
Physical Education Series: Baseball $4.50
1963. 162 pages. Illustrated.
Championship Wrestling . . $4.50
1964. 230 pages.
Conditioning Exercises . . $5.50
3rd ed. 1960.275 pages. Gymnastics and Tumbling . $6.50
2nd revised ed., 1959.
414 pages.
Hand to Hand Combat . . $4.00
1943. 228 pages. Paperbound. How to Survive
ou Land and Sea .... $4.50
3rd revised ed., 1956.
366 pages. Paperbound.
($3.20)
($2.80)
($2.40)
($2.80)
($3.60)
($4.80)
($2.40)
($.25)
($4.00)
($4.00)
($5.00)
($4.00)
($4.00)
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($28.00)
($28.00)
($.80)
($3.60) Revised, 1950. 249 pages.
Modern Fencing .... $3.50
($3.60) 1948. 289 pages. Illustrated.
Paperbound.
($4.40)
Soccer....................................... $3.00
($5.20) 3rd ed., 1961. 172 pages.
Paperbound.
Squash Racquets .... $3.50
(83.2U) 1966. 94 pages. Illustrated.
Paperbound.
($3.60) Swimming and Diving . . $4.50
4th ed., 1965. 345 pages. Paperbound.
U. S. NAVAL ACADEMY
Annapolis Today............................................................................... $6.00
By Kendall Banning. Revised by A. Stuart Pitt. Complete description of U. S. Naval Academy activities. 1963. 329 pages. Illustrated.
The Book of Navy Songs................................................................. $3.00
Compiled by the Trident Society of the Naval Academy. 160 pages. Illustrated. Sold only to Midshipmen and Naval Institute members.
The Prayer of a Midshipman.......................................................... ■ $-25
The midshipman’s prayer printed on quality paper, suitable for framing.
FULL-COLOR REPRODUCTION
Proceedings Cover Paintings
Separate prints, 26 X 22 inches, suitable for framing:
USS Enterprise (June 1962) by C. G...................................... Evers $5.00
USS Bainbridge (November 1962) by C. G......................... Evers $5.00
USS Thresher (March 1964) by C. G...................................... Evers $5.00
(No discount on Thresher prints. All proceeds to Thresher Fund.)
USS Long Beach (August 1964) by C. G. Evers................................. $5.00
Flying Cloud (April 1964) by Warren Sheppard................................... $5.00
Aristides (April 1965) by Robert Salmon (26 X 21 in.)....................... $5.00
“Attack on a Galleon” (May 1965) by Howard Pyle (22 X 29 in.) . . . $5.00
USS America (April 1966) by C. G. Evers (29 X 22 in.) ....... $5.00
U. S. Sch. Yacht America (September 1967) by C. G. Evers (21 X 26 in.) . . $5.00
Seascape of Pacific Coast Destroyers (March 1968) by PH3 Gerald E.
Logan, USN (15>/2 X 19 in.)............................................................. $2.50
Complete sets of 12, on 13 X 13-inch mats, for any of the following years:
1955, 1956, and 1957 ...................................................................... $2.50
Portfolios of the American Sailing Navy
Full color renderings, suitable for framing. Carefully researched and authentic to the last detail. Painted by Melbourne Smith, a licensed Master in Sail in Canada. Six 18 X 21>/2-inch prints, matted, in a portfolio with a separate sheet, also suitable for framing, giving specifications on each ship and details from her history. Priced as follows:
Six Frigates of the American Sailing Navy 1776-1825. Sold only as a set . . . $35.00
Raleigh—1776; Constitution—]797; Essex—1799; Philadelphia—1800; President—] 800, and Brandywine—1825.
Six Schooners of the American Sailing Navy 1775-1838. Sold only as a set . . . $35.00
Hannah—1775; Vixen—1803; Alligator—1821; Grampus—1821; Boxer—1831, and Flying Fish—1838.
MISCELLANEOUS
How to Write a Research Paper.............................................................................................. $1.00
Prepared in the Department of English, History, and Government. U. S.
Naval Academy. 1963. 80 pages. Paperbound.
Naval Institute Insignia. Sold only to members. (No discount)
Cuff Links ....$2.50 Tie Bar ... .$1.50 Tie Tac ... .$1.50 Lapel Button ... .$1.00 Lapel Clutch Pin ... .$1.00