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On the second of September 1898, on a desert plain in the Sudan,
the strongest and best-armed savage army ever to array itself against a 19tli century
European power confronted an Anglo-Egyptian army and gunboats of
the Royal Navy. 7 he Battle of Omdurman, a land action, teas fought in a desert
environment, yet it teas decisively affected by seapower.
by Lieutenant diaries Lavelle Parnell, U. S. Navy
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Canal, also became enmeshed in the affairs of Egypt, and in the affairs of ^Pl’s stepchild, the Sudan.
he chain of events leading to the Battle of Omdurman is fascinating, but too \v'n C0mplex f,,r detailed treatment here. It is a story of how Britain, against her <5 > hut driven by strategic necessity after having become deeply involved in the
S
^.hile Britain increasingly took control, both of Egypt’s internal and foreign (j airs; a leader arose in Egypt’s poorly governed province of the Sudan, claiming escent from the Prophet and calling himself the “Mahdi”—“the expected
75
one”—who had coine to unite and purify all Islam and lead a holy war to conquer the world for Allah. At first, his adherents were only a handful of malcontents, but his victories over the ineffectual Egyptians soon increased both his reputation and his following.
Feeling some responsibility to help Egypt, but not wanting to get British troops involved, Prime Minister William Ewart Gladstone made available to Egypt a retired British general named Hicks, who was given command of a 10,000-man Egyptian expeditionary force having all European officers and being armed with the latest weapons, including Nordenfeldt machine guns.
The Mahdi, knowing that the Sudan itself was his most powerful ally, retreated into the vast, empty, but familiar desert, leading his pursuers farther and farther from supplies and known terrain. At last, on 4 November 1883, parched from lack of water, lost in the endless tracts of the searing desert, the unfortunate Hicks was ambushed by 50,000 of the Mahdi’s followers. No one escaped to tell of the tragic defeat, and only a few prisoners were taken for slaves; the rest were killed,
The failure to receive any word from the Hicks expedition slowly began to panic the Egyptians, and when the news spread that the Mahdi had wrought a miracle and destroyed Hicks Pasha, the Sudan exploded, with massacres of Egyptians and uprisings supporting the Mahdi. Soon, all the outlying regions surrounding the capital, Khartoum, were held by the Mahdi.
Gladstone, urged by his advisers to save the Egyptian garrisons still in the Sudan, but not wanting to send British troops, at last hit upon the idea of sending the famed soldier of fortune and former Governor-General of the Sudan, General Charles “Chinese” Gordon, to Khartoum to evacuate the Egyptian garrisons from the Sudan.
Gordon, contrary to his orders, but true to his deep feeling of compassion for a people he had come to know and love, and had once freed from slavery, refused to abandon Khartoum. Those Egyptians who wished to leave were put on steamers and sent down the Nile to Egypt. The rest, loyal to Gordon, stayed to defend Khartoum until help arrived, as they were certain it would.
Gladstone, determined to avoid entanglement in the Sudan, refused to send help t0 Gordon and repeated his orders to evacuate Khartoum immediately. Gordon, equally termined to remain, planned to hold out unti public opinion forced Gladstone to send help The Mahdi meanwhile consolidated his ho on the Sudan, cut the telegraph wire linkup Khartoum with the outside world, and tigl'1 ened the ring about Khartoum.
As the news smuggled out of Khartoui" grew ever more rare and piecemeal, the run1 blings of discontent in Britain grew into a l°u roar. Gladstone was hooted and hissed 111 public. Newspapers and orators cried “Sav® Gordon!” and the Queen herself intercede with Gladstone on Gordon’s behalf. Assail^ by all for his inaction, Gladstone at 13 authorized an expedition. Lord Wobe ’ was sent up the Nile with a British f0l^e’ proceeding at a slow pace as ordered ’ Gladstone, who still entertained the noti°n that Gordon might lose his nerve, embark 1)1 one of his steamers, and evacuate the are3'
Conditions in Khartoum steadily deterl orated; Gordon had difficulty in keeping 11 Egyptian soldiers from sleeping at tne sentry posts, food became scarce, and nta deserters joined the Mahdi, camped outs1
the city- . . • <rle-
The relief expedition, armed with sing
shot Martini-Henry rifles and early han cranked machine guns, such as the Gatli 8’ the Gardner, and the Nordenfeldt, sDvV crept nearer Khartoum. As they entered 1 Mahdi’s domain, this last British force wear the traditional red coat in war countered the fanatical warriors of the Man j variously referred to in history as “DervisheS or “Whirling Dervishes,” from their habit rousing their martial spirits by whirling 311 dancing themselves into a trance, and “Fu ^ Wuzzies,” from the great beards and hea of hair worn by many of them.
The Mahdi, at last tiring of the long sieg ’ and fearing the approach of the relief cohul ’ launched an all-out attack on 25 Janua 1885, using 30,000 men against Gordoj1^ 7,000 forlorn, exhausted Egyptians. little difficulty, the Dervishes broke throng the defenses and put a bloody end to 317-day siege of Khartoum. Gordon vV^ speared to death on the steps of his pa‘a^ and more than 4,000 were killed by
aelp t0
racuate
iiiyde; jt until d help' lis hold linkin? d tight'
artoui"
le rud'
3 a l°ud
issed >n
1 “Save erceded
\ssailed at last Wolsely h force-
■red by • notio11 ibark h1 he area' deter}' ping b,lS it their id math . 0utside
i sing^’ y hand' GatliaS; slowly
ered ^ force
ng siege’ | colui*11’,
January
ordo*5 s. WitJ throug; t° t\ Ion palace’
by *
Mahd|;
rvisheS habit o
ting m « Fu^y ,d he»dS
dervishes, who indulged in an orgy of murder and pillage.
Two days later, the British relief expedition arrived, but seeing that the object of their mission, the rescue of Gordon, could no longer be achieved, they turned and retraced their steps 1,400 miles back to Cairo. Gladstone, who had twice failed to stop the Mahdi through the use of half measures, who had been too late at Khartoum, now adopted an enclave theory, pulling back his forces to the Egyptian border and coastal strong points on the Red Sea, and abandoning the rest of the Sudan, an area half the size of Europe, to the Mahdi.
Each day that passed deepened the British Public’s sense of outrage and humiliation; eries were voiced for the avenging of Gordon and the vindication of national honor, but Gladstone ignored them.
While Egypt, under British administration, began to shake off the slumber of centuries, the Sudan sank even deeper into the morass °f backwardness, savagery, and slavery. Khartoum was completely destroyed by the •Gaddi, who moved his followers to the city °f Omdurman, on the west bank of the Nile, across from Khartoum, making this his new capital. He desolated huge areas of the Sudan by conscripting the men for his armies and the women for his harems.
Five months after his victory at Khartoum the Mahdi died, possibly of smallpox, possibly of poison, leaving his power, temporal and spiritual, in the hands of his chosen successor, the Khalifa Abdullah.
In Egypt, meanwhile, a small but dedicated group of British officers, with one unswerving purpose, undertook to build an Egyptian Army to fight the Mahdist empire to the south. Among them was Herbert Kitchener, tall, lean, grim, and efficient. He had learned Arabic in Palestine, had served in the intelligence department during the Gordon relief expedition, had been appointed Sirdar (Commander in Chief) of the Egyptian Army in 1892, and, in recognition of his outstanding service, had been knighted in 1894. His watchword was “thorough,” and from the moment he became Sirdar, he began to lay the most thorough plans and groundwork with Sudanese tribal leaders, and he developed a vast, efficient intelligence network.
With the retirement of Gladstone in 1894, Lord Salisbury and his Conservatives came to power. Many Conservatives wished to avenge Gordon and vindicate national honor. One of the many events which helped spark the British decision to reconquer the Sudan and restore European prestige in Africa was the defeat of an Italian army of 30,000 men by Ethiopian Emperor Menelik on 1 March 1896. Some action was necessary in Africa to prevent a serious weakening of the colonial structure. Later that month, the British Government decided to help Egypt reconquer the Sudan.
After 11 years of living with a dream, of planning, of making preparations, Kitchener was ready to act. He knew it would take a miracle of transport and logistics to bring an army large enough to defeat the Khalifa into the Sudan and to sustain that army until the Khalifa could be brought to a decisive battle. Kitchener realized, too, that the most difficult enemy facing him was not Abdullah’s 60,000 Dervishes, but the Sudan itself, the
vast, barren, scorched wasteland that had reduced Hicks Pasha and his men to a wandering band of desperate men, easy victims for the Mahdi.
Kitchener also knew that he could not rely on public opinion to see him through this campaign, for many Britons opposed the war. He resolved to move slowly, building his own strength, backing the enemy into a smaller and smaller area. He would accept battle only when certain of victory. In order not to suffer the fate of Hicks or the inadequacies of supply experienced by the Gordon relief expedition, Kitchener decided to fight the war on a higher logistic plane than the pack horse and camel supply system used 11 years earlier. Kitchener decided to turn the Nile River, which dominates the life and geography of the Sudan, into his principal ally. He would build a fleet of gunboats to
accompany his army, and those sections of the Nile which were not navigable would be circumvented by a desert railroad.
Almost every expert he consulted told Kitchener the railroad could not be built over such rugged terrain as the route he had selected; thus advised, he set about without delay to build the railroad. Nature seemed to vindicate Kitchener’s advisers, for unprecedented floods in the desert washed away miles of the railroad. But Kitchener pushed on. In spite of monstrous difficulties-—heat, storms, and cholera—prior to the end of 1897, Kitchener had completed the first leg of his railroad, from Wadi Haifa, on the Egyptian- Sudanese border, to Abu Hamed, on the Nile, almost halfway to Omdurman. Journeys , that had previously taken weeks by camel could now be made in hours on the train.
Gunboats were nothing new on the Nile- During the 1880s, British and Egyptian sternwheel steamers, 90 feet long, armed with Gatling guns or Gardner guns and 12-pounder cannon, had patrolled segments of the Nile- What Kitchener foresaw was the need f°r a flotilla of gunboats, acting in co-ordination with his army, to ensure the security of his communications, to provide gunfire support to his army in battle, and to forge ahead of the ) army, gaining information and disrupting the enemy’s communications.
With expert assistance, Kitchener pr0' ceeded to design two new classes of gunboats admirably suited to the tasks assigned them-
These two classes, the 1898-class armored screw gunboats and the 1896-class armored stern-wheeler gunboats, were Kitcheners new engines of war, and, symbolically, they were painted white.
The newer gunboats, the 1898-class, were completed in time for the final grand advance- For convenience of transport these vessels were made in eight separate floatable sections, Pllt together in England, marked and numbered, disassembled, and shipped to Egypt. Three of these vessels were transported by rail to the Sudan, and assembled on the Nile. The hid was of light steel, with .25-inch, bulletproo nickel plates around the machinery spaces, deckhouses, and conning tower. A longj" tudinal middle-line bulkhead passed throng ’ the engine and boiler rooms, and forward an
faze.
fo]
0E‘ts in this class were the Melik, built by horneycroft, and the Sheikh and the Sultan, )oth built by Yarrows.
The other class of gunboat, the 1896-class jlcrn-wheeler, had three decks, was 140 feet uagj and had a draft of two feet nine inches. ^ ae engines were efficient, large, and simple °Perate and maintain. The large boilers ^aVe reserve power for towing, enabling these jU'aft to maintain steady speed even when ^Urning green wood; top speed was about 12 n°ts. Armament consisted of one 12-pounder T’ick-firing gun, two 6-pounder quick-firing j^ns> one on the bow, one on the stern, and r,'(' Maxims. Tight, protected platforms Qj.ere built for the Maxims to provide a point vantage 30 feet above the river. There th t^ree ibis class, all built by Yarrows: {'J'ateh, the Nasir, and the Zaflr- ^°me of the older craft were also used by
of these spaces further subdivision was °t>tained by transverse watertight bulkheads. There was a loopholed deckhouse below the upper deck, and a conning tower on the uPper deck. Steam steering engines worked the three rudders, with a hand tiller available 111 an emergency. A steam capstan in the bow provided powerful haulage in case of bounding or when navigating rapids. There were two complete sets of propelling engines °f two-stage, expansion type, with surface c°ndensers. Armament consisted of two 12- pounder, quick-firing guns, one forward and °ne aft, firing shrapnel with Krupp time
common, double, and case. On the facastle, there was a 4-inch howitzer, and there were four .45-caliber Maxims, which c°uld be located in different places as needed.
As fighting machines, they were powerful; lbe protection from rifle fire was good, and the engines were better protected from enemy ute than in the stern-wheelers, but the engines ^ere more complicated and the engine rooms lotter. Repairs to these high-speed engines ''’ere frequent and required more skilled labor *an for the slow stern-wheelers. All the new §unboats were equipped with the most tt'odern improvements of the day: ammuni- hon hoists, telegraph, searchlights, and circu- ar saws for cutting up the wood fuel brought °a board at night. In spite of all these fea- 'ates, and with a displacement of 140 tons,
ue draft was only two feet. The three gun- ooe Th
Kitchener. These small, armored sternwheeler gunboats were 90 feet long, with a draft of two feet six inches, combining in a small displacement, speed, towing power, fair armament, extreme ease of handling, simplicity of working parts, and comfort. Their armament consisted of one 3.5-inch Krupp gun mounted forward, and two .45- caliber Nordenfeldt machine guns on an upper battery. There were four of these black- painted vessels: the Abu Klea, Tamai, Metem- meh, and Hafir.
Kitchener’s three small stern-wheelers, armed only with machine guns, were the Dal, Kaibar, and Akasha.
The Tahra was a small paddle steamer which had been built at Khartoum by General Gordon, used by the Dervishes after their victory, sunk by the British, and refloated to join Kitchener’s flotilla.
Thus, the majority of the gunboats were stern-wheelers. Modern observers might too quickly assume that these craft were extremely vulnerable to shell fire. Not so. Knocking away a few paddles or a slight bending of the wheel frame would not cause immediate stopping of engines. The crank and connecting rod for the stern wheel were always above water, and if damaged, the craft was disabled, but these parts were small and not visible from any great distance. An advantage of the stern-wheeler was her ease of turning. Where there was not room to turn going ahead, the boat would turn on the stern wheel as a pivot, with engines going full astern; once the bow started swinging, very little sternway was gathered, and then she would turn rapidly in her own length. A further advantage of the stern-wheelers was their superiority over the early screw-driven gunboats in towing power and general utility.
Each gunboat was commanded by a British officer, with two British engineers and an Egyptian crew of about 40 men. All but three of the boats were commanded by Royal Navy lieutenants; three were commanded by officers of the Royal Engineers.
Kitchener, though an army general, had a keen appreciation of the possibilities of sea- power when employed with imagination, and indeed, it took some imagination to foresee that gunboats would be a decisive factor in the reconquest of the desolate Sudan.
be
but first, the fort at Hafir would have to
Kitchener understood that if he could control the river, control of the desert would inevitably follow. He plotted an advance up the Nile, knowing that, with the gunboats guarding his rear, the ever-lengthening lines of communication would always be open.
At Kosheh, on the Nile, south of Wadi Haifa, Kitchener established an advance base in 1896, with a railroad terminal and a shipyard. Among the earliest freight brought by rail was the first of the new stern-wheel gunboats. Train after train arrived with additional sections of gunboats. At the dockyard, 20-ton shears and other appliances were used to assemble the gunboats.
The contract for the three new 1896-class gunboats specified that they would be delivered by 5 September 1896, in time to participate in the initial stages of Kitchener’s advance, but by great exertions, the builders of the Zafir completed her in only eight weeks and delivered her to Egypt on 23 July 1896. The vessel soon reached Kitchener’s advance base where she was assembled. It is remarkable that, although in a journey of 4,000 miles the gunboats were transhipped seven times, not a single important piece was lost.
To command his gunboats, the Sirdar had selected some of the most promising young officers of the Royal Navy. In command of the flotilla was Commander S. G. C. Colville. Lieutenant David Beatty was attached to the flotilla at the special request of the Sirdar. Beatty was second senior gunboat officer.
Also present were Lieutenants Horace Hood and Walter Cowan, who were later to be two of Beatty’s trusted commanders at Jutland'
Just as the advance into the Sudan was about to begin, the flotilla suffered a mishap- To introduce the newly arrived i?afir to his army, the Sirdar held a review, assembled his army on the river bank, embarked >n the ■Zqfif, intending to sail up and down the river in front of the army. Commander Colville took command of the vessel; Aa?s were hoisted, and amidst cheering from the banks, the mooring lines were taken in. The stern paddle revolved twice when suddenly there was a loud report like that of a heavy gun. Clouds of steam rushed up from the boilers, and the engines stopped. The Zaf" had burst her low pressure cylinder and would have to lie idle until a new one could be brought up the railway. It was a disappoint' ment to the Sirdar, but not a setback; he waS confident of his strength, and so, on D September 1896 began the first stage of the advance toward Omdurman. .
The first objective was the capture 0 Dongola, near the birthplace of the Mahd1
passed. Commander Colville took four gun" boats and three small steamers to attac Hafir. During the exchange of fire Lieuten ant Beatty got a bullet through his helmet’ but Commander Colville was serious) wounded. Beatty, therefore, succeeded 10 command of the flotilla. ,
The Dervishes, in spite of the gunboats firepower, put up a spirited defense. The,r mud forts fired nine-pounder shells wi wooden percussion fuzes, but generally Dervish shells broke up on impact rather tha11 exploding. The Dervishes also tried tii’lC fuzes but with little success.
This Dervish deficiency in ordnance 'vaS fortunate for Beatty. During the close-*11 exchange of fire, Beatty’s gunboat, the A Klea, received a shell in her magazin^ Fortunately, the shell did not explode, a0^ Beatty personally threw it overboard. Instea of trying to reduce the forts, he ran the gun® c1 the enemy and threatened his rear. Passu r- closer than 300 yards from the enemy gllllS’ Beatty demonstrated to the enemy the re ^ five invulnerability and mobility of his g1111 boats. There was now no obstacle betwe
steadily forward; they penetrated |. eP into enemy country, harassing supply . nes and providing the Sirdar with valuable lritclligenCe.
That same month Kitchener established an Vance position at Fort Atbara, about 140 i Bes from Khartoum. By the end of 1897, s0Vvever, a falling Nile had trapped the flotilla chU' cataract> s0 the Sirdar had no
°ice but to advance, reinforce Fort Atbara, extend the railway there; thus Fort At- ara became, ahead of schedule, the main °acentra.tion for Kitchener’s force, for ltC^ener 'ntendeci to wait at Fort Atbara r ^e next year’s rise in the river and the
eatty and Dongola. Seeing their line of r< treat to the south threatened, the Dervishes evacuated Hafir.
The Dervish emir in Dongola was Astounded to learn from his scouts that seven *ack monsters, exhaling fire and smoke, had evoured the garrison at Hafir and were now the outskirts of Dongola. He disposed his >600 men, his six small brass cannon, and ^ one mitrailleuse gun as best he could to ?aer resistance, but to no avail. Beatty bombed the city, captured or sank all the jaative craft lying off its banks, and on 22 ‘ eptember 1896, the home of the Mahdi surrendered to the Royal Navy.
Beatty was awarded a D.S.O., and was rtlarked on the Admiralty lists for early Promotion. In early 1897, Commander Colin ePpel assumed command of the flotilla. By November 1897 the gunboats had Pushed on beyond the fifth cataract, well out front of Kitchener’s army. The gunboats covered the concentration of his force as he moved
Many troop-laden barges were towed 100 miles from Atbara to the advance base at Wad Hamid, but some, carrying enlisted men, were lashed on opposite sides of sternwheelers.
Historical Pictures Service
final move on Omdurman. Meanwhile, Fort Atbara became an enormous depot of grain, ammunition, rope, wire, medical supplies, and other materials. And, here at Fort Atbara, the “Portsmouth of the Sudan,” in Kitchener’s new shipyard, the 1898-class gunboats Melik, Sultan, and Sheikh commenced to take final shape.
Meanwhile, the three new 1896-class gunboats were operating. While one vessel was in port at Fort Atbara for upkeep, another would cruise off Shendi, halfway upriver to Omdurman, and the third would patrol the 70 miles of river between Shendi and Fort Atbara. Sometimes the gunboats would run past Shendi as far as 100 miles in advance of the army, capture prisoners, and return with valuable intelligence.
But the real game was disruption of Dervish communications and supplies.
Mahmud, the Khalifa’s general in charge of the northward approaches to Omdurman called the gunboats “the devils,” and promised a wife to any gunner who could put a shell into a gunboat; he also wanted to capture a gunboat, but never succeeded.
The long arm of seapower, intruding 1,400 miles into the desert, began to sap the confidence of the fanatical Dervishes and demoralize them long before their main force units were to engage the Anglo-Egyptian army in battle. It was only by drilling holes in the bottom of their own small boats and sinking them, thus keeping them safe during the day, that the Dervishes retained any craft to cross the river at night.
When the gunboats fought Dervish forts they frequently closed to within 50-150 yards when steaming past, and the rapid, accurate fire from the quick-firing guns and Maxims spoiled the aim of the Dervish gunners. Still, several shells entered the gunboats on various occasions, but their engines and boilers were never vitally injured.
Nor was the effectiveness of the gunboats
Sir Herbert Kitchener, Commander of the Anglo-Egyptian forces, was sketched as his troops advanced on Dongola, birthplace of the Mahdi.
Historical Pictures Service
limited to the range of their guns. Each gunboat carried, in addition to its crew, a detachment of half a company of Egyptian troops under a British officer. This landing force could be put ashore at will to support advanced patrols of the army or to raid enemy depots and strong points, to capture prisoners, and to obtain intelligence.
Up to this point in the war, Kitchener had advanced, consolidating his position, step by step, with a force of one-and-a-half divisions of Egyptian and Sudanese troops. Now, as he had planned it, the final, decisive stage of the advance was about to begin. He began to receive units of the British division that was to serve as the steel backbone of his army, and elements of such famous regiments as the Grenadier Guards, the Warwickshires, the Lincolns, the Seaforth Highlanders, the Cameron Highlanders, and others, became colorful, heartening additions to the scene.
Meanwhile, in Omdurman, 140 miles away, the Khalifa was listening intently to all news of Kitchener’s coming. Confident that the farther Kitchener came from Cairo the deeper he was being led into the well-proven trap of the desolate Sudan, the Khalifa declined to offer battle at several defensible positions because he felt sure it was to his advantage to fight Kitchener near Omdurman and as far as possible from Kitchener’s main base. The Khalifa saw Kitchener’s force as another Hicks expedition, staggering through the desert, dependent on pack mules and camels for supplies. Even as the Khalifa watched, uncomprehendingly, two stakes had already been driven into the heart of his empire: the railroad and the Nile flotilla.
Winston Churchill, 25 years of age when he wrote The River War, an account of this expedition, summed up the impact of logistics on modern war as follows:
The fierce glory that plays on red, triumphant bayonets dazzles the observer; nor does he care to look behind to where, along a thou
Under pressure from his emirs to imped e Kitchener’s advance, the Khalifa at laSt permitted Mahmud to take 12,000 men t0 make a stand near Fort Atbara. Kitchen#* welcoming this opportunity to fight, too
12.0 men, half British, half Egyptian, an made a surprise night march to Mahmod s position. On the morning of 8 April 1°' ’ at the Battle of Atbara, the Anglo-Egypt'311 force stormed Mahmud’s zariba (thorn barf1 cade) and thoroughly defeated him, killn4j
3.0 Dervishes—including 40 emirs al1
scattering the rest. British casualties wene fewer than 100. Mahmud himself was take1 prisoner and sent to Wadi Haifa. .,
Now the Khalifa decided to abandon a defensive tactics. He was convinced that would suffer only defeat if he stood on 1
to
defensive. He would let the infidels come Omdurman where, with all his host, he won attack and destroy them. .g
Kitchener began the final stages of ^ grand advance on Omdurman. Covere
^neral of the British Army, Sir Evelyn ,/°od, to
j ltchener
due course, Churchill received orders ~ lch stated that he would be attached to the
°°d, to use his legal authority to overrule on a matter of officer assignment.
barges, built in sections, were brought up to transport the troops. Besides his combat §ear, each soldier had in his pocket a device tailed “sparklets,” by which ordinary water c°uld be aerated in a moment. The trip to advance base at Wad Hamid was over miles, and since the barges woidd be towed against the current, the journey would take three-and-one-half days.
Each new-class gunboat towed several arges, so that more than 1,100 men were Illoved by each of the six new gunboats; the smaller gunboats and steamers lifted proportionately fewer men. By 25 August 1898, 'tchener’s entire army was located at Wad amid, within 50 miles of Omdurman, and Nearly all had ridden to war. Only the cavalry ar>d the camel corps had not been embarked lri the barges.
j W the Sirdar had secured the services of 'eutenant Beatty at his express desire, he ^°°n received another officer expressly against ls wishes. Kitchener disliked newspaper ^respondents and usually refused to speak (| them. He disliked young officers who dou- ect as correspondents (for in those days this Practice was permitted) even more. Young fo*nSt°n ^kurchill had made quite a name D himself as a subaltern by participating and writing about the Afghan wars and °himenting on the tactical and strategic r°rs of his superior officers. Now that the tQand advance was underway, he was eager ^ have a go at the Sudan. Initially attached £ a cavalry regiment not destined for the ^J'dan, Churchill applied for transfer to the st Lancers, the cavalry arm of Kitchener’s t "T- Kitchener personally blocked the ansfer, but Churchill persuaded his friend Prime Minister to send a telegram to ltchener asking, as a personal favor that he D *|VV young Winston to accompany the ex- 'hon. Kitchener was adamant.
q 'nston then persuaded the Adjutant
' ' '
§t T
Pro 1"ancers as a supernumerary. He would of at ^'s own exPense> and in the event kin /S C^eat*1 or wounding, no charge of any Would fall on British Army funds.
Even, with such parsimonious provisions in his orders, Winston was delighted, and following Napoleon’s philosophy that “war should support war,” he entered into a contract to write for the Morning Post, and took passage to the Sudan.
Shrugging off his defeat by subaltern Churchill, Kitchener set about the more pressing task of defeating the Khalifa. Though the Khalifa was finished with defensive tactics as a means of stopping Kitchener’s army, he tried one more method of halting the gunboats. He tried mining the river.
An old officer of the Egyptian Army, long a prisoner at Omdurman, was brought from his cell and ordered to construct mines. The clever old man filled two boilers with gunpowder; buried in the powder of each boiler was a loaded pistol with a string attached to the trigger. The idea was that when the string was pulled, the pistol would fire, exploding the mine.
It worked. On 17 August 1898, the Dervish steamer Ismailia was engaged in laying one of the mines when someone accidentally pulled the string, blowing up the steamer and all on board, including the old Egyptian. The Khalifa, saddened by the loss, but pleased that the mines were so powerful, put the emir who commanded the Omdurman arsenal in charge of the second mine-laying effort, which proceeded without mishap. The emir, being a pragmatic Arab, took the precaution of letting water into the boiler to dampen the powder, thus ensuring that he would not be blown up. Yet, withal, no British gunboat experienced any damage from mines.
On 27 August 1898, the last great natural barrier to Omdurman was passed by Kitchener’s army and flotilla—this was the Shabluka, a narrow, rocky portion of the
th
river, where a determined defense would have cost the British many lives. Thus, the Khalifa had no defensive barrier left; the ground and river to Omdurman were open. He would now have to run, to fight in Omdurman itself, or come out to meet Kitchener, who was only two or three days’ march away.
On 28 August 1898, the unfortunate Zaftr suffered her final mishap; she mysteriously sprang a leak and sank near the river bank. Fortunately, there were no casualties and Commander Keppel transferred his flag to the Sultan.
The Anglo-Egyptian force now was moving southward on the west bank of the Nile, in full order of battle, its left flank guarded by the gunboats, the right flank screened by the camel corps, out in the desert, and the center screened by the cavalry up ahead. To conserve energy for the collision with the Khalifa’s army, which might come at any time, the khaki-clad columns proceeded only eight to ten miles each day and travelled light. Each night a camp was formed, a zariba erected, and the army drew its food and water from the Nile flotilla.
On 30 August, telegraph communications with the rear were lost, owing to the fact that the line had been laid along the ground and the rain had destroyed the sand’s nonconductivity. During the last three days of the
Historical Pictures Service
advance, the Dervishes had not been seen, and the big question in everyone’s mind was whether the enemy would fight or disappear into the mirages of the desert. The only “Dervish” prisoner captured during the las1 three days of the advance proved, upon interrogation, to be an emissary of British Army intelligence.
As the morning of 1 September 18'° dawned, the advance cavalry patrols reported that something had been sighted up ahead’ About 0900, the enormous city of Omdurman could be seen from the distant hills. The city made a large purple stain on the yellow sand, spreading out for miles in all directions, and, dominating the whole scene, was the pal yellow dome of the Mahdi’s tomb.
In front of the city, across the path of the Anglo-Egyptian advance, there stretched a long brown smear. The best field glasseS showed no sign of life, prompting the con elusion that it was a forest of thorn busheS' As the cavalry approached closer, the l"ie seemed to be a Dervish zariba.
Then the line arose, and moved, and re vealed itself as a solid mass of men, eight to ten men deep, measuring four miles fr°nl flank to flank. It was the Khalifa’s mal^ army, drawn up in seven ponderous divisin' numbering at least 60,000 men. When 1 'e cavalry colonel asked for a subaltern, whosC horse was not exhausted, to take a message to the Sirdar, Churchill was convenient) available; he took the necessary notes rode back to the Sirdar, six miles behind cavalry. He reported to Kitchener that enemy had been sighted and had beg advancing at 1105.
At 1300, the Sirdar halted his army, f°rII1f it into a semicircle backed by the Nile, w> 1 the British on the left, the Sudanese in * center, and the Egyptians on the right gave the order to stand to arms and await expected charge of the Dervishes, who W then four miles away and still advancing Kitchener went up to a small hill, looked ^ the enemy, and was heard to remark, want nothing better. We have an exce1 field of fire, and they may as well come to a^ as tomorrow.” Observation balloons ^ sent up and hospital barges were placed m army’s rear. All was in readiness.
But as the enemy reached a depression three miles away, they halted. The Khalifa lr> tended to offer battle, but he preferred not to start in the afternoon, thinking that some of the British might escape in the darkness. He Wanted his victory to be a complete annihila- hon of the infidels, hence he would start early the next morning and have all day to complete the slaughter. Long ago, the Mahdi had predicted a great decisive battle with the ‘nfidels. This was to be it; accordingly, all [he emirs had been summoned to take part 111 the glorious victory. Omdurman was locked with huge piles of dates, grain, forests spears, and piles of other war materials.
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uring the last week in August, the Mahdi ad appeared in a dream to the Khalifa and Promised him a great victory over Kitchener.
fit numbers of men, the Khalifa had a |fyat superiority, his 60,000 men against Kitchener’s 26,000 men. Further, of Kitchener’s force, only 8,200 were in the rttish division; if by some misfortune the |ySyptians and Sudanese lost their nerve and yroke ranks, the plight of the British would 'adeed be serious. On the other hand, the nglo-F.gyptian force had an overwhelming ^tperiority in modern weapons. Though the halifa had 10,000 riflemen, armed with |yeaPons ranging from Remington rifles to 'ntlock muskets, and 2,000 horsemen, the Majority of his army was foot soldiers armed Only with sword and spear. In the Anglo- Syptian force, the Egyptians and Sudanese ^ere all armed with the older Martini- enry rifle, while the British were armed ''nth the deadly new Lee-Metfords. Kitchener i d 44 field pieces and 20 Maxims on land, Plus 36 guns and 24 Maxims on the river. j^ls artillery consisted of 9-pounder Maxim- ^ordenfeldt guns, 5-inch howitzers, and two "pounder siege guns.
while Kitchener had been receiving the Port of the Dervish advance from Winston urchill, the gunboats were escorting and ^wing the howitzer battery to a position on qC east bank of the Nile, across the river from p '"durnian. The gunboats Sultan, Nasir, alteh, Sheikh, and Melik were in a line forman> at intervals of 300 yards; Tamai was ^Wmg t^e barge with the artillery battery, j. Point 1,600 yards from the Omdurman °rts> and 3,000 yards from the Mahdi’s tomb
was established as the artillery position, and the artillery used the great dome of the Mahdi’s tomb as the ranging mark. By 1100, the gunboats had joined the artillery in a bombardment of Omdurman and its forts, which mounted 50 guns.
The walls of the city were breached, the embrasures were smashed, guns were dismounted, and the Mahdi’s tomb was badly battered. After silencing the Omdurman forts and sinking a Dervish steamer, the gunboat flotilla returned to camp, leaving only two gunboats to cruise off Omdurman. In order to assist the army in case of a Dervish attack, three gunboats took position on the right flank of Kitchener’s army, and four took position on the left flank, nearer the enemy.
Kitchener’s army was protected in front by a zariba, sentries were posted around the perimeter, and orders were issued that each man would sleep at his battle station. As night approached, the gunboats activated their searchlights and swept the darkness of the desert. The Khalifa, sleeping in the rear of his host, southwest of the British, was suddenly awakened as one whole side of his tent was illuminated by a passing ray of light. He asked Osman Azrak, “What is this strange thing?”
“Sire,” replied Osman Azrak, “They are looking at us.”
Shaken, the superstitious Khalifa had his tent pulled down and moved to another location.
Kitchener realized that his greatest danger lay in a Dervish night attack. The full moon and searchlights would give some advance notice of an attack, but moonlight shooting would not be as accurate as daytime shooting. If the enemy should pierce the zariba, stampede the transport animals, and create confusion in the recognition of friend from foe, the superiority of modern weaponry might count for little, and the victor of the melee might be the dense, dark Dervish masses.
To forestall such a calamity, Kitchener persuaded the Dervishes of his own intention to attack them. He sent a number of Arab scouts, many of whom were known to be friends of the Dervishes, to reconnoiter the Dervish position, with emphasis on gathering information needed for a night attack. As Kitchener expected, the Arabs imparted
Under the deadly fire of the gunboat Alelik’s quick-firing guns and Maxims, whole ranks of Dervishes, intent on obliterating the Camel Corps, were themselves annihilated.
The Mariners Museum
this “intelligence” to the Dervishes. The Khalifa then bivouacked in the desert, expecting to fall upon Kitchener’s right flank as soon as Kitchener moved on the city. Thus, the night was passed quietly by both armies.
At 0330, Friday, 2 September 1898, before the first light of dawn, amid the bugles, trumpets, drums, and fifes of the various regiments, the Anglo-Egyptian army stood to arms. The infantry made gaps in the zariba to facilitate the advance. By 0500, the 21st Lancers were drawn up, mounted, outside the zariba. It was still too dark to see anything out in front of the army. A small hill, Jebel Surgham, on the left, about a mile away, hid the Khalifa’s army. In front, the country was flat and open for five miles. On the right was a low ridge, the Kerreri Heights.
At dawn the cavalry went forward to reconnoiter. At about 0600, the first of the enemy could be seen on the left, surging over the slopes of Jebel Surgham, yelling, singing, and waving tall flags. In a front stretching across five miles, the enemy were coming!
The Khalifa’s army consisted now of three main corps: his right and center, more than
15,0 men, under Osman Azrak, would deliver a frontal assault on the zariba. The left, more than 20,000 strong, under Ali Wad Helu of the green banner, and Sheikh Ed Din, the Khalifa’s eldest son, was supposed to envelop Kitchener’s right and break through the Egyptians holding that sector. The Khalifa and his brother Yakub, with the black flag and more than 15,000 of the finest Dervish warriors remained hidden behind Jebel Surgham to await the outcome of the first attack. If the first attack succeeded, the Khalifa would move forward with his bodyguard and complete the victory. If Kitchener repulsed the first attack, then, as he marched across the plain to take Omdurman, the Khalifa would fall upon him.
Churchill, with the 21st Lancers’ cavalry screen on the left, vividly described the
initial sighting of the attacking Dervishes-
But now it is broad morning and the slanting sun adds brilliant colour to the scene. The masses have defined themselves into swarms of i men, in ordered ranks bright with glittering weapons, and above them dance a multitude of gorgeous flags. We see for ourselves what the Crusaders saw.
The Arabs were inferior in field guns more than anything else, yet it was with this weap0'1 that they opened the battle. There was a volley from the Dervish line and moments later, 50 yards short of the zariba, a red clottd of sand and dust sprang up where the pr°' jectiles had fallen short. The challenge 'vaS soon answered; at 0615, firing at a range of 3,000 yards, the British artillery opened UP a devastating fire. White banners toppled aS 20 shells struck the advancing masses in d>c first minute.
Churchill and his troop were ordered m stay near Osman Azrak’s force as it advance and to keep the Sirdar informed of al1-! changes in the direction of movement. He a11 his men ranged from 200-400 yards in fr°nt of the enemy, falling back as the enemy continued to advance.
He and his men were close enough to enemy to share their peril as the artillery came into action. He wrote of the effect me artillery had on the dense Dervish mass:
I saw the full blast of death strike this human wall. Down went their standards by dozens, and their men by hundreds. . • • but none turned back.
Shortly after this, Churchill and his troop were called inside the zariba, for the infant' were preparing to open fire. At about 0o- the British, on the left, began firing sectim
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v°lleys at 2,000 yards beginning with the Guards and Warwicks, then, as the Dervishes ^ged to the right, the fire was joined by the bfighlanders, the Lincolns, and Maxwell's °r>gade. The British stood up in double rank behind their zariba; the Egyptians and Sudanese lay down in their shelter trench. Churchill described the scene:
Ancient and modern confronted one another. The weapons, the methods, and the fanaticism of the Middle Ages were brought by an extraordinary anachronism into dire collision with the organization and inventions °f the nineteenth century. ... As the successors of the Saracens descended the long smooth slopes which led to the river and their enemy, they encountered the rifle fire of two and a half divisions of . . . infantry . . . supported by at least 70 guns on the riverbank and in the gunboats, all firing with undisturbed efficiency.
Because the Dervishes could get no closer to .e British than 800 yards, they edged to the j^ght, leaving a trail of dead. They hoped to n<l the Sudanese and Egyptians easier to aPproach. Since the Sudanese were armed vytth the slower firing Martini-Henry rifles, fie Dervishes came to within 300 yards of fieir trench, but the fire was too heavy to c°tne any closer.
G. W. Stevens, a famous British war correspondent of the day, wrote:
It was the last day of Mahdism and the greatest. They could never get near, and they refused to hold back. By now the ground before us was all white with dead men’s drapery ... it was not a battle, but an execution.
In 40 minutes, 2,000 men, including the leader of the attack, Osman Azrak, were dead; another 4,000 wounded lay pinned down by the Anglo-Egyptian fire. The Dervish riflemen lay down and began a desultory fire at the zariba, but then the artillery teamed up with the Maxims to wipe them out. If the Dervishes lay in the open, the artillery would burst over their heads; if they ran for cover, the Maxims would cut them down. Thus, the cycle continued.
So much for the Dervish attack on the left and center of Kitchener’s army. The other attack, on the right, was supposed to have taken place concurrently. Kitchener, preferring not to have his right, which was held by Egyptians, suffer the full fury of an assault, had taken the precaution of stationing Colonel Broadwood and his mounted brigade in the Kerreri Hills, about a mile in advance of the
army’s right, to cushion the impact of an attack in this area and to harass the flanks of the attacker.
Broadwood was skirmishing with some Dervish patrols when he and his 2,000 men came face to face with the 20,000 men of Sheikh Ed Din and Ali Wad Helu. The immediate choice was annihilation, isolation, or retreat, with subsequent envelopment of Kitchener’s right. In a moment, Broadwood decided to send the slower camel corps back to the zariba, while he, with his fast cavalry, would hang near the Dervishes, harass them, and try to get them to pursue him.
Unfortunately, the ground between the camel corps and the zariba was broken by volcanic stones, and the going was slow. The Dervishes, seeing that the camel corps was trying to escape, and seeing how slowly it proceeded, turned their entire mass and raced toward the river bank in an attempt to cut off the camel corps from the rest of Kitchener’s army. Broadwood saw their peril and felt a chilling necessity present itself; these were his men and he must try to save them. It was clear that, unless something stopped them, the Dervishes, rushing in from the west, would reach the river bank before the camel corps, coming down from the north, could slip into the protection of the zariba.
Broadwood assumed the preparatory position for a cavalry charge, 2,000 against 20,000. But, as the howling horde of Dervishes, confident now of victory, certain that nothing could save the camel corps from them, rushed forward, closer and closer to the helplessly outnumbered camel corps, a new force suddenly intervened.
The gunboat Melik, floating white and majestic in the stream, near the shore, opened a deadly fire with her quick-firing guns and Maxims. At such close range, the effect on the dense masses of the Dervishes was devastating; entire ranks disappeared as the Maxims trained from right to left and back and forth. The Dervishes halted, hesitated, and then as two more gunboats appeared on the scene, the Dervish force of 20,000 men fell back from the river.
The camel corps, with a new lease on life, slipped past the point of near interception and entered the safety of the zariba. The enemy, deprived of their first helpless quarry, fell with redoubled fury on Broadwood, and forgetting that his mobility greatly exceeded theirs, pursued him as he withdrew toward the north. Broadwood thus carried out a brilliant ^ diversion; with fewer than 2,000 men, he led 20,000 of the Khalifa’s warriors, including a large proportion of his riflemen, three mileS to the north, out of the battle. Upon getting his pursuers out into the desert, he bade them farewell and quickly returned to the zariba' The unhappy Sheikh Ed Din and Ali Wad i Helu tried to form up once more for an attack on Kitchener’s right, but it was no"1 too late. The first attack on the left and center had already been repulsed, and Kitchener had seized the initiative.
Seeing that the impetus of the Dervish attack had carried them northward across the British front, leaving the way open to On1' durman, Kitchener decided to move °n Omdurman without delay. By 0800, the road to Omdurman appeared open, and the gUI1' boats were bombarding the Mahdi’s tomb- Since he was now between the city and the Dervish army, Kitchener could move °° interior lines, take the city, and thus avoid 3 costly house-by-house fight in Omdurman- was a gamble, he knew, to move out of a well' prepared position, exposing his right to the estimated 35,000 Dervishes still in the field’ But, he took the risk because the road t0 Omdurman was short, about seven mileS’ the enemy had already received a great hammering, and he knew that the gunboat would look after his communications 311 cover his left flank.
The 21st Lancers were ordered to re connoiter the road to Omdurman and dn',e off any Dervishes found in the way.
The 21st Lancers had never made 3 cavalry charge. In fact, the outfit had befn inactive since a detachment had acted aS guard to Napoleon at St. Helena. A troop had been originally reserved for Winst°lJ Churchill in one of the leading squadrons, but due to the uncertainties arising from Kitcl1 ener’s opposition to having Churchill, troop had been given to Second LieutenaIlt Robert Grenfell. Winston had to settle for 3 troop in one of the rear squadrons.
As the lancers advanced, they came under flanking fire from about 300 Dervishes off i0^ the right side. The colonel saw that some 0
men were being hit, so he ordered the regiment to swing into line abreast and face enemy—the 21st Lancers were now about to make their first charge, and the last classic cavalry charge in British military history.
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• nurchill describes his sensations after break- lri§ through the Dervish mass:
Once again I was on the hard, crisp desert, my horse at a trot. I had the impression of Scattered Dervishes running to and fro in all directions. Straight before me a man threw himself on the ground. . . . My first idea
A graduate of Rice University in 1960 with a bachelor’s degree in history, Lieutenant Parnell attended Officer Candidate School at Newport, R. I. He served in the USS Shangri La (CVA-38) and, from 1961 to 1963, in the USS Constellation (CVA-64). He then served for two years in the USS Fremont (APA-44). ncc 1966, he has been assigned to the staff of the
^Vinston, on account of a game shoulder r°m his polo playing days in India, had long aS° decided that in the event of a cavalry charge, his weapon would be a pistol, not a ance or sword. Thus, while in London, be- 0re leaving for the Sudan, he had bought the ^eWest thing in pistols, the 1896 Mauser ■63-mm. military model, the first automatic P'stol to be used in war.
The four squadrons of lancers swung into ffie, Winston commanding the second troop r°m the right, with Lieutenant Grenfell arther to the left. On they charged, gathering Momentum for the coming shock, 400 yards, pW 200—then they saw the trap. Between ‘*em and the 300 Dervishes, there yawned a deep ravine, with 3,000 Dervishes packed Mo-12 thick, with swords waving, banners ^y,ng, and emirs moving among them on °rseback. It was now too late to turn back; nc colonel, riding at the head of the regiment, '■'Harmed, led his men into the collision. With a loud clap, like thunder, the lancers hit the ense mass of waiting Dervishes, carrying l^clmps a thousand with them as they shore k r°ugh the human wall; then the killing cgan. Horses were hamstrung; men were Polled from their horses and hacked to death.
therefore was that the man was terrified. But simultaneously I saw the gleam of his curved sword as he drew it back for a ham-stringing cut. ... I fired two shots into him at about three yards. As I straightened myself in the saddle, I saw before me another figure with uplifted sword. I raised my pistol and fired. So close were we that the pistol itself actually struck him.
He and his men had been fortunate to strike the Dervish left flank, where they were thinnest. Lieutenant Grenfell, commanding the troop orginally reserved for Churchill, was killed and his troop cut to pieces by the thick concentration of Dervishes close to the center. In 120 seconds, the lancers had lost five officers, 65 men, and 120 horses—25 per cent of their fighting strength. Forebearing a second charge, the lancers circled around to an enfilading position, dismounted and with their magazine carbines took a deadly toll of the Dervishes, driving them into the field of fire of the 32nd battery, where the rest of the 3,000 died.
Meanwhile, Kitchener was moving his army forward toward Omdurman. Not ruling out the possiblity of another Dervish attack, Kitchener had entrusted the rear, the portion of his army nearest the enemy, to his most experienced brigadier, General Hector MacDonald, and had strengthened him with several Maxims. At 0940, as the British division in the van crested a small hill between Jebel Surgham and the Nile, a crackle of fire was heard from the rear. The intensity rose quickly to a roar; something big was happening back there!
Lewis had faced westward and was volleying desperately. MacDonald was a line of fire and smoke. These two rear brigades, fewer than 6,000 men, were now being attacked by the Khalifa himself, with his select 15,000 warriors of the black flag. Kitchener, realizing that the battle had been renewed under much more dangerous circumstances than when his army had been drawn up inside the zariba, quickly sent two British brigades to join MacDonald, the anvil on which the Khalifa was now hammering, while three other brigades maneuvered to attack the Khalifa’s right flank. Under this additional fire power the Khalifa’s attack slackened, but then what looked like an entirely new Dervish army
Historians have dutifully noted Kitcheners melding of new weapons and old tactic8 at Omdurman. Yet, it is possible that the Anglo-Egyptian force which stood with *ts back to the Nile would more likely regard the melding of an old weapon—the river gl*n boat—and a new tactic—projecting seapow'*’*’ literally, into the desert’s vastness—as an eve*1 more significant contribution to victory-
appeared suddenly from the Kerreri Hills, to the north; it was the corps of Sheikh Ed Din and Ali Wad Helu returning from their fruitless pursuit of Broadwood, who now launched an attack on MacDonald’s right flank and rear.
MacDonald, cool as though on parade at Aldershot, handled his black Sudanese with skill and firmness; having first faced his 3,000 men southwest to meet the Khalifa’s 15,000, he now reoriented his force to face the northwest and the more than 15,000 new assailants pressing forward. His Sudanese fired too fast, wanting to exhaust their ammunition so as to engage the hated Dervishes in hand-to-hand combat, but MacDonald steadied them.
On the enemy came, while to MacDonald’s right the Lincolns were deploying in support; by the time the Dervishes had reached 300 yards from MacDonald, the crisis of the battle had arrived. It now seemed as though nothing could stop the enemy from reaching MacDonald, but then the Lincolns, who disputed with the Warwicks the title of the best shooting regiment in the British Army, opened a terrible enfilading fire with
3,0 Lee-Metford rifles. Volley after volley crashed out, striking down hundreds of Dervishes; Maxims rattled, and hundreds more of the enemy fell until at last the Dervish host, with all its bravery and disregard for death, could take no more. They fell back, this time broken for good. Yakub, the Khalifa’s brother, lay dead with his followers near the black flag; bodies lay spread evenly over several acres. The Dervishes had fought well and had endured fantastic casualties, but enough was enough.
The Dervish dead exceeded 10,000; wounded exceeded 10,000, many of whom later died, and 5,000 were taken prisoner. In one of the most lopsided victories in military history, the total British, Egyptian, and Sudanese casualties were fewer than 450. Official records credited the Maxims with three-fourths of the Dervish casualties, a fact not lost on the German observers.
The Khalifa, seeing his army beaten, fled> but several months later was killed with his few remaining followers.
At 1130, Kitchener shut up his binoculars and, remarking that he thought the enemy had been given “a good dusting,” reformed his brigades and moved on to take Omdur- man. By 2200, he had drafted his victory telegram to the Queen and went to sleep.
On Sunday, 4 September 1898, on the ruins of Gordon’s palace, the British and Egyptian flags were hoisted together and a solemn memorial service was held for General Gordon. At the end of the service, word reached Kitchener that his grateful country had awarded him a peerage, a stately home; and the title “Lord Kitchener, of Khartoum- Lieutenants Beatty and Hood were both promoted to commander after the battle* Beatty then being 27 years of age.
As a result of the Battle of Omdurman, the Dervish power in the Sudan was broken, ant* the one million square miles of the Sudan brought under Anglo-Egyptian rule. Seven hundred miles of railway had been constructed, and the Nile was now open to commerce and development.
The cost, due to Kitchener’s incredible concern for economy, was only about two- and-a-half million pounds for the two years o reconquest, less than the cost to Britain of han a day’s fighting in World War I.
Churchill, writing about the battle many years later stated:
Nothing like the Battle of Omdurman will ever be seen again. It was the last link in the long chain of those spectacular conflicts whose vivid and majestic splendor has done s° much to invest war with glamour.
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