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he first Micronesians may have mi- ■*- grated from eastern Asia and Indonesia a/* early as 3000 B.C. But, for our purposes, j*e meaningful history of Micronesia— . Marianas, the Marshalls, and the Caro- lnes- dates only from the late 19th century, 'vhen Europe’s acquisitive powers began Gambling for Pacific pearls to brighten their c°lonial diadems.
In 1898, following the war with Spain, the nned States acquired Guam, a 210-square- ^he dot in a three-million-square-mile ‘ Panish sea. In dire financial straits, Spain the remaining Pacific island possessions p Germany in 1899. Germany ruled her acific Empire from a base at Kiaochow Usingtao), China, until the islands were Captured by the Japanese in 1914.
At the Versailles Peace Conference in 1919, ctaPan was awarded the Pacific Islands as a sacred trust” or “Mandate,” which was ®rminated by a series of bloody World War battles fought on the small islands to oust Japanese and re-establish the control the . nited States had so magnanimously waived 1898.*
^ Even as World War II progressed, Allied eads of state and/or their representatives th ^ meetinS to determine the disposition of 'vorI<I after the termination of hostili- s- The question of non-governing terri- les and colonial peoples was on the 8 nda in discussions of the new world order j lch was predicated on a union of nations, ^rreasingly, the initial plans postulated for ’’Pendent territories called for international
SuPervision.
Th
nere were, of course, differences of t ruon. Great Britain and France, for j mple, were opposed to any system which defU<ae<^ aE dependent territories, and in tC> w'shes, trusteeship had
j been discussed at Dumbarton Oaks dur- August-October, 1944. But other matters fj *1^ be discussed. At Dumbarton Oaks,
' •> British, Russian, and Chinese experts
S Masatake Okumiya, “For Sugar Boats or An» arines?” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, UgUst 1968, pp. 66-73.
fashioned the framework of a general International Organization of the postwar world.
In November 1944, at the Wellington Conference, Australia and New Zealand accepted the principle of trusteeship for all colonial territories, and at Yalta in February 1945, Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin agreed that three types of territories were to be brought into the trusteeship system: (1) former mandated areas; (2) territories which might be detached from enemy states after the war; and (3) other territories voluntarily placed under the system.
The United States found itself in a predicament. The State Department clashed with the War and Navy Departments; both wanted at least a part of the Pacific Islands exempted from the system. Admiral Ernest J. King stated at a meeting of the Academy of Political Science in New York on 4 April 1945 that “these atolls, these island harbors will have been paid for by the sacrifice of American blood.” He considered these bases “essential for our defense.” In a memorandum to the State Department on 23 January 1945, Secretary of War Henry Stimson declared in part that,
... to serve such a purpose (bases) must belong to the United States with absolute power to rule and fortify them. They are not colonies; they are outposts, and their acquisition is appropriate under the general doctrine of selfdefense by the power which guarantees the safety of that area of the world.
The State Department, operating under the non-annexation restrictions imposed by the Atlantic Charter and Cairo declarations, yielded to the pressure and formulated the concept of the “Strategic Trusteeship” under the aegis of the Security Council, where the veto power was held.
The question of trusteeship was taken up at the first meeting of the General Assembly in January 1946, and it was the decision of the members that the system should be set up as soon as practicable. There followed a somewhat rapid reaction: the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and Belgium all immediately offered to place their mandated territories under the system. France
•• Alamagan
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MARIANA ISLANDS DISTRICT
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PALAU ISLANDS ‘
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| \ | YAP DISTRICT |
PALAU DISTRICT | \ | |
|
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C A R O L I \N
E Q U A TOR
err'f°ry of the Pacific Islands
I s
TRUK
DISTRICT
• HALL ISLANDS .•/
TRUK ’•> Losap ISLANDS MORTLOCK ISLANDS •• I
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Except for Ponape, third in both size and population, the size of districts does not reflect populal’0 Truk District—46 square miles—is the smallest land area, but has the most people, 2 5,000.
1946, during the first session of the assern President Harry S. Truman declared that
biy-
the islands
stated that the matter required further study, but her agreement was forthcoming before the month was out. The Union of South Africa stated that her Southwest African Mandate’s population would have to be consulted. The United States, too, tarried, ostensibly because a treaty of peace had not yet been signed with Japan. The draft trusteeship agreements were prepared by the mandatory states themselves and circulated to those other states that might have an interest. It is important here to make the point set forth by the Australian representative to the effect that “. . . administration itself was the function of the administering Power. The role of the Trusteeship Council was that of supervisor (on behalf of the Assembly or Council) and not that of Administrator.” Despite the readiness with which mandatory states offered up their mandates, it took almost one year for ap
proval of the initial eight trusteeship agree ments and establishment of the Trusteeship Council. Under the charter (Art. 86), 11 Council consists of representatives of each na
• • r • 1 gjl
tion administering a trust territory, ana equal number of permanent members of 1 Security Council who do not administer T Territories, plus other members elected * three year terms by the General Assembly- Along with an intransigent South Africa> intent on the status quo for her manda^j the United States sat on the sidelines al1^ participated in the formulation of other trllS^ teeship agreements while maintaining discreet, if somewhat embarrassing, silc11 concerning the Pacific Islands. On 15 Janua ;
United States might place some of the under trusteeship and retain others as long
agree'
iteeship 6), ‘be ich na'
and a” , of the r Trust ted b,r
ibly-
Africa*
andate.
,es and er trusting 3
silenc®
anuary seinbly* hat tlte islands long aS
j^ere was a need, and Secretary of War lnes Forrestal opposed a statement pro, ed by Secretary of State James Byrnes pat We would be the sole trustee for the Aacific Islands at the meeting of the General Ssernbly. Finally, the State Department was pjven the “go ahead” by the War and Navy .apartments, provided the final agreement uld amount to sovereignty until such time rs the U. N. was capable of assuming full p P°nsibility for world order. Accordingly, I ndent Truman announced on 6 November p y that we were prepared to place the UClfic islands under trusteeship with the Th *ted States as administering authority. Cn 6 C)rah agreement was submitted to the irnUnC^ on ^ February 1947 and was unan- approved by that body on 2 April pj • With this action, the United States Ced itself in the ranks of the colonial
powers—after having rejected a similar arrangement involving German East Africa following World War I—and thus became vulnerable to the almost certain abuse that was to follow from the Communist bloc and the newly emerging states.
Predictably, the greatest 20th century colonialist of them all, Soviet Russia, has continued to accuse America of being a colonial power, while the Soviet Union continues to champion piously the cause of the newly emerging states.
It would, of course, be rude to remind the Russians that our altruistic offering up of the islands to trusteeship in the first place, coupled with our subsequent commitment to lead them toward eventual self-government or independence, contrasts sharply with the Soviet Union’s acquisition of, let us say, the lower Sakhalin Peninsula and the Kurile Islands at the end of World War II.
Similarly, it would be unseemly for the United States to remind its carping critics that it has instituted policies which are in complete accord with the highest humanitarian ideals expressed in the U. N. charter.
U. S. policies for the Pacific Trust Territories are as follows:
• To foster actively and promote political development toward self-government or independence by starting at the bottom and working up. The basic unit of government in the territory is the municipality headed by a magistrate or a mayor in rare instance. As of 1965, there were 102 municipalities of which 46 were chartered. These are then organized into six districts, each with its legislature and a district administrator. The six districts are governed by the office of the high commissioner with headquarters today on the island of Saipan and a Micronesian Congress.
• To promote the development of the economy so that it will become geared to a world money economy, and thus its subsistence fishing and farming aspects will become supplemental.
• To promote social advancement by programs of general education, by raising the level of public health, by improving the standard of living, and by encouraging the people to adopt useful features of other cultures.
• To provide educational opportunities so that the natives can develop their capacities
of
to the fullest extent. The educational goal is a universal, free public school system through high school, with advanced training in the trades and professions for those who can profit by further schooling.
The Trust Agreement. The strategic Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands agreement differs from a non-strategic agreement. For example, Article 3 of the U. S. trusteeship agreement provides the United States with full administrative, legislative, and juridical powers over the territory, while Article 5, in the interest of maintaining international peace and security, entitles America to establish naval, military, and air bases; to erect fortifications; to station and employ armed forces; and to make use of volunteer forces, facilities and assistance from the territory. Article 6 is the standard trust article charging the trustee with political development, economic advancement, health protection, social development, and educational development. Article 7 guarantees to the inhabitants basic rights and freedoms. Article 8, however, provides the United States with most favored nation treatment in the territory and permits us to regulate air traffic over the area. The remaining articles deal with such matters as membership in regional organization, citizenship status, and diplomatic/consular protection, except for Article 13, which permits the United States to close specified areas from time to time for security reasons.
A cursory study of a non-strategic trusteeship agreement—New Zealand’s trusteeship of Western Samoa is an example—discloses generally similar rights and obligations with the following exceptions:
• New Zealand cannot restrict aircraft flight over Western Samoa.
• New Zealand may not close the territory to all outside scrutiny for any purpose.
• There is provision for reference of disputes between the administering authority and a member of United Nations to the International Court of Justice.
• There is no provision for citizenship in the territory, or consular and diplomatic protection when natives are outside the territory.
• New Zealand ultimately is responsible to the General Assembly while the United States, on the other hand, is responsible in the last resort to the Security Council.
Preparing for Self Rule. With the repatriation of the Japanese to their homeland after World War II, the islands were left without any form of governmental law and order- Very few natives spoke English and the islands were ravaged by the bloody campaigns that had been fought on their soil. It was fortunate that the U. S. Navy was the first agency entrusted with their administration, for, with civil government cadres trained at Stanford University and the in-house material and technical capability of the seagoing forces: the islands had achieved. some measure normalcy. With the transfer of control authority from the Navy Department to the De" partment of Interior on 1 July 1951, some headway was lost due to the shortage 0 trained personnel and the meager appropn3' tions allotted to Interior by a less-than-muni' icent Congress.
Since that time, however, there has been 3 slow but steady advance in the political educa tion of the natives, characterized by the es tablishment of legislative bodies, and the re placement of Americans in all governmenta and civil positions. The extent of this progreSS can best be demonstrated by the establish ment on 12 July 1965 of the Congress 0 Micronesia, a bicameral body patterne somewhat after our own Congress. Althoug the High Commissioner exercises the power of veto on legislative proposals, one canr>ot deny the importance of this singular event to the political education of the Micronesians-
More and more Micronesians are bem& assimilated into all levels of administrate6’ governmental, and professional positions-"011 30 June 1967, for example, the number 0 Micronesians filling these positions was 4,0' as opposed to 467 Americans. The Depub High Commissioner is a Micronesian, sl* Micronesians have been appointed Assist3 District Administrators, all judges except f°r the appointed Chief Justice and Associa(C Justice of the High Court are Micronesia'lS’ and, in August 1966, the first Micronesia'1’ Dwight Heine, was appointed a District A ministrator.
The Economy of the Islands. Basically, islands suffer from a severe balance of Pa- ments situation. They are consuming 1 more than their agriculture and small lfl
for
1965. Starting in 1962, Congress was
v°rably upon the economic stewardship of le United States. Why, for instance, doesn’t nierica pump up such promising areas as (e fishing industry? By way of contrast, in
'Justry can support. The table gives the total "xports/imports and Gross National Product (gnp), expressed in millions of U. S. dollars, for selected years for the territory.
Year | Exports | Imports | GNP |
1956 | 1.73 | 3.18 | 3.23 |
1959 | 1.24 | 4.01 | 3.66 |
1962 | 2.13 | 4.14 | 5.44 |
1965 | 3.15 | 7.09 | 10.23 |
Contrast the foregoing figures with the revenues, expenditures, and congressional appropriations in millions of U. S. dollars listed ltl the table below.
Year | Revenue | Expendi tures | Appro priations |
1951 | .346 | 1.35 | 1.01 |
1956 | 2.2 | 7.70 | 5.55 |
1960 | 1.4 | 8.22 | 6.81 |
1965 | 2.05 | 23.5 | 17.24 |
Expenditures, then, are pretty well geared appropriations plus revenues. This is so Slr*ce the appropriations are voted on the basis °f a budget for the forthcoming year. The '"°st significant figure is the appropriation
Persuaded to more than double the amount
aPpropriated since about mid-1950. Other
dealing statistics are the amounts of ex-
P°rts/imports exchanged with the two major
jjade centers, the United States and Japan.
0r instance, in 1965, the Territory exported
50°ds amounting to $160,000 to the United
Jates while Japan’s share was worth
3)000,000. Imports from the United States,
°Wever, totalled $4,500,000 while those
r°m Japan were only $2,000,000. A signifi-
factor is the nature of the economy.
Ver one-half of the monetary value of ex-
P°rts from the islands every year is accounted
°r by the sale of copra, which does not reflect lav •
th.
th,
^37, the Japanese tuna catch in the islands C(lUalled the production of our California industry. One answer is that we want to help native to help himself. Our aim has been keep the ownership of industries and en- rprises in native hands. This has been our lcy since we began administering these
islands, and we have not wavered until recently. However, it seemed obvious that it will be yet a long time before the capability will be internally developed. For, despite increasing appropriations, the gap continued to widen between imports and exports, revenues and expenditures. Accordingly, the first U. S. firm (Van Camp) was permitted to establish a tuna fishing industry in April, 1964. The United States bars all but U. S. commercial interests from the territory since, under the terms of the trust agreement, if permission were granted for one nation to exploit resources, the United States would be required to permit similar privileges to all nations. Who would desire to enter the territory? Japan, for one!
Health and Education. The United States has generally fared well before the Trusteeship Council in the areas of health and education, although the U. N. wording of resolutions or endorsements is a curious admixture of commendation and disapprobation. For example, at the 1961 meeting of the Trusteeship Council, our medical efforts were lauded, but services to outlying districts were declared deficient; education was declared commendatory, but the council found central funds lacking. In 1956, the United States was commended on health measures in the Territory, but educational standards and subsidies were found lacking. In 1964, the free 12-year school program was praised, but a junior college was urged, as was the lowering of the school age to six years. In 1954, the Council agreed that the U. S. record reflected considerable achievement throughout, but asked why less money was spent on education in 1955 than the preceding year. (The reply was use of surplus supplies and less teachers.) One persistent criticism was the continuing tuberculosis problem and, as late as 1965, the World Health Organization (WHO) investigated complaints of inadequate health services voiced by 11 departmental staff members at the request of the United States. The findings were that justification existed and the WHO recommended equipment replacement, increase of supplies, leprosy control, and centralized TB control.
Contrast the foregoing criticisms with remarks related by Koichi Sana, Truk hospital
was passed in the General Assembly on December 1960. It was reinforced on 16 ^f cember 1966 by a resolution which stated 111 part that colonial rule was a threat to inter. national peace and security, and aparthel was a crime against humanity. The resoluti°3 also requested the dismantling of all mild3 '
les
14
administrator, who is himself of Japanese extraction. He confirmed the fact that “Medical care is much better than in Japanese times. . . . There were no Micronesian doctors then. If a native needed an operation, he was just out of luck. On the other hand, Japanese patients who required operations were transported to Japan. The natives simply died.”
U Thant complained in 1960 that medical care was not free in the territory. This is true; however, patients were charged 50 cents a day for hospital care, one dollar for minor operations, and ten dollars or less for major operations—and fees were waived if the patient was unable to pay.
The following budget figures may give some additional insight into the U. S. approach to these areas:
Year | Health | Education |
1953 | $ — | $ 435,440 |
1957 | 718,614 | 505,368 |
1960 | 738,763 | 760,200 |
1965 | 1,955,074 | 4,741,347 |
A look at population growth may show health trends. The population in the islands is increasing rapidly. At the end of Japanese rule, the islands contained 40,000 natives, but by 1960 the number had nearly doubled (75,836), and it is estimated to be very close to 100,000 today. Population growth rates range from a high figure of 3.5 per cent in the Marshalls to 7.3 per cent in the Marianas, with an average of 3.9 per cent for the territory. U. S. annual current growth rate is less than half—about 1.8 per cent. These figures
would not seem indicative of a poor state health and nutrition.
The Annual Report. Each year the Unite States must submit a report to the Unite Nations explaining its administration of the territory. As expected in a situation roughly comparable to that of a guardian submitting an annual report to a State Assembly about raising his ward, the reaction of the govern ing body is mixed. Those who were opp°se^ to the adoption from the first are convince that everything the guardian is doing lS wrong. His friends, on the other hand, agree with virtually everything he is doing"3' though they concede ruefully that they he would do some things differently. ^ Precisely what type of reaction is prompte by these annual reports? The criticism leven by the Soviet Union ranges from diatribeS against atomic testing—radiation hazards t° the people—to accusing us of using the islan s as a base for Vietnam. At practically every meeting of the trusteeship council, the Soviets continuously harp both on the colonialist1 theme, and on the lack of economic and p°llt; ical development. The Afro-Asian states als° accuse us of colonialism, and decry atoi"lC testing. The colonialism issue is so strops that a declaration on the granting of hlC pendence to all colonial countries and peop
bases. The vote was 71-7 for, with 20 abstentions and the United States among those against. It is significant, however, that the Trusteeship Council has never been preempted by the Security Council in examining Tb S. annual reports, and that an attempt by the Soviet Union to move for deliberation of the 1963 report by the Security Council failed hy a vote of five to one, with two abstentions.
Australia, the only other remaining administering authority—New Guinea; the other trust territories have all achieved independence—was severely castigated in the General Assembly in 1966 by a resolution condemning her rule in phosphate-rich Nauru and calling for Nauru’s independence not later than 1 January 1968. (Nauru achieved independence h(J January 1968; size, 5,263 acres; population, less than 6,000.) The vote was 81-8, with the United States against, and 25 abstentions, fo is noteworthy that Nauru’s mineral deposits are expected to be exhausted by 1975 a°d the island is expected to become uninhabitable. This is indicative of the anti- c°lonial feeling in the General Assembly, and the rather hasty and unreasonable actions Vvhich sometimes result.
U. S. Trust versus Japanese Mandate. The Japanese policy for the islands might be characterized as having been one of exploita- t’on, colonization, and militarization. ConVersely, to the United States, the islands are au economic liability; until recently, we did n°t even permit tourism; and we have not ^'•litarizcd them to any extent even though VVe have the right to do so.
Truk alone had 40,000 Japanese military n'Cn stationed on the atoll, and the islands SlJPported a Japanese colony numbering be- lvveen 70,000 and 100,000, depending on °ue’s information source. Japan developed 'he fishing industry, and established a sugar- ';ane industry on Saipan that netted six mil- lQn dollars annually. Roads were constructed and railroads were built on Saipan.
Today, there are no railroads and surface r°ads are in generally poor condition. The territory contains 90 miles of paved road today at)d 351 miles are unpaved. Yap had 118 rrules of good roads during the Japanese regime; today there are 18.
The Japanese in 1936 had 25 schools for natives; today we have approximately 300, but what is more important, we provide the natives with 12 years of education while the Japanese gave them only five years of schooling.
Under the Japanese, the islander’s health and welfare were secondary to his potential service to the Empire as a tiny cog in the wheel that would later be called the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.
The phenomenal Japanese development of the 1920s and 1930s yielded a living standard for the Islander that has not been matched today, and set up an infrastructure which, too, remains unparalleled. On the other hand, the United States wins hands down in the political, social, and educational areas, and has a definite edge in health services.
A revealing statistic is population growth under the Japanese. Between 1921 and 1938, the number of natives in the islands increased only 7 per cent or an average of .4 per cent per year—less than one ninth of its present rate of growth.
Fallout in Paradise. In 1946, 312 natives of the Marshallese atolls of Bikini and Eniwetok were evacuated from the two islands so that nuclear tests could be conducted in the area. They were transported to new homes on two other uninhabited islands; the people of Eniwetok to the island of Ujelang where they comprise today a viable colony with more than double the original total of 146. The natives of Bikini, however, were moved to the island of Rongerik where they were unable to subsist. After a short move to Kwajalein where they were squatters, they were moved to a relatively inaccessible island called Kili, in the southern Marshalls about 35 miles from the island of Jaluit, where they have led a somewhat unhappy existence until this day. The 166 Bikinians are now about 300, but they are dissatisfied and homesick. Unfortunately, Bikini is still too radioactive for them to return. In 1956, the United Nations was petitioned by the people of Bikini concerning their plight and by the end of that year, the United States had agreed upon a financial settlement. The Bikini natives were awarded a $25,000 cash settlement and a $300,000 trust fund, while the Eniwetokese received the same cash but a trust fund of only
half the amount.
On 1 March 1954, the United States exploded a fusion-type nuclear weapon off Bikini with disastrous consequences. A wind shift caused the irradiation of a Japanese fishing boat which had ventured into the closed area, but more seriously, the Marshallese island of Rongelap, inhabited by 86 natives, was exposed to the fallout. The people were afflicted with body lesions and loss of hair. After treatment on Kwajalein, the natives were moved temporarily to the island of Ejit in Majuro atoll, but when Rongelap was declared safe three years later, a new village was built for them and they were returned to their home island. Upon hearing that the Japanese victims in the fishing boat were awarded $2,000,000 in damages, they pressed a claim for $8,500,000. It was not until 1964 that Congress authorized a “compassionate” settlement of $950,000 and appropriated the funds in 1965. Thus far, none of the 13 Rongelapese deaths since 1954 could be attributed to other than natural causes.
The two events described in preceding paragraphs were to be the source of the most persistent abuses, complaints, and condemnations against the United States from all quarters. The United States was denounced in the U. N. and scorched by world public opinion. Yet, the United States had announced its intentions to conduct nuclear tests in these remote, almost uninhabited islands in 1948, 1951 and 1952 to the Security Council of the U. N. and there were no objections raised at the time.
In 1961, the year before the test ban treaty, we announced that we had no further plans for nuclear testing in the islands.
The Natives. As early as in his first annual report, the High Commissioner for the Trust Territory, our ambassador to the U. N., Mr. F. B. Sayre, found it appropriate to remark on the good nature of the islanders. Yet, this good nature, good humor, and relative docil-
In some parts of the three-million-square- mile territory, seaplanes, such as this SA-16 Grumman amphibian on Ulithi, are the only means of rapid transportation.
ity can disappear when certain stimuli arouse them. We have seen this to be the case with nuclear treaty-testing and displacement from their home islands. Two other areas in which the petitions of the islanders have been effective are the subject of war claims against the Japanese and land claims against the United States for ground we have designated f°r public use and for such projects as the missile facility. The latter were finally settled 111 February 1964, but the Japanese war claims are not settled to this date although the U. N- annually expresses its regrets, urges action, and urges use of the offices of the Secretary General as arbitrator. It may well be, as one writer suggested, that the matter is too far down on the agenda of items dealing with United States-Japanese relations.
Except for the instances discussed thus fab there appears to be a very genuine attachment to the United States by the islanders- Without quoting an inordinate number ol comments by islanders, perhaps the following examples of native feelings and empathy Win serve as evidence of their good will and satisfied station:
• The first Micronesian District Administrator, and a severe critic of the United
States in the U. N. and in regards to land claims, stated that the islands would be best °ff as an outright U. S. possession.
• The hereditary chief of the chamorros 011 Saipan, Elias Saban, remarked that the Saipanese were pro-American because of the economic progress since the island was taken from Japan.
• Chief Ring of Lukonor, Truk, when asked if things were better under the Americans, replied: “Why hell, you just can’t compare the Americans to the Japs.”
•When a visiting mission from the United Nations held a plebiscite on Saipan and Tinian in 1961, to determine whether the People would prefer union with Guam, annexation by the United States, or the status 'jno, 1,642 voted for union, 875 for annexation, and 27 for the status quo. Over 80 per Cent of the registered voters went to the polls.
On the other hand, natives, especially in Truk and Palau, complained that life was better under the Japanese. One unbiased author reckons that the per capita income in lke islands in 1966 was $58, while during the Japanese rule, it went as high as five times that amount.
. Still, all things considered, the vast major- tty of the islanders seem to be well-satisfied, with U. S. administration, and if anything, desire closer ties.
Missions and Petitions. The United Nations does not determine the character of U. S. administration of the islands by the words of the annual report alone. There are two additional sources of information available to the Trusteeship Council: the Visiting Mission and the Petitions from natives.
The trusteeship provisions of the Charter Provide for visits by members of the Council to the various trust territories. These are made *JP of representatives of four States, two trust- administering members and two without jrust territories. The first such visit to our
acific Islands was in 1950, and additional Vlsits have followed at three-year intervals.
The standing Committee on Petitions has Occasionally been accused of “rubber stamp” decisions since, without the petitioner’s physiol presence (a petitioner can only appear in sPecial circumstances and must pay his way)
mere is little hope for redress unless the grievance possesses significant humanitarian aspects. The petition on nuclear testing is an example of a valid grievance. On the other hand, the preponderance of petitions is far less consequential. One Palau housewife complained that the Americans were too lax in the matter of saki. She called for total prohibition. The reply by the council was to get out and vote against this “local problem.”
Administrative Obstacles. There are three significant obstacles which must be overcome if the people of the Pacific islands are to be peaceful, productive members of the world community. These inhibiting factors are: the vastness of the area, the diversity of the population, and the scarcity of natural resources.
Imagine, if you will, a land area of only some 700 square miles—half the size of Rhode Island—fragmented into over 2,000 pieces and scattered indiscriminately over an ocean area of three million square miles—the size of the United States. How does one—how do the inhabitants of the 96 populated islands—communicate in an area of this stupendous size? The most feasible way is by boat; it is primarily a maritime task. The secondary means is by air, but this mode is restricted by lack of adequate landing sites because of the size of the islands. Float aircraft can be used, but their load-carrying capability is limited and they are restricted by sea conditions. All districts will soon be linked by air when the sixth and last airport is completed on Ponape Island. The present air fleet consists of four aircraft, two DC-4s and two amphibians, and a trip is scheduled to each district once a week. Ships are limited in size because the waters of the ports they visit are restricted in depth. The administration has two ships of about 4,000 tons each and six others of between 228 and 558 tons. Two new diesel boats were to join the fleet in July 1965. The emphasis, however, is on assembling a variety of small ships to enable visits to all inhabited areas at least several times a year.
Nine major languages are spoken in the territory and there is considerable social stratification in the Marianas, Palau, Kusaie, and particularly on Yap where there are nine social classes in a rigid caste system.
The resources of the islands are meager with one exception—the sea. This source of
income is virtually untapped. However, industry and agriculture are low level and prospects for rapid growth are limited by scarcity of mineral and land resources.
Strategic Significance. Despite changing technology and modes of warfare, these islands still have the same military significance they possessed prior to and during World War II. They provide a defensive barrier astride the Pacific which could effectively throttle the lines of communications in the western Pacific. These islands are not now fortified—unless one would characterize the Marshalls’ missile test site as a center of military power. Nor should they be fortified unless a clear threat to the international peace manifested itself. Only a few of these islands can accommodate land-based air, but many of them are, as recent history shows, eminently suitable for service as the bases and fleet anchorages which will continue to be needed in a conventional war. One writer puts it this way:
The more separate bases there are, the more problems they present to an enemy intent on destroying or neutralizing them ... if there is justification for a navy or an air force, there must be bases to service and maintain them.
In this respect, the Pacific islands with existing or potential facilities continue to have a strategic role.
The islands also have value as sites for weather stations, tracking stations for missiles and space satellites, and as bases for surveillance of hostile enemy submarines. Obviously, the United States, wherever possible, should avoid concentrating military forces in the islands; a wide dispersal throughout the Trust Territory would present formidable targeting problems for a potential nuclear aggressor.
Finally, the mere denial of the islands to the use of certain potentially hostile powers would seem to continue to be in the best interests of the United States.
These are, however, long-range considerations; for the present, many are asking if these islands are worth the money we are pumping into them. The answer is that, until recent years (1962), the amounts appropriated to administer the islands have been insignificant, and even today, the annual appropriation would not buy a half-dozen high performance fighter aircraft. The possibility also exists that,
Between 1946 and 1961, Captain Morgiewicz served successively in the USS General W. A. Mann (AP-112), the Philippine Sea (CV-47), the Harold J. Ellison (DD-864), the John Willis (DE-1027), and the John Paul Jones (DD- 932). From 1961 to 1963, he was assigned to Officer Placement, Bureau of Naval Personnel. He commanded the USS Sellers (DDG-H' from 1963 to 1965. He was a student at the Naval War College twice—School of Command and Staff, U5 to 1959, and School of Naval Warfare, 1965 to 1966 ‘ before joining the Faculty as Head, Instruction Teafl1 Two, School of Naval Command and Staff.
with time, the development of agriculture and fishing industries will close the gap be" tween expenditures and revenues. The JaPa” nese did it, and there is no reason that we w» not be able to do so in the future.
Nor is there any reason why the islands, despite their racial and cultural disparities) their remoteness from each other, and thd1' limited resources, cannot aspire to govern themselves. They have progressed rapidly toward this goal—some say much too rapidly'' and, today, they have the foundations for a functioning legislative machinery. There lS evidence to suggest that the natives would be very pleased to govern themselves but the indications are that a guiding hand from the United States will be welcome for some time to come. Most outsiders agree. In 1960, the High Commissioner for the Territory, Del' mas H. Nucker, stated that it would be some years before the islands would be ready fo1 self-government or independence. And 111 1964, the visiting U. N. mission noted “thn1 no fully matured opinions on the future of the territory have yet emerged among the people of Micronesia.”
Few knowledgeable people, then, applaU the strident cries of those states within the United Nations that call for independence) now, for the people of the Pacific Trust Territory; if the United States were to pull out to day, the island’s economy would collapse'
Willard Price, who has studied this regfo11 intimately since 1935, states that “self-de' termination is an impossible and even crin\” inal ideal. . . . The doctrine . . . has sprea much false hope and bitter disillusionment in the world. It should be replaced by some such term as interdependence.”
The political advancement of the Pacific Elands has proceeded at a pace which has out- dipped both economic development and social development. With the opening of the Congress of Micronesia in 1965, the islands Were endowed with governmental functions restricted only by the Executive Branch as Personified in the administration headed by the current High Commissioner, W. R. Norwood. All that would be required to give them complete self-government would he an orderly transfer of more powers from the High Commissioner to the Congress as it Sains more experience in the law-making and other legislative processes. The basis for a Judiciary is already present, with only two C. S. justices in the High Courts. These could s°on be replaced. Thus, in effect, the only thing separating the territory from a political ^dependence is the Executive Branch, the numbers of which are dwindling as more of the nearly 459 Americans are being steadily replaced by qualified Micronesians.
Advancement is taking place in the social area, but it tends to be superficial, and as late as 1965, the U. S. annual report conceded that social and cultural diversity still exist to a considerable degree. U. S. policy is to encourage the natives to integrate voluntarily 'nto their culture those features of other cultures which will prove useful to them, and their social advancement is promoted by a general educational program, raising both health and standards.
Still, as previously noted, the most serious shortcoming has been the gulf between polit- lcal and economic development. The latter area has been outstripped by the growth of political bodies in the islands, and the current economy, left untended, would collapse and fall seriously short of supporting any form of government. The imbalance between economic and political development has been recognized by the United States, and in 1966, a legislative proposal to the U. S. Congress called for U. S. capital expenditures of $170 million for five years and $152 million for operational costs. Also, about 450 members of the Peace Corps were in the territory by June 1967. The budget for fiscal year 1968 (Congressional grant and direct appropriation) was to be increased to $24 million.
The Future. What, then, should the future hold for these Pacific Islands? Independence? Should the United States relinquish its administration and dismantle its missile test site in the Marshalls? Perhaps the territory should be joined to Guam, or become a part of Hawaii?
Or would they not be better off with selfgovernment, but with the United States being responsible for their defense and external relations?
We should be thinking of a plebiscite, for, depending on the pace of economic development which could accelerate substantially, the United States may fulfill its commitments to the U. N. by 1975-1980.
An American, familiar with both the problems and the promise of Micronesia, cannot but heartily agree with Robert Trumbull, who states: “No country, I thought many times while I was in the islands, could govern the Trust Territory better that it was being done, except possibly the United States.”
Would not a period ten years hence appear to be a logical time for the admission of our Fifty-First state?
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Splash One, Splash Two!
During a Royal Navy carrier visit to Hong Kong, an enlisted man, returning on board late at night after celebrating ashore, was stopped by the Officer of the Deck for having two suspicious bulges under his jacket. The OOD told him to go back over the side and get rid of the bottles.
The man disappeared and, shortly afterwards, two splashes were heard. He appeared again at the top of the gangway with the same two bulges under his jacket, except that now he was barefooted.
---------------------------------------------- Contributed by Commander D. H. Hamilton, Royal Navy
Tinian .* Saipan______________________________________________________________________________
Aguijan
[2] Rota
<f Guam