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of
vessels m1 ^
cruise under canvas. Regarding the issue 0
steam versus sail, therefore, Admiral Portef position in the mid-1880s accurately reflect01
the
ford!
/Admiral David Dixon Porter has not always -XlL fared well at the hands of historians. In their standard-setting study, The Rise of American Naval Power, 1776-1918, Harold and Margaret Sprout argue that Porter and most other “senior line officers” were “unyielding in their reactionary views on motive power, naval architecture, and strategy.” The Sprouts decry Porter’s ostensible failure to appreciate the merits of steam at an early date, and they severely criticize his long-held preference for ships driven by sail. This criticism is overly harsh.
Porter quite early demonstrated an awareness of the importance of steam to the U. S. Navy. In 1865, while serving as Superintendent of the Naval Academy, he installed a steam engine for use in training midshipmen. Twenty-two years later, the Admiral pointed to the Academy’s continued reliance on this then obsolete engine and demanded its replacement. Only by the installation of modern training equipment at Annapolis could the Navy improve the education of its engineers. This improvement Porter ardently desired. Clearly the Admiral’s attitude toward steam was not that of a superannuated obstructionist.
Porter’s protracted insistence that American ships be rigged for sailing rested upon his realization that acquisition of a large number of overseas coaling stations was contrary to the established national policy of the United States. Furthermore, the Admiral observed that the European nations, “including even the Ottoman Government,” had declared coal “contraband of war. ... In case of our having a war with any foreign power all the coaling stations of the world would be closed against us.” Given this diplomatic context, Porter’s views on motive power were not anachronistic, confused, or illogical. Illustrative are his remarks about those heralds of the “new Navy,” the cruisers Atlanta, Boston, and Chicago, which were authorized on 3 March 1883. The Admiral expressed keen appreciation of the “moral effect” to be achieved by the peacetime visits of these new ships to foreign shores. But he also recognized their operational limitations as combatant vessels.
In time of war till foreign ports will be closed
against them, and therefore they should have
enough sail-power, if not full sail-power, to
enable them to go around the world without touching their coal.
Porter believed that the limited supply coal carried on board the cruisers must 1 preserved for maneuvering in battle.
This viewpoint formerly had enjoyed vvid spread respect. As late as 1876, Command11 Alfred Thayer Mahan unquestioningly sumed the use of a combination of steam 3,1 sail to propel American men-of-war. But 1884, Secretary of the Navy William ' Chandler realized “that masts and sails artj detrimental to the fighting qualities of a na'3 vessel.” The new Naval Advisory Boar ’ that had been created in response to a suggeS tion by Admiral Porter, recommended c0tl struction of a cruiser propelled only by stea"J' The Secretary’s advisers favored the acqlllS’ tion of the overseas coaling stations that sLlC a vessel would require. The United State* however, would not prove ready to establ*s a global chain of refueling depots l,nt! vigorously prodded by Secretary of the N3' 1 Benjamin F. Tracy in 1889. In the me*fl time, the Navy’s oceangoing mU essentially non-expansionistic - - . policy of the United States. The Admit3 rested his argument on a simple premlsC “We have no colonies.” He neither antic1 pated nor advocated their acquisition. j Less clear and less perceptive was Admit3 Porter’s understanding of the strategic role t0 be played by the new cruisers during a Throughout the 1870s it had been Portet opinion that in time of war the United Sta(‘5 must rely principally on commerce raiding W fast, independently operating cruisers whic' probably, but not necessarily, would constructed of wood. He did believe tha| national prestige and the desirability 0 encouraging the domestic shipbuilding in' dustry demanded that the United States cd1' struct a few seagoing ironclads of the s0[t being built by Great Britain and Franc6' But a fleet of enlarged monitors would be the real guardian of the coasts. The America1' posture vis-d-vis enemy warships was to b6 strictly defensive. As he wrote in his annu3 report for 1874:
et the U. S. Navy continued to arm its ips with muzzle-loading smoothbore guns,
p
If we should fit out powerful iron-clad fle«s, and they should engage an equal force °f the enemy, the destruction of either or both forces would have no effect to bring about a Peace; neither country would suffer materially.
It is only by destroying the commerce of a ®reat nation that we could bring her to terms; hence, one vessel like the Alabama roaming foe ocean, sinking and destroying, would do 'ttore to bring about peace than a dozen un- Vvieldly ironclads cruising in search of an enemy of like character.
Thirteen years later, in the penultimate formation of his views, Admiral Porter etitonstrated his undiminished conviction that ^erican naval strategy must be primarily efensive. For reasons which he did not make ^ together clear, he now concluded it was fofokely “that the [commerce destroying] part fhe Alabama would ever again be played.” *he United States must depend primarily IJPon “a proper fleet of armor-clads” for its rst line of coastal defense. These vessels 'v°uld be giant monitors capable of standing ^ the coast and engaging attacking enemy etts just outside American harbors. They °uld not be true seagoing warships.
Thus, the Admiral failed to foresee the fopid evolution of American naval ship design torn the “ABC” cruisers of 1883 to the battle- 'fo'Ps of 1890. That he continued to espouse fo construction of cruisers, when he no longer ’foarnbiguously conceived of a wartime mis- j]l0n for them, is explained in part by the 'fodamental attitude that Porter maintained throughout his long career: “We want ships.
must have a Navy.” In the final analysis,
size of that Navy was of much greater ‘toportance to Porter than the types of vessels tornprisiiig it.
Whatever the limitations of Porter’s stand r>t| motive power and naval architecture, his position on torpedoes and breech-loading t^ed cannon was thoroughly progressive. To 0rter, as to all advocates of renewed Ameri- tor* maritime power, the British bombard- toent of Alexandria in July 1882, merely toinforced a lesson taught by the Confederates to Fort Sumter some 20 years earlier: Forti- toations were no match for rifled cannon.
X i
shi
Old Navy 141
which delivered a substantial destructive impact only at very close range. In his repeated pleas for modernization of American naval armament, Porter emphasized the national interest, which required a capability for the domestic manufacture of rifled breechloading cannon. Creation of this industrial capacity would require a costly expansion of the U. S. steel industry, and he urged Congress to assume the financial burden because American capitalists were unwilling to make the necessary investments.
During his tenure as Admiral of the Navy, Porter was an active participant in the development of a system of gunboat-launched torpedoes for employment alongside his cherished monitors in defense of the coasts and harbors. In 1871, his enthusiasm for the torpedo was virtually unbounded. With a fervid burst of 19th century optimism, the Admiral sang the praises of this
most terrible engine of war ever yet invented . . . [which] will no doubt in the end prove a good peace-maker, since it is a well-established fact that the more powerful the instruments of war become the less numerous and less destructive to human life are the wars.
Later, he urged thorough experimentation with the torpedo boat Alarm, whose development he had closely supervised. In his last annual report he confessed some doubts about the destructive potential of the torpedo when used against a well-built modern warship, but he continued to argue that the rapidity with which torpedo boats could be constructed made them an essential element in the U. S. arsenal, at least “until we can get our new Navy fairly started.”
It should not be thought that Porter’s position on defensive monitors and torpedoes was incompatible with the offensive strategy that came to be the hallmark of American naval theory in the 1890s. Historians have generally taken Secretary of the Navy Benjamin Tracy’s annual report for 1889 as a milestone in the development of American naval thought. In that document the Secretary explicitly discarded the strategy of commerce raiding and simple coastal defense as inadequate. Any future war fought by the United States must be “defensive in principle” but “offensive in operations.”
142 U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, July 1968
However, even a Secretary who would carry war to the enemy’s fleet and coast must also provide for the defense of the American coastline. And in his 1890 report, Secretary Tracy advocated a coastal defense system that included torpedo boats and enlarged monitors.
Be it offensive or defensive, any strategy reflects the geopolitical presuppositions of its propounder. David Dixon Porter, like many Americans of the period, regarded Great Britain as the archrival of the United States. In 1876, although he then considered war with Britain unlikely, he had warned that the British government might fortify the area around Vancouver Island. Twelve years later, in a letter to Senator John H. Mitchell of Oregon, Porter observed that Britain recently had constructed a major naval station at Esquimalt, just north of Puget Sound. The Admiral believed that rapid growth of the population of Washington was inevitable, and he feared that geographic contiguity could easily lead to “sufficient provocatives of war.” Therefore, argued the Admiral, the United States must build a navy yard at Puget Sound to prevent British hegemony in an area which “forms a part of our great Anglo-Saxon empire.”
Admiral Porter’s empire was truly vast. One of his contemporaries described the spreading American domain with a virile vigor that Porter would have echoed.
I chant the world on my Western Sea; . . .
I chant the new empire, grander than any before—As in a vision it comes to me;
I chant America, the Mistress—I chant a greater supremacy;
I chant, projected a thousand blooming cities yet, in time, on those groups of sea-islands;
I chant commerce opening, the sleep of ages having done its work—races, reborn, refresh’d. . . .
Walt Whitman was by no means the first American to see in a flourishing future trade with the Orient a part of America’s destiny. Thomas Jefferson may have had this in mind as he wrote instructions to Meriwether Lewis. During the War of 1812, David Dixon Porter’s own father, Captain David Porter, showed his awareness of the
importance of the commerce of the PaC^.C by single-handedly trying to eliminate Brit*s influence in that ocean.* In 1823, Secretary of State John Quincy Adams explied- stressed the importance to the United Sta^’ of “the commerce of the Sandwich Islan 5 and China.” Much later, in 1880, Represent3 tive Washington C. Whitthorne of Tennessee a steadfast friend of the Navy, explained 1,1 grandiloquent language why the HollS<: Committee on Naval Affairs believed dl3 the United States must have a navy yard 0,1 the coast of the Pacific Northwest.
The manifesdy growing interests of the Pa" cific coast, as well as the large and increasing commerce traversing the Pacific Ocean . • ■ demand the care and protection of the Federal Government. . . . Indeed, fully studying the logic of American energy and enterprise on a soil so rich in natural advantages, y°ur committee believe the day is not distant when the trade and wealth of our Pacific States wiH be equal to that of the first States of the world- And when this day shall arrive the commerce of Western America, linked with that d China, Japan, Australia, and other European countries, will simply be fabulous in amount and value.
It is scarcely surprising that Porter succumbed to the fancy. “The nations 0 the earth,” wrote the Admiral, “are looking for the shortest possible route to and fr0"1 China. The nation that can retain possess!0'1 of the Eastern trade will be the richest 0,1 earth.” Thus, his letter to Senator Mitche' called attention to British grand strategy3 The base at Esquimalt would guard terminus of the recently completed Canadia11 Pacific Railway. British merchants using this railroad and a complementary system 0 subsidized steamships could convey goods from Hong Kong to Liverpool in less time than Americans could transport merchandise from Hong Kong to New York.
Arguments such as Porter’s soon bore frujtl On 30 November 1888, Secretary of Navy William C. Whitney willingly heeded the command of Congress and ordered 3 board of naval officers to visit the Pacifi0 Northwest and “select a suitable site f°r
* See W. Patrick Strauss, “Captain David Porter' Pioneer Pacific Strategist,” U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, February 1967, pp. 158-160.
!>y-yard and docks, having due regard for , Commercial and naval necessities of that
'oast.1
%ai
Significantly, the president of the
, commission was Alfred Thayer Mahan. ter a careful study, the Captain and his 7eagues selected Point Turner in Puget
Vi.
^he hope of capturing the trade of Asia lead an American admiral to some Vr extreme positions. For example, Porter ^"Cessfully advocated stationing U. S. gun- on Chinese rivers, alongside European Voats, in order to “afford our country- f;ri proper protection and not subject our- 'es to the derision of semi-civilized
•elv,
siatics.” Porter also proposed annual visits \ American warships to the peoples of the 5c*fic islands, who were “scarcely civilized ^°Ugh as yet to recognize the rights of Signers, and to whom guns make a 0riger appeal than the reasoning of mer-
til
Vi
tti
[L
nants or missionaries.”
..Vt concern for the commerce of the ’dted States also prompted Porter to more ^erate and characteristic expressions of .Muion. He believed that the national
Ci
jr'arine would provide a manpower reserve „0r the Navy, while a large commercial iof fast steamers could be converted into
’ghly effective commerce destroyers when-
*Vr
‘erest required a prospering merchant !arine such as had not existed since the <lvil War. Seamen trained in the merchant
er hostilities seemed imminent.
Sorter advocated federal subsidization to ^uild the merchant marine. A subsidy Vht take any of several forms. It could insist of , high rates paid for carrying the nails, or it might involve outright payments
Old Navy 143
to ship owners based simply on the number of miles of ocean traversed by their ships. But whatever its form, governmental aid to shippers would increase the number of merchantmen flying the American ensign.
Porter favored congressional legislation to ensure that these ships were built in the United States. The Admiral listed over 175 industries that would be benefited by an increase in domestic shipbuilding. He believed that the security of the United States depended on the stimulation of these industries, which when mature could build and sustain a naval fleet in time of war. Britian historically had subsidized her merchant marine, and Porter believed that this was one of the secrets of her lasting maritime predominance. “We are essentially a maritime nation,” wrote the Admiral, and he concluded that the United States, therefore, should emulate Great Britain.
But Porter also believed that the United States should take the initiative. To this end, the Admiral gave early and wholehearted support to Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce’s struggle for the establishment of the Naval War College, the first institution of its kind in the world. Luce was one of the men who helped make Porter’s house at 1710 H Street in Washington “a mecca for politicians and naval officers.” Perhaps it was in his own home, during long evening discussions over brandy and cigars, that Admiral of the Navy David D. Porter made his most telling points about torpedoes, rifled cannon, a subsidized merchant marine, and the future role of the United States in the Pacific. Certainly these were favorite topics of his, topics about which he demonstrated acumen and vision.
Their Tears Betrayed Them
While our family was stationed at Pensacola, my little brother had to get a flu shot. He asked Mother if it would hurt. She said it would, but that he shouldn’t cry, because Daddy is a Marine, and Marine youngsters don’t cry. This seemed to satisfy him, and he left for the dispensary. When he returned, Mother asked him if he had cried.
His reply was, “No, but there sure were a lot of Navy kids there!”
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Contributed by Peggy Carey
{The Naval Institute will pay $10.00 for each anecdote published in the Proceedings.)