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Liddell Hart once observed that the old Roman maxim, “If yon wish Peace, prepare for war” had not insured peace, either for the Romans or Anyone else since. Thus, he reasoned, the argument must either be falla-
f Uls, or else it is put too simply—without sufficient depth of thought. Liddell then submitted that his studies of war suggested that a truer maxim °tl*rf be, “If you wish for peace, understand war.” j their failure to understand war, the Hawks and the Doves are equally at [yt. They favor (or oppose) war—either war in general or some particular "~on doctrinaire grounds without really understanding what it is, why it furred, or what role it is playing. Interestingly enough, soldiers (who are not ^.c<‘ssarily Hawks) and pacifists show surprisingly little difference in this regard, ptldell Hart did not say, “If you wish for peace, study war,” he said, “If you lsh for peace, understand war.” Pacifists completely condemn war and make no etnpt to understand it, believing that it is intrinsically sinful. Soldiers, on the i er hand, study war, but their studies are almost exclusively devoted to the ct*cs and techniques of military operations—military strategy in the narrowest J. as opposed to an examination of the nature of war and its relationship to lety. Neither group really understands war.
■ Nature of War. When one political group attempts to impose its will upon j, other political group, and the ensuing power struggle results in the ordered ljrPlication of military force, the resulting organized violence is called war. Now, T Course, any political action involves the use of power by competing groups !‘h differing views on matters of public policy. Power is an essential element Political intercourse, and no one tries harder to use it than the advocate of “non-
purpose of war can be identified, of these holds that war is a rational uh1 taking, initiated to achieve certain dcs‘
The Rationalist View of War. More than other writer, Clausewitz represents the tionalist view. In his view, the passage
Pact of 1928, by which the signatory nat1' agreed to “renounce [war] as an instrun
War, as seen by Clausewitz, was a con11
violent” protest—even in those rare instances where, in fact, no violence is used. However, so long as the exercise of power does not involve the ordered use of military (as opposed to police) force by opposing political groups, it is not war. Thus, neither riots nor civil disobedience are war, even though both use power in their attempts to impose their will upon others in matters of public policy.
In the arena of international politics, war is the court of last resort. Nations appeal to it after all other means of adjudication have been exhausted. No nation goes to war when it truly believes that other means capable of leading to what it considers acceptable results are really available. As the consequences of nuclear war have grown more and more terrible, nations have shown a marked increase in their willingness to try other means, or even to reduce their standards of what constitutes “acceptable” results. In some cases, limited war has been found to be acceptable, while—since 1945—nuclear war has always been rejected.
When war is recognized as the court of last resort, pacifists who would outlaw it entirely must recognize that they really have only two courses of action open to them. First, they can attempt to find some alternative court of last resort, and second, they can accept results that are unfavorable to their nation. The first choice does not really exist, as the possibility of a resort to force will always remain. The second will ultimately lead to the destruction of any political group that follows it. In the words of Arnold Toynbee:
The most obvious lion in the path of the strategy of Pacifism is the prospect which Pacifists have to face that, in so far as their action might prove effective, its first effect would be to put States in which Pacifism was an appreciably strong political force at the mercy of States in which it was impotent; and this would mean allowing the most unscrupulous Government of the most benighted military Powers to make themselves master of the World in the first chapter of the story.
The so-called “salami” tactics, made famous by the Communists and practiced so effectively by Hitler up until his attack on Poland, is an attempt to exploit the tendency of Western idealists to accept unfavorable results rather than risk war. Parenthetically, while Pacifism is not really a possible solid1® Arms Control may be one. Arms Control a to reduce the possibility and violence of'' without attempting to remove it as an at l®1' theoretical final option.
Two general theories of the nature ®l!.
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results, and which—at least within fin11 can be controlled by the application of rea.
This can be termed the rationalist view- , other theory holds that war is an act of passion, controlled only by demonic p°" of darkness, and is incapable of serving ‘ rational or useful purpose. War, once start will (a) follow a predetermined course acc°., ing to the inexorable laws of nature, or else meander aimlessly, guided only by the ' grant and capricious whims of fate. This c‘ be termed the determinist or fatalist view- d
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peace to war is not a discontinuity or a hid1' but is merely the logical extension of p0*1 Since:
war is an instrument of policy; it must nee®5 sarily bear the character of policy; it m115 measure with policy’s measure. The conch1®1 of war, in its great outline, is, therefore, pohd itself, which takes up the sword in place of d1® pen, but does not on that account cease t0 think according to its own law.
According to this view, the Kellog-Brtf11
of national policy,” was unrealistic. , an instrument of national policy, and this cannot be changed by the simple expedie”1 renouncing it
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lable (and hence avoidable) option avail3 to the policy maker. He recognized all'0 war as a theoretical possibility—“War is ‘ act of force,” he wrote, “and to the app*1 ^ tion of that force there is no limit.”—bn1 did not see all-out war as the necessary cO11 quence of any resort to force. “ . . . cv® thing, however,” he added, “assumes a j ferent shape if we pass from the abstract
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. War as being limited by the political ob
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^he smaller the sacrifice we demand from adversary, the slighter we may expect his ^ 0rts to be to refuse it to us. The slighter, /Jlvever, his efforts, the smaller need our own . • Furthermore, the less important our politic • °kject’ the less will be the value we attach • 11 and the readier we shall be to abandon ■ For this reason also our own efforts will be e slighter.
A •
^Satn, he remarked that:
^ar is no act of blind passion, but is domi- ated bv the political object, therefore the y Ue of that object determines the measure *he sacrifice by which it is to be purchased.
In other words, when peaceful methods failed, and when the object sought was important enough, nations as a matter of policy, frequently have gone to war to realize their ambitions.
Mahan also agrees with Clausewitz in seeing a difference between the immediate aim and the final object. Mahan put it this way:
In a war undertaken for any object, even if that object be the possession of a particular territory or position, an attack directly upon the place coveted may not be, from the military point of view, the best means of obtaining it. The end upon which the military operations are directed may therefore be other than the object which the belligerent government wishes to obtain, and it has a name of its own —the objective.
e concept of war as the continuation of
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I war is begun, or at least, no war should f begun, if people act wisely, without first
’'ding an answer to the question: what is to
j attained by and in war? The first is the j^al object; the other is the intermediate aim. y this dominant idea the whole course of the
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^tisewitz sounds like the first advocate of r^(ed war!
I Ufed Thayer Mahan is in agreement with ^hsewitz in viewing war as an instrument j^tional national policy. Mahan viewed Jljrne commerce as having had a “pro.. ^ influence . . . upon the wealth and
.ength” of nations. He then went on to ite;
j. To secure to one’s own people a dispropor- ^°nate share of such benefits, every effort was I ade to exclude others, either by the peaceful ^Sislative methods of monopoly or prohibi- b’ regulations, or, when these failed, by direct . °fence. The clash of interests, the angry feel- ^ §s roused by conflicting attempts thus to J'propriate the large share, if not the whole,
^ *be advantages of commerce, and of dis- unsettled commercial regions, led to wars.
There are, however, two aspects of the rationalist view of war to which Clausewitz did not devote much attention. The first of these is the reciprocal relationship between war and policy. While he clearly saw war as the result of policy, he did not seem to realize that the reverse was also true—that war can create policy as well as implement it. War itself is, as he said repeatedly, an instrument of the political process. But he failed to point out that it is a blunt instrument, not
a scalpel, and that its use leaves terrible scars on the society that resorts to it. The war itself may distort, intensify, moderate, or even obliterate its intended object and can create a new one in its place. This truth led Raymond Aron to conclude that:
Karl von Clausewitz
The very situations that bring about a modern war are destroyed in its wake. It is the battle in and for itself, and not the origin or the conflict or the peace treaty, that constitutes the major fact and produces the most far-reaching consequences.
The other aspect of the rationalist view of war that he neglected is the nature and formulation of the policy itself. If war is to be “ra-
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rational. Justified war presumes the ration3' ^
view of war. The determination of what rational policy is made by each nation itself. In making this decision, nations
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sees war as the uncontrollable result of sllPc human forces. Rather than being a free cnl taken in pursuit of a rational national p°
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the determinist (or the fatalist) view sees as being determined by psychological an
tional,” then it must support a rational policy. The formulation of national policy in pursuit of the national interest lies in the province of politics, and the political leaders must make the ultimate decision. However, if war is too important to be left entirely to soldiers, so is policy too important to be left entirely to politicians! Since any war will have many, and often contradictory, results— some of them good and others evil—a war that serves the national interest must offer a reasonable assurance that its good effects will outweigh its evil ones. Hawks are inclined to overlook the evil results, while Doves avoid the good ones.
As Clausewitz knew, a purely military evaluation cannot decide which result is “good” and which is “evil,” or attempt to strike the balance between them:
That the political point of view should end completely when war begins would only be conceivable if wars were struggles of life or death, from pure hatred. As wars are in reality, they are, as we said before, only the manifestations of policy itself. The subordination of the political point of view to the military would be unreasonable, for policy has created the war; policy is the intelligent faculty, war only the instrument, and not the reverse. The subordination of the military point of view to the political is, therefore, the only thing which is possible. . . .
In a word, the art of war in its highest point of view becomes policy, but, of course, a policy which fights instead of writing notes.
According to this view, it is an unpermissible and even harmful distinction, according to which a great military event or the plan for such an event should admit a purely military judgment; indeed, it is an unreasonable procedure to consult professional soldiers on the plan of war, that they may give a purely military opinion, as is frequently done in cabinets; but still more absurd is the demand of theorists that a statement of the available means of war should be laid before the general, that he may draw up a purely military plan for the war or for the campaign in accordance with them. [Italics in original.]
It is thus plain that Clausewitz clearly recognized the political outcome as being more important than military expedience, and knew that the furthering of political policy was the true object. If war is not an end in itself, neither is victory an end in itself—
extent that political purpose is served then If this is true, it is clear that a political jb, vantage is worth a military cost. The that Clausewitz did not elaborate on nature and formulation of political P° ^ cannot be attributed to a lack of understaC ing on his part. Perhaps he felt that in a 0 „ called On War a discussion of policy won! out of place. m
A rational war can only exist if both ^ means (kind of military force empl°l f( and the end (the political object sought)
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governed by the situation as they kno'V and by their own peculiar traditions, m3 ^ and goals. However, no rational policy" V soever would be served by a thermoni'C y. suicide pact. The national interest °* nations would be served by avoiding one-
The Determinist View of War. The other
natural forces that are beyond human con ^ A corollary that follows directly from thisv j, holds that a war, once started, proceeds, " . logic of its own that is also beyond h11'1^, control. Once war breaks out, it must .j its course, somewhat like the Black Death ^ in Medieval Europe. “Hyperbolic W3t t war which expands without limit in r means and object once military force is ployed for the resolution of any conffict, p; also a necessary corollary of the deternU view of war. j,
Guilio Douhet was the apostle of air P°\'()t- not a philosopher of war, and nowhere t he state explicitly his understanding [<■ purpose of war. However, his writings ca*’ ^ understood only on the implicit assumpt>°'_\, the determinist view, and he, more than ^ other military writer, is its great exeinP In contrast to Clausewitz and Mahan, ^ of whom saw limited war for an attain3 |, politican object as the norm, Douhet 0 v contemplated war on such an unlimited s
Zation,” he wrote,
§lven war a character of national totality
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ln another place he wrote that:
Nation which . . . finds itself subject to ^ant aerial attacks aimed directly at its Qf st vital centers and without the possibility Active retaliation . . . must arrive at the dnv>ction that all is useless, that all hope is d- This conviction spells defeat,
Guilio Douhet
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8®niz ■ "^le Preva'l*ng form of social or- has
WarCeS 3 nat'on are sucked into the maw of in r ^nd> s’nce society is now definitely evolv- . S along this line, it is within the power of
'V>11 K311 f°resight to see now t^lat future wars “e total in character and scope.
bgj ^°uhet saw any possible political object he *nd War, he gave no hint of it. Rather, t)ff(C°,Tipletely ignored political motives, and njna n° purpose for war beyond the win- sctt^ the war itself. He spurned negotiated c0J.^nt, and thought only in terms of un- 'tional surrender:
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l(h 'v°uld be suspended] could also happen to fast tVventy> fifty cities. And, since news travels
what, I ask you, would be the effect civilians of other cities, not yet stricken
°r military authorities could keep order, lc services functioning, and production S Under such a threat? And even if a sem- aUce of order were maintained and some done, would not the sight of a single p0ITl'’ plane be enough to stampede the \v Nation into panic? In short, normal life *d be impossible in this constant night- Ij. c °f imminent death and destruction. And fift°n second day another ten, twenty, or ., y cities were bombed, who could keep all
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to fU
ne open countryside to escape this terror that air?
tUr CornPfele breakdown of the social struc- to cannot but take place in a country subject •ph ais kind of merciless pounding from the air. CUt^ drTIC w°uld soon come when, to put an to horror and suffering, the people them- yQ^es’ driven by the instinct of self-preserva-
tvar’
•tic.
Douhet also felt obliged to reject the concept of justified war. “It is,” he wrote, “useless to delude ourselves.”
All the restrictions, all the international agreements made during peacetime are fated to be swept away like dry leaves on the wings of war. A man who is fighting a life-and-death fight—as all wars are nowadays—has the right to use any means to keep his life. War means cannot be classified as human and inhuman. War will always be inhuman, and the means which are used in it cannot be classified as acceptable or not acceptable according to their efficacy, potentially, or harmfulness to the enemy. The purpose of war is to harm the enemy as much as possible; and all means which contribute to this end will be employed, no matter what they are.
In keeping with these views, Douhet was logically compelled to reject any hope of successfully limiting war by agreement:
We dare not wait for the enemy to begin using the so-called inhuman weapons banned by treaties before we feel justified in doing the same. . . . Owing to extreme necessity, all contenders must use all means without hesitation, whether or not they are forbidden by treaties, which after all are nothing but scraps of paper compared to the tragedy which would follow.
The psychological forces that would drive men to deterministic war are presumed to arise from within man himself, from a nature that is assumed to be warlike, irrational, and self-destructive. It is almost as if war were ascribed to original sin, which cannot be controlled or limited, but must either be passively endured or completely exorcised by baptism in the font of pacifism. Dr. Strange- love is a parody on the psychological variation of the determinist view of war.
The natural forces variation of the determinist view of war, on the other hand, sees man as the prisoner of external, demonic forces of nature, which drive him to war willy-nilly.
is resolved. A choice is inescapable: the
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Food, population, class struggle, even history or geography, rather than man’s essential nature, are seen as the things that drive him to his destruction. Karl Marx and Karl Houshofer both are disciples of the natural forces variation of the determinist view of war.
Hyperbolic—totally unlimited—war is anticipated, perhaps unconsciously, by both pacifists and militarists. Both groups necessarily reject any limitation—either moral or
"War is not an act of God—or of the Gods—hut is a, direct result of things that men and nations do
or fail to do.”
political—on the use of force as being either meaningless or futile. Both are, in fact, military extremists, who see no possible alternative between absolute peace and all-out war. Accordingly, they appear to believe that war can serve no rational purpose, and is motivated only by uncontrollable hate, fear, greed, and blind instinct. Once war has broken out, they believe, all decisions must be (or will be) made on the basis of military expediency alone.
Having determined that war can be viewed as either rational or determinist, it is important to remember that, like any other simple, two-part division, this classification does not stand up under close scrutiny. It is, however, a helpful first approximation, and it can be very instructive. Unfortunately, the real world is more complex, and the two may coexist in any situation. The reciprocal effect between war and policy will almost always introduce some deterministic factors. Full acceptance of the determinist view of war, however, would destroy man as a creature with a free and responsible will who is ultimately accountable for his own actions.
War is not an act of God—or of the gods— but is the direct result of things that men and nations do or fail to do. Conflict is inevitable, and national policy (or the lack thereof) determines the method by which that conflict
fail^ to have a policy becomes policy, and the fusal to make a choice is in itself a pr°*° choice. Onlv in the case of indecision on
part of our leaders is the outcome ^ guided by fate (or the choice of the 0 party). Once a nation has gone to war . that stern court of last resort—the outc for good or for ill likewise stems from ^ men and nations do or fail to do. We 1 ^ have military and political leaders wh° apply the faculty of moral reason to the terprise of war.
Forms of War. War, according to the ^ tionalist view, is the ordered applicati0{ force, undertaken to resolve a social 1 .
after all other means have failed. The ca of war are usually thought of as the hn1 diate cause and the remote origin. The ^ mediate cause is the sequence of events ^ ing directly to hostilities, while the rCI" J origin is the basic or underlying sourC<W conflict. Past studies of the way war have emphasized historic events rather ^
um
themselves more with the issues invo Human motives are more important than termining the aggressor or fixing cease
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social issues. Perhaps historic events attention first because they are easier to , derstand than human aspirations and s°' < issues. In fact, only a handful of theolog and psychologists have tried to probe ( hope, fear, greed, and hate that lie at the ^ of human conflict. Likewise the study °* itself has dealt primarily with the way . fought rather than the source and resol^ ^ of the conflict that precipitated the c ‘ And yet, to be truly effective, attempt ^ prevent, limit, or conclude war must con^
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Conflict between nations arises from s° issues, and any issue that evokes strong P j,, sions can lead to war. War can be classing,, many ways: according to the means ^ ployed, according to the restraints obsef ^
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according to the results desired, and so f°' When the role of war in society is being L((j sidered, it should be classified according the issue involved. War assumes a dine^|l(| foim as it stems from different issues, there are as many varieties of war as * ^ are issues that lead to it. These vane
nUr>K^er Can de considered under a small 0yerer generic forms. Leaving out wars dynlssues that no longer exist (such as das?c*C Accession), ..,o^ ~~~ i—
most wars can be
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tfatare: First, civil war, when the frus- groud aspirations of a dissident internal the ^ ^reaFs out into open rebellion against tyjQr Constituted government. Second, national i^ ’ "'ben one nation (or alliance) reaches an gfQasse in its relations with an external 0tli P> and armed conflict appeals to be the tabl avabable method of resolution accepts . to both. Third, religious war, when one defe l0"S ®rouP iee‘is compelled to spread (or j>f0CF its faith against another religious !t,arUp by fire and the sword. And, last, class Cvhen one social, economic, or ethnic
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cha °Cla* order using force to compel a tjlutE’c- These causes are not necessarily ^ UaHy exclusive, and are frequently found C"mbination- ®ven these combinations, Qf Ver> are usually under the domination °ne.ofthem.
tolv1"11 war arises when the issue to be re- |^0a 'S domestic, and an internal dissident Sov attempts to replace the constituted tin er,ninent by force of arms. It must be dis- tr0||*lsbed from civil disobedience (however iesome) and coup d’etat. While civil dis- i • • . the failure to have a ° lcy becomes policy, and , the refusal to make a >0lce is in itself a
profound choice
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p()Vvence is clearly an attempt to bring is nr to bear on domestic policy, the result civil war unless the dissident element is s'ibvr°lled (or expl°ited) by an organized q ersive movement.
Sl;t d’etat is a clandestine action by a small fic; .taken to replace the top government of- Coup S with others chosen by the junta. Since d etat does not involve the masses, the
only issue may be who is to be in power. However, a real social issue can exist, as in the overthrow of a dynastic autocracy. A successful coup d’etat lasts only a few hours and results in little actual fighting. When one is unsuccessful because the rebels lack sufficient power to gain a quick victory, and a real issue does exist (or can be created) so that the masses do become involved, a true civil war may result. An attempted coup d’etat by Francisco Franco following the 1936 Spanish election fell short, and Spain was plunged into three years of civil war.
Between civil war at one extreme and civil disobedience at the other, a domestic power struggle can range through conspiracy, subversion, insurgency, uprising, mutiny, revolt, insurrection, rebellion, and revolution. These struggles vary greatly in intensity, violence, and duration. The point at which conspiracy becomes war is arbitrary, being a matter of degree rather than kind. Civil war is frequently extremely bitter, and the resulting scars on the body social often show for generations. And yet, issues over which men will fight do exist, and when an issue of this intensity arises, no government in the world (or no world government!) can prevent war.
Sometimes a civil war occurs in which the dissident elements are geographically concentrated to the extent that they are able to constitute an independent rebel government which (at least until defeated) has all the attributes of a sovereign state—territory, population, and military power. Both the American Revolution and Civil War are examples of this kind of civil war. In all purely military details these are wars between two nations. Politically they are civil war.
When Americans think about war, they usually think about national war. Ever since the transition from dynastic war to national war during the 16th and 17th centuries, Western civilization has been preoccupied with war between nation-states. The great wars of the 18th, 19th, and 20th centuries were all national wars. This preoccupation has become so complete that we often forget that other forms of war exist. Plans for universal peace as well as plans for possible war both tacitly assume national war, and books on the history of warfare give major attention to the international wars of the Western world.
wars.
and vicious of wars. This has resulted fr01'1
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While civil war and national war are effected by the political organization; j
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ligious war and class war are not. These two stem from loyalty to something that
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However, this is an unwarranted simplification. Many wars of great consequence were not of national origin.
National war includes all those where national rivalry is the principal cause. They may be imperialistic war, colonial war, war to maintain a favorable status quo, war for national survival, or war to forcefully advance the purpose of one nation against the opposition of others. War to improve one nation’s position vis-a-vis others is national war, while war to spread an ideology regardless of national boundaries is not. While this difference is only of academic interest to the military tactician, it should be highly significant to the strategist. The outward appearance may be the same, but the issue to be resolved is different. In the words of Alfred Thayer Mahan, the objective is the same but the object is different.
National war is fought over objects of differing degree of importance. In accordance with the value of this object, national war may be limited, total, or all-out. Wars in which the frontiers of a nation, but not its existence, are in question can be kept limited. War in which national survival is at stake cannot be limited. For example, so long as the Arabs vow to destroy Israel, that war, as seen by Israel, will be total.
Limited national war presents a serious but little recognized challenge to liberal democracy today. Modern warfare—even when it is limited war—demands the co-operation of the citizens, particularly in a democracy. If the political leaders play down the issues involved, they will have difficulty keeping the war acceptable to the citizens until a solution is reached. If they attempt to whip up public enthusiasm for the war by playing up the issues, they may have difficulty in keeping the war limited.
Religion was, at one time, the major cause of war, and the religious wars following the Reformation were among the most cruel that men have ever fought. The Islamic expansion between 632 and 732 was a religious war in almost pure form. In fact, the Jihad (Islamic holy war) is the very quintessence of religious war. This Islamic drive was first checked at Constantinople in 718 and then turned back at Tours in 732.. By the time of the siege of Vienna by the Ottoman Turks a thousand
years later, the nature of the conflict changed. Most of the religious frenzy ■ gone, and the war assumed the character ordinary imperialistic war. The CrusadeS^f the 11th through 13 th centuries and bloody Thirty Years War in Europe bet" 1618 and 1648 were also religious wars. W the Arab-Israeli War and the Indian-1 ‘ stani dispute both involve religious issuts'^ In recent years, national wars ha'e
fr. . . national wars h(li> replaced religious wars as j the most destructive a],i
vicious
placed religious wars as the most destrn1 world and the simultaneous rise of nati ^ ism. Rousseau’s “general will” has com0 with Jean Bodin’s sovereignty to create a ^ tion-state able to command the allegia*lCe its citizens in a manner that was once
elusive province of the Church. . ^
Both the Russian and French Revoh'tW had their origin in class struggle rather
clear-cut of the forms of war, and it usU^|,f blends into another form. Thus, while ^ French Revolution had its origin as a ^ war, it was entirely contained within u boundaries of one nation, and therefore c° ^ be called a civil war. It also led direct*; the Napoleonic Wars which were clearly • tional. But, however unsatisfactory the cl ^ fication, ever since the Bolshevik Oct° . Revolution of 1917, Marxist inspired c^) war has claimed ever-increasing attend ^ Other forms of class war do exist, such ;1-' j-, tribal wars frequently seen in emergen1 '
b o'
cends the nation, and therefore are j limited by political frontiers. The sprea
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e'Se kinds of war is only affected by national °Utidr ' • - - -
aries by coincidence or for tactical
arxist class war, clothed in the garb of tin K natl°nal liberation,” is the heir to C(„, 1 °f the fanatic personal dedication and ligi tnitment that formerly belonged to re- V0t°Us war. The hold of Communism on its Ofj ^les is much akin to the hold of religion e faithful, and both religious and Marx-
ist
are ideological. In fact, the spread of
C,
ls dangerous to push historical similarity
' ir •
K,/!1 F'csent conmct witn uoinmumsm may
c iou •
Ofar> hut this does suggest that the “Tours e present conflict with Commun
definition—sovereignty requires and power creates sovereignty. The
Pqi
'Wer
bi
'fen*ence- When the Manifesto of the Com- C0|jW Party proclaims, “Workingmen of all t0 ?tr^es unite!” it is calling on Communists of j andcm their loyalty to the nation in favor °Valty to an international class. It is the ^to a class Jihad.
tUr|.rue Communists (as opposed to oppor- va1Sts who join the party only for tactical ad- fctrt Set t^le‘r P°Htical faith above their t0 ! ^ nation, or God, and willingly submit Tjj- e regime whose ideology they admire, (j ls often forgotten or overlooked by nonAir, ,nun'sts who cannot understand why \[ r,can Communists show more loyalty to )Scow than to Washington.
„ ^ '
war.
War
der "nunism since 1917 is probably best unis] °0cl when compared to the sweep of silo'" ^Je"ween 632 and 732. History may yet If,,, that the Communists’ failure to win the par*an election in 1948 was a check com- $ta2 . e to the check of the Muslims at Con- t(|rn!'n°Ple in 718. If this is so, then the final Chrnil'tg point, the Free World’s equivalent of If .^tjanity’s Battle of Tours, has yet to occur.
le>o f
Und somewhere in Asia.
Cl
tar ‘aractenstics of Military Power. When mili- issrf f>.OWer is employed to resolve a social it is important to keep its capabilities i^l limitations as a political instrument in Of, ’ lest it be expected to accomplish too ij>n h- The misuse of military power, through Cha°rance or with deliberate disregard for its aacteristics can be counter-productive. As ^Political instrument, military power is U*in, relative, protean, and limited.
Ofj|j ates were probably first created to wield bf>nary Power, and military power is sover- capacity for organized violence is inherent in human society, and when force must be used, it should be exercised by constituted authority in accordance with the will of the community. In the community of nations, the independent nation-state is free to have whatever kind of military establishment it deems necessary for the purposes of its foreign policy—which in turn is determined in part by the military power it has available to implement it. The social group capable of exercising military power in support of an independent political policy has established itself as sovereign.
The sovereign nature of military power is one of the problems of military alliances, and Napoleon once remarked that his success was due to fighting coalitions. Only when national interests and national sympathies are as nearly identical as were those of the United States and the United Kingdom during World War II is true allied unity of command possible. Today the problem in NATO is really the contradiction between international command and national sovereignty. While De Gaulle has effectively exacerbated this conflict, he did not create it.
Next, military power is relative, because no absolute measure is available. As Henry Kissinger pointed out: “In the seventeenth century it would have been futile to compare the power of Japan and that of Great Britain, since they possessed no means of bringing their strength to bear on each other.”
If a nation is to employ a power confronta-
(VUnfortunately, the domestic debate over' Vietnam is not really a dialogue, but is a duel of monologues. ”
tion successfully, it must bring enough power to bear against its adversary at the right place and at the right time. Since a power confrontation is necessarily a two-sided contest, the determination of how much constitutes “enough” will depend upon the power that the other party is willing and able to exert. What is enough here today may be either inadequate or superfluous at some other time
Finally, military power is things are not and others cannot be done military power. Faith, for example,
is
more suiuiujlc ncius ui cuucavui. ^
the conflict between East and West 1111 ^ ultimately be “decided” through some of coexistance, just as Muslim and Christ*
coexist. 1 .
fi°
• • Da
end the conflict, but that conflict can oc , pressed in other ways, and war can be avoio^ Interestingly enough, the increased structiveness of nuclear weapons has ■
creased rather than lessened the
much will destroy achieve it. War was
the
o'1
existed, and the threat of nuclear destruc*1' has increased the reluctance of nations to to war. War, as a political instrument, Is£ controlled application of force, and there!0 . should it become uncontrollable, it W°l‘ cease to be useful.
and in some other place. In fact, the concept of power is meaningless until it is related to a particular situation and made to perform a concrete task against specific opposition.
Deterrence is now a major function of military power. However, this use of military forces is not really new. Recall, for example, the old concept of the “fleet-in-being.” Today this old aspect of military power has assumed a vastly increased importance. Deterrence is the passive use of military power. It is a psychological, not a military undertaking, and the power necessary to deter will depend upon the pyschological characteristics of the two opponents. When military power is not used, its measure is precisely what people think it is. Under these conditions, psychological factors are as important as material ones, and not only is military power relative, but it becomes uncertain, since there is nothing to relate it to.
Even more than being relative, military power is protean. At one time sheer numbers of men was the decisive element. But as clubs gave way to spears and swords, castles gave way to gunpowder, cavalry gave way to the machine gun which in turn was countered by the tank, so the manned aircraft is now giving way to the missile. Any history of military technology is really a study of these changes. We cannot see the next step, but so long as we constantly strive to move faster, hit harder, and defend a position more firmly, we can be sure that there will be no end to this constant change.
The protean nature of military power underscores the need to keep up with technical progress. Forces and policies that produced great military power yesterday arc today reduced to unimportance. In today’s world, survival requires creative adaptability.
Beyond purely technical change is the psychological change in man and his outlook. Human attitudes have always been important, but since deterrent power is what people believe it to be, attitudes are decisive. Human attitudes can change even faster than hardware, and deterrent strength is not only difficult to assess, but is subject to rapid fluctuations. The Russian Sputnik I did not change Russian ICBM capability, but it made a significant chapge in the world’s attitude toward Russian power.
A graduate of Colorado 1 , University in 1940, C° ^ I Giddings served with the Infantry Division in the Pa6 r Theater during World II. His subsequent asSl^r ments include: Instructor, - ^
Defense School (1951 \
1953); Missile Officer ' .. AAA Brigade (1954 to WJ, , Staff Officer, ODCSOPS,
Pentagon (1956 to 1959); Senior Advisor, ^°1q, | Saudi Arabian Artillery School (1959-1960); a 1st Battalion, 61st Artillery (1961 to 1963); ^
Officer, NORAD (1964 to 1966); CO, 50th ArtiU Group (1966-1967); and Staff Member, Wrap Systems Evaluation Group, DOD.
limited. S0'1'
by
iot
spread successfully by fire and the sword- wars of 632-732 did not “decide” the between Islam and Christianity, nor did j Thirty Years’ War “decide” the issue j tween Protestant and Catholic. The Treab^ Westphalia did not bring the conflict bet" Protestant and Catholic to a conclusion! j merely acknowledged that military power been unable to render a decision. Prosely* » continued, and the conflict was transferee ^ suitable fields of endeavor. Like"is(
Protestant and Catholic now must be a mutual decision, and it will
politic,
limitations of military power. Once a ccr level of power has been brought to bear, t*1 is no use for more and an attempt to apply ,
object rather ^ } never fought °ver(j, border incident, unless a serious issue alrc°
tty Ject °nd Objectives. The distinction be- object and objectives is one of the most Cult things to keep in mind in limited war. e object is the social issue to be resolved, objective is the place where military is applied to achieve this end. As we »b' ,lnto bold of indirect strategy, the ■Rcfive may become more and more re- to rorn the object. It is therefore necessary a consci°us effort to remember that ,l °bjective is only important to the extent
i U - „
resolution of the social issue at hand.
the ■orce move
contributes to reaching the object, i.e.,
To
take
Pof a sPecibc current example, our
(- lcy continues to be one of containment of 4ncJ munism. The basic social issue that we iiS(; die Communists have to resolve is the outside power to force Communism on tor ,Te°Ple- Therefore, our objective (“vic- *n Vietnam) ;s significant only to the
ent that it contributes to our object (the °nta'
a>nment of Communism). This means ,ri every military action should be viewed c vrelati°n to this object, remembering that tj^T action will evoke some response. Will n.et effect of our action and their likely jsctlon further our object? Since our object
|hat
Hot
simply to prevent the spread of Com-
munism into South Vietnam, but to prevent the spread of Communism everywhere, the answer to that seemingly simple question becomes exceedingly complex.
Unfortunately, the domestic debate over Vietnam is not really a dialogue, but is a duel of monologues. The “peaceniks” argue that the war is killing people, and therefore it should stop, while the “Hawks” argue only that we must stop the spread of Communism, therefore we must win. To transform this into a meaningful dialogue, the argument would have to be that (a) both the object and the objective are right, or (b) the object is right but the objective is wrong, or (c) the object is wrong, and therefore the objective is irrelevant.
As Liddell Hart reminds us, we must indeed understand war. Both Jean Rousseau and Immanuel Kant believed that, prior to the French Revolution, wars were waged by princes for their personal advantage rather than for the advantage of their subjects. Therefore, they concluded that there would be no war under a republican form of government. It is clear that both men had studied war as they knew it. It is also obvious that neither of them understood it.
—★ '-----------------------------------------------------------------
Sing Out—Mark Twain
During World War II, a U. S. submarine was standing in the Thimble Shoals Channel heading for Norfolk. Visibility was very poor and the captain ordered soundings to be taken. The age-old chant of the leadsman was most reassuring to everyone on the bridge until it was noticed that no one could understand the words. The chant sounded more like a yodel. Upon inquiry by the Executive Officer, the leadsman replied that he didn’t know the words—he just knew the tune.
' -------------- Contributed by Lieutenant Commander John R. McDonnell, U. S. Navy
When Overtaking a Senior
During the early days of Recruit Training for Women, Great Lakes, a brand new company had just had its first day’s instruction in Naval Orientation. The recruits had learned how to salute, had practiced the proper procedure for overtaking a senior, and in their opinion had been taught everything possible about what to do and when.
During liberty on this same afternoon, one of the young ladies was on her way to the Recreation Building. The Officer in Charge, who was walking just ahead, stopped to greet an acquaintance.
Dismay clouded the face of the recruit; she had forgotten everything. Suddenly, she remembered!
Quickening her pace, and saluting snappily, she passed the VIP with a loud and confident, “By your rear, Ma’am!”
---------------------------------------- Contributed by Evelyn M. Pierce, YNCS, U. S. Navy
(The Naval Institute will pay $10.00 jar each anecdote published in the Proceedings.)