Hitler’s decision to attack the Soviet Union in 1941 was based on two assumptions: (1) that his armies would be able to overrun western Russia within a few months; and (2) that with the loss of the Ukraine and additional areas of the western USSR, Russia would be deprived of her industrial heart and would therefore lack the equipment and supplies to continue the war.
The first argument was founded on the verdict of the German General Staff concerning the fighting value of the Red Army; the second was suggested to him by reports which maintained that the center of Russia's war industry was to be found in the region around Leningrad, Moscow, Kharkov, Gorki, the Donetz Basin, and Stalingrad. Although it was recognized that some important war plants were located in the Urals, the full significance of the more recent industrial development of Asiatic Russia was not realized by German Military Intelligence, despite its generally good information on Russia. To be sure, urgent and serious warning was received from such men as the German Ambassador to Russia and the Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy, but Hitler preferred to listen to the other view and made his decision accordingly.
The first few months of the Russian campaign seemed to prove the correctness of this decision. The Russian armies suffered one military defeat after another and their losses in men and materiel were colossal. In view of Germany's superior productive capacity, it seemed highly unlikely that the remnant of the hard-hit Soviet industry could make up the tremendous expenditure in equipment and supplies. But an exceptionally early and severe winter, for which the Russians were better prepared than the Germans, radically changed the situation. Among the first victims of the extreme cold was the German armor, which within a few days was reduced to almost complete impotency. In that period the Germans lost 75,000 motor vehicles—in addition to 180,000 horses—while their industry could only replace 7000. Naturally, the striking power and the mobility of the German armies in Russia suffered immensely. The new situation required a complete reorientation of German plans and a thorough reorganization of the German forces. Nevertheless, the German Supreme Command remained confident of carrying on the war successfully, "unless unforeseen events occur."
Yet, unknown to the Germans, the "unforeseen events" were already taking place. The terrific losses of the German Eastern Army through the winter months had brought it down almost to the level of the defeated Russian Armies. They not only postponed a German victory over the Russians, but gave the Soviet Union time to reorganize its resistance and. prepare counteroffensives. Still, having lost their western industries, the Russians could not have done so, except for two factors. The one was the earlier relocation of factories in eastern Russia, whose production proceeded unhindered by the German invasion. The other was the arrival of large quantities of equipment and supplies from Great Britain and the United States.
From the day of the German attack on Russia, June 22, 1941, the two allies had started to consider the sending of aid to the hard-pressed Soviet Union. Although popular feeling in this country did not favor the extension of Lend-Lease help to Russia, President Roosevelt went ahead quietly with measures to release to her a maximum of military equipment. Eventually, at the end of September of that year, the so-called Moscow Protocol was signed which obligated the United States and Great Britain to furnish to the Soviet Union specific amounts of war material, including airplanes, tanks, guns, metals, petroleum products, chemicals, industrial equipment, and agricultural produce. Shipments were to start immediately and to be executed as quickly as possible. In fact, every effort was made to deliver the needed materials, and about the end of the year 1941 deliveries began to catch up with the promised amounts. The following year, the average monthly Lend-Lease shipment to Russia was valued at $112,000,000; in 1943 it ruse to $247,000,000; and from January, 1944, through June, 1945, it was about $300,000,000 a month. By the end of the war, America's contribution to Russia amounted to more than $11,000,000,000, while Great Britain also had delivered very considerable quantities of war materials.
Besides the lack of shipping, the main problem in connection with the rapid delivery of this aid was the route over which it was to be sent. Political considerations, distance, transportation facilities, and the dangers to which the various possible shipping routes were exposed had to be taken into account. The most direct way, via the Baltic Sea, was, of course, dominated by the Germans and therefore closed. So were the Turkish-controlled and neutralized Dardanelles, eliminating the Black Sea as an avenue of approach to Russia. The third possible route, via the Pacific, suffered from various disadvantages, especially the enormous distances involved, across the whole United States and the Pacific, and then through the whole of Siberia. Moreover, after Pearl Harbor all shipments to Vladivostok on American vessels had to be stopped. Even before that date, Japan had taken a hostile attitude toward the sending of war material to neighboring East Siberia. In order not to increase the already existing tension, the United States began to transfer merchant ships to the U.S.S.R.; a total of 125 were thus delivered to the Russians under the Lend-Lease Act. Together with other Russian vessels in the Pacific, these ships eventually carried about half the total American aid to the Soviet Union.
Another alternative was the route via the Persian Gulf and Iran. Again, distance was the main obstacle here, as it took a convoy about 75 days to cover the more than 12,000 miles from New York to the head of the Persian Gulf, by the Cape of Good Hope. But in addition to distance, the lack of docking and trans-shipment facilities in Basra also greatly reduced the usefulness of this route during the first years of the war. Nevertheless, Great Britain started to use it at an early date, and the first American ship to go over this route sailed in November, 1941. After the opening of the Mediterranean, in 1943, the bulk of supplies to Russia went through Iran.
Another possible way to send aid to the Soviet Union led through the Bering Strait and the Arctic Ocean, around Siberia to Murmansk or the White Sea ports. This route was safe from enemy interference, but it was open only during a certain part of the year and seems to have played no significant part in solving Russia's supply problem. This does not mean, however, that it may not do so in the future.
By far the shortest and quickest route from the American East Coast and from Great Britain to the center of Russia was the one via the North Atlantic, Iceland, around the North Cape, and across the Barents Sea to Murmansk or through the White Sea to Archangel. The average length of a convoy voyage from Iceland to Murmansk was only 10 days. The potential strategic value of that route had been recognized by the Russians as early as World War I. Despite its northern latitude, Murmansk is kept ice-free all year around by a branch of the Gulf Stream; Archangel is ice-locked a part of the year. Both ports had been greatly developed by the Russians in the period between the two wars and had been connected with the main part of the country by railroads. A canal enables ships up to destroyer size to pass between the Baltic Sea and the Arctic. The full significance of this development, which made the western Arctic coast an integral part of the Russian defensive system, seems to have escaped the Germans. To be sure, the northern ports were little used by merchant ships in peace time, when more attractive avenues to Russia were open, so that British and American ships had also had little experience with navigation in that region.
But with the advantages of short transoceanic distances and closeness to the Russian front, the northern route combined the drawbacks of unexampled bad weather and ice conditions and, above all, closeness to enemy-held territory. From their position in northern Norway the Germans could use their surface ships, U-boats, and planes to attack convoys along this route, making it the most dangerous of all the possible approaches to Russia. Nevertheless, since in 1941 and 1942 time was of the essence, and since the other approaches were not fully developed as yet, the northern route had to carry the bulk of Allied supplies during the most crucial period of the war. And even though, due to losses suffered on the way, only about three-fourths of all cargoes sent over it arrived in Russia, this portion still was more than could have been delivered at that time over any other route. But the combination of bad climate and enemy peril made the "Murmansk Run" one of the most unpleasant assignments of World War II.
The first convoy to sail over the northern route left Great Britain in late August, 1941. It consisted of one Russian and six British vessels, and it arrived at Archangel without interference from the enemy. Other convoys followed until, by the end of the year 1941, some 110 ships had used the route with the loss of only one or two. As time went on, the convoys began to include ships of many Allied nations, especially America, until eventually more than half of the cargo ships on that run came from this country.
Why were the Germans so slow in taking advantage of the opportunity that offered itself in these northern waters? There were, of course, several reasons for this. First of all, at the beginning of the Russian campaign the aid which the Soviet Union might obtain from the Allies looked unimportant. Also, at the end of 1941, the German surface fleet found itself in a rather weak state, having been reduced to about half its original size by the losses suffered in the preceding campaigns. All that remained of it was the newly-commissioned battleship Tirpitz, the battle cruiser Scharnlzorst, the heavy cruisers Admiral Hipper, Prinz Engen, Admiral Scheer, and Lutzow, and four light cruisers. the number of destroyers was very limited, since earlier losses had not been replaced by new construction. The first German aircraft carrier, Graf Zeppelin, begun before the war, had never been finished, as all shipbuilding efforts were concentrated on the construction of submarines.
When the Germans finally began to concentrate their naval forces in that area, it was primarily because of Hitler's fear of an Allied invasion of Norway, and the German Navy's expectation of a British attempt to gain a foothold at Murmansk. Even then the assembly of the available surface ships in northern Norway was slow and fraught with danger. On their way north, the Prinz Engen and the Admiral Scheer were attacked by the British submarine Trident, and the Prinz Engen, having been hit by a torpedo, had to limp back home for repairs. Eventually, one battleship and three heavy cruisers were shifted to the Arctic region, but in March of that year Tirpitz was the only heavy unit available there. In addition to the surface vessels, however, some twenty submarines were assigned to the area, new airfields were built, and the air force was considerably strengthened.
The strategic task assigned to the German naval forces in northern Norway was:
- to help defend the coast of Norway against an Allied invasion;
- to interrupt the flow of supplies to the Russian front via Murmansk and Archangel;
- to tie down, by their mere presence, heavy enemy forces in the northern Atlantic so that they could not be made available elsewhere.
When the expected invasion of Norway did not materialize, and when the Germans gradually realized the effect of Allied aid on Russia:! resistance, the convoys to Russia became the main object of German naval strategy in the northern sector. In fact, this task was eventually given high priority for both the Navy and the Air Force. To carry it out, the following operations were undertaken by the German Navy, in cooperation with the Luftwaffe and coastal defenses:
- Sortie by Tirpitz and three destroyers toward Bear Island, March 6 to 9, 1942;
- Operation by Tirpitz, Admiral Scheer, Admiral Hipper and seven destroyers in the Barents Sea, July 2 to 7—Operation " Rosselsprung" (Knight's move);
- Thrust into the Kara Sea by Admiral Scheer and submarines, August 18 to 30—Operation "Wunderland";
- Mine-laying operation by Admiral Hipper and four destroyers along the northern coast of Novaya Zemlya, September 24 to 28—Operation "Zarin" (Tsarina);
- Foray by Admiral Hipper and four destroyers into the area between Bear Island and Spitsbergen, November 5 to 9—Operation "Hoffnung" (Hope);
- Attack by Admiral Hipper, Lutzow and six destroyers on a convoy, December 30, 1942 to January 1,1943—Operation "Regenbogen" (Rainbow);
- Operation against convoy by Scharnhorst and five destroyers December 25 to 26,1943, resulting in the sinking of the German ship.
The third and fourth of these operations were aimed primarily at interrupting the Siberian Sea Route and will not be discussed further here. But a more detailed analysis of the other actions, using German sources as well as accounts of Allied nations, may be of interest and point up some of the peculiar conditions of Arctic warfare.
By March, 1942, the number and size of Allied convoys to northern Russia had increased to a point where they offered a tempting target for German attacks. Weather conditions also began to favor the attacker, as lengthening hours of daylight improved his chances of spotting a convoy and maintaining contact with it. In fact, from April to June the weather in that region is usually good, while the summer months are often foggy, which naturally reduces the Air Force's chances of successful attack.In winter, navigation in those waters is, of course, made exceedingly difficult by the combination of darkness, extreme cold, and the alternation between snow storms and hurricanes, with icebergs and ice floes greatly adding to the dangers to which ships are exposed.
The North Russia convoys at that time assembled at Loch Ewe, on the west coast of Scotland; from there they first passed round Iceland, to enable escorting vessels to refuel, and then proceeded east, keeping as far north—and as far away from Norway—as the position of the polar ice-pack allowed. On that course they continued at least to the longitude of Murmansk before turning south. They were escorted by a force of British cruisers, destroyers, and corvettes, while a covering fleet of several battleships, at least one aircraft carrier, and a number of cruisers and destroyers was kept in readiness at sea, to go to the convoy's aid if necessary. As a rule, however, this task force was kept in the region between Bear Island and Jan Mayen, well outside the range of German land-based planes. Russia-bound convoys at that time bore the designation PQ, with the current number, while the homeward-bound ones were called QP.
The first attack on these convoys was launched late in December, 1941, by a few German destroyers, but it was beaten off by the naval escort. Between January and March, 1942, three attacks were made by V-boats, and several merchant ships were sunk. But a large-scale operation was not attempted until the beginning of March, 1942, when two convoys, PQ 12 and QP 8, were on their way simultaneously.
About noon, March 5, German air reconnaissance sighted a convoy of fifteen ships, steering a north-easterly course and located seventy to eighty miles south of Jan Mayen. Thereupon, the German Air Force was ordered to attack, and six submarines were dispatched for the same purpose, although they were restricted to operation in the area east of 26° East—the longitude of the North Cape—in order not to interfere with German surface ships.
At the same time, the battleship Tirpitz and three destroyers lying in Trondheim made ready for action. The task force wasunder the tactical command of Vice Admiral Ciliax, the Commander of Battleships, but the operational direction lay with the Naval Command, Group North, with headquarters in Kiel. At noon, March 6, the ships were instructed to proceed, at a speed of 2S knots, to a point halfway between Jan Mayen and Bear Island where, it was assumed, the convoy would be at about 1600 hours on March 7. The destroyers were to refuel from Tirpitz during the night. According to his orders, the task force commander was to avoid combat with superior forces, accept a fight with those of equal strength only if necessary to achieve the main objective—the destruction of the convoy—but destroy inferior forces if that could be done without interfering with the main goal.
Admiral Ciliax did not entirely agree with these orders. He objected, first, to the late hour of starting the operation, which necessitated the high speed and the early refueling of the destroyers, cut down the time he would have to search for the convoy, and made easier an early discovery of his departure. Leaving the preceding night he could have, for a much longer time, escaped detection by enemy agents or British submarines watching the coast of Norway. Taking it for granted that the convoy would be protected by a force of heavy ships, even though German scouts had not spotted it as yet, he also argued that even a successful fight with such opponents might put Tirpitz out of commission for a long time. Only a task of major importance, not the attack on a single convoy, would justify such a risk. But assuming that the higher command had a much clearer picture of the over-all situation than he had, he finally acquiesced.
It soon became apparent that under existing weather conditions the destroyers could not maintain a speed of 25 knots; nor could refueling take place under these circumstances. That meant that they would have to be sent back early, and Tirpitz would have to proceed alone, without the protection and scouting possibilities afforded by the destroyers. Because of the strong wind, reconnaissance by the battleship's own planes also was impossible. Besides, visibility was so limited that for a long period the destroyers even lost sight of the Tirpitz.
At 1640 on March 7 a single steamer was sighted, which turned out to be the Russian Ijora of 2800 tons, en route to England. Although single vessels were to be avoided, Ciliax ordered it destroyed to prevent it from reporting the German force. Actually, however, the Ijora did manage to send off her message.
Assuming the Russian to be a straggler from PQ 12, Tirpitz then steered at high speed toward the supposed meeting place, still some 65 miles distant. No convoy was found there. At the same time, intercepted radio messages made it probable that Ijora's report had been received and that the British were taking counter-measures. During the evening the fuel situation of the destroyers also became critical. A new attempt to refuel them from Tirpitz failed because of the heavy seas and the icing of the decks. One of the boats had to be dismissed.
During the following night Tirpitz with the remaining two destroyers continued eastward, to keep ahead of the convoy of whose whereabouts no report had been received for the last two days. At daybreak of March 8 the last two destroyers also had to leave, and the battleship continued its search unescorted. At 0700 a submarine was sighted which turned out to be the German U 403; she had not been notified of the limit of submarine operations. The encounter illustrated the difficulty of joint operations. At 0800 Tirpitz turned north to cross the assumed course of the convoy, but at noon a message from the Group Command placed it farther west. The battleship immediately changed course for the new location, but poor visibility, bad weather, lack of air reconnaissance, the vastness of the operational area, and complete ignorance of the enemy's disposition made success more than doubtful. In the evening of March 8, therefore, Admiral Ciliax decided to terminate the operation.
Next morning, weather and visibility having greatly improved overnight, one of the destroyers rejoined the battleship. At 0800 several British scouting planes were sighted north of the task force. Without air cover and with only one destroyer as escort, the situation of the Tirpitz closely resembled that of the Bismarck in May, 1941, or the Prince of Wales and Repulse in December of that year. Assuming that the carrier to which the enemy planes belonged would not have ventured so close to the Norwegian coast without the protection of other heavy fleet units, the German admiral ordered his battleship to proceed toward the Lofoten Islands at maximum speed. Soon thereafter, however, she was attacked by a group of Swordfish planes. Daringly and skillfully executed, these attacks failed only because of the Tirpitz's adroit maneuvering and because of wind conditions unfavorable to the planes. The German commander's request for aid from the Luftwaffe was not forwarded in time and was, therefore, not acted upon. At 1200 on March 9, Tirpitz entered the West Fjord; on March 12 she was back at Trondheim. With the exception of the sinking of the Russian steamer, the operation had been unsuccessful.
On the morning of March 9 a German submarine reported a convoy of ten steamers and four destroyers some forty miles north of Kola Bay, steering toward Murmansk. It probably was PQ 12, which had last been seen by the Germans on March 5. According to its position at that time, it must have been close to Bear Island when Tirpitz was in the vicinity. If the Germans had been able to scout a wider area, or if they had had air reconnaissance, it is most likely that they would have found the convoy and destroyed a major part of it.
British reactions to the sortie of the Tirpitz were quick and effective. As soon as her departure from Trondheim was reported, the Admiralty diverted the convoy from its course and alerted the Home Fleet. With its vast superiority over the German force, it might easily have caused it to suffer a fate similar to that of the Bismarck. But its success was thwarted by the same foul weather that foiled the Germans. Neither side, therefore, fully achieved its objective.
The negative result led the German Naval High Command to conclude:
"Its course shows the weakness of our naval situation in the northern area. The enemy responds to every German move by dispatching strong forces, especially aircraft carriers, which must be considered the most dangerous opponent of our heavy ships! It is characteristic of our extremely weak defense that the enemy dares to advance into the coastal waters of the northern area without being annihilated by the German Air Force. Our own defensive forces (destroyers and torpedo boats) are so few in number that our ships are in gravest danger whenever they are exposed to air attacks or come into contact with enemy naval forces."
The War Diary also notes the experience gained with regard to the enemy's behavior:
"Opponent operates very skillfully—completely unobtrusive use of radio, very effective shadowing by planes, ruthless and daring attacks by torpedo bombers, operationally correct use of submarines, extremely effective employment of forces by all commanders involved, as well as elastic direction of the convoy (immediate change of course when sighted by us), splendid cooperation between sea and air forces."
It proceeds to draw the following lessons from these conditions:
"(a) Absolute prerequisite to any successful operation in the Northern Sea, in the absence of an aircraft carrier of our own, is strong support by our Air Force in the Norway area (including reconnaissance, fighters, torpedo planes)
(b) In view of the resolute reaction by the enemy, any operation in the Northern Sea requires the employment of all our naval forces, especially as long as there are aircraft carriers available to the enemy;
(c) It is therefore desirable that our naval forces be held back for the time being, in order to have them ready to repulse enemy landing attempts. They should at present be employed only if our reconnaissance has furnished accurate information about the enemy and if there is adequate support by our Air Force;
(d) It must be categorically demanded that the Air Force wage relentless warfare against enemy carriers. Their elimination at sea or at their bases must be the supreme objective of our Air Force's [contribution to] naval war in the northern area. Their extermination would constitute a radical improvement of our operational possibilities;
(e) We must demand that work on our own aircraft carrier be accelerated. This includes also the provision of an adequate number of carrier planes. The early formation of a German task force composed of Tirpitz, Scharnhorst, a carrier, two heavy cruisers, and 12 to 14 destroyers must be attempted at all cost. It would represent a grave danger to the enemy in the northern area and would be capable of carrying out important and successful operations."
Hitler agreed with Grand Admiral Raeder that the heavy ships should not be exposed to danger without air reconnaissance and protection. But even so, Raeder obtained Luftwaffe cooperation only with difficulty. The Navy and the Air Force had long fought for the control of naval air forces: the deadlock was never completely resolved and prevented proper coordination of plans as well as smooth cooperation in carrying them out. Yet the following months showed clearly enough what effective cooperation between the two services could achieve.
The next attack by surface ships occurred on March 28, when a group of three German destroyers tangled with PQ 13. As snow squalls hid the opponents from each other to the last moment, the Germans came upon the convoy suddenly; in the ensuing fight the escorting cruiser, H.M.S. Trinidad, and the destroyer Eclipse were torpedoed, and one German boat was sunk. With the protective screen thus weakened, the convoy became the prey of the German bombers and U-boats, which attacked it despite the prevailing dirty weather. The furious onslaught continued even after the ships had reached Murmansk, only seventy miles from the German air base at Petsamo. Several steamers were lost on this run; Trinidad, though badly damaged, managed to reach port and was quickly repaired. But a few weeks later, when escorting another convoy, she was bombed from the air and sank.
Although the Germans seemed to concentrate on the Russia-bound convoys, they did not entirely overlook the homeward-bound ones. On April 28, QP 11 left Murmansk, consisting of thirteen steamers, H.M. cruiser Edinburgh, eight destroyers, six corvettes, and one armed trawler, that is, more escorting vessels than merchantmen.
QP 11 was attacked on May 1 by three German destroyers which were, however, prevented from closing in on the convoy by the skillful maneuvering of the escorting force. After a fight of four hours' duration, the Germans were forced to withdraw because they were running out of ammunition. In the meantime, the convoy commander had taken his charges into the ice, where they remained for seven or eight hours and whither the destroyers could not follow on account of their thin plates.
During the fighting, the escorting cruiser, H.M.S. Edinburgh, had been attacked and damaged by two U-boats. The retreating German destroyers made an attempt to finish her off with torpedoes, but they found to their surprise that the cruiser's fire power had not been diminished by her injury. In fact, the defense put up by her and the protecting four destroyers was so effective that one of the German vessels was hit and had to be abandoned by her crew. Unfortunately, Edinburgh also had to be sunk on her way home.
While QP 11 escaped without the loss of any of the merchant ships, the east-bound PQ 15, consisting of 23 ships, at sea at the same time, had worse luck. Continually attacked by German planes for 48 hours, it suffered considerable damage. On the other hand, the next returning convoy, QP 12, which left Murmansk on May 21, again got through without any losses.
The unsuccessful destroyer attacks had showed the German Naval High Command that the employment of these units, unprotected by heavy ships, could only lead to losses out or proportion to the results achieved. Yet the period from April to June had offered no favorable opportunity for the use of the heavy surface ships. Air reconnaissance had not furnished sufficient information about convoys and their covering forces to warrant another sortie by the Tirpitz and the cruisers. The critical fuel situation alone forbade a thrust into an uncertain and therefore risky position.
But even so, by the middle of April, 1942, the North Cape route had become so dangerous that the British were unable to provide enough escorts for the convoys. Sixteen out of 84 northbound ships and eleven out of 78 southbound ships, in four convoys each way, had been sunk, nor including serious damages suffered in Murmansk itself. These losses were far greater than those on any other route. In Reykjavik there were dozens of ships awaiting the formation of a convoy, others had to turn back from the Murmansk run, still others had to be routed to Scotland instead of Iceland because of the congestion in Reykjavik. At the same time, the Russians pressed for quicker delivery of the badly-needed weapons and ammunition. In view of the heavy losses suffered by the convoys, Admiral King suggested that the Soviets conduct bombing missions on the German air and sea bases in northern Norway, especially those of Narvik and Kirkenes, and it was also suggested that they provide air coverage for the convoys as they approached Murmansk, but the Russians made no move to comply with these requests. To relieve the British Navy, the United States sent Task Force 39, under the command of Rear Admiral John W. Wilcox, Jr. It included our two newest battleships, the Washington and NorthCarolina, the aircraft carrier Wasp, the heavy cruisers Wichita and Tuscaloosa, and Destroyer Squadron 8. Task Force 39 stayed till the worst danger had passed.
But if losses during these months had been considerable, worse was still to come. The partial success of the previous attacks had helped convince Hitler of the importance of continuing and intensifying them, in order to deprive the Russian armies of essential aid at a critical time. Even though it was clear that neither the German aircraft carrier nor naval planes for it could be made ready in time, plans were made for a major coordinated operation aiming at the complete destruction of the next convoy, which was expected some time in June. Before this large-scale attack could be launched, the German Air Force and the U-boats went through a sort of dress rehearsal by attacking PQ 16, at the end of May. Composed of 34 ships and a strong escorting force, the convoy went through an ordeal of fire lasting for six days, during which it lost at least eight ships.
By that time most serviceable German surface ships had been assembled in the Norway area. Tirpitz and Hipper were at Trondheim. Lutzow and Scheer at Narvik; only Scharnhorst and Prinz Engen were still absent. The Commander-in-Chief of the German Fleet, Admiral Schniewind, took tactical command of the operation known by the name "Rosselsprung."
According to the operational directives issued to the German fleet, it was to proceed to meet the convoy at a point east of Bear Island which, starting from Alten Fjord, it would reach within eight to ten hours—that is, long before the covering fleet, cruising in the region between Iceland and Jan Mayen, could come to the convoy's rescue. But permission to sail and begin the operation was subject to Hitler's personal approval. He made it dependent on the condition that either the enemy carriers in the region be eliminated by the German Air Force, or that their position had been unequivocally established, making it quite certain that neither battleships nor planes could engage the German fleet.
On June 30 a westbound convoy, QP 13, was sighted; it consisted of about forty ships and was left to the Luftwaffe to deal with, in order to keep the surface fleet and the submarines in readiness for the more important Russia-bound convoy that was expected to sail at about the same time. Escaping the planes, this convoy ran into minefields off the west coast of Iceland and lost five ships.
PQ 17, the one selected by the German High Command as the target of the main operation, was late in sailing, as the Allies were waiting for the July fogs to help them get through. Consisting of 36 ships, of which 22 were American, it was escorted by more warships of various classes than there were merchantmen in the convoy, while the British Home Fleet, strengthened by the American units, acted as distant covering force. The convoy was sighted by the Germans on July 1, when it was sixty miles east of Jan Mayen, but poor visibility and the strong escort prevented attack as well as uninterrupted contact. Nevertheless, from the reports it received, the German Naval High Command deduced that the two convoys, PQ 17 and QP 13, would meet somewhere half-way between Bear Island and Jan Mayen; this was made the focal point for concentrated attacks by the Luftwaffe.
In the meantime, the German surface ships had started their advance toward the prospective area of operations. But almost immediately they ran into bad luck. The Narvik group hit heavy fog and Lutzow ran aground; three destroyers of the Trondheim group hit a hitherto uncharted rock in the entrance of the West Fjord and had to be left behind. Conflicting reports by planes and submarines about the strength and whereabouts of the Allied covering fleet made it appear that Hitler's conditions for the employment of heavy fleet units did not prevail. And although the German Naval Command did not consider the actual danger from the Allied battleships and carriers to be acute, the order to sail could not be given without the Fuehrer's personal approval; yet Hitler could not be located, so the German fleet had to wait.
On the morning of the 4th German planes and submarines began to attack the convoy. Despite the gallant defense by the escorting vessels and the merchant ships themselves, losses began to mount. On the evening of that day, the Admiralty ordered the escorting force to return west and directed the convoy to scatter. Possibly this maneuver saved it from complete annihilation, but even so, the results were disastrous, as the separate ships fell easy prey to the attacking aircraft and V-boats.
While this onslaught was going on, the German fleet was still waiting at Alten Fjord. Reports coming in during the morning of July 4 indicated that all heavy forces of the Allies had withdrawn to the west; their fuel situation alone made it plain that they could not return to the theater of operations at an early time. With these considerations before him, Hitler finally gave his permission for the starting of Operation "Rosselsprung." Even then, however, the Naval High Command admonished the Fleet Commander to avoid defeat, adding the following directives: "A short duration of the operation with partial success is preferable to a complete one and longer duration. Report immediately if sighted by enemy planes. Do not hesitate to terminate operation if the situation becomes doubtful. Do not permit an enemy success against the nucleus of our fleet."
After the long delay, the German fleet left the Scurries at 1500 hours of July 7, under conditions which the Germans themselves considered favorable. Soon afterwards, however, intercepted radio messages indicated that the sortie had been reported and that an Allied fleet of heavy units had turned east to cut the German forces' retreat. According to his explicit orders not to risk an encounter with a superior enemy and in view of the fact that the convoy at that time had already been scattered and was being cut to pieces by other means, Admiral Schniewind had to order the return of his fleet without seeing an enemy or firing a single shot.
Although the action of the German heavy ships again ended without success, the Germans had come close enough to a realization of their intentions. Out of the original 36 ships, 23 with a cargo of more than 125,000 tons were sunk, only thirteen survivors limping into Murmansk.
The disaster of PQ 17 forced the Allies to suspend the sending of convoys to North Russia until September, when shorter daylight hours and the receding polar ice would offer more favorable conditions. The Russians, however, continued to press for accelerated deliveries to help them stem the tide of the second German offensive. In order to send at least the most urgently needed supplies, a task force including the U. S. Cruiser Tuscaloosa was loaded and dispatched to Murmansk. Helped by foggy weather, it made the trip without suffering any damage.
Since no convoys were at sea in August of that year. Operations " Wunderland" and "Zarin" could find no targets.
The next convoy to sail for North Russia was PQ 18, composed of 39 merchant ships and 77 warships, including, for the first time, an escort carrier, H.M.S. Avenger, with 15 planes. It passed Jan Mayen on September 6 and was under attack by submarines and more than 200 aircraft during the next few days. Although the Avenger's planes and the ships' guns took a heavy toll of the attackers, losses ran high, and only thirteen of the original 39 merchantmen in the convoy arrived at their destination. This action is considered to have been one of the fiercest battles of the entire war.
The west-bound counterpart of this convoy, QP 14, of fifteen ships, which had departed from Archangel on September 13, was able to stay outside the range of the Luftwaffe by taking full advantage of the receding ice line and steering up the west coast of Spitsbergen. On the other hand, it ran into a pack of V-boats and also suffered considerable damage, losing four merchant ships and one of the escorting vessels.
Due to these exorbitant losses and to the greatly increased demands made upon Allied naval and merchant shipping at that time, the last convoy scheduled to leave for Russia that year, PQ 19, never sailed. Instead, a compromise solution was tried, known under the name of "Trickle Movement." Under this arrangement, one or two fast merchant ships were dispatched daily to North Russia, to a total of thirteen ships. Relying on their speed and the lengthening Arctic nights for their protection, they attempted to make the run without an escort. But the results of the experiment were not encouraging. Only five of the ships got through to Russia; the reverse movement showed a better record, as only one out of 23 ships was lost.
A summary of this period, from August 1941 to the end of 1942, gives the following figures: In 21 Russia-bound convoys 301 ships sailed, 248 arrived, 53 were lost. Of 232 ships in 16 homeward-bound convoys, 216 arrived, while 16 were sunk. The losses were, however, much more serious than this tabulation indicates, since most of them occurred in the short period from March to September, 1942. In addition, the British Navy during that time lost two cruisers, four destroyers, and six other vessels on the northern route.
By this time, the end of 1942, the North Russia route was declining in importance. Shipments via the Pacific began to arrive in western Russia in increasing amounts, while transport facilities in Iran were being improved, enabling the Allies to route a large portion of their aid to Russia through the Persian Gulf. Especially so, since the Japanese made no effort to help their German ally—and themselves—by occupying Madagascar or otherwise interfering with shipments through the Indian Ocean. Nevertheless, the northern route was never entirely neglected and retained some measure of importance to the very end of the war, particularly for shipments from Great Britain.
With weather conditions again favoring the defense, a new series of convoys to North Russia was started December 15, 1942. They were now dispatched in two sections separated by a week. The first section, JW 51 A, of sixteen ships, had an uneventful and safe voyage. The second section, JW 51 B, of fifteen merchant vessels, which left Scotland on December 22, was not quite as lucky and ran into a German task force consisting of the heavy cruisers Hipper and Lutzow and six destroyers.
The attack occurred during a heavy snow storm which greatly reduced visibility. This, together with the gallant defense put up by the four British escorting destroyers and a series of mistakes by the Germans who mistook each other for the enemy and vice versa, kept the German force from reaching the convoy. When after a fight of several hours the British cruisers of the covering force appeared on the scene, the German admiral, assuming them to be the vanguard of the British Home Fleet, broke off the engagement and retired in accordance with his orders. The convoy escaped without the loss of a single merchant ship. While two of the British destroyers were sunk, the vastly superior Germans had also lost two of their rapidly-vanishing flotilla units.
Operation "Rainbow" thus again ended without success for the German surface ships. But the consequences of this action for the German Navy were even more serious and far-reaching than the escape of an Allied convoy.
Owing to a failure of communications Hitler had first been told that the operation had apparently been a complete success. When the truth was finally learned, he fell into a rage in which he accused the German High Seas Fleet of cowardice and incompetence and blamed it for never fighting actions through to a finish—although he himself had insisted that no undue risks should be taken by the few capital ships. He demanded that all major German warships be scrapped and their guns mounted on land for coastal defense. In this he was eagerly supported by the Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe, Goering, who pointed out that the maintenance of the heavy ships was tying down squadrons of planes which could be used to better advantage elsewhere and that, anyway, his Air Force could do everything that the warships could. Besides, the steel that would become available through the scrapping of the large vessels could alleviate the general steel shortage of the Germans.
In a memorandum to Hitler, Grand Admiral Raeder tried to dissuade the Fuehrer from putting his order into effect. He argued that the decommissioning of the heavy German ships would constitute a "victory gained by our enemies without any effort on their part. It will be viewed as a sign of weakness and a lack of understanding of the supreme importance of naval warfare in the approaching final stage of the war." When his reasoning failed to change Hitler's "irrevocable" decision, the admiral—who had always advocated a balanced German fleet including battleships, aircraft carriers, and a separate naval air arm—had no choice but to resign. The Fuehrer appointed Admiral Doenitz, hitherto Admiral of Submarines, to succeed Raeder as Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy.
Doenitz, who had little interest in anything but his U-boats, at first welcomed the decision to decommission the heavy ship. But his new and wider responsibility soon made him realize his mistake. In a conference with Hitler on February 26, 1943—less than four weeks after taking over the command of the German Navy—he showed that he had, in the meantime, learned his lesson. And it seemed to have been in connection with the northern route, because in that conference he proposed to use the remaining heavy ships for operations against the northern convoys. Where only a short time ago he had been quite willing to go along with Hitler in scrapping all German battleships and heavy cruisers, he now stated that he considered it essential that the Scharnhorst be sent to Norway to form a new and powerful squadron with Tirpitz and Lutzow. He probably was forced to recognize this necessity when he found out how helpless his U-boats and the aircraft were against the convoys during the months of winter darkness and bad weather. Their reduced usefulness at that time had been illustrated when, in January 1943, JW 52, with thirteen merchant ships, had gone through undamaged, despite attacks by German planes, while JW 53, with 22 ships, also escaped in February. Only the south-bound RA 53, which left Murmansk March 1 with thirty merchant ships, suffered a coordinated attack by submarines and planes, losing three ships to enemy action.
Being more diplomatic than Raeder, Doenitz first talked Hitler into a partial reversal of the original order and later quietly canceled it altogether, thus saving the heavy units from being decommissioned. However, since no convoys were dispatched to North Russia during the spring and summer of 1943, the Germans found no opportunity for using their heavy ships for the intended purpose until the end of that year. At the same time, Doenitz also began urging greater cooperation of the Luftwaffe with the Navy, especially its U-boats.
With the coming of spring, convoys to North Russia were temporarily suspended to avoid a repetition of the disasters of the preceding year. At that time most Allied supplies to Russia went to the Persian Gulf over the newly-reopened Mediterranean route. But by the end of the year 1943, several new factors combined with weather conditions to give Allied convoys a better chance of getting through to Murmansk without excessive losses. First of all, the bulk of the German Air Force had been withdrawn from northern Norway to be used elsewhere; second, the inclusion of escort carriers with the convoys provided a new and effective method for keeping U-boats at a distance; third, on September 22 of that year the Tirpitz had been torpedoed and severely damaged by two British midget submarines which had penetrated the Alten Fjord. The only remaining German capital ship, the Scharnhorst, carrying guns of only 11-inch caliber, was greatly inferior to the British battleships of the Home Fleet; finally, British radar development had advanced more rapidly than that of the Germans. This gave the Allies a great advantage during the long nights of the Arctic, when scouting by planes and submarines was difficult or impracticable.
As a result of these circumstances, only three out of 191 outward-bound ships were lost on that route during the winter of 1943-44, although enemy submarines remained as active as ever, losing twelve of their own number in abortive attacks.
Faced with these poor achievements, the German Naval High Command was forced once more to turn to the employment of surface ships to disrupt the North Russia convoys. For by that time the Germans were thoroughly aware of the considerable strengthening which the Russians were receiving from the Allies and of the necessity to relieve the pressure on their retreating armies of the East. In order to stop or to slow down the flow of goods to the Soviet Union by another telling success, it was deemed justified to risk the last serviceable German capital ship, the battle cruiser Scharnhorst, even though the chances of such a success were not considered high. The operation was, of course, predicated on the possibility of taking advantage of favorable conditions and was to be preceded by an increase in the German submarine force in the Arctic region. The weakness of the German air forces and the consequent insufficiency of air reconnaissance were thought to be less of a hazard in winter, since during that period air support could, at best, be only of limited value.
The existing doubts as to the possible effectiveness of Scharnhorst under prevailing circumstances were expressed in a report submitted by the Deputy Commander of Cruisers, Admiral Bey, on November 11, in which he stated: "It is best to use only destroyers in winter, if there is a sufficient number of them. The backing by heavy ships is always desirable; the available five destroyers are not enough. (But) this lack cannot be made up by Scharnhorst, since she herself needs to be protected during the polar night. Nevertheless, her employment is necessary as a cover for the destroyers and because there is always a chance that ,she might be useful."
As there actually was no alternative, an operation of Scharnhorst and the five destroyers in Norwegian waters against the next convoy was decided upon. In the meantime German air reconnaissance had observed the resumption of convoys to North Russia at the end of November, and had reported another one in the first half of December. The next one was selected as a target for the planned operation by the German surface ships. It was JW 55 B, which was first sighted by the Germans on December 22, while at the same time the homeward-bound RA 55 A, protected by a squadron of three British cruisers, also was at sea. Both convoys were covered by a force under the Commander-in-Chief of the British Home Fleet, Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser, in the battleship Duke of York, with the cruiser Jamaica and four destroyers.
Although for the next two days reports of the convoy were received from submarines and aircraft which gave a reasonably clear picture of its strength and location, the Germans seem to have had no accurate information as to the whereabouts of the British covering force. On the late evening of the 24th, the Northern Group Command summed up its own conception of the existing situation in a report to the Naval High Command in which it stated that German Air Force V had promised to carry out reconnaissance and shadowing of the convoy as well as sample visits to naval bases on the east coast of Scotland and Jan Mayen, but could provide no air cover for the German task force. On the other hand, eight U-boats had been dispatched to participate in the attack. On the basis of available information the Group Command recommended the beginning of the operation on December 25, so that the ships could reach the convoy at 1000 hours on the 26th, in the latitude of the North Cape. But since there were less than two hours of daylight, from 1122 to 1207, during which Scharnhorst could use its artillery, it was doubtful whether the vessel could break through the protecting force and reach the convoy before she herself would be exposed to torpedo hits. Consequently, the chances of success were considered low in comparison to the risks. Nevertheless, the Naval High Command considered the need of the German armies so pressing that the operation must be undertaken, if there was no heavy covering force in the vicinity, and if the German ships could make use of the element of surprise. An attack by the destroyers alone was not authorized; any action started must be fought through to the finish, but if superior enemy forces should appear, the action must be broken off.
With these rather contradictory and negative directives, Scharnhorst and her five destroyers sailed from Alten Fjord at 1900 hours on December 25. The weather had in the meantime worsened to such an extent that the Group Command urged the recall of the force; it was finally decided to leave the decision to the tactical commander who had a better insight into local conditions. But since all concerned were anxious to avoid another "failure" such as Hitler had criticized in connection with previous operations, the ships continued on their mission.
The course of the operation has been described often enough in detail, so that it will suffice here to give only the highlights. At dawn of December 26 Scharnhorst, in quest of convoy JW 55 B, was sighted by the escorting cruiser squadron under Admiral Burnett, which at that time was some fifty miles east-southeast of its ward. After a short artillery duel the battle cruiser turned and sped away on a northeasterly course. Hampered by the heavy seas, the light cruisers could not follow her and Admiral Burnett decided to return to the convoy. Scharnhorst's maneuver was probably aimed at drawing the cruisers away from the convoy in order to give the German destroyers a chance to attack it in their absence. That Admiral Burnett's reasoning was correct was proved a couple of hours later when the cruisers, now ten miles ahead of the convoy, made radar contact with a vessel that soon turned out to be the Scharnhorst. Admiral Bey, who had very little information about the strength and position of the British forces providing distant cover, may have assumed that he had run into that portion of the British Home Fleet; the reason for his actions from then on can never be known since no officer survived the eventual sinking of the German battle cruiser. In any case, Scharnhorst again turned and sped away to the south-southeast at 28 knots. Bu t this time the British cruisers were able to shadow her. That the Germans actually had given up any hope of continuing the operation against the convoy is indicated by Admiral Bey's order to the destroyers, sent at 1418 that afternoon, to break off the action and return home.
In the meantime, however, Admiral Fraser's force was coming in from the westward at 24 knots, heading to cross the Scharnhorst's bows. Although the British squadron had been sighted by German planes, Admiral Bey seems to have had no inkling of this, probably due to poor radio communications between the German ships and shore installations. By 1617 hours the Duke of York was in radar contact with Scharnhorst, which unknowingly had run directly into the arms of the main British force. In the following engagement the German ship was at an insurmountable disadvantage; her enemies had a clear picture of her position and distance, she was practically groping in the dark, because the development of naval warning radar had been seriously neglected by the Germans. Hit several times by the British battleship's guns, the Scharnhorst continued at high speed, but finally was hit by three torpedoes from British destroyers. With her speed greatly reduced, she was soon surrounded on all sides. At 1825 Admiral Bey sent a last message to the Fuehrer: "We fight to the last shell." At 1945, hit by additional torpedoes and heavy gun salvoes, the Scharnhorst sank, unseen in darkness and smoke, sixty miles northeast of North Cape. Only 36 members of her crew could be picked up by British destroyers.
With the elimination of the last serviceable German capital ship, the German forces had little chance of success against the northern convoys. Only a few ships were lost during that winter, and even the summer months were now much less dangerous than they had been. Monthly convoys were started again in August of 1944 and continued to the end of the war. Even when schnorkel-equipped submarines began to appear and when, in the winter of 1944- 45, the Luftwaffe showed signs of reviving strength, losses were kept to a minimum. During the last convoy season, from August 1944 to August 1945, only two out of 250 ships were lost on the northern route.
A few statistical data may illustrate the Allied wartime aid to the Soviet Union: During the course of the war 2660 ships, carrying 16,529,791 tons of cargo, were sent to Russia. Of these, 775, carrying some 4,000,000 tons of supplies in 41 outward-bound convoys, sailed to North Russia, losing 57 ships en route; 36 convoys returned from there with 707 ships and lost 21 of them. 12 These vessels delivered in Russia 7056 tanks from the United States and 5128 from Great Britain—3480 of these going there by the northern route; 14,795 aircraft from this country and 7411 from Great Britain, almost half of the latter via the northern route. To this must be added enormous quantities of ammunition, food, petroleum products, railroad and industrial equipment, some 500,000 trucks and other motor vehicles, not to mention 202 torpedo boats, 140 submarine chasers, 77 minesweepers, 28 frigates, 105 landing craft and three ice breakers. There seems to be little doubt that these supplies played a decisive role in the defense of Soviet Russia and the eventual defeat of Germany.
It only remains to assess the German attempts to interrupt the flow of these vital materials, especially those going by the shortest and quickest route. Once they realized the significance of that passageway, the Germans did use all means at their disposal to cut it and deprive their Russian enemies of this substantial aid. In doing so they were, at least in part, quite successful; if they did not accomplish their purpose even more effectively, it may be attributed chiefly to these reasons:
(1) By neglecting to mobilize all their available warships for this task, they violated the principle of concentration of force. Instead of employing a formidable squadron in each operation, they sent out individual ships, while others remained idly at anchor in various German ports. Such a piecemeal use of their surface ships could only achieve success by a lucky chance; moreover, concentration of all effective German forces in the northern area would have tied down a much greater Allied naval force at a time when it was badly needed in other parts of the world.
(2) The lack or uncertainty of support of naval operations by the Luftwaffe. Whenever such support was available in sufficient strength, success was achieved. Without it, any German naval effort was doomed to failure. Nor could submarines accomplish the task unaided by their aircraft. Only full and effective cooperation between all fighting forces could achieve the purpose, but this was rarely attained.
(3) German backwardness in radar technique and the poor functioning of radio communications. The latter may be blamed on insufficient training and experience of German crews, the cream of whom was being taken over by the submarines. This left the surface ships with green sailors who suffered from seasickness and lack of sea experience.
(4) Finally, the Germans were late in realizing the eventual significance of the North Russian ports; when they did, it was too late for their armies to capture them or otherwise render them useless. Even today the potential importance of these harbors, as ports of entry to Russia and as bases giving access to the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, must not be overlooked. Their possible significance in any war of the future is perhaps the most useful lesson which we can draw from the experience of Allied convoys to North Russia and German countermeasures during the last war.