For many years, I thought myself merely unfortunate to have served more than one commanding officer whose leadership qualities have been wholly lacking or seriously deficient. But, a tour of duty with a destroyer squadron staff gave me reason to suspect that there was more to the problem than my own bad luck. My position on the staff allowed me to observe quite a few surface warfare officers in command, as many as 15 at one time. While there was a variance of leadership styles and qualities, which spanned the spectrum to both extremes, there was an inordinately high percentage of "screamers."
The screamer, as this type affectionately has been dubbed by junior officers in the fleet, leads by threat and intimidation, loses his temper more than frequently, and trusts no one. Those who have not had the misfortune of encountering him may consider this description an exaggeration. But, those who have known the screamer will recognize the characterization as accurate or perhaps even understated.
Confirmation of my assumption that the screamers exist in far too abundant numbers came with my most recent assignment to the Naval Academy, where the junior officers (JOs) are hand-picked, outstanding examples of the Navy's finest. Listening to the inevitable swap of sea stories, I found that my experiences were not unique. The screamer appeared time and again in their stories. It is most distressing to hear of the influence this type of CO has on the career decisions of his juniors. Too often he has been a potent factor in JOs' decisions to leave the Navy or transfer to other communities.
The event that triggered this writing began one day as I questioned a junior officer on his method of training midshipmen on board one of the yard patrol craft. He had been criticizing and chastising the midshipmen on their performance before their peers. When I suggested that perhaps this was not the most effective method for motivating and educating his students, the JO told me, "That's the way it's done in the fleet, so I might as well get them used to it."
Why does the screamer exist in such epidemic proportions? Why apparently is he so often a surface warfare officer? What is it in the surface warfare community that creates or clones him?
The answer lies in our career pattern. From commissioning through the surface warfare officer's department head tour, the officer is operationally involved with the ship. He stands watches as the officer of the deck and tactical action officer; he schedules and plans; he is in direct contact with the ship's deckplates. He is intimately involved with the ship as an operational entity.
But, the end of the department head tour (or in some cases a follow-on lieutenant commander sea tour) marks the beginning of a period of decay. The surface warfare officer begins to lose touch with the operational aspects of the Navy. Several years ashore are followed by an executive officer tour, in which he has little or no contact with the ship's operations, but concentrates primarily on administrative functions. Several more years of shore duty follow. Then, one day, six to eight years since he was last in a truly operational billet, the surface warfare officer finds himself in total command of a ship—the ultimate operational challenge.
The new captain is suddenly expected to be an expert shiphandler, a sapient tactician, and the final word in all matters pertaining to his ship. Never mind that he probably hasn't handled a vessel under way in many years; that, as an executive officer, warfare tactics were relegated to his priority list after a myriad of inspections, reports, and records; or that he has been out of contact with a rapidly evolving fleet for more years than it took to develop the atom bomb.
Who can doubt that many individuals, finding themselves in this situation, doubt their own capabilities? Confidence is not a natural by-product of such a situation. And the man who lacks confidence in himself is characteristically distrustful of others and often is incapable of handling situations with the same degree of calm as the man who believes in himself.
What's the solution? It lies in shifting the emphasis of our thinking from paperwork to seamanship and tactical skills. We must be mariners and warriors first, managers and administrators second. Since I cannot begin to hope to offer plans for stemming the tide of paperwork which floods and floods but never ebbs, I am bound to look elsewhere for a solution.
The answer is radical but feasible. We must redefine the role of the executive officer.
Recent attempts have been made in this direction, but all too feeble. One solution suggested designating the executive officer (XO) as navigator on all Atlantic Fleet ships. The intent was good but lacked realism. Giving more responsibilities to an officer who is already working 24 hours a day is no more a viable solution than is attempting to solve a serious physical-fitness deficiency in the fleet by writing an instruction and requiring an annual test.
Another solution, even less realistic than the first, called for a general rethinking by the CO as to the role of his XO, considering him to be a true second-in-command rather than a mere administrative officer. The failure here is in expecting the commanding officer to realign his priorities without a corresponding realignment at other levels of the chain of command. No mention was made of who was going to move this mountain of paper in the XO's stead. Nowhere was it stated that the commanding officer's superiors were going to be understanding when the reports started to come in with less frequency. We must avoid the temptation of attempting to solve systemic problems with individual cures.
The solution lies in a radical change in shipboard organization. The executive officer ought to be responsible for the duties the current operations officer is handling, and the operations officer billet should be renamed administrative officer and be tasked with moving the paper at the department-head level. Current organization has the operations officer functioning as the CO's right-hand man for everything of an operational nature. This is a role which rightly belongs to the XO—the second-in- command.
The administrative officer would still be in the mainstream because he would be, like any department head, standing watches. He would continue to be responsible for the communications personnel and pick up the administrative ratings, while relinquishing the combat information center personnel to the XO's control.
The executive officer would use combat information center personnel much as he now uses the administrative personnel. Administrative control, such as division officer functions, might remain under the administrative department just as the yeomen, personnel-men, etc. are often under a separate division officer, even though they work almost exclusively for the XO. This same arrangement might also apply to the quartermaster, allowing the XO to function as the navigator in an operational sense, but leaving the administrative functions (chart and publication procurement and maintenance as well as division officer functions) to the administrative department.
This proposal helps the executive officer become a true second-in-command. And when it comes time for new commanding officers to take their commands, they will not have been far removed from the operational fleet. The result will be COs with more confidence in themselves, and consequently, they will be better leaders.
Samuel Johnson said it well in 1779: "Self-confidence is the first requisite to great undertakings."