Navies' essential role as military forces structured to fight in time of war can never change—but emerging threats at sea, including in times of peace, dictate a fresh perspective. We now expect more of these seagoing symbols of state power. Piracy has graduated from plain robbery to ransoming crews and the ships themselves, and maritime terrorism is only a step away.
Admittedly, this is not new. The terrorist attack on the USS Cole (DDG-67) in 2000, on the French tanker Limburg in the Gulf of Aden in 2002, and on oil platforms off Basra and passenger ferries in the Philippines are some examples. Activities of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam's marine wing in Sri Lanka have included suicide-ramming selected targets. In the Indian context, all explosives used in the 1993 bomb blasts in Mumbai were brought in by sea in ramshackle boats. These dhows were landed on the unguarded coast in and around fishing villages; then the weapons were transported into the hinterland with the connivance of some among the police and customs forces.
Similar incidents may have taken place since then but remained undetected. Preparation for attacks has anticipated the potential for blocked ports, oil spills, tankers being set on fire, and so on. But no one expected what took place in Mumbai on 26 November 2008, India's 9/11 (or 11/26). It was, quite literally, an amphibious assault.
The Assault of 11/26
A little before 2100, ten people came ashore in a small rubber dinghy (termed Gemini in the Indian Navy) designed to carry no more than six people, mainly divers. They landed at a bustling fishing village in the heart of Mumbai. Crossing the road, a very busy thoroughfare in a prime up-market residential area, they stopped four cabs and headed to different areas. Two groups went to two of the most high-profile seafront hotels, the Taj Mahal and the Oberoi. A third went to the busiest railway station in the country, and a fourth to the Nariman House, regularly frequented by visitors from Israel.
Upon arrival at the Taj Mahal, two of the terrorists split off and entered a restaurant in an extremely busy marketplace packed with foreigners. They took AK-47 rifles from their shoulder bags and emptied two magazines into the helpless, stunned customers. Then they ran less than 200 yards to join the rest of the group, which by that time had reached the Taj. Some entered through the front lobby, while others used the rear gate, passing the swimming pool and spraying AK-47 fire.
At the railway terminus, two terrorists did the same in a station crowded with several thousand commuters. They then joined the group at the Nariman House, hijacking a passing police jeep by killing the four officials inside. But en route to the rendezvous, this vehicle was challenged at a police checkpoint. As it escaped, one of the terrorists was wounded and arrested, providing a major breakthrough.
The Oberoi Hotel group walked into the lobby and the ground-floor restaurant, killing dozens of people who were having dinner. At both the hotels and the Nariman House, residents were taken hostage or stayed locked up in their rooms. Some were herded out and shot.
All four sites were located within a radius of two miles. Nearly 200 people, including several foreigners, were killed. The rest of the story is well known, including the way in which all four groups were neutralized. The important point for our focus here is to analyze how the terrorists arrived: from the sea. This incident occurred in Mumbai on 11/26, but it could easily happen again elsewhere.
Unconnected Intelligence Dots
On 19 November, one week before the attack, Indian intelligence intercepted phone conversations indicating that a vessel carrying terrorists had sailed from Karachi and was in a position about 50 miles southwest of that port. Two earlier reports from different agencies, in May and September, had indicated that Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT) terrorists were planning "something big." The United States, having assessed this group as threatening to its homeland security, had already banned it.
Indian ingelligence also indicated that high-profile targets in Mumbai, specifically the Taj Hotel and others located on the seafront, could be targeted. Unfortunately, these three bits of information, though communicated to different agencies at the time they became known, were never put together or analyzed. Therefore, no indication was given of what could be expected, not to mention when or how.
They moved out of Pakistan at the maritime boundary separating that country from India by apprehending an Indian fishing trawler. They killed four of the five crewmen and, using the fifth as hostage, proceeded toward Mumbai, posing as a fishing vessel by day. The journey of about 500 miles was completed without any mishap, and the trawler was 4 to 5 miles off the city by the afternoon of the 26th.
The miscreants had a global positioning system with them, with their planned tracks marked. As darkness fell, the Gemini carried on board was inflated and lowered. Into it went the ten terrorists, each wearing an inflated lifejacket and carrying a shoulder bag containing an AK 47, ten loaded magazines, and ten grenades. In addition, six bombs made of lethal RDX, about ten pounds each, were embarked. A 45-horsepower outboard motor was lowered and started, and all was ready for the final approach. The fifth crewman was killed and the raid began.
The absolutely professional nature of this mission becomes clear if we appreciate that all this was done even as the two craft rolled and pitched in the darkness, in a not-too-calm sea. Well trained commandos could not have done this any better.
The terrorists set forth loaded with about 60 pounds of weaponry each. The fishing village they had selected has about 100 boats variously at anchor or beached. Into this congested area, spread over a waterfront barely 100 yards wide, the Gemini made its darkened approach. The coastline was lit like a Christmas tree, and the final journey was completed without hindrance. Luckily, choppy waters dissuaded the terrorists from opening the underwater valves of the trawler as they had planned, and the boat was located the next day, providing vital intelligence.
Valuable Information Gathered
The terrorists' sea passage spanned the Indian exclusive economic zone across two coastal states: Gujarat to the north bordering Pakistan, and Maharashtra. Together they account for almost 60,000 fishing boats of various sizes, mechanized and otherwise, not all of them registered or with required authorization. These waters also host dozens of oil platforms of different sizes and functions in the oil and gas industries, from drilling to processing to pumping. There are several Indian Coast Guard stations but only marginal marine police forces; a couple of radar stations stand guard, but the possibility of detecting small craft is low, and that of differentiating between friend and foe even lower.
Patrol boats provide staggered and random surveillance, assisted by aircraft. This is the barrier that the attackers crossed with such great ease. All of this, of course, became known only later, when the fishing trawler was located and the captured terrorist, a prize catch, interrogated.
Subsequent days also brought home the sophistication of the attack, including how the computer-based voice link for conversation between handlers in Karachi and their "workforce" in Mumbai was camouflaged to avoid identification. But within hours of the raid's start, this link was intercepted, tracked, and continuously monitored and taped. Everything indicated an operation by a very capable terrorist group such as the LeT—masterminded, planned, and executed by people well versed in special operations.
Several measures have, of course, now been taken to plug the loopholes, of which there were quite a few in the system. Whether such an attack can be repeated in India or take other forms remains to be seen, but the lessons drawn from this experience apply to many countries that are similarly exposed, including the United States. It may be useful to see what India is trying to do or has already done on this score.
The Status of Antiterrorism in India
Intelligence is clearly key to preemptive and/or preventive action against terrorism. There are several agencies involved in this activity at both the federal and state levels. Coordination and exchange of information between them all is essential. Just as 9/11 found these very aspects wanting in the United States, so did 11/26 in India. The inputs obtained by federal agencies were not shared with the two state governments or between them. There was no analysis of the inputs that were available. A National Intelligence Agency has now been constituted to rectify these shortcomings.
Coastal surveillance also proved to be weak. Until now, security at sea was a naval responsibility only in the blue waters. Security in the exclusive economic zone came under the purview of the Coast Guard, while state marine police forces patrolled the coastal belt within their territorial jurisdictions. This was largely ineffective.
In the new security environment, an entirely warfighting role for the Navy can no longer be sustained. The force must also assume counterterrorism duties during peacetime. Accordingly, the entire range of maritime security, both at and from the sea, and against state as well as non-state actors, has now been assigned to the Navy. For this purpose, Coast Guard forces involved in coastal security will function under naval control, and operations of the two maritime forces will be joined and networked for real-time exchange of information, facilitating efficient command and control.
Marine policing of coastal states is also being strengthened and will take orders from these joint operations control centers as required. Measures to augment resources needed for coastal security—ships, aircraft, and more radar stations—have been initiated. Similarly, quick-reaction forces, until now positioned only in Delhi to be moved as required, will be augmented and positioned at four or five important locations.
All vessels entering Indian ports will need to provide advance information of arrival and cargoes carried. Indian craft below 300 tons must have automatic-identification-systems transponders, and all fishing boats will compulsorily be registered, until now done quite lackadaisically. Port security, including harbor patrols, is to be strengthened along with the screening of containers that is already required under the Container Security Initiative, but not yet implemented in India and many other countries.
The entire offshore area of oil-and-gas exploitation is being declared a prohibited area with zero tolerance of violations. In short, all possible measures are now being taken to ensure security of the exposed coast. Had these been taken earlier, they might have prevented the Mumbai attacks. They will certainly make things a lot more difficult for elements planning such dastardly acts in future. These Indian responses to the terrorist threat have application in many countries.
The Larger Maritime-Security Picture
Serious as the events of 11/26 were, they cannot overshadow the larger issues of maritime security. The Indian Ocean littoral is a vital region. Not only do its sea routes carry about half of all global seaborne commerce, but a fifth of this comprises oil and gas. Energy lifelines of many countries start and stop here. The United States, France, Japan, India, and China are all major importers of energy from the Gulf, and the dependence will only increase with time. Since 65 percent the world's known oil and 35 percent of the gas are located in this littoral, it is most unlikely that involvement will diminish in the foreseeable future. Additionally, resources under the sea are yet to be discovered. All of this lends great strategic importance to the region.
All access points to the Indian Ocean pass through restricted waters. In these channels, there is little scope for violent maneuvering or high speed, which makes it easy for miscreants to board vessels and rob or hijack them. The waters off Somalia have overtaken the Malacca Straits as the most dangerous area. Dozens of ships have been hijacked in this region.
The first and definitive blow against these criminals was struck in 2008 by the Indian Navy, when one of its frigates first warded off threatening moves and later actually sank a Thai trawler being used by the pirates who had hijacked it earlier. A few days later, another Indian warship apprehended a dozen pirates. Since then there have been more arrests by ships of other nations. Complicating matters, the political situation in the region is not very reassuring. Most littorals are faced with racial, religious, sectarian, and ethnic problems. There is also the inherent dissonance between Shiite Iran and the predominantly Sunni Gulf states. The strategic importance of the Indian Ocean littoral has, therefore, to be viewed in the context of its vulnerability.
India's interests are both strategic and more proximate. The Bay of Bengal and Arabian Sea guard its eastern and western flanks. To the south, approaches toward subcontinental India pass through the island nations of Mauritius and Seychelles and, nearer home, Sri Lanka and the Maldives. As stated earlier, external powers show a continuing interest of in this region, manifested in military presence. China is not yet on the scene, but, given the pace of its naval modernization, energy interests, and clearly articulated goals, it is inevitable that it will seek to be an Indian Ocean player before long. Its involvement in development of ports in Pakistan, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka, which could later be available for use by its ships as base facilities, is a harbinger of what lies ahead. These developments need to be monitored closely.
Addressing Maritime Threats Together
Much has recently been written about piracy and potential acts of maritime terrorism. Obviously, adequate capabilities are needed to cope with these threats, but these alone will not help. Close cooperation with maritime forces of other nations is vital. In the Indian Ocean, India is the preeminent regional force at sea. Thus it must play a proactive role to promote engagement with both littoral countries, many of which do not have capabilities of their own, and those with similar interests and concerns.
In recent years, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand have come together to ensure safe movement in the Malacca Straits. This has reduced incidents of piracy considerably. India also patrols the approaches in coordination with these littorals. Something similar was needed in the Gulf of Aden; a beginning was made last year in the form of Combined Task Force 151, an international effort. Several countries, including India and China, have deployed warships in that region, and their presence has provided some deterrence even as sporadic incidents of piracy continue. India is also assisting the government of Seychelles in counter-piracy patrols in those waters.
India is more seriously involved than most in the safety of merchant ships, because a great number of them have Indian crews. We need to expand on cooperative interfaces: standalone capabilities can never be enough to cope with such challenges. Joint exercises and regular interaction are key ingredients of engagement at sea. They promote the mutual confidence and trust without which meaningful cooperation and sharing of intelligence is not possible. The U.S.-India engagement at sea provides a good model of how such interfaces can be created and nurtured.
The Indian Ocean is also susceptible to frequent natural disasters, and cooperative regional capabilities are needed. India, as the largest maritime force in the area, has a special responsibility to respond effectively in times of such disasters. Acquiring the ex-USS Trenton, a former U.S. Navy amphibious transport-dock vessel subsequently renamed INS Jalashva, has been one step in that direction.
Like all others, the Indian Navy has been groomed to counter threats from nation states. Peacetime constabulary duties, considered somewhat inferior until now, are not part of its ethos. The emerging environment, however, requires a change in this mindset. In times of crisis such as that faced by the country on 11/26, the public sees the Navy as the guarantor of security at and from the sea. The citizenry at large is unable and unwilling to divide responsibility or accountability between various maritime forces such as the Coast Guard, marine police, and others.
Combat readiness is a full-time activity in times of peace, and diversion of assets to other duties comes at a cost. But the Navy does not have police powers, and ways must be found to devise appropriate capabilities in this regard. The U.S. Navy has overcome this difficulty by embarking its Coast Guard units on board Navy warships in Task Force 151. But changes in mindset and long-established methods are not easy, and maritime powers must learn from one another's experiences and practices.
Economic growth has become a key determinant in a nation's development. Energy security and overseas trade depend on tranquility at sea. These factors are becoming increasingly important; as economies grow, so will their importance. In short, the security concerns of countries such as India, which have long remained fixated on land, are now shifting seaward. In the Asian continent, the Indian Ocean is acquiring new strategic dimensions. Nations, especially those with maritime interests, must react and adjust to these changes.