Blurring the Lines
(See J. Murphy, p. 12, July 2009 Proceedings)
Intelligence Specialist Seaman Thomas F. Christie, U.S. Navy—With the greatest respect to the senior chief, I was very interested to read his thoughts on the new Navy Service Uniform that we are now wearing. I could not help but respectfully disagree with his opinion. I am a newly minted Sailor, very green with much to learn. My division was one of the first to be issued the new "Peanut Butters" as we are now calling them at Recruit Training Command Great Lakes. Yes, we are "all wearing khaki now," but there is still a distinction in senior and junior enlisted personnel and not just with uniforms. I know as I walk down a passageway when a chief is walking toward me. The way chiefs carry themselves; their professionalism, the experience, the pride, it's all readily visible. They are in every respect the sort of Sailor I wish to be.
They serve as an inspiration and proof what hard work and pride in the job can do. Such a person stands out regardless of the uniform they are wearing. The best examples I can think of are the new cammies, the NWU-Navy Working Uniform. While I agree the lack of rating badges is somewhat bothersome in being able to properly address petty officers, the collar devices remain unchanged.
In that uniform there is still a distinction between junior and senior personnel, the stitching for names and "U.S. NAVY" is in gold for chiefs and officers, and silver for petty officers and below. But even in this situation where the difference is not as grand as the old utilities vs. khaki once were, again the collar device and the way chiefs handle themselves is of greater significance to me than any uniform color. We could all be wearing haze gray and I would still show the same respect for the senior enlisted that I do now. It is a matter of respect in the leadership that transcends clothing. Yes, the heritage may be changing, even disappearing perhaps, but a new one is forming that still tips its hat to the old while embracing the new. To that—as was hammered into my head at Great Lakes so many times—"Gold Fouled Anchor with Silver Super-Imposed USN," I will always show the utmost respect, and I am sure I can count on a great many of my fellow junior shipmates to do the same.
Senior Chief Cryptologic Technician (Interpretive) Daniel D. Moore, U.S. Navy—While I respect and agree with most things my esteemed colleague writes, I have to disagree with his most recent comments about the uniform he, unfortunately, misidentifies as the Navy Working Uniform. The uniform about which he writes is, in fact, the new Navy Service Uniform (NSU). The NWU is the new blue and gray digital camouflage uniform recently authorized for the entire Fleet and worn by all ranks from seaman to admiral.
The new NSU for seaman to petty officer first class has been the subject of derision and complaint since it was initially announced for many of the same tired reasons put forth in this column. I say, however, that those who dislike the uniform and point to it as evidence of the decay of the Navy's heritage and culture miss the point. For evidence, look to our sister services and our own history and heritage.
In the Marine Corps, the only difference between a gunnery sergeant and a sergeant is the two rockers below the gunny's three chevrons. Yet, no Marine would ever mistake the two. The reason for this is because the gunnery sergeant understands the additional duties and responsibilities of his or her rank and exercises the authority of that rank on a daily basis. The same principle applies in the Army.
Just as clothes do not make the man, the uniform does not make the chief. How hard do we try to instill in our new chief petty officers every year the idea that being the chief is more than just wearing the anchors? The reason we put new chiefs through initiation (or induction if you prefer) is to "impress upon [them] that challenge is good; a great and necessary reality which cannot mar [them]—which, in fact, strengthens [them]." Chiefs were chiefs long before they were ever authorized to wear the same uniform as officers. From the creation of the rank of chief petty officer in 1893 until just before World War II, chief petty officers' uniforms were essentially the same as the uniform worn by more junior enlisted.
Chiefs are chiefs not because of the uniforms they wear, or even the anchors on their collars. They are chiefs because of who we are and what we do. Chiefs earn their anchors every day through their actions, which demand the respect of both seniors and juniors. To quote the oft-quoted cliche , "the chief is still the chief, even in a towel and shower shoes."
Ships of State
(See M. J. Quigley, pp. 54-58, July 2009 Proceedings)
Commander Harold H. Sacks, U.S. Navy (Retired)—Lieutenant Quigley's research may not have uncovered two examples of Cold War "gunboat diplomacy" that may be of interest.
In the 1950s, Sixth Fleet ships making port visits to places like Cannes, France, were greeted by large signs on the quay saying "Americans Go Home." During those years the Communist Party was very powerful in France and Italy and there was concern that voters would face coercion during elections. The Sixth Fleet commander saw to it that a U.S. Navy warship was in every major port around election time, showing the flag, and contributing to free elections.
In 1960, the Soviets shot down a U.S. surveillance aircraft, and Premier Nikita Khrushchev was pounding his shoe on the table at the United Nations. That summer, the USS Davis (DD-937) and USS Harlan R. Dickson (DD-708), under the tactical command of Captain Alan Nibbs, transited the Dardanelles and the Bosporus into the Black Sea. Testing the Montreux Convention, they were the first U.S. warships to enter the Black Sea since 1945. The task unit was met and trailed by two Soviet Kotlin-class destroyers, yet successfully gathered significant sonar and signals intelligence from Romania, Bulgaria, and the Crimea while greatly bolstering Turkish morale during port visits to Eregli, Samsun, and Trabzon. The Soviet and U.S. warships remained in Condition 3 (at least one gun mount, director, and plotting station manned) at all times when under way.
Injecting a bit of levity and gamesmanship, Captain Nibbs ordered the ships to light off four boilers prior to getting under way from Eregli. The Kotlins, patrolling offshore, were caught with their superheaters down and were left behind to their embarrassment, making clouds of black smoke as the Davis and Dickson disappeared over the horizon.
The Contested Commons
(See M. Flournoy and S. Brimley, pp. 16-21, July 2009 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Mark Harris, U.S. Navy—The authors suggest "the time is right to both reframe American grand strategy and rebalance the U.S. military to succeed in today's wars while preparing for tomorrow's challenges." They also suggest a critical pillar in our emerging strategy should be "Helping to build the capacity of our partners and allies and working toward a common agenda." During the past few years, Department of Defense doctrine has been replete with affirmations of the importance of building and enhancing global partnerships.
Good as they may sound, words and talk of "partnership" and "common agenda" do not guarantee the present or future existence of either. In his superb book on modern counterinsurgency practice, The Accidental Guerrilla, David Kilkullen noted that even the United Kingdom—our closest alliance partner—does not share the United States' overarching strategic view on the global prosecution of terrorism. If we are to remake our strategy standing on a pillar of partner capacity and shared agenda (both good ideas in my opinion), we would do well to earnestly consult our alliance partners as we formulate the strategy, and not presume they will follow us down the path of our choosing.
Adapting The Force to the Fight: Naval Special Warfare
(See J. J. Burnham, pp. 22-27, July 2009 Proceedings)
Commander Kevin Sudbeck, U.S. Navy—While I agree with the author's comments, it reflects a stovepipe view within Naval Special Warfare (NSW) with respect to air support. It does not significantly address the issue of Joint and Interagency Teamwork (Naval Aviation). This seems to be a trend in Special Warfare as a whole, as the ground forces do not understand the inner workings of special operations aviation. Also, the lack of a dedicated Naval Special Warfare air arm hinders the ability of NSW to prosecute a campaign plan in an effective manner to achieve the desired effects.
What I've heard in my interaction with special forces commanders is that they want more of that air "stuff," but it is beyond their comprehension to understand how it works. Army Special Forces not only have a dedicated rotary arm, but also are able to leverage the U.S. Air Force special operations forces. Because of this dedicated SOF air arm, they have a much deeper understanding of the processes and nuances relating to SOF ground forces. Compared to those entities, naval aviation's understanding of NSW operations and processes is, at best, elementary.
Thankfully, our service is recognizing this issue and developing a dedicated NSW air arm in the reserve forces. But this is not enough and is a superficial response. Without a type wing in the active forces to manage the processes and relationships necessary to be successful in the SOF world, the reserve solution is inefficient and will not achieve the desired effect. The naval air enterprise needs to recognize the importance of a dedicated SOF air arm, with the backing infrastructure to fully and effectively support NSW's specialized skills in the developing irregular warfare strategy. I feel the effects of cognitive inertia, however, will hinder development of this organizational entity matched to the developing irregular warfare strategy.
The Promise of a Port Call
(See C. Hymen, p. 60-62, July 2009 Proceedings)
Cryptologic Technician (Interpretive) Second Class Joseph Courtemanche, U.S. Navy—The ensign has a very good idea that will result in a dismal future for blue shirts. Sometimes a Sailor just needs to get off the ship and sit in a sidewalk cafe. You don't have to drink (and, on a rare occasion I actually didn't have a drop, but my memory is clouded) or carouse to have fun, but it sure allows you to blow off enough steam to deal with the stress and monotony that is shipboard life. My ships regularly offered tours of local historical locations, visits to schools and factories, and the opportunity to grow culturally.
Where I differ with the author is that while it is a nice idea to hold volunteer activities, there is a streak in our Navy that drives an odious behavior—"My crew is more public spirited than yours." This reaches from squadron to ship to wardroom to berthing compartment. Some leaders with a desire to advance feel that if their people are more involved than the other guy's, they will gain from it professionally. This attitude led a former CO of mine to call me on the carpet for not donating to the Combined Federal Campaign. He offered to put the money in for me so he could hit 100 percent command compliance. I politely declined (E-3 vs. O-4 is not a good basis for argument) and left the office. Imagine my chagrin when we had 100 percent participation-and my donation card had been forged by the officer I was supposed to follow.
Even worse, this pressure will be brought to bear on everyone on board to "play nice and make us look good" when such events occur. Now, instead of visiting a local bar/pizza parlor/park/beach and having some fun and relaxation, you get to go with your division officer and chief and the boys/girls to spend your day off taking orders in civvies. If you fail to "volunteer" and you have a leader like the one I described here, it will surely be reflected in your eval and the jobs you are assigned. It is easier to volunteer against your will than do every lousy job that comes along. This doesn't appeal to me in the least.
Anyone with a memory of those horrible mandatory fun day experiences that constituted the command picnic will quickly see my point. If this is to take place, make it a duty day and plan an extra day or two in the port to do the project. Don't short the crew liberty to make the project happen. This would be a great solution and still accomplish the goals the author has set forth. And ensign, have a beer for me next time you're in Rota. I tilted a few there in my day—before you were born.
From the Seas to the Stars
(See T. Cremins, pp. 38-42, July 2009 Proceedings)
Eric Soskin—This article on cis-lunar space starts off on the right foot, noting Mahan's summary of maritime philosophy as "display the flag, open new markets, protect U.S. commerce, aid vessels in distress, [etc.]," in an environment of increasing and international activity. Ironically, the author then outlines an American space future built around NASA's Ares program, while downplaying potential private, commercial enterprises that are likely both to lead America's future space presence and to provide Mahan's commerce, new markets, and vessels in distress.
Cremins writes "[c]ommercial launch capabilities and services are not yet suited" to lead the way beyond "low Earth orbit," and thus, that "government engagement and resources" will be required for cis-lunar and lunar presence and transportation. This is a puzzling conclusion given that after the space shuttle's scheduled retirement next year, NASA will lack even a transportation system to carry astronauts and cargo to the International Space Station in low-earth orbit (LEO) and has contracted with private industry to help fill the gap. The delays and design challenges with the Ares program and its complexity and cost indicate it is unlikely to increase the frequency or responsiveness of American space access from the current shuttle era.
In contrast, July's successful commercial launch of Malaysia's Razaksat by privately-funded SpaceX represents a significant step forward for commercial space pioneers. With plans to launch the Falcon 9 later this year, and contracts to supply the ISS, SpaceX is demonstrating that high costs and government involvement may not be irreducible requirements for space transportation. With Bigelow Aerospace's plans for its Sundancer habitat and 19 teams competing for the Google Lunar X Prize, private entities are also taking aim at the idea that space habitation and lunar transportation are necessarily in the province of government. The freedom of these entrepreneurs-and the better-publicized suborbital tourism companies-to innovate is likely to bring the breakthroughs in access cost and frequency that NASA has not been able to achieve.
To move beyond LEO to the moon in the next decade, it's likely that commercial players will adopt some of the space-infrastructure ideas rejected by former NASA administrator Mike Griffin, such as orbital assembly and fuel depots. The United States thus cannot assume that its heavy-lift vehicle (if successful) will dominate cis-lunar access or that a launcher program will be sufficient to assure the government presence required to achieve the identified objectives.
Instead, it must move beyond a launch system-centric viewpoint and develop a strategy that can evolve to promote and take advantage of the new tools and technologies of space access and infrastructure.
With wisdom gained protecting American interests throughout the oceans and recent experience leveraging commercial technologies at sea, the U.S. Navy has much to add to those developing this strategy. Certainly thoughtful course corrections will be required to secure and maintain American leadership from the Earth to the moon and beyond.