Commander William Earl Fannin, Class of 1945, Capstone Essay Contest
This essay contest is for first-class midshipmen at the U.S. Naval Academy and is named in honor of Commander William Earl Fannin, U.S. Naval Academy Class of 1945, and supported by his bequest. Normally, there is a prize awarded in each major warfare specialty.
In almost any discussion about naval aviation, the word "retention" is used. All the armed services face retention problems, but the strain is being felt particularly hard in aviation. The future naval aviators in my class have the opportunity to be part of either the problem or the solution. Money is a simple solution, but it is neither the only one, nor even the most effective. When deciding how to solve the aviation community's retention problem, the senior leadership must look for the hard answers—because they will make a greatest impact.
The Navy's shortage of pilots was 1,077 in 1999, but it was expected to drop to 825 by 2002. The Air Force, however, had a shortage of 1,354 in 1999 and a projected shortage of 1,943 by 2002.1 This is not the first time that military aviation has experienced shortages. The periods before the Korean and Vietnam wars also saw pilot shortfalls. When a short-term balance is not attained, the Navy looks for short-term solutions that may or may not be helpful in the long run. But to end the cycle of shortages and surpluses, a short-term, relatively painless solution might have to be passed over for a possibly painful, long-term solution.
The Navy and the Air Force face similar problems, but the Navy also has problems of its own. These include extended forward deployments, long workup schedules, and seemingly never-ending flight-school delays. With 12 aircraft carriers and only 10 air wings, the Navy constantly is trying to reshuffle its aviators. One proposed solution is an increase in the number of air wings to match the number of carriers. It is difficult, however, to form a new air wing when the retention problem (not to mention the equipment shortage problem) is so great. In addition, an aviator returning home from a six-month deployment probably is facing workups and more periods under way instead of time at home. Flight-school delays add another dimension to the retention problem. The solution to shortening the delay requires that experienced pilots become instructors, which would leave fleet squadrons with even fewer pilots. The Air Force does not face these particular problems because of differences in training and deployment strategies.
The primary causes of the retention problem can be narrowed to the following: quality of life; distrust in leadership; pay (including airline competition); and maintenance and safety. Pay is not near the top of the list of reasons aviators are leaving, but it always is the first solution attempted. During testimony before the House Armed Services Committee by Vice Admiral D. T. Oliver, Chief of Naval Personnel and Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Manpower and Personnel, pay/compensation was the primary focus while quality-of-life issues received a few short sentences. He did say that "the reduction of 'at home' OpTempo has recently been addressed by the CNO with his mandated 25% across-the-board reduction in Interdeployment Training Cycle requirements."2 In addition to deployment concerns, quality-of-life issues include family pressures and standard of living. The lure of the airlines does not lie only in the pay increase, but also in the immeasurable jump in quality of life.
The most difficult cause to correct, and the one that leads to the most introspection, is the issue of distrust of the leadership—both military and civilian. In a survey taken in 1987 of 4,230 Air Force pilots who were leaving the service, the primary reason they were leaving was dissatisfaction with "leadership and supervision at and above unit level."3 This sentiment is echoed by former commanding officer of the Blue Angels, retired Commander Robert Stumpf. He believes that the military's fighting spirit is dead or dying, and the leadership is responsible. "The flight of our military aviators has little to do with how much we pay them," he emphasizes, "and much to do with the decline of their cherished military culture and traditions. They will continue to be dissatisfied until their leadership's policies actively and definitely support a warrior approach at the squadron level."4
Another cause of the retention problem is the one that people hear most about: pay. A pilot who leaves the service at age 30 to work for an airline will see his pay drop from $61,000 to $32,000 in the first year, but he will pass through his military pay in four years and has the potential to earn more than $220,000 by the time he reaches age 50.5 The Navy instituted the Aviation Officer Continuation Pay (AOCP) program in 1981. It was initially successful, but only 10% of eligible carrier pilots took the bonus in l998.6 Pay probably never will be at a level that pleases everyone, so we may be wasting our time thinking that money will be the factor that retains our aviators.
The final causes behind the aviation retention problem include maintenance and safety issues, and personal reasons—such as the lack of flying as a pilot nears the end of his career. With retention a problem across the board, the maintenance of aircraft is going to suffer. Pilots are tired of having downed aircraft and wondering if their planes are genuinely safe to fly once they are in the air. Pilots also are frustrated by the amount of their time consumed by non-flying collateral duties—which might lure them to the airlines, where their sole job is to fly.
The solutions to retention are not so clear cut. The first goal should be to improve quality of life. That means deployment schedules and interdeployment workups must be examined so that any changes will be beneficial both to the individual pilot and the Navy as a whole. The flight school backup must be eliminated so that the Navy produces pilots as quickly as the Air Force and the strain on experienced fleet pilots can be decreased. One way to do this is to consider more senior officers for flight-instructor duty. This would solve the concern that flying time decreases as seniority increases, and it would allow young pilots to train with very experienced aviators.7 Improvements in quality of life also can mean that pilots have more say about where their next duty stations will be. This will help pilots feel that they are working with the system instead of against it.
Distrust of leadership is a difficult problem to solve quickly. It is tied, directly and indirectly, to all of the other problems. Feelings of distrust stem from the perception among junior officers that no one really listens to their concerns. If things were to change for the better, pilots would have a sense that their voices finally were being heard.
Many solutions are floating around, some dealing with pay. The AOCP already is in place, although it may have to be reviewed to see how well it compares with civilian bonuses and pay. When young officers decide to leave the Navy for the airlines, part of the reason is that they think they will not be competitive for an airline job if they stay in the military for 20 years. The Air Force has addressed this problem with a program called Phoenix Aviator 20. Under this program, pilots receive a guarantee that they will have flying assignments for their last two years of duty and serious consideration from the airlines when they retire. This is in return for a commitment of 20 years in the Air Force.8 A similar program would benefit the Navy.
The Navy also cannot afford to fall behind on its maintenance and safety standards. Broken aircraft must be fixed and quality maintenance must be the standard. Again, the issues of pay and quality of life come into play, this time for the enlisted personnel who keep pilots in the air. Top enlisted professionals within the aviation community should be given the opportunity to become warrant officers and then pilots, much as the Army does in its helicopter program.
This is not an exhaustive list of all the causes and solutions to the retention problem facing naval aviation today. This does provide, however, a general outline of the areas with which we—as junior officers—are concerned. We ask senior military and civilian leaders to help us to become part of the solution to the retention problem.
Ensign Alexander will finish her master of science in finance at the University of Maryland before going on to flight school in Pensacola.
1. Christopher Jehn, testimony before House Armed Services Committee. back to article
2. Vice Admiral D. T. Oliver, testimony before House Armed Services Committee. back to article
3. W. J. Kelly, "The Canadian Forces Pilot Shortage Problem: An Outsider's Perspective," Ex-New Horizons. back to article
4. Robert Stumlif, "Problems with Pilot Retention in the Post-Tailhook Armed Forces." back to article
5. Kelly. back to article
6. Ibid. back to article
7. Jehn. back to article
8. Ibid. back to article