The naval component that provided support to Operation Enduring Freedom from November 2001 to April 2002 was impressive in the sheer number of ships, aircraft, and nations involved. Yet the true significance of the coalition naval support effort was in the operational proficiencies and capabilities demonstrated by participating forces. A new level of integration and coordination was achieved through the hard work and determination of all parties involved, particularly those units of Task Force 50 operating in the North Arabian Sea.
A new mission was developed in late November 2001 to support the maritime interdiction of al Qaeda and Taliban leaders fleeing war-ravaged Afghanistan. Dubbed leadership interdiction, it initially was planned and executed by Commander, Destroyer Squadron 9, the sea combat commander for Task Force 50. Destroyer Squadron 21 took over this role on 15 December 2001. Task Force 50's operations demonstrated the expertise and incredible energy coalition units brought to the battle force, achieving results that never could have been realized by a U.S. carrier battle group operating alone. Canada, Italy, the Netherlands, France, Greece, Australia, Bahrain, and the United Kingdom provided a combined average of 25 ships to the North Arabian Sea battle force during a five-month period to support leadership interdiction for Task Force 50. Many more nations contributed to theater-wide naval operations for Commander, U.S. Fifth Fleet, including Spain, Germany, and Japan. From command and control to basic maritime interdiction procedures, the staff of Carrier Group 7 and Destroyer Squadron 21 were astounded every day by the capabilities and can-do spirit the coalition partners exhibited.
Allied integration into U.S. carrier battle groups proved a boost to capabilities in all warfare areas. As the John C. Stennis (CVN-74) battle group prepared to surge deploy two months earlier than planned in support of Operation Enduring Freedom, HMCS Vancouver was added while she was operating with the Canadian Pacific Fleet in mid-October 2001 off southern California. The Vancouver had just three weeks to complete her exercise and return to Esquimalt, British Columbia, to outfit and prepare for deployment on 12 November. She came ready to fight and was an integral part of the battle group the moment she reported for duty.
While the John C. Stennis battle group prepared for an early deployment, several coalition nations entered the theater of operations for Enduring Freedom. Important additions beyond the ships, submarines, and aircraft were the afloat staffs that came with their national contingents. Commander, Canadian Forces Atlantic, deployed as the "high readiness" staff from Halifax on board HMCS Iroquois and coordinated missions such as surface defense of the Peleliu (LHA-5) and Bataan (LHD-5) amphibious ready groups during the early stages of land operations in Afghanistan. Commander, Naval Group Italy, deployed with the ITS Giuseppe Garibaldi, which had forces committed to overland operations in Afghanistan, as did Commander, French Task Force. In mid-November, as combined air and land operations pushed the Taliban from power, and senior leaders of al Qaeda evaded capture in the caves of Tora Bora, Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, ordered Task Force 50 to block the sea and air routes of escape from southern Pakistan. The interdiction of escaping al Qaeda and Taliban members became a unique mission area; it was an ideal vehicle that helped integrate further the coalition's surface combatants.
As requirements for surface defense of the several amphibious ready groups became less critical in late November and early December, Commander, Canadian Atlantic Fleet, became available to support the sea combat commander's execution of leadership interdiction. This kind of operation is similar to maritime interception operations in support of United Nations sanctions against Iraq, but it has separate rules of engagement, a distinct area of operations (the North Arabian Sea), and a different target (terrorists). Just sorting through the vast array of vessels that could transport escaping individuals presented a significant challenge to the task force. The large search area (roughly 80,000 square miles) complicated the hunt for contacts of interest, and it was the ideal situation to designate a sector sea combat commander. The Canadians were the logical first choice for this duty, as their staff is trained and oriented toward the execution of surface and subsurface warfare. In addition, the Canadian task group staff has rules of engagement and communications capabilities closely matched with U.S. forces. Another factor that made the Canadians ideal for the job was their liaison officer, who had been in the John C. Stennis with the sea combat commander since the time the Vancouver had arrived at the battle group. The liaison officers played an instrumental role in coordinating many communications and rules-of-engagement issues, and they became the key lines of communication between the Canadians and the sea combat commander.
Even as geography issues necessitated the creation of a sector sea combat commander, unreliable high-frequency communications and limited ultra-high-frequency satellite access made implementation more important. One way Commander, Canadian Atlantic Fleet, and the sea combat commander were able to maintain nearly continuous communications and share vital information was through the use of the Coalition Wide-Area Network. Developed to enhance real-time data sharing through super-high-frequency communication paths, real-time chat, web sites, and e-mail, network terminals and servers had been installed into major command-and-control stations on the John C. Stennis just prior to deployment. This network facilitated continuous direct communication between the sea combat commander and his sector commander in real time to share intelligence and operational reports and refine operational goals and plans. As a result, the Canadians became major contributors to the leadership interdiction mission. In the words of one allied commander, the Coalition Wide-Area Network "brought integration to a level we would not have thought possible."
Many coalition naval units brought similar, if not more, capabilities in national command-and-control systems than the Canadian units. Systemic and architectural differences, however, prevented a closer integration of these coalition partners. In mid-February 2002, Commander, Naval Group Italy, assumed duties as a second sector commander, with responsibility for another large geographic region of interest in the North Arabian Sea to execute leadership interdiction. The Italian units brought with them a wealth of knowledge concerning maritime interception operations from their participation in Operation Sharp Guard in the Adriatic in the 1990s as well as a complete package of special operations forces, naval infantry, and capabilities suited to this kind of mission. They also came with national and NATO super-high-frequency communications systems, such as LOCE and CRONOS, which have real-- time data exchange capabilities similar to those of the Coalition Wide-Area Network. The latter network, however, is a Pacific Fleet initiative and common to many coalition units that normally work in the Pacific, and LOCE and CRONOS are associated with NATO, Atlantic Fleet, and Mediterranean-oriented units. LOCE's belated installation on the John C. Stennis made it more useful as an administrative tool for liaison officers to contact their ships. Battle force e-mail, which almost all coalition units had installed either prior to arrival or in theater, was another alternative for sharing near-real-time data. Because battle force e-mail relies on high-frequency propagation, ships often were beyond direct high-frequency range-making battle force e-mail unreliable as an operational or tactical tool. The capabilities that the Coalition Wide-Area Network provided to the sea combat commander demonstrate the need for a common super-high-frequency command-and-control system to be integrated fully into coalition battle force operations. Whether we use the Coalition Wide-Area Network, LOCE, CRONOS, or a system not yet designed, a common operating standard will help further integrate coalition naval forces at sea.
A unique facet of coalition naval operations is the common purpose that brings all the units together. Naturally, each nation has its own unique rules of engagement and operating policies that might limit what their units can do. One nation's policies might align perfectly with certain missions, such as leadership interdiction and the boarding of suspect vessels, but the rules of engagement of another nation might allow the boarding of a suspect vessel only under particular circumstances. One challenge for the sea combat commander in executing leadership interdiction was blending these varying rules of engagement to support a variety of operations. Where some units such as the Italians brought highly specialized boarding forces to the effort, units with more restrictive rules of engagement found creative solutions to problems that arose and provided detailed information critical to interdiction operations.
One example was the localization and tracking of merchantmen of interest from one port to the next. Coalition units were very inventive in adapting their littoral tactics to help provide valuable information that shaped the way the sea combat commander moved forces to intercept, query, and visit these merchantmen when they got under way. One problem with dealing with local fisherman and coastal mariners in this region is that many do not speak English, nor do many carry very-high-frequency radios. Naturally, they rarely respond to classic radio hails or direction unless approached by a warship or warship's small boat. Coalition forces were particularly adept in establishing face-to-face communication with smaller vessels through hand gestures or signs in local dialects (Farsi and Arabic). Such interactions established a more friendly relationship with local mariners and provided detailed observations of coastal maritime activity.
Whereas U.S. forces might have approached local traffic cautiously because of force protection concerns, many in the coalition saw an opportunity to learn about the ordinary traffic in the area of operations. These observations demonstrated the need for gathering cultural intelligence and building a detailed plot of coastal maritime activity. For example, very few fishing dhows were observed in the immediate vicinity of the carriers' operating areas through the early part of 2002, but a distinct increase in dhows was observed literally overnight in late spring, when several hundred were fishing well off shore. As a result of engagement with local maritime traffic, our partners were able to discern and analyze such nuances and share them with the entire force. They became experts at building a maritime picture that included ferreting out elements of neutral shipping to a level of detail that was achieved only through their hard work and determination.
Without the contributions of coalition navies, leadership interdiction would not have been possible on such a large scale and likely would have had only marginal results. To date, thousands of vessels have been queried and many boarded, mostly by coalition naval units. Such a mission could be turned over to a coalition staff in the future. Recently, maritime interception operations in the North Arabian Gulf have been executed by a coalition commander from the multinational interception force (most recently from Australia). In the future, a coalition commander could embark on a U.S. aircraft carrier and work along-- side battle group staffs. This is an achievable objective, which would set a new precedent for coalition combined staff operations at sea.
Because the leadership interdiction commander will continue to be a subordinate warfare commander for Commander, Task Force 50, regardless of his location, it is important that liaison officers from each coalition partner are on board the Task Force 50 command ship. A direct link back to coalition ships to interpret and translate command intent and direction into a working-level staff dialogue and action is very important for integrating coalition partners into the mission. To smooth the command-and-control process, liaison officers are the key link between the task force commander, the sea combat commander, and the coalition forces at sea. Receiving sound tactical recommendations from the liaison officers, and expeditiously implementing these recommendations if they meet the commander's intent, builds a tremendous reservoir of trust.
In addition, a near-real-time operational and tactical information flow through e-mail, chat, and voice capabilities that comes with super-high-frequency bandwidth command-and-control systems, such as the Coalition Wide Area Network, is critical for continuing integration. A common operating system and architecture that links current resources must be available in the tactical watch standers' space for real-time information exchange. Without it, some coalition partners might be hampered and unable to participate fully.
In just a few months, coalition naval support to Operation Enduring Freedom has become nearly flawless. Coalition navies have been integral to the success of operations and will continue to be a necessary part of future operations in the war on terrorism. We must build on the lessons of these early days to integrate each nation's navy, with its staffs and ships, into a coherent fighting force for future phases of this most important campaign.
Lieutenant Williams was the operations officer for Destroyer Squadron 21. He now is special assistant to the Vice Chief of Naval Operations. Captain Wisecup was Commander, Destroyer Squadron 21. He now is a fellow at the Chief of Naval Operations’ Strategic Studies Group at the Naval War College.