President George W. Bush's statements on transformation of the U.S. military rarely are associated with specific programs, with two exceptions—the Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicle and the conversion of Ohio (SSBN-726)-class ballistic missile submarines to conventionally armed guided-missile submarines (SSGNs). Without addressing the merits of other initiatives promising to change the way the United States fights, it is clear that the SSGN program has a lot to offer in terms of transformation.
Surely the most transformational aspect of the SSGN is the conversion of a card-carrying Cold War strategic nuclear platform to a flexible conventional strike system. In shaping the mission sets for the extraordinary capability a converted Ohio could possess, the power projection mission, underwritten by the SSGN's more than 150 long-range missiles, was a no-brainer. But those who study the emerging concept of transformation, rather than just trying to use it to leverage a legacy program, know there is more to a revolution in military affairs than simply adding firepower. Recognizing that U.S. plans to project military power are increasingly vulnerable to anti-access threats, the Bush administration envisions a transformed force capable of succeeding under constraints far more stressing than those faced in Afghanistan. Specifically included in this vision are capabilities providing access-- insensitive intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), and access-insensitive high-volume precision strike.
Similarly, there is more to transformation than the incorporation of new technology or, in the SSGN case, the conversion of existing capability to meet new challenges. Doctrinal changes that institutionalize technical breakthroughs are important aspects of military transformation in both ISR and strike. Therefore, if the potential of the SSGN is to be realized, we need a concept of operations that contributes to a seamless mix of surveillance and strike.
The SSGNs likely will contribute in three key arenas: strike on time-critical targets; support of special operations forces; and the enhancement of submarine-based ISR in littoral regions. To support these missions, the SSGN must be integrated into the network, with real-time access to the information grid and the ability to support rapid decision making. The submarine also must have missiles fast enough to kill time-critical targets, capabilities to support SEALs (and other special operations forces), and enhanced ISR tools.
When it comes to support for special forces, our experience in Afghanistan again has emphasized the importance of ground forces to cue long-range precision strike. This easily transfers to a rediscovered need to provide covert ingress and egress for large numbers of special forces in contested littoral areas. Not only is updated doctrine appropriate here, but new hardware is needed as well. One of the shining stars of this effort is the Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS), essentially a mini-submarine of significant endurance that can mate to an SSN or SSGN and provide dry transportation for Navy SEALs. Although ASDS and SSGN had been following parallel, rather than congruent, development tracks, combining the two into a joint concept of operations is a superb example of adaptation and innovation.
After a series of design changes typical for a first-of-a-kind, first-of-a-class platform, the ASDS is making progress. ASDS-I was delivered to SEAL Team One for deep water testing in Pearl Harbor in August 2001, and two Los Angeles (SSN-688)-class submarines have been modified to test the minisub. Five more ASDSs are planned for delivery to the Special Operations Command over the next decade, but budget limitations and the current plan to acquire a vehicle every third year starting in fiscal year 04 guarantee that ASDS will be another low density/high demand system. A concept of operations that would field the system more quickly and affordably envisions an ASDS installed on each deployed SSGN—whether or not special operations forces are embarked. Thus, special operations forces would retain an organic ASDS to train with and, when lead time is available, would mate it with a suitably configured SSN for deployment. In a contingency calling for rapid deployment, SEALs could be airlifted to a location to join an SSGN already deployed with its combat-ready ASDS. Because the ASDS is air transportable, an additional system also could be deployed to an in-theater SSGN—two ASDS will fit side by side on the forward two tubes—doubling the rate at which SEALs could be inserted or extracted.
Coincident with the outfitting of the first ASDS in 2001, the Defense Advanced Research and Development Agency (DARPA) sponsored a submarine payload and sensors program in which industry and government entities were encouraged to think outside the box regarding future configurations for attack submarines. One of the findings was the need for large unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs), capable of conducting intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions at significant distances from the parent submarine. A term frequently used to describe this UUV during the DARPA program was "ASDS-- like."
Attack submarines of the future will be expected to perform ISR missions better than today's SSNs, and an ASDS-- like ISR platform such as that envisioned in the DARPA study would add great value to the parent ship and to littoral situational awareness. Unfortunately, such a platform does not now exist and surely will take years to define and develop. However, although unmanned variants are properly the goal, it is likely that sensor and processing realities and requirements will lead us to manned platforms in the near term.
Could an ASDS meet this need? Right now, the ASDS, optimized for SEAL delivery, is not configured for the ISR missions an SSGN would require, but there is no reason why, without interfering with the delivery schedule promised to the special operations forces, a variant could not be designed and constructed concurrently. One is reminded, as an analogy, of the C-130. This aircraft accomplished a multitude of missions in configurations never dreamed of when it first was designed as a troop carrier—gunship, electronic warfare, search and rescue, and emergency communications relay aircraft, for example.
The ASDS variant we might term a "manned adjuvant sensor platform" (MASP) would be very different internally from the ASDS. The hyperbaric chamber likely would be gone, and skilled technicians would man a number of electronic workstations fed by sophisticated radio frequency, acoustic, and photonic sensors, including a tethered remotely operated vehicle. The MASP could, for mission profiles of a day or so, bring organic sensors and onboard processing and evaluation into waters of 5-10 fathoms for missions including electronic intelligence, communications intelligence, acoustic intelligence, measurement and signature intelligence, and mine detection and localization. In addition, in time-sensitive situations, it would have the ability to insert acquired, fused, and evaluated information (not data) quickly into whatever version of a global grid/system of systems/network-centric cyber-system might then exist.
Desired sensor capabilities/characteristics of this vehicle would include:
- Good non-penetrating photonics mast with organic communications and electronic intelligence capability
- Active/passive sonar suite in support of acoustic intelligence, mine detection and localization, and own ship safety and protection
- Hydrographic and environmental sensors, possibly to include measurement and signature intelligence ISR requirements
- Onboard digital storage and processing capabilities to support evaluation of recovered data and transmission of information to higher authority
When considering the transformational nature of the SSGN, it is useful to think in terms of enabling strike as well as delivering cruise missiles from a stealthy stance. ASDS on board an SSGN represents an enormous potential expansion of that platform's littoral capabilities. When the system is always mated and maintained fully operational, it is far easier to get some number of special forces to the SSGN than to pack up and ship an ASDS. And given the need for enhanced ISR through UUVs, a logical first step is a manned version of a similar vehicle developed concurrently with ASDS. After all, the affordable dual use of existing programs and hardware to achieve new capabilities also is transformational.
The ASDS has been developed and exists, excess industrial resources are available (one or two platforms a year is preferable to six over a seven to eight year period because of production and manpower retention issues), and a submarine ISR issue remains unanswered. It would be prudent to accelerate the ASDS build rate both to guarantee on-time deliveries to special operations forces and to ensure that each SSGN has its own ASDS waiting for it after conversion. An SSGN with both an ASDS and an MASP would enhance the conduct of joint operations in a future littoral contingency immeasurably. In a transformational sense it might be said, Don't leave port without one (or both).
Captain Patton, U.S. Naval Academy class of 1960, served in five nuclear-powered attack submarines and two ballistic-missile submarines, commanding the USS Pargo (SSN-650). On retirement in 1985, he established Submarine Tactics and Technology, Inc. He has since provided services to a number of government and private entities, served three years as the technical consultant to Paramount Pictures for The Hunt for Red October, and has participated in the annual major war games at the Naval, Army, and Air Force War Colleges.