First Honorable Mention, International Navies Essay Contest
The U.S. Navy has a long history of protecting and promoting security in the Mediterranean with forward-deployed assets. As Mediterranean forces are diverted to other operations, can the United States afford to let down its guard now?
Since the end of the Cold War, domestic and external economic factors have led the United States to prioritize political and military relationships in certain areas of the globe. This prioritization will reduce gradually and drastically the U.S. direct participation—mainly through naval and air forces—in Mediterranean affairs. Such behavior is clearly part of a change of strategy that goes against the deep involvement of U.S. forces in the Mediterranean since the early days of the 19th century. This phenomenon is quite dangerous in view of possible developments not only in the Mediterranean, but in Europe as a whole.
Two major aspects marked the end of the Cold War for Europe and the beginning of a new era for the Mediterranean basin: the consolidation of the "enlarged Mediterranean" concept and the continuous involvement of U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf. The "enlarged Mediterranean" must be seen as a theater that includes the Black Sea, the Red Sea, the Horn of Africa, a significant portion of the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf. In Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, maintaining freedom of the seas in the Mediterranean and its adjacent maritime areas was paramount to supporting sustained U.S.-led Coalition efforts. The periodic strike operations against Iraq in the years since the war have confirmed not only a requirement of stable presence in the Persian Gulf but also the need to provide a "dynamic presence" of U.S. forces, mainly maritime, to face crises and conflicts likely to emerge in the Mediterranean itself.
The new geostrategic environment of the 1990s forced the United States and many Western European countries to adapt their strategies in order to respond promptly to unpredictable contingencies likely to erupt in the enlarged Mediterranean. The old Soviet-style threats have been replaced by new and unpredictable "risks", the most dangerous among them being the emergence of new forms of nationalism, ethnic and religious confrontations, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. Each of these situations could provoke a massive involvement of military forces. Events in the Balkans and in the Persian Gulf have turned these risks into realities. Once again, the Mediterranean has proved its value as the "theater of choice" to deploy and operate U.S.-led allied military forces.
Motivations for change
Notwithstanding such critical situations and the change of terms in the strategic global equation, the United States has profoundly modified its policy for the Mediterranean theater, especially for peacetime engagement. As a consequence of the desire for a fleeting peace dividend, overall defense budgets and service personnel have been cut. Although facing a real situation of risks and threats, the U.S. military has been obliged to implement the principle of "doing more with less," prioritizing the commitment approach and making some difficult choices concerning the placement of forward-deployed assets such as carrier battle groups.
In the aftermath of the Cold War, with NATO facing no major "traditional" military threats in the Mediterranean or in any other European regions, the U.S. began increasingly to redefine its national interests in economic, rather than political or military terms. At the same time, the power vacuum left in the East by the collapse of the Soviet Union provided fuel to the political and military rebirth of a number of nations including Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and Malaysia. Thanks to a steadily growing economy, these nations also have matured politically, decisively contributing to the rising importance of the Pacific Rim for U.S. strategy. Against that background, China has changed its own strategy, becoming a major regional power with interests spread over an area that extends from the eastern part of the Indian Ocean to the central section of the Pacific Ocean.
Within a couple of years, the value of bilateral trade relationships between the United States and the Pacific Rim nations easily overtook those involving European nations, including such Mediterranean countries as France and Italy. The closure of Clark air base and the Subic Bay naval bases did not affect this global trend, nor did the emergence of a clear and present threat to stability and security from North Korea. Moreover, the establishment of a new "engagement policy" between Washington and the Beijing leadership emphasized the importance of the Pacific Rim area for the continuous development of political and economic interests.
The major consequence of these developments has been a clear shift in the focus of U.S. strategy that has not even been affected by the economic problems of the so-called "Asian contagion". The new bilateral security agreement between Washington and Tokyo—although envisioning a greater role of Japanese forces in security matters—highlights the value of the Pacific Rim for U.S. global interests. One has to take into account that the expression "global interests" in a maritime theater means safeguarding of shipping and maritime communications through active and forward naval presence.
A clear evidence of U.S. commitment in the Far East theater is the presence there of 100,000 U.S. military personnel, the largest such commitment in the world and far greater than forces permanently based and occasionally deployed in Europe (and therefore in the Mediterranean region). The United States is negotiating with Singapore to use their naval facilities for U.S. Seventh Fleet port calls and maintenance, meaning that even though facilities at Clark and Subic Bay are gone, a "Singapore Naval Station" could replace them .2 Another relevant issue is the possible establishment of a regional antiballistic missile defense network, including both sea-based and land-based assets and therefore involving the military forces of the United States, Japan, South Korea, and possibly Taiwan. Even though this move will affect relations between Washington and Beijing, the establishment of such a network will probably mean a further strengthening of security and military ties with the traditional U.S.-allied nations in the Far East theater.
All these maritime-oriented initiatives have been undertaken as U.S. defense budgets steadily decrease. In order to maintain a force able to face all commitments, a policy of prioritization has been developed that reduces forces in areas where the perception of risks and threats is not as acute as in other theaters. While the U.S. policy can "enjoy" a continuous carrier and amphibious presence in the Pacific, the U.S. Sixth Fleet can longer rely on a stable carrier presence, while its amphibious component could be split to cope with contingencies in distant areas such as Central Africa. A similar situation has occurred in the Persian Gulf, where the ongoing crisis between the United Nations, the United States, and Iraq about weapons inspection has led to the reconstitution of the U.S. Fifth Fleet and its permanent basing there. Pre-deployment activities and distances to and from U.S. homeports, however, could cause dangerous gaps in carrier presence and affect directly the operational requirements for the Mediterranean basin?
Reasons For Staying
Security in Europe and in surrounding areas is closely linked with security and stability in the Mediterranean Sea. This basic principle has been demonstrated by both past and recent history, and should lead the United States to reverse its new Mediterranean policy, which is now mostly based on the use of expeditionary forces. This principle is the centerpiece of several closely related political and military aspects that call for a continued permanent presence in the Med. First, the lessons learned from the past and current Balkan operations highlight the need for a security policy based on credible deterrence and prevention, which should rely mainly on flexible and mobile forces such as air and maritime forward-deployed forces.
Second, the enlargement of NATO should continue in the southern region, after the first wave of new members oriented toward Central Europe. It is not surprising that France and Italy (two major Mediterranean countries) support the admission of Slovenia and Romania in order to enhance stability under the NATO aegis. The U.S. Sixth Fleet has been involved with many highly successful peacetime engagement programs in the Mediterranean.
The dialogue between NATO and other Mediterranean nations must be expanded, to include security and stability issues. This means that such a dialogue could evolve toward military cooperation opportunities, which require a stable presence of military forces.
Finally, currently available technology for countering weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means compels Western Mediterranean countries and their allies to rely almost exclusively on U.S. sea-based systems, another reason to deploy naval forces in the basin.
The United States will continue to have many strategic and cultural ties to the Mediterranean that justify its continued engagement in the region. The dynamics of the post-Cold-War era have confirmed the strategic requirement for a permanent military presence in the Mediterranean basin. It remains an area of instability that cannot be addressed only by diplomatic or financial means. It also requires a strong and capable, maritime-oriented military presence that, at least for the time being, can be provided only by a restructured NATO with military capabilities and responsibilities adequately shared among North American and European countries. The United States must not forget the importance of the Mediterranean.
Commander Cosentino graduated from the Italian Naval Academy in 1978 and served on board submarines and surface ships. He was assigned for a three-year tour at NATO headquarters, Brussels, and currently serves on the Navy Staff in Rome.