The Cold War has been over for ten years, but our arms-control regime still is stuck in the days of U.S.-Soviet confrontation. A new approach is needed, with the focus on reassurance rather than reduction.
Some 50 years ago, the advent of nuclear weapons led to a new era of arms control that dominated diplomacy between East and West. Arms control, in its various forms, has been part of every administration's national security policy since 1945. But now we have entered a wholly new era. Arms-control practice must change to meet new realities, or it will have no relevance or applicability to today's issues.
Since the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) agreement were signed in 1972, the strategic relationship between the two sides has changed fundamentally. The U.S.S.R. no longer exists. The United States and Russia no longer look at one another as mortal enemies. There are open dialogues about a number of strategic and military issues that were not possible during the Cold War, when strategic arms control negotiations constituted virtually the only dialogue about these issues. Strategic offensive forces on both sides have been reduced substantially and the alert levels of many remaining forces have been relaxed. The military balance in Central Europe has changed radically, and the Russian armed forces have been seriously weakened by the economic crisis and resulting social upheaval. There is no place where a direct military clash between the United States and Russia is plausible at the moment. Thus, nuclear weapons are much less likely to be called into play.
Despite these fundamental changes, many advocates of arms control persist in viewing it as an end in itself, and continue pursuing the same policies as they did 50 years ago. But arms control is not an end in itself, nor is it central anymore to U.S.-Russian relations. Like any endeavor of statecraft, arms control is rooted in power, the national interest, and strategy. It no longer can be treated as distinct from diplomacy. Nor will the transfer of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to the State Department automatically alter this mind set.
Arms control is a secondary or tertiary issue in U.S.-Russian relations. Russia no longer has the need, means, or the motivation to use arms control negotiations to try to weaken the United States and gain a strategic advantage, even though we will continue to have conflicting strategic interests. Russia needs to assure itself of a relative degree of security and stability in the geopolitical and strategic sphere as it copes with massive internal problems and tries to restore some semblance of its superpower status. The Russian economic situation, not negotiations, will "control" arms. The United States also will seek reassurance that developments in Russia do not endanger our security as we turn our attention to global problems.
Arms-control negotiations no longer are isolated from the full panoply of issues before the two countries. There will be differences in our interests, but arms-control negotiations no longer will be the litmus test of the health of those relations as they were during the Cold War. In fact, arms-control negotiations may be the leverage both sides employ to reach solutions to more pressing political and economic issues through more traditional diplomatic means. If there are further nuclear armed reductions, they are likely to be driven by economic factors and the need to reduce the damage from a war that neither the United States or Russia will initiate.
Problems with the ABM Treaty
The ABM Treaty presents the United States with a paradox. We want to amend the treaty in order to exploit the most advanced technologies for theater missile defense (TMD) and to be prepared to deploy a modest territorial defense in order to protect us against missile proliferators. The Russians resist changes to the treaty, for they fear any expansion will threaten the effectiveness of their deterrent or increase U.S. power. They also fear that they cannot afford to keep pace with the United States in either type of defensive deployment. The French and the British, supported by many other NATO allies, oppose modifications to the treaty because of its potential impact on deterrents of any Russian defensive deployment and because it could exacerbate political tensions between Russia and the European members of NATO. The Chinese oppose changes because they are concerned that altering the treaty would be a prelude to deployment of missile defenses in Japan and Taiwan. Many of these concerns are greatly exaggerated, for the defenses planned by the United States and those possible by the Russians are not of a scale to seriously impact the deterrents of third parties. The political importance of ABM angst, however, is very real.
Meanwhile, the United States is facing a growing missile threat from states other than Russia, and seeks to deploy TMD and a modest national missile defense. Increasingly, the ABM Treaty stands in the way of these goals. As a result, political pressure has been growing to abrogate the treaty. Such a course of action would lead to serious tensions with Russia and several of our key allies. It also could result in a divisive political debate in this country. At the same time, the ponderous process of amending the ABM Treaty, with a Russian veto looming at every step of the way, does not serve current U.S. security requirements.
The ABM Treaty is the oldest of the Cold War arms-control treaties, dating back to 1972. It relies primarily on national technical means for compliance and verification. The treaty lacks the features of more recent treaties, such as a provision for on-site inspection, confidence building measures, or even the exchange of liaison personnel. A new relationship with Russia would permit more cooperative means of assuring compliance.
Technologically, there has been immense progress in the 28 years since the treaty was signed. Defenses based on "other physical principles" such as nonnuclear kill devices now are a reality. Missile defenses based at sea, in space, or using an intercontinental ballistic missile as a missile defense interceptor are now real possibilities.
Problems with Strategic Offensive Arms Limitations
The effort to control and reduce strategic offensive arms is at a standstill because the Russian Duma has not ratified the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) II Treaty. The arms control process has become an obstacle to arms control. Both Russia and the United States are retaining thousands of offensive weapons in their nuclear arsenals that neither wants, while they await the outcome of an arms control process that would reduce defensive burdens for both parties. The START process is obsolete.
When strategic arms negotiations began between the United States and the Soviet Union in the late 1960s, the relationship was one of mutual fear and suspicion. Arms control was an adversarial process in which nothing could be taken for granted unless it was reduced to writing. SALT provided virtually the only dialogue between the United States and the Soviet Union that dealt with the military confrontation that was rapidly being transformed into an arms race. The guiding U.S. goal in arms control was to codify a relationship of mutual assured destruction and to try to stabilize the competition in strategic arms at then-prevailing levels. The Soviets eventually signed on to SALT to preserve the advantages that they had and to curb the momentum of U.S. programs, especially on defense.
Today, both the United States and Russia are agreed that major reductions in nuclear forces are desirable. Both are prepared, and even eager, to undertake reductions that will lessen defense burdens, but the formal arms control process stands in the way. Meanwhile, Russia's weaknesses have created a new set of strategic problems that are not addressed by START.
First, there is the danger of the leakage of nuclear materials, knowledge, and even weapons to third parties as individuals in Russia desperately seek ways to earn income. There is concern that the Russian strategic warning system and command and control over nuclear forces have deteriorated badly, increasing the risk of a nuclear accident. Furthermore, there are tensions created as Russia comes to grip with all of its internal problems and faces the realization that its status as a superpower has declined markedly except for its nuclear weapons and forces. Russians (and others) are resentful of the status of the United States as the world's only remaining superpower, and they are understandably suspicious that we will seek to take advantage of the situation. To compensate for a seriously weakened military establishment, Russia has placed renewed emphasis on nuclear weapons in their strategy. This is one factor behind the Russian reluctance to include non-strategic nuclear weapons in arms control.
Finally, current nuclear arms control deals only with a slice of the total spectrum of nuclear capabilities. START II would place limits on deployed strategic nuclear forces. It does not deal with non-strategic forces, or with spare, reserve, or developing systems that are not deployed. It does not deal directly with warheads, and it does not deal with the nuclear infrastructure that provides the potential for creating new forces in the future. There are substantial asymmetries between the U.S. and the Russian postures in these areas. If and when nuclear forces are reduced to much lower levels, asymmetries in these "hidden" components of the nuclear posture will become a potential source of instability.
A New Approach to Arms Control
All of these factors suggest the need for a new approach to arms control that reduces the current focus on formal agreements and numbers of weapons. A new approach would place greater emphasis on security arrangements that seek to build mutual confidence and reassure each country about the actions and programs of the other, particularly through greater transparency. Offense and defense need to be approached in an integrated way because they affect each other. Not only must deployed systems be taken into account, but also the underlying infrastructure that provides the basis for future systems. The approach needs to deal not just with platforms, delivery systems, and subsystems, but also with warheads and stockpiles of weapons-grade material, and with qualitative issues such as command and control, weapons safety and release authority, and early warning and confidence-building measures.
Our proposed approach is centered on traditional diplomacy. It would reverse the previous strategic-arms-control process, in which consultative arrangements were the outgrowth of treaties. In our proposal, agreements would be the outgrowth of a diplomatic process that could lead to a variety of formal and informal agreements or other institutional arrangements to manage bilateral security relationships. As broader understandings were reached, they would provide each side with growing reassurance about their security. This process could build on U.S.-Russian fora that already exist and meet regularly to discuss strategic issues.
An ABM Reassurance Regime
With respect to missile defenses, both parties would agree that there would be no clandestine or sudden deployment of missile defenses. We will require assurance that the extensive modem Russian air defenses could not be upgraded to a missile-defense capability, while they will want reassurance about our plans for TMD and a "thin" national missile defense. The reassurance would come primarily from a diplomatic process in which the character and extent of missile defense deployment of any kind against a non-party would be explained in detail beforehand to the other party. This explanation would allow the other party to understand the magnitude, extent, and purpose of the deployment, and hopefully, to assure themselves that it was not directed against them. There could be no unilateral veto of a party's decision to deploy after informing the other party. If a deployment were directed against the other party, this would constitute a material breach of the treaty and the treaty would lapse.
A Reassurance Regime might have the following provisions:
- It would be bilateral.
- Any and all types of testing and experimentation on missile defenses would be allowed, including development and testing of space-based, sea-based, and mobile missile defenses and upgraded surface-to-air missiles.
- Any and all types of sensors are permitted, and they can be netted, webbed, and linked.
- There is no difference between strategic, theater, and tactical missile defenses.
- All of the Russian large phased-array radars (LPARs) outside of Russia would be grandfathered. An incentive to the Russians for joining the new treaty would be for the United States to assist in building new acquisition radars similar to the U.S. LPARs at Thule and Fylingdales for Russia, and helping to replace and upgrade their satellite early warning system, using Nunn-Lugar funds. This would be a stabilizing measure and an extension of programs already under discussion to share warning data.
- A new joint early warning center would be established to facilitate sharing of early warning data. This would be jointly manned by U.S. and Russian personnel with secure, rapid communications links to their respective aerospace and missile defense command centers and headquarters. Early warning data would be shared through this center as a stabilizing and confidence-building measure. The U.S.-Russian Y2K measures taken at the U.S. Space Command are an example of the measures our approach would foster.
- Verification would include on-site inspections and visits, sharing of test schedules, test notifications, observers at test sites, and other confidence-building measures that are mutually acceptable.
- A new consultative mechanism would be created. Unlike the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) of the 1972 ABM Treaty whose meetings are relatively fixed, predetermined consultations would occur only as needed and could be called on short notice by either party so long as an agenda is furnished in advance. There can be no veto of such a meeting. The joint early warning center might be used as a locale for such meetings. There also could be annual or biennial reviews of the treaty through normal diplomatic channels alternating between Washington and Moscow.
Initial deployments would be limited in scale and not directed against each other. If one party deemed it necessary to deploy a defense against the other party the treaty would lapse. This proposed agreement would go a long way toward addressing both U.S. and Russian concerns. Its simplicity avoids the imprecision and ambiguities of the ABM Treaty and the excruciating hours of pointless discussion in the SCC. Only requested meetings codified in the treaty would be necessary. The treaty would be bilateral and thus avoid the prolonged discussions and pitfalls that any multilateral treaty forum would involve, which is currently the case with the SCC. With offensive force size and characteristics fixed and more predictable, and defenses limited in size and scope, deterrence is stronger than if there were no defenses and one was forced to rely solely on offense to deter.
Controlling Offensive Weapons
The same principles that are suggested for dealing with missile defense could be used for dealing with strategic offensive arms. The heart of the process is a dialogue that leads to reassurance regarding mutual security rather than a negotiation that leads to legal obligations that become a source of friction or are out of context with broader security and political relations. The approach assumes that relations between the United States and Russia have reached a point where an adversarial process is no longer appropriate, but mutual reassurance is still needed.
It would not be necessary to formally terminate the START negotiations, but it would be recognized that these negotiations may simply languish. Meanwhile, the United States and Russia would begin to build a new regime through diplomatic dialogue. This regime would recognize that each side will have unique requirements for nuclear forces, dictated by their geopolitical situation and strategies. For example, the United States is not prepared to reduce its strategic nuclear forces to levels as low as the Russians seem eager to reach. At the same time, the Russians retain a far larger arsenal of non-strategic nuclear forces and appear to consider a substantial arsenal an important element of their current strategy. It may be possible, through diplomatic dialogue, to arrive at an understanding in which forces of the two parties are acknowledged as asymmetrical—a status that exists today. The dialogue might begin with each side declaring its plans for nuclear forces over a ten-year period. Those plans would include reductions in active inventories as well as reserve forces. Reassurance, however, would be the main goal. Both parties would discuss these plans and voice their respective concerns. Agreements reached as a result of the dialogue could be formalized into treaty form or in less formal instruments. As in the case of the ABM Reassurance Regime discussed above, a mechanism would be established to facilitate prompt review of any concerns that arise in implementation of the initial agreement.
Subsequent steps in the new regime would need to deal with the issues of nuclear infrastructure, weapons that are not deployed with active forces, stockpiles of fissionable material, production facilities, research and development, early warning, command and control, and nuclear safety and surety. As active stockpiles are reduced, elements, representing nuclear potential could become more strategically significant in the overall balance. The diplomatic dialogue needs to provide reassurance that both parties can maintain a posture that hedges against possible future threats without being seen by the other party as a potential threat. A major source of such reassurance will be greater transparency with respect to the nuclear postures of both parties.
How Do We Get There?
We do not underestimate the obstacles to implementing this new approach. It cannot be done overnight. For a variety of reasons, Russia entertains growing suspicions of U.S. foreign policy which will make any U.S. initiative suspect from the start. We can anticipate strong objections initially from the Russians to any changes in the existing arms control regime. The U.S. arms-control community will resist any major changes to the ABM Treaty. Some skeptics will say that any agreement with the Russians must attempt to pin down every detail in binding form. Congress may object to the idea that all agreements will not be in treaty form. We can expect objections from our allies, particularly to major modifications of the ABM Treaty.
Despite these problems, we need to begin moving promptly in this new direction. This may not be politically feasible until there is a new administration in 2001. It is not premature, however, to begin discussing alternatives to the present dead-end process. Constructive alternatives need to be developed in contrast to the stand-pat approach of the arms-control community and the unproductive stance of those who would tear down the whole arms control structure. Initially it would be more productive if such discussions take place in low-key diplomatic channels and in an exploratory mode.
At some point there need to be government-to-government discussions. Once there is a consensus in the U.S. government, the Russians should be approached at a high level to make clear that we will not be able to live with the present ABM Treaty or the continuing delays in the START process. Rather than abandon the START negotiations or the limitations on missile defenses entirely, we want to explore their willingness to accept a new approach. As a first step, we would propose replacement of the current ABM Treaty with a new bilateral reassurance regime that would satisfy the concerns of both sides that there would be no major surprises about deployment. We would expect these arrangements and consultations to yield new agreements more appropriate to a post-Cold War strategic relationship. We do not want a new Cold War with its unconstrained arms competition. The United States and Russia have far more important strategic and geopolitical interests in common than either arms competition or a rationalized arms control process.
Mr. Adams was Director of the Secretary of Defense Strategic Studies Group and the Corporate Fellows Program. From 1988-94, he served as Deputy U.S. Commissioner and during 1988-90 as Acting U.S. Commissioner of the Standing Consultative Commission. Mr. Sloss, a former government official and now an independent consultant, has specialized in national strategy and arms control for 45 years.