Assignment to a support squadron should not squash a naval aviator's chance to make flag rank, but the data say that is exactly what is happening.
There is a peculiar phenomenon in the makeup of the leadership of naval aviation. Fifty of the 68 aviation flag officers come from the fighter and attack communities. This translates to almost 75% representation from communities that make up only 27% of naval aviation as a whole. When only carrier-based aviation is viewed, the number is more skewed—90% of the flag officers come from the fighter and attack communities (referred to as tactical air, or TacAir). Table I details the distribution by community and rank. How did such disproportionate percentages come about, and why do they persist? More important, are the most qualified officers being chosen to lead us in the conflicts of the future?
The evolution of this phenomenon is easy to track. In carrier-based aviation, the route to flag rank begins with the competitive fitness report (fitrep) that a commanding officer receives from his or her air wing commander (CAG). A high ranking among one's peers as a squadron commanding officer allows an aviator to compete favorably for a major command at sea after promotion to captain. It is generally accepted within the aviation COMMUnity that major command at sea is an absolute prerequisite for selection to flag. Thus, the squadron command fitrep and the Aviation Major Command Screen Board (AMCSB) are the two critical factors that determine which aviation officers will be competing for flag rank.
Historically, air wing commanders have been selected almost exclusively from TacAir communities. There have been exceptions, but the prevailing attitude seems to be that to be CAG, one must be capable of leading from the front, and only those who "go into harm's way" are capable of doing that. As a result, most air wing commanders have been hesitant to give high fitrep rankings to the commanding officers of the support squadrons (VAW, VS, VAQ, and HS). This hesitancy, it appears, stems from the perception that they are evaluating support commanding officers on their potential to serve as CAGs, irrespective of their actual performance and perceived leadership potential. CAGs do not want to waste the proverbial silver bullet on an officer who they feel is not qualified to serve as a future air wing commander.
The second hurdle in the quest for flag rank is the Aviation Major Command Screen Board, most of whose members are flag officers and captains who have selected for flag. This board reviews the records of all aviation officers who have selected for captain and attempts to select those who are "best and most qualified" for major command, either at sea or ashore.
Based on the career paths of currently serving admirals, attainment of flag rank for those who serve in carrier-based communities is contingent on being selected to command either an air wing or an aircraft carrier. Several officers have been selected after serving as commanding officers of big-deck amphibious ships, but this has not been the norm. All of these selections take place at the AMCSB.
Individuals who select for CAG are put directly into their command tours. They serve first as deputy air wing commander, but the fleet-up process is automatic and does not require another screening. To select for carrier command, an officer must first select for and serve as the commanding officer of a deep-draft vessel (fast combat support ship, amphibious assault ship, etc.) and then be screened again for the larger vessels. Only nuclear-qualified officers can select for command of nuclear-powered aircraft carriers. This selection process takes place at the Aviation Commander Command Screen Board. Post-command commanders with the academic background, records, and willingness to submit to the rigors of nuclear training are selected, trained, and assigned to serve as executive officers on nuclear-powered aircraft carriers. Only officers (in the nuclear pipeline) who have completed nuclear training are considered for major command at sea.
The Aviation Major Command Screen Board is an uphill battle for any aviator from a support community. Although there is nothing in the precept to support such a preclusion, the mind-set that they cannot serve as CAGs continues to prevail. The ship options, therefore, are the only pipelines realistically available, and there is a stumbling block here as well. The number of TacAir officers who have the records and background to compete for CAG exceeds the number of slots available in any given year. Those officers who fail to select for air wing command are then considered for ship command, and many come armed with glowing fitreps written with the intention of making them CAGs. In addition, as of 1999, officers selected for the nuclear pipeline are required to have a number 1, 2, or 3 ranking in their fitreps in their command tours. Eighty percent (four out of five) of the officers selected for the nuclear pipeline on the most recent board were from the VF or VFA communities. Thus, it appears that the support communities are at a distinct disadvantage when competing for any major command, and the historical selection rates bear this out. Tables 2, 3, and 4 detail the various major command-at-sea selections by community for the past six years.
The cause of this anomaly is obvious. Who is able to serve as air wing commander appears to be the major factor in the support community's ability to select for major command at sea and the follow-on ability to promote to flag rank. But does it matter that the system is unfair? Does it affect our capability to fight and win in combat? I hold that it does. A strong argument can be made that this myopic view is weakening the leadership selection process and causing some very talented leaders to fall by the wayside. It also is definitely affecting the quality of the team that is being fielded by carrier air wings.
Aviation community selection takes place early in an officer's career. Aviators are assigned based on, in order of priority, the needs of each community and the individual's academic and flight performance. Oftentimes, a "draft" will dictate that a majority of available officers be directed to a particular community with pressing manpower requirements. When possible, the Training Command does its best to give each community a fair share of the quality spread from the available pool of officers. It is not possible, however, to judge leadership ability and command potential in this environment, and these criteria are not part of the quality equation. Because command potential is not being measured at this juncture, the law of averages suggests that an equal number of officers with the character traits and abilities to be future leaders have been and currently are assigned to each community.
Thus, all the communities have people who possess the innate ability to lead and command. It is now, and always has been, the responsibility of commanding officers to seek out the members of their commands who have such abilities and report such in their evaluations. For the most part, this process takes place in an environment free from the prejudice of community background until one is evaluated as a squadron commanding officer.
When the artificial restraint of being able to serve as air wing commander comes into play, the leadership pool is weakened unnecessarily. There are flag officers today who have stated publicly that only TacAir aviators are qualified to command carrier battle groups. This focus forces the Navy to select from too narrow a group, overlooking talented individuals and fostering a warfighting mind-set that might leave us unprepared to deal with the conflicts of the future. History offers some insightful lessons.
The Battle of Midway was waged almost exclusively by naval air forces, but neither of the admirals who directed it were aviators. The aircraft carrier had replaced the battleship as the primary naval striking force and the mind-set that only aviators could employ this force effectively in combat was beginning to take hold. The assignment of Rear Admiral Raymond Spruance to replace Vice Admiral Bull Halsey was therefore especially surprising, as there were several officers with aviation experience and greater seniority available. But Rear Admiral Spruance was chosen because it was felt that he was the best leader, period, and the decisions he made in combat were key to the U.S. victory. Are our current methods of selection causing us to overlook the next Spruance?
Consider the cruiser-destroyer groups. Here, a surface line admiral leads the battle group. Is such an assignment lessening the combat effectiveness of the group? Obviously not, as evidenced by the many successful deployments that have occurred with this command structure.
The absence of leadership opportunities at high levels is a potential quality detractor for an air wing as well. Specifically, erosion is taking place at the department-head level in the support communities. Junior officers identify with their commanding officers, and often their commanding officers are models for the type of leader they strive to be. When junior officers see little to no post-squadron command potential for people they admire, it influences whether they stay in the Navy beyond their obligated service and serve as department heads. Many of our best and brightest are getting out, and this specific issue has been listed on numerous resignation letters. In the support communities, resignations have depleted the pool of officers available to serve as department heads.
What then, if anything, can be done to rectify this situation? Options do exist, but they will require the Navy to change the way it does business.
The first, and simplest, option is to mandate that community background not be a factor when considering who can serve as CAG. This mandate should apply both to air wing commanders when writing evaluations and to the deliberations of the Aviation Major Command Screen Board. There will be much comment regarding this suggestion, and it most likely will state that support aviators are not versed enough in the strike mission to be successful. But aviators routinely take command of a ship—how does this differ? The Navy has assigned aviators as ship commanding officers as a matter of course, and these leaders are successful because they are given the requisite training prior to taking command. Why not do the same thing with air wing commanders? The nuclear pipeline offers an interesting model. The Navy could select officers for a CAG pipeline as post-command commanders. Selectees could be sent through an extensive CAG training track and then be assigned to serve as deputy CAGs. This pool of officers would then be eligible for air wing command at the AMCSB.
The second, and probably most controversial, option is to establish a quota system. Quotas could take two forms. The first would involve assigning flag billets to communities commensurate with the number of people in them. The second would involve major commands at sea. If support communities are not allowed to compete for CAG, then a certain number of ship commands, commensurate with their overall numbers, could be designated as available only for officers from support communities.
A third option is to change the summary group composition in an air wing. This option is the least controversial and has a good deal of potential benefit. The proposed change would have the air wing commander evaluate the squadron commanding officers in two separate summary groups. VFA and VF would make up one group, and VAW, VS, VAQ, and HS would make up the other. Such an arrangement would eliminate potential community bias and would level the playing field at the AMCSB.
All of these options have good points and bad, but perhaps they will generate needed discussion. Discussion is the precursor to change, and this system needs to be changed for all aviation communities. A junior officer's assignment to VRC or VQ should not mean that he has no chance to rise to flag rank. But when you look at the data, historically and in today's Navy, that is exactly what it means. Many talented and capable officers have been denied the opportunity to serve solely because of community bias, and the Navy has suffered a loss as a result.
A vice admiral, who is a naval flight officer, recently lectured at a community symposium. He recounted how, as a junior officer in flight training, he was told, "Go out and enjoy the fleet, but forget any aspirations of becoming a commanding officer." His superiors felt that even after the law allowing naval flight officers to become commanding officers had been passed, naval leadership would not support such selection. His subsequent success has certainly proved those perceptions wrong. Another senior officer recently stated, "Performance is the purest form of competition; it does not understand names, places, or billets. It is our most important unit of measure." We should make it our only unit of measure.
Commander Andrews just completed a tour at Naval Personnel Command and is executive officer of VAW-124.