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is ^uss'an drive for military exports continues. A recent ■ ue of a Russian defense magazine describes an interesting caM UCt’ a neW metric-wave air-search radar intended specifi- ar y t0 defeat stealthy aircraft such as the F-117. The authors tyP‘ca* steaIth features, faceting and perhaps radar- le S0IJen' trtaterial, are unlikely to be effective at long wave- rad^1 S- FaCetinS unusuaf shape of the airplane) scatters 0u.ar s‘gnals away from the receiver, but, as the article points ov a.1 k)n8er wavelengths the radar sees and responds to the f0 era ' s'ze °f the target, not to its details. Faceting ought there- m ? t0 have little or no consequence. As for radar-absorbent of th'31’ ’tS thickness is presumably related to the wavelength j 6 rac^ar stgnal it is intended to absorb. It is probably almost Possible to absorb very long wavelengths.
The new radar’s wavelength is not specified, but it is P obably not too far from the 1.5 meters of World War II dlr-search sets and
the
Postwar SPS-
29/37/43. Perhaps ijSfificantly, the •S. Navy reverted 0 metric wave- 'e«gths in the 1950s ecause its shorter- "'ave sets were un- "hle to detect the aew streamlined jet 'ghters at sufficient ra"ges. Their shapes redticed radar cross potion (in this case, y eliminating most corner reflectors).
he metric-wave sets responded to 'heir overall sizes and thus overcame the effects of streamlin- "g- Faceting is a different cross-section reduction technique, Ut the analogy is difficult to dismiss. Eventually the metric- ave sets were abandoned because their beams were too wide. >pboard antennas could not be made large enough to make "arrow beams at those wavelengths.
The antennas of the Russian radars are much too large to be “ccommodated on board small ships; they are truck-mounted. °th two- and three-dimension sets are offered, providing suf- lc'ient precision for fighter direction. Claimed range is several ""ndred kilometers.
The skeptical reader may recall that after the Gulf War the hinese claimed that a long-wave radar they had installed in °aghdad had successfully detected and tracked F-117s. Since hat city was never occupied, it was never possible to check the ruth of their claim. It was suggestive that during the war F-117 Phots sometimes saw Iraqi fighters equipped with searchlights "nting for them. That the fighters got close enough to be Seen suggests that something, most likely a radar, cued them '"to position. That they did not actually intercept the slow F- 17s suggests that the cuing was of somewhat limited accuracy. II indeed the new Russian radar is the antidote to the current
Proceedings/ July 1994
VP-11 Crew Fires AGM-65F Maverick
—
The April 1994 launch was the second from a fleet P-3C.
version of stealth, that would have considerable significance. Many countries that currently fear U.S. attack will probably be happy to buy such radars. At least in the past, metric-wave technology has been quite rugged, so such systems may enjoy better availability than the more common shorter-wave ones. The vision of stealthy B-2s flying at will above Third World countries, destroying their armies or other assets at leisure, may turn out to be just that, a vision without substance.
For the U.S. Navy, the appearance of such radars would seem important for the debate on the next-generation attack airplane. The A-12 program seemed to show that the combination of stealth, range, and payload would be extremely, perhaps excessively, expensive. If stealth is a prerequisite to attacking Third World defenses, then the Navy must invest in a new generation of attack aircraft. If, however, stealth is limited to a counter to short-wave radars, then it is important mainly in the end-game, in which an interceptor cued by ground radar closes with its bomber target. In that case jammers and even air-to-air
anti-radar missiles may be a better investment than new stealthy airframes. It may be that, instead of occupying an interim position pending development of a satisfactory next-generation stealthy attacker, the F/A-18 series can serve for several decades, updated with new electronics and weapons.
That is a very significant question at a time of declining resources. In the past, aircraft procurement cost the Navy about as much as ship pro- curement/modemization. That large expenditure sufficed to buy enough airplanes to maintain a steady force. It would not have been enough to introduce an entirely new type on a timely basis. The appearance of the Russian metric radar may carry the (ironically welcome) message that we can continue to buy incrementally—that stealth, which seems to make existing airframes obsolete, may not be the crushing economic burden that it was first thought to be.
Metric wavelength radars may also be relatively difficult to destroy, since current anti-radar missiles should be unable to home on them (the radar wavelength is far larger than the dimensions of the missile seeker). The most likely technique would be to locate the radar by some other means, e.g., a maneuvering airplane or even a ferret satellite, and then send a precision- guided weapon to its location. Presumably the new generation of inertially-guided munitions would be ideal. The radar truck probably cannot move quickly enough to escape attack but the combination of location by one platform or set of platforms and quick attack by another is complex and may not always be feasible. It depends on precise navigation by all the platforms and weapons involved.
U.S. NAVY (C. TYNES)
Litton Authorized Sub Exports
For some years, Litton, currently a builder of surface warships, has sought permission to build diesel submarines for export. The company has a license to build the German Type 209, which has achieved considerable export success. Now, the State Department has overruled long-standing Navy objections and approved Litton’s request. The company argues that because it will be building a foreign type of submarine, and because it is not involved in nuclear submarine construction, its proposal cannot damage the security of the U.S. submarine force. The economic rationale of its plan is that because of European Community agreements and their own laws the Germans cannot sell to some potential customers (particularly Taiwan) and that some other countries receive U.S. military aid with the understanding that they will buy U.S.-made equipment. Egypt is the main case in point. The Egyptian government wants the United States to finance construction of at least two modern submarines. Thus for both Egypt and Taiwan Litton might enjoy a decisive competitive advantage merely because it is in the United States.
The U.S. Navy’s unstated reason for opposing the request is that the special market Litton has described is extremely limited. To build submarines at all, Litton would have to make a considerable investment, even though much of the material would come from Germany. Once the company’s special market had been exhausted, it would want to keep building submarines. To do that, it would need a competitive advantage. With U.S. Navy submarine construction sharply declining, Litton might well find a ready supply of engineers and workmen who had built U.S. submarines, and who would be quite familiar with U.S. Navy design and construction practice. To a considerable extent, the secrets involved in modern submarine construction, such as quieting, lie in details rather than in overall concepts. Although Litton would not be offering nuclear submarines, it might reasonably be argued that it would soon be offering (albeit unconsciously) some rather sensitive details of the U.S. submarine fleet.
Litton is an important part of the naval industrial base, and should the U.S. Government decide to finance submarines for Egypt, Litton is by far the most likely builder. Construction for Taiwan would require Congressional agreement, and presumably would be hotly contested by the Communist government on the mainland (which has scuttled several other potential Taiwanese submarine deals). U.S. Congressional unhappiness with the Chinese human rights record might well help Taiwan in this case. [See “Nonproliferation—Let’s Start With the Easy Stuff, Proceedings, June 1994, page 9; and Comment and Discussion, Norman Polmar, this issue, pages 14-17.]
Preserving the Industrial Base
In March, CoCom, the Western committee that regulated high-technology trade with the Communist world, went out of business. The committee’s Western participants were unable to agree on new restrictions on technology export. All agreed in principle that sensitive technologies would still be denied to dangerous Third World states. It seems unlikely, however, that any such agreement will have much real impact. It is more and more obvious that the different Western governments cannot agree on which Third World regimes are to be denied which technologies. Even the United Nations embargo on Iraq has become somewhat porous. The situation was far simpler in the past, when all agreed that the Soviet Union was the common enemy. The long history of disagreement between the United States and the West Europeans over dealings with “terrorist states” in the Middle East makes for little optimism that any similar agreement can be reached in the future.
Last year, for example, Germany sold Iran an intelligent computer system designed specifically to help the Iranian go' ernment track down exiled dissidents. The U.S. governm^11' protested vigorously, on the ground that the Iranians woul surely use the German computer to kill off those who had es' caped its continuing internal bloodbath. In the U.S. view, han was an irredeemably terrorist state. The Germans countered thal the contract supported their valuable contacts within the Iran ian regime. Surely it would be better to maintain those connections in hopes of further moderating the radical Island regime in Teheran.
A cynic would point out that, at least in the past, European economies have been far more dependent on trade, so the U.S’ position would have been far more costly for them. Now out own economy is less autonomous. The recent argument over most favored nation status for China may reflect that changing situation. Congress tried to tie this status, which means minimum tariffs on imports, to progress in human rights. The Chinese regime says that it would much prefer to maintain order by continuing its old repressive ways. It fears, perhaps quhe reasonably, that any real opening would destroy it, much as former Russian President Mikhail Gorbachev’s liberalization destroyed the old Soviet regime. For the U.S. administration, trade with China means very large numbers of jobs. If the Chinese economy continues to grow, that country may easily become a very large market for U.S. goods. The administration argued that most favored nation status would promote Chinese economic growth, leading to a more liberal political system, and granted China MFN status.
Not long ago, it was relatively easy to differentiate between military and non-military technologies. Now it is more and more difficult to say what dual-use items are really wanted for. The chips that power standard Western personal computers also form the basis for many command-and-control systems, including some of those made in the West. Often a computer-driven command system so magnifies the effect of the weapons it controls that its introduction is a major change in a country’s military potential. Yet few would try to control the export of standard computer chips. The chips do not in themselves enable a country to manufacture a sophisticated command system- much depends on the software that controls them. It is nearly impossible to control the dissemination of software, however, and many countries have enough of their own programmers to provide what they need.
With the end of the Cold War, the U.S. Government’s concerns have changed. If companies cannot be supported, the defense industrial base itself will wither, making revival that much more difficult. The United States may find itself relying on obsolescent technology, simply because none of the current developers can afford (or will want to afford) to go further. The government has decided, then, to allow the satellite-builders to compete in selling their products, on the theory that they will therefore be preserved against a future need.
These are not abstract points. Before 1914, Great Britain had by far the largest naval industry in the world. It included not only shipyards, but also gun and armor producers. Post-World War I disarmament, culminating in the Washington and London treaties (1922 and 1930), drove many of the specialty firms out of business and Britain found it difficult to respond to the emergency that she faced beginning in 1933. The Royal Navy, for example, had to go to Czechoslovakia for some of its armor; interestingly, the Germans permitted delivery even after they overran Czechoslovakia in 1938.
At Washington in 1921, British naval officers at the arms reduction treaty asked whether the proposed ten-year suspension of capital ship construction would not destroy the British heavy warship industry; the President of the Board of Trade reassured them. He was almost wrong.