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Forged in War: The Naval Industrial Complex and merican Submarine Construction, 1940-1961
Weir. Washington, DC: Naval
'storical Center, 1993. Bib. Gloss. Ind. otes- Photos. $14.00 ($13.30)
Rev'ewed by Alfred J. Giddings
Just before World War II, the United ates rushed to reconstitute its naval f°^.er' during that time, a close and ef-
tve working relationship developed ^niong the leaders and organizations of we Navy, industry, and the scientific [L °r^d a relationship that became what e author calls the “naval-industrial comP ex- In the logical sequel to his previ- ■ qS book Building American Submarines, lg 4-1940 (Naval Historical Center, ., Dr. Weir describes and analyzes e development of the submarine-related art of this “complex” as it grew before orld War II—nurtured by mutual trust . respect among the communities’ se- !°r leaders—and matured during and . ter the war. Among the topics exam- ned are the prewar buildup, the wartime °nstruction programs, the responses to old War pressures, the major innova- °ns based on new knowledge of un. ersea acoustics and new developments ln hull forms and propulsion, and the ad- Uion of long-range ballistic missiles to he submarine force.
Throughout the book, the emphasis is °n the inner workings of the naval-in- Ustrial complex. The author correctly Ofcdits the many special committees with arniliar initials and significant scientific and technical operating agencies, which °cused the efforts of the widespread n<tval-jndustrial complex on achievable g°als. Their major published reports greatly influenced the directions taken in submarine technology. (It was a relief 0 learn, after some futile speculative eriorts at decryption, that the often-referenced “Project Nobska” is not based on aU acronym, but on a place name.)
One of the most innovative efforts of he naval-industrial complex was the Al- acore (AGSS-569) program. Dr. Weir Remedy summarizes accomplishment: 'v'ith [the] Albacore, the naval-industrial c°rnplex took their doubts and ideas to j*ea and came back with firm answers.” ghe sea-tested answers from the Albacore and the Nautilus (SSN-571) were inte- gfated into the Skipjack (SSN-585) which took the submerged speed record from
Albacore on her initial sea trials.
Modern submarine development and construction used and improved significant new program-management tools and capabilities. The Performance Evaluation Review Technique (PERT) system matured in the Special Projects Office of the Polaris Program. By exploiting the growing availability of computer-aided management tools, the PERT system enabled effective completion of high-risk parallel developments vital to the timely success of Polaris. Although not mentioned in the book, another very valuable Polaris technical management technique was the formal and rigorously enforced Interface Control Program.
Often a source of grumbling in the trenches, it was all that stood between the successful installation and test of new systems and the large emergency rip-out and rebuild programs.
As the discussion of each topic is concluded, the author reviews the overall health of the naval-industrial complex. For most of the period covered, there were vigorous and beneficial “collegial” relationships.
At its peak—the Polaris program—the naval-industrial complex’s successes stemmed from “productive informality and professional intimacy” based on “unaffected relationships and mutual trust.” After imposition of completely new management approaches during the McNamara era, however, this fortunate and productive state “began to wither in an atmosphere of systems analysis and close budgetary scrutiny.”
The author also faults Admiral Hyman G. Rickover for shutting the scientific community out of the complex by rejecting the Project Nobska recommendations for long-range research into alternative nuclear propulsion designs. Critics of Admiral Rickover’s conservatism in nuclear engineering should recognize that nuclear power is unique in both the reality and perception of the effects of failure. The U.S. nuclear power community worked—and still works—in an atmosphere where failures that are not lethal to any person can kill the entire
gram gone down a second blind alley of a magnitude equivalent to the liquid- sodium plant in the Seawolf (SSN-575)— not to mention a dramatic reactor plant failure—the public reaction could have terminated all further construction of nuclear-propelled submarines.
Many names familiar to me are cited in the book. Engineers and scientists from industry, universities, and Naval Laboratories are quoted, as are many distinguished officers from the Bureau of Ships (BuShips), Naval Shipyards, and the offices of the Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion, and Repair. But the names of civilian naval architects and engineers from these government offices appear only rarely. This is stems from the almost universal Navy prac-
ACME PHOTO (INSET U.S. NAVY)
In the years immediately before the United States’s entry into World War II, industry, the scientific world, and the Navy were forging a team. In little more than two decades, it had built the wartime U.S. submarine force (here, the 1943 launching of the USS Hammerhead [SS-364]), made great strides in submarine technologies, and (inset) put the Polaris missile to sea.
program. Had the nuclear-propulsion pro-
tice (laboratories excepted) that limits signature authority on outgoing correspondence to officers—regardless of its actual author. Therefore, historians find documents bearing only the names of the signing officers. Thus, only in a few instances—e.g., where a civilian was a member of an external panel as Philip Mandel was on Project Nobska—do they appear in this book. Even so prominent a civil servant as John Niedermair—BuShips’ long-time Chief Naval Architect—
rates only a footnote.
As is true with any well-done history, there are useful lessons to be drawn from Forged in War. One is that a U.S. submarine capability cannot exist without a special government-industry relationship. The aircraft industry can remain in good technological health without continued large-scale military procurement, but without the Navy, there can be no submarine industry. Another lesson is that many governmental contractual and administrative procedures that evolve in a relatively stable peacetime environment are not well suited to the high-pressure, risk-drenched, and time-compressed environment of a rapid arms buildup. The United States was fortunate indeed that the “collegiality” among those in science, industry, and the Navy—as well as Congress—established from 1939 to 1941 continued through World War II and on into the Cold War.
It is probably unavoidable in a work of such scope that there are some technical errors. A few of these—important to understanding—are worth mentioning.
► The yield strength of a material and the pressure exerted by the sea are each expressed in pounds per square inch, but they are not interchangeable concepts (pp. 75 and 205).
>■ The Albacore was built with “HTS,” not “STS” steel (p. 145).
>■ No submarine piping is made of HY80 steel (p. 204).
>■ The “limited range” of the Loon missile was not what “made additional guidance ships necessary” (p. 233). It was the ability of the missile to fly out of the range of the launching ship’s guidance electronics. It was not until Harpoon and Tomahawk came along with their autonomous guidance capabilities that this need was overcome.
► The “RT” in “PERT” is for “Review Technique,” not “Research Task” (p. 238).
There were a few minor annoyances as well. The use of “schnorchel”—rather than “snorkel” as has been familiar for 40 years—is one. The frequent appearance of “architect” where “naval architect” is intended aroused a personal and professional pique.
However, these few distractions do not prevent Forged in War from being absorbing reading for a participant in any of these developments. For others, this book is an instructive and thought-provoking analysis of interactions between those who designed and built submarines and those who made major U.S. naval and industrial policy.
A professional naval architect, Mr. Giddings was the Naval Sea Systems Command’s Head Engineer for the Los Angeles (SSN-688)-class Attack Submarine Project from 1970 to 1984.
Nuclear Proliferation & the Future of Conflict
Martin van Creveld. New York: The Free Press, 1993. 252 pp. Bib. Ind. $22.95 ($20.65)
Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel John E. Valliere, U.S. Air Force
The theme of this book—which essentially is a sequel to the author’s 1991 The Transformation of War—can be summed up in one paradoxical sentence: In the end, nuclear weapons are stabilizing within a state structure, but tend to break down that same state structure.
The evidence Dr. van Creveld presents to support the first view—that nuclear weapons are stabilizing within a state structure—is convincing. Whether in the relationship between the superpowers or between regional powers, as soon as it is understood that nuclear weapons have been introduced into it, large-scale war between either has diminished or disappeared. As evidence of this phenomena, he points to the lack of direct military conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union, India and Pakistan, India and China, and Israel and her Arab neighbors as soon as one or more parties achieved a nuclear capability.
However, Dr. van Creveld points out that in these situations direct military conflict often is replaced by an arms race— either to achieve parity in nuclear arms or to obtain alternatives to them—and/or low-intensity conflict—fought for any number of reasons, but exacerbated by nuclear powers’ inability to apply their full might to a non-nuclear situation. Dr. van Creveld uses the development of the situation in the Middle East to make a convincing case about the development of arms races. Iraq tried to meet the Israeli nuclear threat by developing its own nuclear capability. Syria realized that the development of its own nuclear weapons was not possible and, therefore, it invested in chemical weapons as a counterweight to the Israeli nuclear capability. Earlier, Egypt chose a third course: preemption. Dr. van Creveld argues that the 1967 Six-Day War was inspired by an Egyptian desire to defeat Israel before it developed an atomic bomb.
These arguments concerning the stability that comes when nuclear arms enter a region are reassuring. However, Dr. van Creveld does not address what happens when nuclear arms come into the hands of those outside duly constituted governments (e.g., terrorists). Furthermore, he does not make a convincing argument that no government could become an undeterrable renegade.
These concerns aside, it is when Dr. van Creveld addresses the second part of his theme—that nuclear weapons tend to
break down the state structure—that h>s logic starts to break down. He attribute5 the origin—and future significance-' of low-intensity conflicts to the j
strategic stalemates created by nu' clear weapons. However, many 0 > these conflicts are ancient and woul take place regardless of any nation 5 nuclear arsenal. Furthermore, nuclei weapons influence low-intensity conflict* only where and when a convention^ ! power is constrained because of concerns about an escalation to a nuclei ;
confrontation. Where unconventiona
forces do not have a nuclear patron °r where that patron’s support can be countered without risking nuclear conflict'' nuclear weapons are basically irrelevant- Dr. van Creveld goes one step farther and declares that low-intensity conflict eventually will destroy the state-centnc international system. He bases this conclusion on two beliefs: first, there is n° way to deal effectively with low-intensity conflict from a military standpoint-' mainly because classic strategy cannot be applied—and, second, that these conflict are insoluble internal-security problems- In many cases, however, low-intensity conflicts do not diminish fundamentally the state’s ability to protect its citizens— and, thus, maintain its credibility with them. Although it might take a whfle’ states either can contain or defeat the problem. Moreover, even when low-intensity conflicts lead to a transition ot power—as in Lebanon and Liberia—the short-term chaos caused eventually is superseded by some form of state control- Insofar as the effectiveness of conventional military force in a low-intensity conflict is concerned, conventional forces can deal effectively with unconventional opponents if they employ appropriate strategies that take into account the political and economic dimensions of the conflict. In fact, throughout history- insurgencies have been defeated—e.g-’ Malaya in the 1950s and 1960s. Sometimes victory has been achieved through the use of overwhelming force and brutality; other times through a combination of reforms and a methodical, patient security strategy. In short, there is nothing inevitable about an insurgency’s victory or the collapse of the state structure.
Dr. van Creveld presents an interesting compilation of history and opinion that he uses to reach rather outrageous conclusions based on sometimes circular—and uniformly pessimistic—logic- All in all, while some of his arguments deserve attention, the critical lines of reasoning in this book simply don’t hold up-
Lieutenant Colonel Valliere presently serves in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict.
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Books of Interest
By Lieutenant Commander Thomas J. Cutler, U.S. Navy (Retired)
*" That Others Might Live: The U.S. Life-Saving Service, 1878-1915
Pennis L. Noble. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval nstitute Press, 1994. Bib. Illus. Notes. Tables. *27.95 ($22.36).
(rom 187g to 1915 (when it was incorporated ‘n'o the Coast Guard), the U.S. Life-Saving ervice (USLSS) conducted thousands of resCUes that almost defied belief—and, by doing s°. helped create the great humanitarian tra- 'tton of the Coast Guard. In the first book 0 Put the USLSS and its “storm warriors” into a national context (the strong USLSS presence
°n the Great Lakes is of particular interest), Noble tells the entire story of this organization from its many daring rescues to the recruitment and retention of its men, from •he design of its stations to the development °f its equipment and techniques. Mr. Noble’s clear and concise prose and his extensive use °f contemporary photographs and illustrations niake this story of the valorous and determined soldiers of the surf’ at once captivating and educating.
The Pearl Harbor Papers: Inside the Japanese Plans
Uonald M. Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon, Editors. McLean, VA: Brassey’s (US), 1993 416 pp. Illus. Ind. Maps. $30.00 ($27.00).
The Japanese tactical and logistical plans, letters from Admiral Yamamoto, personal diaries, and other official and unofficial records collected in this book provide a revealing look Into the thinking, planning, and actions that culminated in the “Day of Infamy” on 7 December 1941. This is history in its purest form and will be of great interest to professional and amateur historians alike.
Concepts in Submarine Design
Roy Burcher and Louis Rydill. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994. 314 pp. Append. Bib. Figs. Ind. $74.95 ($67.45).
Part of Cambridge University’s Ocean Technology Series, this book explores the many engineering and architectural aspects of submarine design. Particular attention is given to the interplay between aspects of hydrodynamics, structure, and propulsion, and many examples of concept design algorithms are provided. This book will serve as a text for students and as a reference manual for practicing engineers, naval architects, and designers.
The Invasion of Japan:
Alternative to the Bomb
John Ray Skates. Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1994. 290 pp. Bib. Ind.
Maps. Notes. $27.95 ($26.55).
Popular belief has long been that Operation Downfall—the planned Allied invasion of Japan—was preempted by the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. While there is a certain truth in this, planners may not have weighed the bombing and the invasion against one another as alternatives. Through a careful study of the invasion plans, a detailed analysis of the state of Japanese preparedness, and a hard look at the apparent thinking of the Joint Chiefs, the author draws some thought-provoking conclusions about the decisions made in 1945 and extrapolates some of the “what-ifs” that might have occurred had the invasion taken place as planned.
June 6, 1944: The Voices of D-Day
Gerald Astor. New York: St. Martin’s Press,
1994. 432 pp. Bib. Photos. $25.95 ($23.35).
The words of U.S. and British sailors and soldiers are woven into an account of the greatest amphibious operation in history. Meeting fierce resistance as they stormed the bastions of “Fortress Europe,” these men found that not everything went according to plans and they now reveal their thoughts and emotions during those trying days. Astor has woven their stories into a gripping and revealing account that Kirkus Reviews describes as “original, evocative, and brilliant.”
Dark Laughter: War in Song and Popular Culture
Les Cleveland. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994. 232 pp. Bib. Illus. Ind. Notes. Photos.
$49.95 ($47.45).
Popular culture is important in wartime. It asserts the values of patriotism and nationhood, it expresses people’s emotional feelings and it helps them adapt to new roles and situations.” So begins this book, which looks at that popular culture as reflected in service songs, folklore, and popular music. Ranging from World
War I to Vietnam, Cleveland studies the revelations found in parodies, graffiti, sexual fantasies, and other manifestations of popular culture to reveal how soldiers deal with the grim facts of their situation.
& Operation Crossroads: The Atomic Tests at Bikini Atoll
Jonathan M. Weisgall. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994. 435 pp. Append. Bib. Ind. Notes. Photos. $31.95 ($25.56).
The two atomic bomb tests conducted at Bikini Atoll were big news stories in 1946.
But behind the scenes, there was bitter interservice rivalry, intense scientific controversy over radiological hazards and their circumstances, and heated political debate. The tests also made “nuclear nomads” out of the residents of Bikini. Mr. Weisgall reveals many details of Operation Crossroads and its aftermath in this meticulously researched and carefully compiled study—the first ever done outside the U.S. government.
Voices of Captivity:
Interpreting the POW Narrative
Robert C. Doyle. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1994. 383 pp. Append. Bib. Ind.
Notes. Photos. $35.00 ($31.50).
Doyle’s analysis reveals that although the circumstances and times may change, there have been similar themes and common experiences among prisoners of war from the earliest days of Colonial America to the Persian Gulf War. This is more than a mere narrative of POW experiences. It is a serious study of a special aspect of American culture and it reveals how that aspect has the power to not only move us but instruct us as well.
Security Issues and the Law of the Sea
David L. Larson. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1994. 400 pp. Append. Bib. Figs.
Ind. Maps. Notes. Photos.Tables. $47.50 ($45.13).
The author noted that the three United Nations conferences on the Law of the Sea held since the end of World War II have dealt with many important issues—e.g., territorial waters, exclusive economic zones, and deep seabed mining—but have failed to address some of the important related security issues. Therefore, Larson has written this book to “fill the gap in the literature.” This work covers such topics as “Naval Weaponry and the Law of the Sea,” “Security Issues in the North Pacific,” and “Law of the Sea and Maritime Strategy.”
The Soviet Military Encyclopedia: Abridged English Language Edition
William C. Green and W. Robert Reeves (Trans, and Ed.). Boulder, Colorado; Westview Press,
1993. 4 vols.: 1,462 pp. Illus. Ind. Tables.
$380.00 ($361.00).
Although the Soviet Union was dissolved formally in 1991, this four-volume abridged version of the eight-volume original (written in the late 1970s) is an essential source for all those interested in Soviet military history and those who want to understand the roots of the military policies of the former Soviet republics. Intended for the non-specialist audience, this translation is a breakthrough work that provides stunning insights into Soviet doctrine, tactics, and strategy.
Douglas A-l Skyraider: A Photo Chronicle
Frederick A. Johnsen. Atglen, PA: Schiffer Military/Aviation History, 1994. 112 pp. Illus. Notes. Photos. $19.95 ($17.95). Paper.
When it entered the U.S. inventory in the years between World War II and Korea—a time when jets began to take over the skies—
the propeller-driven A-l Skyraider seemed an anachronism. But this marvel of aviation engineering would play key roles in Korea and Vietnam and would earn the respect of aviators everywhere. The A-l could carry more ordnance than a B-17, refuel fleet jets, and carry nuclear weapons. During the Vietnam War, two MiG fighters were shot down by Skyraiders. The entire story of this illustrious aircraft is recounted in this well-written and heavily illustrated account.
They Had a Dream: The Story of African-American Astronauts
J. Alfred Phelps. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1994. 311 pp. Bib. Ind. Notes. Photos. $24.95 ($22.45).
Written by the author of Chappie: America ’.v First Black Four-Star General, this is the story of people who not only had to surmount the tremendous mental, physical, and emotional challenges that face any would-be astronaut but had the additional burden of having to overcome the obstacles of racial prejudice as well. Author Stephen Coonts describes their struggle as fighting “their lonely battles to fulfill their dreams—and ours” and describes this book as “must reading for everyone who cares about our human family.”
Veterans Benefits: The Complete Guide
Keith D. Snyder and Richard E. O'Dell with Craig Kubey. New York: Harper Perennial, 1994. 410 pp. Append. Ind. $15.00 ($13.50) Paper.
Many new changes have occurred in veterans benefits in recent years—even the name: the former Veterans Administration is now the Department of Veterans Affairs. This book is an up-to-date, one-stop reference covering such topics as pensions, disability compensation, education, medical services, housing, employment assistance, dependents programs, and records corrections.
GAME
Matanikau: Battles on the Matanikau River, Guadalcanal, 1942 |
Sam Simons, Game Designer. Homer, IL: The Gamers, 1993. Map. Counters. Dice. $35.02 with shipping. Order directly from publisher: 500 West Fourth St.; Homer, IL 61849.
Some of the fierce fighting for Guadalcanal between U.S. Marines and Imperial Japanese forces is recreated in this board game simulation. Much realism is incorporated—including the “fog and friction of war”—and six battle scenarios provide variety while preserving the game’s historical relevance.
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