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“It Begins With Recruiting”
(See K. A. Seiwall, pp. 50-55, April 1994
Proceedings)
Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth M. Kobell, U S. Marine Corps Reserve, Commanding Officer, 3d Battalion, 23d Marines— Major Seiwall’s conclusion to his otherwise complete and cogent treatment of the minority officer recruitment dilemma implies that the Naval Academy is the only pool of minority talent that may be immediately tapped. This myopic view overlooks an equally talented but much larger pool of prescreened and highly qualified candidates who have demonstrated their patriotism and dedication to the Corps: the Select Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR). On average, 39% of my infantry battalion are full-time college students and 9% are part-time students. Probably, most other SMCR units approximate—if not duplicate—those high percentages.
The minority Marines in this vast pool of talent are hard charging, highly motivated young people who are heavily recruited by the private companies that also see the benefits of an ethnically diverse work force. These Marines also are ambassadors of good will who, through their daily actions, counter the misperceptions about the military—specifically, the Marine Corps—that Major Seiwall cited. Further, these young people are the emerging leaders of today and tomorrow. They already know the Marine Corps and the challenges that face it; they should be challenged to be part of the solution. □
“Who’s To Blame When Women
Don’t Measure Up?”
(See E. Hamblet, pp. 101-102, April 1994;
R. C. Pensiton, p. 16. June 1994 Proceedings)
Vice Admiral Jerry Miller, U.S. Navy (Retired)—It is probably dangerous for an aging retired flag officer to agree with a lieutenant. Nevertheless, Lieutenant Hamblet’s thoughts on the responsibility of senior officers are superb. Somewhere the system must be working because it has caused her to develop some outstanding concepts of leadership. Her last paragraph is a classic. □
Roger Thompson—Bravo Zulu to Lieutenant Hamblet for having the courage to
speak out against the failure of some male officers to reprimand female subordinates for incompetent performance. It is sad indeed that things have come to the point where military men are afraid to say anything that might upset the apostles of feminism and political correctness, even if their silence could cost people their lives. Not only do double standards impair safety, they also can undermine the confidence and morale of any unit- There is a great deal of evidence that so- called “affirmative action” programs and quotas do far more harm than good in the civilian workplace. When such programs are forced on the military, it will inevitably lead to the unnecessary loss of life, poor morale, and retention problems- No one will want to stay very long in a service that subjects its personnel to needless risks simply because it’s not politically correct to criticize women who don’t live up to professional standards. Such nonsense has to stop—and soon. 0
“The U.S. Marine Corps in
Review”
(See D. Evans, pp. 131-138, May 1994
Proceedings)
Captain Edward Loomis, U.S. Army—- Lieutenant Colonel Evans must have been suffering from a case of parochial amnesia when he wrote about the events in So- / malia. Nowhere in his discussion of the c Marine Corps in Somalia is it mentioned that, from the earliest days of Operation Restore Hope, the Marines were assisted by a brigade of light infantry from the 10th Mountain Division and by military police and other Army units. Even more exasperating were his weakly attributed statements about the Army—e.g., “U.S. Army forces, sources relate, arrived late.”
Late to—or for—what? Such disparaging remarks have no place in what is purported to be a historical recounting of events in a publication like Proceedings.
All this is especially ironic because soldiers were Colonel Evans’s point of contact with the Marines in Bardera during | the 1992 Christmas season—and he filed his stories from an Army tent using an Army satellite uplink.
The Marines can be proud of their service in Somalia; it was a dirty job. However, the accomplishment of all initial objectives was a joint—and in some cases, a combined—accomplishment. The
d
Marines conducted the initial landings at)d secured Baidoa and Barders. How- ®VeL U.S. soldiers secured Marka, Kismayu (with the Belgians), and Belet Uen (with the Canadians).
One of the important lessons from past Operations that was relearned in Soma- lla is that—despite their different service traditions, cultures, and languages—sol- diers and Marines can work side-by-side to get the job done. That is, if we can get rid of the dinosaurs. □
‘The Future of Amphibious
Warfare Takes Shape”
(See J. B. LaPlante, pp. 86-88, May 1994
Proceedings)
Captain Peter M. Warker, U.S. Marine Corps—I wholeheartedly agree with several of Vice Admiral LaPlante’s recommendations about the future of amphibious warfare. All of the services must 'tnprove their operational familiarity with maritime prepositioning (MPS) Scluadrons, the strategic sealift assets of *he Military Sealift Command, and the Maritime Administration-administered Ready Reserve Force fleet. The joint lo- gistics-over-the-shore (JLOTS) program’s deficiencies that Admiral LaPlante men- doned are significant and have been val- ■dated during the Joint Test Directorate’s JLOTS III Test. As the Director for Logistics on the Joint Staff, he established lhe Joint Integration Office for JLOTS in March 1994—taking a strong step in the dght direction.
There are, however, several points in his article that are confusing and could iead to misperceptions about the makeup °f the amphibious task force (ATF). The requirement for commercial shipping to deliver some of the ATF’s assault forces ls not new; it has been part of amphibious doctrine since the early 1960s. A Maine landing force—comprised of an assault echelon (AE) and an assault follow-on echelon (AFOE) with specific naval support forces assigned to each— 's an integral, inseparable force that deploys on Navy amphibious ships and strategic sealift ships. The assault echelon is the element of the amphibious force responsible for the initial assault on an objective area and is embarked on amphibious shipping. The AFOE is made of up of the assault troops, vehicles, aircraft equipment, and supplies that are not needed to initiate the assault, but are required to support and sustain the assault. Normally, the AFOE—usually embarked on commercial shipping—is required to be in the objective area no later than five days after the assault landing begins.
Because both echelons are considered to be part of the ATF, it would be ideal
if both were embarked on amphibious shipping. But even though operational requirements might demand that some of the AFOE be in the amphibious objective area at the time of the initial assault, the shrinking of the amphibious fleet dictates that the AFOE arrive in strategic sealift shipping. I agree with Admiral LaPlante that commercial ships will have to be included in the assault shipping of the ATF; nevertheless, I believe they should be classified as belonging to the AFOE.
Admiral LaPlante’s idea that the sustainment capability for Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs) be transferred to a strategic sealift platform doesn’t make sense. A MEU deploys now with supplies and equipment to sustain it for 15 days. This minimum level of sustainment provides the combatant commanders-in-chief ready forces for contingency operations and supports the landing force until prepositioned ships become available or strategic mobility assets start bringing in supplies from the Continental United States. The loss of the MEU’s sustainment package would deny the comman- ders-in-chief an amphibious capability to establish a lodgment for follow-on forces and would relegate the MEUs to raiding operations. Furthermore, the cost of maintaining self-sustained ships with a selective offload capability, required for sea- based logistics in support of MEU-level operations, would be prohibitive. Nevertheless, shifting the sustainment burden to commercial shipping in larger ATFs is both feasible and in practice today.
I agree with Admiral LaPlante that the retirement of the tank landing ships (LSTs) and the amphibious cargo ships (LKAs) will have significant impact on the shape of the future—but I cannot track with his rationale. The LSTs carried a few causeway sections, warping tugs, and small boats designed to support the offload and sustainment of the assault echelon. Initial dry cargo sustainment for the assault can be supported by the remaining elements of the assault craft unit and helicopters. Whether it is a floating causeway barge ferry or a landing craft utility delivering the supplies, it is still logistics over the shore.
The more significant loss associated with the retirement of the LST is its ship- to-shore fuel transfer capability. The LST’s shallow-draft and dual-point mooring capability—combined with the Amphibious assault bulk fuel system—made it ideal for this purpose. An analysis conducted by Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, in March 1993 projected that an amphibious Marine Expeditionary Brigade had a ground-fuel requirement of 105,000 gallons per day at the surge rate—and 84,000 gallons per day at a sus-
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tained rate. Augmented by tanker support, the LST could have fulfilled such requirements until strategic assets—e.g., a MPS squadron—were available. So far, no suitable replacement for this vital capability has been suggested.
Strategic agility requires properly focused logistical support, and strategic assets cannot be applied to all levels of warfare. The MEU must maintain a flexible logistic capability at the tactical level. Assigning strategic sealift platforms to an amphibious ready group would be like sending a tractor trailer to follow an infantry platoon in the attack. □
“Less Punishment and More Patience”
(See J. F. Kelly, pp 27-30, January 1994;
E. Palm, pp. 30-32, April 1994 Proceedings)
Commander Christopher Baldwin, Royal Australian Navy (RAN)—Patience may indeed be a necessary quality; however, the rapidly changing external environment and very real need for positive leadership and guidance from senior military staff requires action. Patience can be construed too easily as procrastination and the Navy organization seen as irrelevant in today’s society. The culture of the naval service is indeed, as Captain Kelly explains, multi-dimensional and multifaceted. The RAN is finding that the only
way to consolidate the culture is to educate our young officers and sailors in its values and core traditions—even though we, like the U.S. Navy, have left tradition out of our values. The values are not clearly understood by many of these men and women and, hence, many of them perceive a degree of irrelevance about the naval organization. In an environment in which issues such as sexual equality, gay rights, women at sea, and liberation of personal rights are thrust at the Navy, faulty understanding of the organization’s raison d’etre can easily form in the minds of many. As older officers and sailors lose confidence in their understanding and appreciation of their service’s culture, they revert to a past comprehension of what they believed the Navy used to be all about. This retrograde action is understandable, but it does not facilitate a dynamic approach to change.
We once were called on to serve “God, King, and Country.” For many, God does not exist; the King is irrelevant; and Country conjures up a complex hybrid of allegiances—some of which can be distorted by political whim. Less punishment and more patience is perhaps too simplistic an approach for what is, in effect, an organization fighting to ensure its core values and culture stay relevant and clearly identifiable against an increasingly destructive onslaught from society at large. □
“Nonproliferation: Let’s Start With the Easy Stuff’
(See W. J. Holland, p. 9, June 1994 Proceedings)
Norman Polmar—Opponents of the St* Department’s decision to allow Inga“' Shipbuilding to market and build G® man-designed Type 209 submarines
Egypt cite three principal reasons their objections: (1) such submarines
fd
eventually pose some degree of threat' the United States; (2) the submarines not meet U.S. standards of safety and e
fectiveness; and (3) such construed0 will not help the U.S. submarine struction base. Indeed, Admiral Holla0 concludes his commentary on the su ject: “The potential military dangers ^ this deal far outweigh the economic 1 political benefits.”
This highly controversial issue m0' be addressed in context. For more tn° three decades, the hard-core nuclear-sd marine community—led initially by A miral Hyman G. Rickover and subs1- quently by his disciples—has fought a”) effort to build conventional submari^' in the United States for the U.S. Navy 0 anyone else. This objection was of seC ondary concern until the 1970s whe° the number of U.S. shipyards buildi'1-^ nuclear submarines declined from a pea of seven to the current two: Newp0' News Shipbuilding and General Dyna111
In the early 1980s, several friendly foreign nations asked the United States to build diesel-electric submarines for their navies. Indeed, a preliminary agreement was worked out between Israel and South Korea in which Israel would share the plans for its new Dolphin design with
compromised because U.S. systems would be put in the diesel submarines.
► The U.S. Navy did not have qualified personnel to inspect and certify diesel submarines.
After Admiral James Watkins, at the time the Chief of Naval Operations and a Rickover protege, wrote letters to the
They [the nuclear submariners] don’t want a diesel submarine built in the United States because they feat a member of Congress will go on board and say, “This submarine goes 25 knots, carries 25 weapons, and only costs $250 million dollars? We should have some of these.”
From 1959 to 1989, the USS Bonefish (SS-582) (left) served effectively in combat and training roles. In those 30 years however, non-nuclear submarines—here, the Dutch Walrus- class submarine, the Zeeleeuw—have become far more advanced.
South Korea so that the two navies could reap the benefits from such factors as larger production numbers, a larger spare- parts bank, and documentation. Israel wanted to build three submarines in the United States (with U.S. funding); South Korea planned to build a “couple” in the United States (with its own funds) and then produce additional units in Korean yards.
When Australian officials heard of the Israel-South Korea deal, their naval attache in Washington asked to be kept informed of its progress, noting that there was always a possibility of Australia joining such an arrangement. At the same time, there was potential for a Canadian submarine buy.
For the work, the Israelis selected shipyards that at the time were not building nuclear-propelled submarines: initially the General Dynamics yard in Quincy, Massachusetts; subsequently, the Todd Shipyards in Long Beach, California. But the Navy’s nuclear-submarine community objected, bringing forward three reasons for their opposition:
>• U.S. nuclear submarine technology would be compromised because workers from the nuclear yards would migrate to the other yards.
> U.S. submarine technology would be
heads of the Israeli and South Korean navies, the deal quickly died.
The nuclear-submarine community’s arguments were bogus. They implied that nuclear-submarine technology would be directly applicable to diesel boats, that foreign countries wanted U.S. submarine technology, that it would eventually be leaked to the Soviet Union, and that the Soviet Union needed our technology to build its submarines. The nuclear-submarine community ignored the fact that virtually no U.S. nuclear-submarine technologies were applicable to diesel submarines, that there was no U.S. diesel-related technology to offer, and that the foreign navies did not want the U.S. Navy to become involved in their submarine programs.
The implication that the Soviets were hungry for information about U.S. submarine technology reeks of arrogance. The fact is that their building techniques are sophisticated—they have long been welding titanium and HY-130 steel which is much more difficult to work than the HY-100 steel that is giving the Seawolf (SSN-21) program massive problems. Their designs are more innovative; their boats’ speeds and operating depths continue to surpass those of Western submarines; and, their boats’ reduced signatures continue to surprise Western intelligence analysts.
The real reason for the nuclear-submarine community’s strong objection to building diesel submarines in the United States was related to me by then-Secretary of the Navy John Lehman at the time the Israeli-South Korean deal was being developed:
The U.S. submarine community clings to the myth that Admiral Rickover had to fight toolh-and-nail for the U.S. Navy to shift from diesel to nuclear submarine construction and believes, somewhat more reasonably, that if diesel submarines were to be built for the U.S. Navy the necessary funds would be taken away from nuclear construction. But the decision to build only nuclear submarines was taken by the Navy’s leadership in 1956, long before Admiral Rickover had the influence to affect such discussions (the Nautilus [SSN-573] had only gone to sea in 1955). Furthermore, there is no evidence of senior naval officers or civilians proposing to build diesel submarines instead of nuclear-powered boats.
Despite the hard-core nuclear community’s objections to building conventional submarines for foreign navies in U.S. yards, in July 1985, Secretary Lehman, Senator John Warner (a former Secretary of the Navy), and officials of the Department of Defense collaborated, inserting language into the fiscal year 1986 Defense Authorization bill that declared:
The Secretary of the Navy shall take such steps as necessary—(1) to encourage United States shipyards to construct combatant vessels for nations friendly to the United States, subject to the requirement to safeguard sensitive warship technology; and (2) to ensure that no effort is made by any element of the Department of the Navy to inhibit, delay, or halt the provision of any United States naval system to a nation allied with the United States if that system is approved for export
to a foreign nation, unless approval of such system for export is withheld solely for the purpose of safeguarding sensitive warship technology.
The second provision was written sPecifically to deter the submarine community from blocking diesel-submarine instruction in the United States. Still, lhe hard-core nuclear submarine community remained resolute in its opposi- tlon. Accordingly, Israel placed a contract submarines—paid for with U.S. funds—with the HDW Shipyard in Germany, as did South Korea; Australia went to Sweden for help with its six Collins- class submarines; Canada is still with- °ut a follow-on submarine program. Meanwhile, the General Dynamics yard ln Quincy, Massachusetts, went out of business and Todd Shipyards no longer builds ships. So much for the submarine community’s concern for the U.S. shipbuilding industry.
Now Ingalls Shipbuilding, which built °ne diesel and several nuclear-powered atIack submarines in the 1950s and 1960s, bas the State Department’s approval to market submarines to Egypt. Several °ther countries, some close friends of the United States, are awaiting the result of this effort. If it works out, they also may seek to “build American.”
With respect to Admiral Holland’s specific objections to building diesel sub
marines in the United States, if the submarines for Egypt are not built in the United States, they will be acquired from one of the many countries that are offering to build modem submarines for other countries: Germany, the Netherlands, France, Great Britain, Sweden, and Russia. Refusal to build such craft in the United States will have absolutely no impact on the proliferation of submarines. Indeed, Great Britain is ready to sell all of its new Upholder-class of modern diesel submarines; while in Russia several advanced diesel submarine designs are being offered for sale with buyers being sought for one of the Kilo (Project 877) submarines that was to have gone to Iran and now is available to a potential buyer.
Second, the navies seeking to build submarines in the United States know of our lack of experience in diesel submarines and want no U.S. government assurances of standards of safety and effectiveness; any deals would be between the foreign navies, the builders, and the designers.
If anyone believes that such a project will not help U.S. shipyards, he should speak with officials of Ingalls, Todd, or even Newport News and Electric Boat. The U.S. shipbuilding industry is in trouble and building submarines in the United States will help preserve what is left of this industry and create jobs.
With the end of the Cold War, there are additional implications to this issue: The potential role of nonnuclear submarines in the U.S. Navy. The Navy’s current strategy, “. . . From the Sea,” emphasizes operations in littoral waters against Third World nations. Several of the potential antagonists have diesel submarines and more nations will acquire them. The lack of diesel submarines in the U.S. Navy means that our antisubmarine forces must train against nuclear submarines on the rare occasions they are available. But diesel submarines and the men who run them are very different from nukes; therefore, a few diesel “target” submarines would be invaluable training tools for U.S. antisubmarine-warfare forces.
Furthermore, the Navy now plans to use multi-billion dollar attack submarines for mine detection and special-operations duties in littoral waters. An objective appraisal must be undertaken to determine the relative effectiveness, costs, and vulnerability of employing diesel vis-a-vis nuclear submarines for such roles.
There is—as Admiral Holland wrote— “arrogance and cupidity” over the diesel- submarine issue. But the nation’s interests must be put above those of specific service communities whose attitudes are steeped in mythology. Objective analyses and decisions based on national interests must be taken. □
The ceremonies might be over. . .
But you can still have your own colorful memento honoring the 50th anniversary of the 1944 Normandy Invasion.
NAVAL History magazine’s tribute to the sea service veterans of D-Day offers the best in historical narrative and gripping first-person accounts rarely found in other publications— a trademark of the U.S. Naval Institute.
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Best-selling author Stephen Ambrose sets the stage for the seaborne attack and cites obstacles that hampered the invaders.
A young, no-nonsense tank landing craft skipper assaults Omaha Beach in the first wave—minus a landing ramp.
Unsung Coast Guardsmen in rescue cutters—called the Seagoing St. Bernards—live up to their name.
Walter Cronkite recounts his flight over the Normandy beaches at H-Hour and critiques the evolution of war reporting.
“It’s Time to Beach the NOAA Corps”
(See W. Connelly, pp. 67-68, February 1994; N. G. Millett, p. 30, April 1994; R. W. Maxson, G. A. Walker, pp. 26-28, May 1994 Proceedings)
Commander Larry Simoneaux, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Corps—Mr. Connelly asks us to “[i]magine an organization ... of fewer than 450 men and women holding ranks between ensign and captain, with no enlisted personnel. It is under the command of a rear admiral (upper half)— whose five immediate subordinates are also rear admirals (lower half)—and is responsible for the operation of fewer than 24 vessels (none greater than 4,100 tons) and 14 propeller- driven aircraft.”
Please imagine as well that this organization successfully operates ships that are 30 years old, often older, and aircraft that are at least 20 years old.
Imagine that these ships and aircraft—despite their age and hard use—remain fundamentally sound, well-preserved, and, if appropriate maintenance is allowed to be performed, quite capable of working into the next century. Imagine also that this organization was required for years to deny—for both political and budgetary reasons—the need for a replacement or rebuilding program.
Imagine this organization operates continually in some of the most hostile waters and air masses of the world with equipment built in the 1960s, but that its people have a deep and abiding commitment to duty, a willingness to “go the extra mile,” and a firm dedication to its missions.
Despite Mr. Connelly’s strident assertions, the NOAA Corps is not an incompetent “Gilbert and Sullivan” organization staffed by a bunch of pusillanimous, dim-witted, self-serving, self-aggrandizing, politically motivated, desk-riding, do- nothing position seekers. Neither is the NOAA Corps dedicated to its own advancement at the expense of other programs and agencies. Quite the contrary.
The NOAA Corps is staffed by highly motivated, energetic, idealistic, and dedicated professionals who are singularly
concerned with getting whatever job is assigned them done—and done well. They have done so in the past and will continue to do so in the future.
The NOAA Corps’ desire to replace some of its research ships is not prima facie proof of selfishness. Rather, it represents an honest—and long overdue— attempt to build the ships needed to serve the nation for the remainder of this century and well into the next.
Mr. Connelly damns the NOAA Corps because our fleet is unable to meet a commitment of 5,000 days at sea with its current assets. He then segues into the question of how, if unable to do so with 28
ships, we propose to do so with fewer. What Mr. Connelly so disingenuously fails to mention is that the shortfall of days at sea does not stem from poor or inefficient management. It is caused by budgetary and political mandates that have denied NOAA the funds it needs to perform its missions.
There are, indeed, areas where improvement in the NOAA Corps is needed; many inefficient procedures and operating instructions must go. They are being identified and eliminated. Certainly, we have our share of officers to whom the noun “action” and the verb “to do” are anathema, but they are slowly losing out in the face of current realities.
Perhaps I am overpaid and not cost- effective. But how much would it actually cost to keep a civilian hydrographic,
oceanographic, or fisheries officer work ing at sea 12 to 18 hours a day, 15 to 31' days at a stretch, for 230 to 280 days» year? When I last looked, my pay statement did not have entries for overtime holiday, penalty, or any other special paj Finally, as to Mr. Connelly’s assertion that the NOAA Corps is either incom petent or untrustworthy, after reading hi* little polemic, I don’t think he packs the gear required to make that evaluation. 0
Lieutenant (junior grade) N. Charles Hanna Daboul, U.S. Naval Reserve (Merchant Marine Reserve)—As a former officer in the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Corps, 1 think that Mr. Connelly could not be closer to the mark: the management of NOAA ships should be turned over to private contractors at the earliest opportunity.
During my NOAA service, most of my fellow officers were intent on research or science—and gave little attention to shipboard management, shiphandling, or the other skills required for the proper running of a ship at sea. As a result of their order of priorities, behavior that would not be acceptable in any merchant ship or warship was tolerated onboard NOAA ships. Any professional seagoing officers who did not embrace this “science-first” agenda and attended to such ship-related business as good order generally were held in contempt.
Essential hydrographic and oceanographic work should continue, but the ships should be run by Merchant Marine officers. This move alone would cut the cost of ship management. Survey ships such as the new USNS Waters (T-AGS-45)—and soon the new Pathfinder (T-AGS-60)-class—are more than able to do the same work that NOAA ships do now.
I disagree, however, with Mr. Connelly on one point. The NOAA ships in which I served were well-maintained. Design discrepancies caused my problems—not a lack of allotted operational funds for maintenance. □
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:er work 15 to 3® 0 days * ay state- vertime :cial pay assertion • inconi- tding his acks the ation. 0
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‘Where To in the 21st Century?”
(Se<? D. A. Smith, pp. 75-79, April 1994;
•LM. Hill, pp. 23-24, May 1994 Proceedings)
‘The Legacy of Leadership”
T. C. Lynch, pp. 75-79, April 1994
Proceedings)
Lieutenant E. L. Armistead, U.S. Navy— Taken together, these two articles illustrate one of the main problems facing the Naval Academy today: no one can agree °n what is wrong with the institution (or even if something is wrong) and how to 8o about fixing it. The fact is that the Naval Academy reflects the service and society; therefore, whatever problems af- ,ect the academy essentially mirror those (he nation faces.
One major problem is Navy’s rela- honship with the press. For some reason, Problems at the service academies tend t0 get more play in the news media than Slmilar ones at state universities—perhaps because academies are supported directly by the federal government. As the most 'osular and independent of the services, the Navy has never been very comfortable with any outside scrutiny and this tends to show in its dealings with the fourth estate. The Naval Academy needs to be honest and forthright about its problems. Delays in launching investigations and command discretion tend to give the wrong impression to the press and, therefore, the public.
Colonel Smith, like many other graduates from the 1950s, thinks that the solution lies in returning to a simpler era, when the academic program was much less flexible. 1 do not agree with his ideas of phasing out of the liberal arts—or ‘'bull”—majors and changing the status of varsity sports. It is proved everyday that one does not have to be a rocket scientist to fly a Navy aircraft—and the same can be said about standing watch on a ship or maneuvering a submarine. In its various training programs, the Navy does an outstanding job of teaching all
young ensigns the necessary tools of their particular trades. In fact, it is the lack of a proper humanities background—in particular, a command of the English language—that tends to hurt junior officers. The ability to write a concise, semantically correct paper is a skill sorely needed by many officers.
Overall, though, the Naval Academy is doing a disservice to itself and the Navy by concentrating too much on its academic reputation. Because it concentrates so heavily on the academic potential of its candidates, it falls to accomplish its mission of educating career officers. I can’t give you numbers for the entire Navy, but I can give you numbers from my personal experience. I graduated from the Naval Academy in 1984, having spent all four years in 21st Company. Of the 29 people from my company who graduated with me, 12 are still in the Navy—a 41% retention rate. That’s not bad for the ten-year mark; however, not one officer has been looked at yet for lieutenant commander. We are all in zone this year, when the board looks at the bottom 58% of Year Group 1984, and the top 75% of Year Group 1985. Thus, not one of my company mates was in the top 42% of Year Group 1984.
What does this mean? A lot of things, but first of all it means that the Navy is not retaining its best academic minds after their initial obligation. Is that bad? After all, officers with high IQs are not necessarily the better leaders. The point is that the Naval Academy spends a lot of time and effort recruiting superior students who are not going to stay in the fleet past their initial obligation.
The Navy needs officers who are reasonably intelligent and dedicated to service. With the reductions of the Navy continuing unabated, the Naval Academy’s very existence will be called into question unless there is an increase in the number of graduates who stay in the Navy past their initial obligation.
1 am not sure how higher ethical standards can be instilled in midshipmen,
when so many of their superiors—military and civilian—seem to lack them. In the context of today’s society, the Naval Academy does an excellent job of producing quality officers. Therefore, instead of trying to reinvent the school, I think that we should work to ensure that it remains relevant in the 21st century.
Unless we do so—and do so quickly— there may not be an institution to left reform. □
“Gatekeepers of the GuIP’
(See J. Kraska, pp. 44-47, March 1994
Proceedings)
Lieutenant Tom Leech, U.S. Navy—It is beyond comprehension how this article won the International Navies Essay Contest. Although it was well-written, it smacked of sensationalism. Furthermore, many of the basic facts were seriously in error. Among the obvious:
>• Lieutenant (junior grade) Kraska asserts that the “main Iranian naval bases” at Bandar Abbas and Chah Bahar are being expanded and modernized. Chah Bahar is not—nor has it ever been—now one of Iran’s “main naval bases.” Bushehr in the northern Persian Gulf is the other primary naval facility in Iran. Furthermore, Iran’s two Kilo-class submarines are not based at Bandar Abbas and Chah Bahar. Iran does not base any naval ships at Chah Bahar—much less submarines. This is no secret; it is commonly known in the military and defense world.
► In discussing Russian-supplied weapons, Lieutenant Kraska mentions that the Iranians have been supplied with “many MiG-29 and Su-27 fighters.” The Iranians do not have the Su-27 in their inventory. They do, however, have the Su-24 Fencer, an aircraft more of a concern to the U.S. Navy because of its air- to-surface capability. The author also erroneously places the Backfire bomber in the Iranian inventory.
► The commander of the Iranian Navy is misidentified as Rear Admiral Abbas
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Mohtaj; he is the deputy commander. The current commander of the Iranian Navy is Rear Admiral Ali Shamkhani who has been in that position since October 1989.
Several times, the author alludes to an Iranian Navy “in disarray.” Tell that to the Iranians. While all of its ships may not be fully operational or the most technically sophisticated—and despite weapons embargoes—the Iranian Navy has kept at least some of its ships sailing and its planes flying. (Do not forget the U.S.-supplied P-3s and F-14s still seen over the Gulf of Oman and Persian Gulf.) This is a testimony to the perseverance and innovation of its officers and men.
Lieutenant Kraska’s credentials to write an article of this nature are not established. His failure to cite sources that substantiate his claims makes me wonder where he nurtured his vision of the Iranian Navy. By publishing this folly, Proceedings has done its readers a disservice. □
“New Cruising Cutter”
(See M. W. Collier, pp. 12-1 A, April 1994
Proceedings)
Admiral O. W. Siler, U.S. Coast Guard (Retired), Commandant of the Coast Guard, 1978-1982—It is great to dream about the ideal Coast Guard cutter. But when it comes to moving the dream to the drawing board and then to the shipyard, there are many compromises and adjustments that must be made. It is unfortunate, but many must-have items become should-have and nice-to-have items along the way.
From the start, the 270-foot “Famous”- class (WMEC-901) cutters were designed to be multipurpose ships, not just fish- eries-protection ships. The former captains of the 210-foot Reliance (WMEC- 615)-class cutters were asked about the shortcomings of those ships. The 327-foot “Secretary”-class was considered nearly ideal in size; overall, however, it obvi
ously was obsolescent. Without ocean- station duties to perform, a cutter as large as the 378-foot Hamilton (WHEC-715)- class was difficult to justify, except for fishery patrol-duties in Alaskan waters or the North Atlantic.
One of the first requirements was for a helicopter landing deck. Then, we looked for a simple, dependable power plant that could be maintained at sea without difficulty; eventually, we determined that diesel power fitted the bill. There was no formal Navy-Coast Guard Board at that time; so we conferred with Navy Plans and Programs on the range of missions the Navy expected the Coast Guard to perform, and which missions could be performed by cutters of various types.
When determining the cutter’s speed requirements, we considered the fastest fishing boats that might be encountered in waters where the Coast Guard would be enforcing the laws. Looking at their speeds—and the fact that our cutters had to be able to overtake them—we calculated the power requirements for the new class. The speed of our drawing board prototype could have been increased by adding two diesels and making it possible to couple them when high speed was required. But that would given these ships only four more knots, while increasing the length of the ship by approximately 40 feet, increasing the crew to maintain the larger plant, and increasing the housekeeping requirements for the larger crew. All this meant a much more expensive ship. This is why, in the design process, a length limitation of 270 feet came about.
New or different designs are always welcome for Coast Guard cutters, and the Small Waterplane Area Twin Hull (SWATH) concept was suggested at the time of the design of the “Famous” class. But at the time, it was an expensive concept and did not offer enough new advantages to justify such a major investment. Perhaps, SWATH may be the way to go when the Coast Guard is ready to
design the next class of cutter. Further-1 more, the complete outfitting of a cut'I ter—including her sensors, armament.r command-and-control systems, andl boats—must be considered by designers, r Finally, the cost of a fleet of cutters! often overshadows all facets of design I and construction—and so it was with the I “Famous” class. Changes that could have | been made in the final order of the cutters were not made because the Office of I Management and Budget made it very clear that one or more of the cutters would be dropped if there were any adjustments to what had been presented as a firm requirement. □
“Myths of the Balkans”
(See J. C. Linder, pp. 77-78, May 1994 Proceedings)
“Waging Peace in Bosnia”
(See D. N. Griffiths, pp. 31-34, January 1994
Proceedings)
Milan Vego, Professor, Department of I Operations, U.S. Naval War College— Commander Griffiths and Lieutenant Linder apparently tried to dispel some “myths” of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina and evenhandedly explain the roots of the conflict and the current situation there. Regrettably, in the process they accepted, consciously or not, many of the claims of the Serbian propagandists at face value and, by doing so, crudely distorted the facts of the situation in my former homeland.
First, it is patently untrue that there is no military solution to the conflict in Bosnia. In fact, one is in sight. The Serbs have won the war. Unless current Western policies toward Bosnia and Herzegovina change soon, the Serbs’ territorial gains will be preserved and they will be able to claim justifiably that they are “victorious.” The only obstacle to this is the Bosnian Muslims’ refusal to accept
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their defeat in the field—in other words i to sign their death warrants. In fact, man) | Western diplomats seem annoyed that tbs Muslims refuse to surrender.
The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina is | neither a “civil war” nor an “ethnic” °r “religious” conflict. It is a war of ag' gression by the Bosnian Serbs supported politically, militarily, and propagandists cally by the national-socialist regime of Serbia. Of course, in any conflict, there are elements of ethnic or religious ha- tred—and war in Bosnia is no exception However, neither religion nor ethnicity was the primary cause of war in the former Yugoslavia. This would be clear to anyone who bothers to analyze the events in the former Yugoslavia since 1987. : when Slobodan Milosevic emerged as a party leader in Serbia. Since then he has | convinced a vast majority of Serbs that all of their problems have been caused by alleged anti-Serbian policies of the communist dictator Tito and that the only solution is to reestablish Serbian hege- ■ mony in Yugoslavia. Mr. Milosevic and the top leadership of the Yugoslav Peo- pie’s Army also wanted to recentralize the Yugoslav federation and preserve “socialism”—again, under Serbian control- As a first step, the autonomy of the provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina was abolished and their leaders were ousted.
After Slovenia and Croatia proclaimed their intent to become independent in June 1991, the former federal army put into effect its plan Bedem (Rampart) 9b aimed at seizing Slovenia’s main political and industrial centers and both republics’ border crossings with the West, with the ultimate goal of preventing their secession from the Yugoslav federation. However, the former federal army suffered a humiliating defeat in Slovenia. Therefore, Milosevic and his generals decided to let Slovenia leave the federation and turned their attention to creating “Greater Serbia.”
To this end, the former federal army executed the long-prepared plan Rain (Frame), aimed at seizing by force those parts of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina where the Serbs comprised a majority—or that were strategically or economically important to Serbia. The first part of this plan—code-named Poljuljana Zemlja (A Tottering Country)—was put into effect in the early July 1991, when the former federal army began redeploying in preparation for hostilities in Croatia. Several months before Croatia’s first democratic elections were held in the spring of 1990, the army also had secretly armed the Serbian minority in Croatia— and by the time a democratically elected government in Zagreb came to power in June 1990, the local Serbs were ripe for rebellion. Fully supported by the former
t
federal army and its political arm the “League of Communists-Movement for Yugoslavia,” the rebels started open hostilities in late July. After six months of fighting, the war in Croatia formally ended with a cease fire signed in Sarajevo on 3 January 1992. The Serbs controlled about 17,000 square kilometers— riughly 30%—of Croatia, including not only places where the Serbs are in the majority, but also Eastern Slavonia and parts of Western Slavonia—where they were never in either an absolute or relative majority. These territories were seized because they had some of the richest agricultural areas, or they held oil reserves, or they could improve Serbia’s border with Croatia. About 250,000 Croats were expelled from the lost territory.
Similarly, war in Bosnia and Herzegovina did not break out spontaneously; it was planned well in advance. First, most of the former federal army and air force units that had been evacuated from Slovenia and Croatia were redeployed to Bosnia and Herzegovina—by the spring of 1992, they numbered 80,000. Second, after the government in Sarajevo declared independence on 6 April 1992, the General Staff executed its Most (Bridge) plan, an integral part of the Ram plan and a move aimed at seizing large parts of Bosnia, including many areas—e.g., Eastern Bosnia—in which the Serbs were in the minority. During the first weeks of the invasion, in a series of operations— including Pomrcina Meseca (Eclipse of the Moon), Stari Hrast (Old Oak), and Trojanski Konj (Trojan Horse)—forces of the former federal army, cooperating Bosnian Serb militias, seized most of the territory now held by Serbian forces. Third, in a transparent ploy designed to fool Westerners, the Belgrade regime transferred all but 12,000 troops of the former federal army to the Bosnian Serbian government. These troops and the Bosnian Serbs’ paramilitary groups were formed into the Army of the Serbian Republic. Since the war started, an estimated 200,000 people have died and 2 million have become refugees—the vast majority of whom have been Bosnian Muslims.
For any serious observer of the scene in my former homeland, it is clear that the Serbs bear the principal responsibility for war and the crimes committed during it. The Serbs are the ones who started— and continue—the vicious policy of “ethnic cleansing” against the Bosnian Muslims and, to a lesser extent, the Bosnian Croats. The Bosnian Muslims and Croats have never practiced anything approaching the brutality of Serbian “ethnic cleansing.” The Bosnian Muslims did not besiege cities and tried to starve innocent civilians into submission as the Serbs did—and are still doing. The tragedies of
the peoples of Sarajevo, Gorazde, Srebrenica, Tuzla, Bihae, and other Bosnian cities, are living testimonies to the true aggressor and the true victims.
It would be a terrible mistake to end the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina by recognizing the fruits of the Serbian aggression. Serbia should be made to pay a heavy price for its aggression and for the crimes it has committed against innocent civilians. This demands that the victims of aggression be allowed to obtain necessary arms to defend themselves. A balance of forces on the battlefield must be attained before any real peace or just settlement can be reached in the former Yugoslavia. □
“Duty, Honor, and the Commission”
(See D. F. Maruna, pp. 36-38. June 1994 Proceedings)
John Ellingson—Midshipman Maruna is right. The time to start embedding honor and integrity as they apply to naval service is at the beginning. For midshipmen at the Naval Academy, the oath taken on Indoctrination Day—their first official act—is that beginning. It is a wonderful guide to what these young men and women can expect as midshipmen and, later, as officers.
/, . . . having been appointed a midshipman in the United States Navy, do solemnly swear that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that l will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that / will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter, So Help Me God.
► The oath is personal; it applies to the
individual taking the oath. He or she
and he or she alone—is responsible for honoring the commitment.
>■ A midshipman holds an appointed position. The power of the appointment rests with the United States government, which the midshipman is obligated to serve. The office of midshipman specifically and completely describes the station of the individual.
► The affiant is now in the U.S. Navy and his or her personal interests now are subordinated to the larger interests of the Navy.
► The oath is a solemn commitment, not undertaken lightly, and the strongest one an individual can make. It also is a specific oath under which the midshipman is swearing to perform specific duties and
undertake certain obligations >■ The affiant is committing himself 0,1 herself to an affirmative undertaking, n0' a passive obligation. The individual nu^ subordinate personal interpretations tt$ may diverge from settled constitution-' laws and conduct himself or herself111 accordance with all laws and regulation5- (Importantly, this includes the Hono1 Concept at the Naval Academy.) Th£ defense of the Constitution is against 0“ enemies. The affiant no longer may e*' ercise individual prerogative when 11 comes to supporting government policies ► The individual nature of the oath is nf firmed and the unconditional and enduf ing nature of the promise is underscored-
There is no room allowed for secon1
thoughts or compromises; this is the ultimate dedication
► The affiant has no extraneous purpose- he or she also is affirming that he or sN is not under any duress, either parent^1 or self-imposed. The affiant is not at the Naval Academy for any other purpose than to become an officer in the U.S Naval Service. Certainly, the opportunity to obtain an outstanding education or to participate in major college athletics are part of every midshipman’s motivation- but they are consequence of the duty he or she undertakes, not the end.
► At the very beginning of his or her service, the incoming midshipmen immediately is held to a rigid moral standard
► The singular pronoun indicates the importance of the undertaking. The mid shipman is promising to give a 100% effort at all times.
► The affiant is making an unconditional promise to adhere to the obligations of service, regardless of what that might de mand. The affiant also is acknowledging that his or her obligations will be defined by someone other than himself or herself. Again, it represents the subordination of the individual’s to those of a larger institution, in this case, the U.S- naval service.
► The oath concludes with an affirmation of the solemn nature of the obligation and duties that the new midshipman is promising to discharge.
Obviously, the oath of a midshipman is so much more than part of a colorful ceremony in front of Bancroft Hall. It is a solemn promise to adhere to the special demands of military life. Perhaps, then, a copy of the oath and an explanation of its import should accompany the travel orders issued to incoming plebes.
I often wonder how many past and present midshipmen—and all others who take similar oaths—reflect on the meaning of the words they utter. Whether they do or not, they would do well to revisit, from time to time, the obligation they made when they took the oath. □