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On 25 March 1994, Secretary of Defense William J. Perry lamed the commission that will carry out his congressionally Mandated roles-and-missions study. On 28 April at the U.S. Naval Institute’s Annual Meeting and Annapolis Seminar, General Carl E. Mundy, Jr, Commandant of the Marine Corps, welcomed that study. Defining the Marines’ role as littoral opera- hons from bases at sea and—alongside the Army—sustained operations ashore, General Mundy said that “different Ser- V|ces use similar equipment for differing reasons” and appeared confident that Marines would not be denied the sort of materiel 'hat role required.
In October 1944, when its forces were driving toward vic- '°ry in Europe and the Pacific, the U.S. Army awakened to 'he German use of guided missiles with a similar outlook; the Deputy Army Chief of Staff assigned responsibility for research and development of guided missiles of one type to the Army's Ordnance Corps and of other types to the Army Air Forces, but said that the Army’s ground and air forces would each “be assured of an opportunity to develop a tactical use with respect 'o its own needs.”
Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Colin L. Powell’s February 1993 roles and missions report, also required by law, took the same approach. While offering some organizational innovations, such as a joint training mission for the U.S. Atlantic Command, General Powell denied no service a means that it construed its role required.
Disappointment in congressional quarters (and reportedly expressed by then-Secretary of Defense Les Aspin) led to the current commission. It will be directed by Dr. John P. White of Harvard University. Six of its ten members are civilians (one being Mr. Aspin). Its military members, all retired, are Army General Robert RisCassi, Admiral Leon Edney, Air Force General Larry Welch, and Marine Corps Lieutenant General Bernard Trainor. One can surmise that this will not be a warmed-over repeat of General Powell’s study, but that in the name of saving money and reducing duplication the commission will strive for real change.
Change in basic law is neither likely nor required. The National Security Act of 1947, as amended, spells out each service’s enduring role, guarantees naval aviation and a Marine Corps, and for the latter establishes a three-division/three-air wing structure. On specific weaponry, however, the commission can be expected to have substantial influence; weaponry enters service inventories by other acts of Congress, with the initiatives coming almost entirely from the Department of Defense.
By late May the commission had not met nor had it selected a staff director; speculation about its possible direction is only that. But it seems reasonable for the commission to look at the range of future force employment in the fundamentally changed post-Cold War world, to consider what Dr. Andrew Marshall, Defense Director of Net Assessment, calls "the revolution in military affairs” that is emerging with advanced technology—and to visualize full future jointness. The commission then could replace the principle that a service should have all the tools that it needs for its role with a principle that a joint force should have all the tools that it needs for its mission. One
can imagine the chairman of the commission saying something like this:
“Let’s not tinker around with transferring this function or that function from one service to another. Almost every case will involve all services operating interdependently. Instead, let’s look at how joint forces can exploit technology, and in a wide range of scenarios let’s visualize how forces would be most effectively built and employed under joint command.
“Let’s look, not at the service components of a joint force but at joint force functions—e.g., air defense, forcible entry, inshore sea control, achievement of air supremacy, deep attack, intelligence, close-in fire and maneuver, logistics, and command and control. Let’s think imaginatively and objectively about how systems can perform these functions efficiently, then determine the specific service contributions to each system—with the joint force being a ‘system of systems.’
“Take, for example, air and missile defense in a joint multidivision forcible-entry force. Let’s build an air/missile defense system that uses an Aegis cruiser/AWACS combination for command and control, and fleet and land-based missile batteries and all-service fighters to sweep the skies. Then tell me how next- generation technology can do that job better and cheaper under joint command, with no service owning all it needs to perform its role alone.
“In that scenario let’s do the same for deep attack, for intelligence, for logistics, and so on. In another scenario, such as a hasty multi-brigade distant stability operation, let’s go through a similar drill. If a Navy task force can improve inshore sea control using ship-based Army Comanche helicopters, let’s see how that flies. If a Marine brigade can usefully include an Army multiple-launched rocket system (MLRS) battery, let’s try that out. Those artillerymen may never be as close to the Marines as the Navy hospital corpsmen who have been spliced to them for a century or more, but that’s the kind of teamwork—regardless of uniforms—that we should be looking for.
“Our staff will not be large enough to develop these scenarios alone, so let’s arrange for each service’s combat-developments agency and the Joint Staff’s equivalent to do three or so, looking at the problem from the viewpoint of a joint commander—and each critiquing the others’ work, with our commission as referee. Incidentally, I can’t think of a better way to force, say, the Army’s five ‘battle laboratories’ to think ‘joint.’
“Of course, service doctrine drives service materiel requirements, so we will be getting into each service’s family jewels— its doctrine. So be it. I am satisfied that the military members of our commission have enough professional breadth to ensure that whatever comes out of our varied employment will form a basis for writing the most suitable doctrine for the joint force— recognizing that the responsible commander ultimately must decide how his force will be employed.
“We need the services to manage their own affairs well and we need them as indispensable repositories of heritage and elan. We seek only to open each of them up to the others and to encourage teamwork among their members and units at all levels. A roles-and-missions overhaul along these lines will mean an overhaul of service cultures, of officer education, of unit training, and perhaps of our systems for materiel development and acquisition, as well. I trust that you will agree that it will surely bring about more effective joint forces at lower cost.”
Proceedings author of the year for 1993, General Cushman has written and published a pamphlet, Thoughts for Joint Commanders.