The Naval Coastal Warfare team is a unique mix of US. Navy and US. Coast Guard active-duty and reserve personnel. The Navy must upgrade the team and shift its attention to fleet security in the expeditionary setting: unfamiliar harbors, forward bases, and amphibious areas of operation.
The terrorists' success in nearly splitting the USS Cole (DDG-67) in half should have come as no surprise to the Navy. Since the devastation at Khobar Towers in 1996, the U.S. armed forces had dramatically increased their force protection and antiterrorism posture. Unfortunately for the Navy, the effort centered on the area from the main gate to ship quarterdecks, with very little attention paid to security from the waterside of the fleet-the gap, or "seam," referred to by former Secretary of Defense William Cohen in his introduction to the Cole Commission Report. While the services congratulated themselves on their improved posture, Jihad warriors plotted and executed one of the worst acts of terrorism ever committed on the Navy. It is especially troubling that the attack in Aden was so unsophisticated. Imagine the devastation that trained and properly equipped professionals could have inflicted on the soft underbelly of naval security. Naval planners are now waking to the dawn of combat in the 21st century.
The Navy has two distinct waterside security problems. The first is protection of permanent naval facilities in the United States and overseas, which can be accomplished by waterborne security forces and sensors cast from the same mold as guards at the front gate of a base. Although protection of permanent facilities is not simple, their static nature makes the necessary surveillance and security zones easier to establish and hold. The second problem involves protecting forward-deployed naval forces at unfamiliar harbors, forward bases, and amphibious areas of operation. As this task is much more complex, it requires highly mobile and tactically flexible units.
Expeditionary naval force protection is the specialty of the naval coastal warfare (NCW) community. However, NCW units currently are trained only for operations of short duration in low-intensity environments and benign sea states—and their weapons, sensors, and other interdiction equipment are inadequate. Considering the multitude of terrorist organizations and increasing threats worldwide, there is no excuse for failure to enhance the existing expeditionary force protection and antiterrorist framework. The Navy must more effectively protect itself from surprise attacks or be prepared to lose more ships and personnel.
Magnitude of the Threat
The Navy must avoid the standard bureaucratic response of the U.S. military, which is to continue fighting the last war or focus on avoiding repetition of the latest embarrassment. The waterside threat to naval forces is far greater than that presented to the Cole and other U.S. ships in Aden. Rogue nations and international terrorist groups routinely practice inserting operatives tasked to attack high-visibility and high-value targets with everything from car bombs to chemical agents. Their skills and equipment range from elite North Korean special operations troops in the latest semisubmersible infiltration craft to disfranchised fringe groups in the proverbial "rent-a-boats" loaded with McVeigh-style explosives.
In the future, naval units might not experience a repeat of the clumsy—albeit effective—daylight attack on the Cole. Instead, they may well be attacked by highly trained and capable professionals akin to Navy SEALs and force reconnaissance Marines. The goal could be to stage a "CNN moment" for political gain or to take preemptive action for military reasons. Common targets include:
- U.S. Navy combatants
- Personnel staging areas, such as berthing, headquarters, and embassies
- Communications and command-and-control facilities
- Commercial and military port facilities
- Coastal defense stations
- Civilian and military airfields
- Power stations
- Petroleum facilities
- Logistics transport, such as delivery trucks and water taxis
Surprise is crucial to terrorists; they must reach their objective without detection. The art of infiltration has been refined continually from the Revolutionary War Turtle, to the mini-submarine attack at the initiation of the attack on Pearl Harbor, to SEAL team insertions during the Vietnam War. Small boats, semi submersibles, and swimmer delivery vehicles are tailor-made for infiltration because they can achieve surprise and overwhelm defenders in fixed, or temporarily fixed, positions. They are fast and maneuverable, and difficult to detect owing to their small size and ability to exploit sea clutter. They can carry many different types of weapons and ordnance, and their ease of operation minimizes crew-training difficulties. Not least, they are inexpensive compared to most modern weapon systems, which means that larger numbers can be procured and employed. Commanding officers would not sleep well if they comprehended the potential threat arrayed against their ships when the moon is new, the tide is inbound, their ship is "cold iron," and the sailor on watch with a dirty weapon and ten rounds of ammunition is concerned mainly with staying warm.
The Foundation
The naval coastal warfare team is a unique mix of commissioned units drawing together reserve and active-duty personnel of both the Navy and Coast Guard. This combination is under the active-duty chain of command of Amphibious Groups Two and Three, but it is weighted nearly nine to one in favor of reservists. Active-duty personnel are assigned to each unit for maintenance, planning, and the many administrative duties that keep the unit linked between monthly drills. The active and reserve elements work extremely well together and relationships are uniformly excellent. The three major coastal warfare components are the Harbor Defense Command (HDC), Mobile Inshore Undersea Warfare Unit (MIUWU), and Navy and Coast Guard boat units.
The HDC is equipped with a Military Assistance to Safety and Traffic (MAST) II system that is essentially a mobile flag plot in tents. It consists of various information and support systems, advanced voice communications, and super high frequency connectivity systems intended to provide a highly capable command, control, communications, computer, and intelligence node.
The MIUWU is a mobile surface and subsurface surveillance unit that fuses a combat information center into a 8' x 8' x 30' road and air mobile container. The MIUWU is equipped with extensive communications and detection capabilities, including satellite communications, radar, electronic support measures, thermal imagers, acoustic processors, and sensor trucks.
The boat units make up the newest component of NCW. Navy inshore boat units (IBUs) and Coast Guard port security units (PSUs) provide 22- to 32-foot boats for target classification, interdiction, and acoustic sensor deployment. These patrol boats are equipped with .50 caliber and 7.62 mm machine guns, surface-search radar, secure ultra-high-frequency and very-high-frequency radios, and handheld night vision devices.
The Way Forward: Personnel
Can reservists be trusted with such a significant mission? Definitely—the NCW community has been a magnet for attracting the most professional and talented members of the Naval Reserve. NCW weapons and equipment generally are not as complex as that of the combatants that its members served on while in the Navy. All NCW officers are warfare-qualified specialists and many completed their department head tours prior to leaving active duty. The simplicity and focus of the coastal warfare mission is ideal for the reserves. NCW reservists are authorized almost twice the annual allotment of drill days above the standard Saturday or Sunday, once-a-month drillers. The increased drill allotment coupled with the standard two weeks of annual training are sufficient to train NCW crews in field operations, weapons, and tactics. The Navy has a force that can accomplish force protection and antiterrorism, but does not have to employ them 365 days a year.
Following the Cole incident, several reserve units were activated to provide force protection while the Navy developed long-range plans for protecting its facilities. Because of administrative and medical requirements, activation of a reserve unit takes more time than activation of a regular unit. While it is difficult for reservists to shut down their civilian pursuits and report for duty, they still are subject to a 72-hour recall requirement that shadows their daily business and personal activities. To mitigate delays in responding, the Navy should develop a core of active-duty NCW units that can be called on to react to contingency operations on short notice or be activated when a presidential reserve recall is not politically expedient.
Naval reservists can handle the majority of coastal warfare tasks, but the mix of active and reserve specialists should be altered slightly to accommodate the highly perishable skills of the sonar technician. Acoustic analysis experts are key to the success of the MIUWU, and reservists rarely have time for the continuous practice and refinement it takes to maintain the requisite skill level. NCW units would be better prepared for "pop-up" contingencies if the assigned sonar technicians were activeduty personnel.
The Way Forward: Equipment
In addition to fielding active-duty coastal warfare units, there are a number of equipment gaps that must be filled. Sensor improvements are necessary for successful detection and targeting. The newly introduced light acoustic arrays are beginning to make their mark. These passive arrays provide a formidable acoustic barrier through which infiltration units must pass, yet layered defense requires a variety of acoustic sensors. Most notably absent in the acoustic inventory are active sonar systems and a long-life buoy with rechargeable batteries that can be anchored and rigged for varying depths and optimized for the shallow littorals. These systems are critical to locating electric motor-driven swimmer delivery vehicles, mini-submarines, semisubmersible boats, and swimmers.
Electronic support measures (ESM) gear, which detects enemy radar and radio transmissions, has just been introduced to the MIUWU. ESM gear also should be allocated to the unit's mobile sensor vehicles and boats. Triangulating from a variety of ESM sensors enables units to more quickly pin down locations and respond to threats. Radar suites require upgrading as well. In an effort to keep costs low, MIUWU and boat units were outfitted with marginally effective radar that cannot detect small, high-speed, low-profile craft. "Frog finders," inexpensive adaptations of commercial fish finders, are capable of locating swimmer delivery vehicles and even swimmers, and would be useful supplements to the coils of barbed wire dragged behind patrol boats.
The thermal imager is one of the most feared devices in the coastal warfare inventory. It is effective because it is difficult to cloak anything from the thermal sensitivity of this compact, lightweight equipment. Periscopes, antenna masts, a swimmer's head, and certainly the hull of a boat stand out in stark contrast to the background through temperature differences as slight as 1 deg. The shore-based MIUWU has been outfitted with thermal imagers—similar systems mounted on the boats would pay dividends. In the same high-technology vein, the Department of Defense is evaluating technologies for detection of explosives and weapons of mass destruction. An intense research-and-development effort is under way in this area to improve security at airports and other large public areas. When the technology matures, consideration should be given to its employment by waterborne and shore-based NCW elements.
To detect "shooters" before they reach their weapons release point, the detection envelope must be expanded much farther from high-value targets. As the envelope expands, NCW communications system capabilities must follow suit. Land communications with offshore units must be seamless, and target data must be shared nearly instantaneously among all elements of the NCW force and its air and surface partners. The new generation of large and small coastal patrol combatants should be equipped communicate by voice and data, and to transmit and receive camera images.
The waterborne interdiction arm of coastal warfare is fairly a few years old. Operations thus far have focused on inner harbor areas using rigid-hull inflatable boats, Boston Whalers of various sizes, and 17- to 32-foot boats. Now that the inner harbor has several capable platforms, attention should be paid to the offshore approaches. Lack of a heavy boat is by far the most glaring gap in the ability of NCW to provide the force protection and antiterrorist umbrella the fleet requires. A patrol boat that can operate off shore must be seaworthy and have lengthy on-station time. In addition, it must have stabilized heavy caliber weapons, improved sensors, a low radar cross section, armored positions for the crew, and enough room for boarding parties. Consider the image of a waterborne Bradley Fighting Vehicle with water jets.
The need for air and road transportability restricts equipment size, weight, and shape—especially for boats. The Mk V special operations insertion boat matches the maximum lift limits of the C-5 aircraft. Working down from the Mk V, NCW units should develop a heavy boat to satisfy current deficiencies. Because of the strategic role and age of the C-5, it would be best to use the newer C-17 as the air transport model.
The coastal patrol boat (PC) would be most useful in force protection-antiterrorist situations, but its size limits mobility for expeditionary purposes. PC shortcomings include limited air and road transportability, unstabilized weapons, and a large radar cross section. NCW planners should consider the PC's lessons learned when they evaluate future patrol craft. Evolution of its role in delivering SEALs to objectives provides excellent material for understanding how NCW can best hunt for clandestine delivery vehicles.
The Way Forward: Weapons
Naval coastal warfare forces are armed at three different levels. All personnel are issued an individual weapon that coincides with their watch, quarter, and station bill assignment. A rifle, shotgun, or pistol is issued for general quarters, security alerts, and Condition III responsibilities. Crew-served weapons are issued for perimeter defense if the unit is authorized an internal security force. Heavy machine guns are issued to the boat units for surface gunnery. NCW units have been issued their own weapons only recently. However, they have been allocated insufficient ammunition to qualify their people, let alone improve marksmanship, and their flak jackets and field gear look as if they were drawn from some military equivalent to the Salvation Army store. Finally, as coastal warfare likely will include military operations other than war, nonlethal weapons should be issued so that boat crews and other security forces can limit collateral damage and casualties in the performance of such noncombat duties.
Boat weaponry consists of stanchion-mounted .50 caliber and 7.62 mm machine guns that largely are ineffective in high-speed scenarios and worse in even moderate seas. Further, there is nothing in the NCW weapons inventory to counter underwater threats. Exotic solutions are not necessary. Waterborne units need weapons that can destroy high-speed surface craft, swimmer delivery vehicles, semisubmersibles, and swimmers. Stabilized guns and underwater concussion ordnance would handle the vast majority of threats. Stabilized guns dramatically increase the probability of hits on the target, and lightweight 20 mm and 25 mm mini-guns are available that can be controlled by helmet-mounted displays, thereby eliminating the need for heavy, power-thirsty fire control systems. The ability to illuminate large quadrants of a security zone could be provided by simple boat-- mounted mortars. In short, the overall weapons goal for equipping NCW boat crews has to be heavy and accurate fire, underwater ordnance, and illumination—because little exists today.
The Way Forward: Tactics and Training
Naval coastal warfare units have at times conducted exercises with special warfare, explosive ordnance demolition, and very shallow water mine countermeasure teams to evaluate each other's tactics and equipment. Officers at all levels should promote an active relationship among these units because pre-exercise training as well as the exercises themselves teach valuable lessons to infiltrators, surveillants, and defenders.
Improved mobility and tactical flexibility for MIUWU commands was ensured by a recent contract award. The 8' x 8' x 30' container that houses the majority of the processing and communications equipment will be eliminated in favor of HUMVEE-mounted suites that undoubtedly will simplify the footprint, transport requirements, and tailoring of the NCW surveillance component.
Use of operational deception is key to successful force protection and antiterrorist operations. It is relatively simple to present a overt surveillance posture by hoisting your flag, radiating every emitter, and illuminating the security area. However, a covert surveillance posture is much more difficult to attain. Encampments and boats can benefit from the relatively inexpensive use of camouflage paint schemes, camouflage netting, thermal imagers, reduced radar cross section, and engineering systems designed to reduce acoustic and thermal signatures.
Any security unit deployed to seaward will perforce have a land presence for berthing, tactical equipment, generators, vehicle staging, and messing facilities-all of which must be protected. The only units that have specific security forces assigned are the MIUWU and PSU units that are able to protect their own positions and no more. To ensure adequate self-protection, each coastal warfare unit must be able to provide its own physical security and must routinely exercise with local security forces when multiple units are collocated. While they may never be the primary objective for saboteurs and terrorists, their presence alone provides a tempting target.
Learn or Repeat?
The heroic efforts and sacrifices of the USS Cole crew are likely to be repeated if the Navy does not substantially reinforce its expeditionary force protection and antiterrorist capabilities. The mission is well within the "skill set" of the combined active and reserve Navy-Coast Guard forces of the coastal warfare community. But the questions remain: Will the Navy provide as a matter of priority the wherewithal to deter the next attack? Is the handful of boats, weapons, and sensors necessary to prevail in this turbulent, violent environment too costly to prevent the possible loss of a maritime prepositioning ship or a carrier, and the crew manning it? How many more successful attacks on billion-dollar targets can the United States afford?
Lieutenant Commander Weeks commands Inshore Boat Unit 17. He previously served as operations officer of a mobile inshore undersea warfare unit. He is a program manager for SAIC, Incorporated, in San Diego, where he works on integration of emerging technologies for the Navy. Proceedings published his "A Combatant for the Littorals" in November 1999.