"The future is now ... The more things change, the more they stay the same .... Pigs will fly."
If, as former Secretary of the Navy Richard Danzig remarked at the outset of last year's Current Strategy Forum at the Naval War College, the real focus of the conference was on the needs of the next 15 years, the most the U.S. Navy is likely to accomplish is to take initial steps to some future vision of U.S. naval power appropriate to the 21st-century information age. Even if the Navy takes full advantage of some "out-of-the-box" and "not-invented-here" proposals, much of tomorrow's fleet is in service today:
- As for cruisers, destroyers, and frigates, 55% of the surface force of 2015 is now in the fleet.
- Today's submarines will comprise nearly 70% of the undersea force.
- In addition to the Nimitz-class CVN currently under construction, only two new carriers—one a transition to the new CVNX-1 class-will enter service during the next 15 years to maintain a 12-carrier force level that is increasingly strained by global commitments.
Even more elements of the Navy of 2015 and beyond already are in development or under construction, and-barring peacetime catastrophes or conflict losses-will be with us for much of the century. Assuming the Bush administration and those that follow continue to support today's "program Navy":
- The last of the 12 San Antonio (LPD17)-class amphibious platform dock ships will be in service until about 2060.
- Likewise, the last of the 30 Virginia (SSN-774)-class submarines will be retired about that same time.
- The final ship of the 32-ship Zumwalt (DD-21) land-attack destroyer class will retire some ten years after SSN-804 is decommissioned.
- If all ten of the planned next-generation CVNX aircraft carriers are acquired, the last carrier of the class will be in service at the turn of the next century.
- A follow-on CGX replacement for the 27 Ticonderoga (CG-47)-class Aegis cruisers could comprise half the surface force in 2075.
Amid compelling demands for more resources, work continues on the second Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), which seeks a new strategic framework for critical decisions regarding the nation's armed forces. There is great danger that wrong-headed decisions may yet be taken, from which there will be no easy and inexpensive way back—and transformation to the "Navy-after-next" therefore imperiled. But a transformation to what? And at what cost?
Visions
"One of the many challenges we face," Rear Admiral Robert Sprigg, commander of the Navy Warfare Development Command (NWDC), commented in mid-January 2001, "is the fact that there are competing visions of what the future Navy must and should be.... From the Sea, Forward ... From the Sea, and the maritime concept provide good frameworks," he continued, "but there remains a critical need to solidify our view of where we're headed and why." The maritime concept was published as chapter 3 of the April 2000 Navy Strategic Planning Guidance. It builds on the landward focus of ... From the Sea and Forward. . . From the Sea, and describes how future naval forces will use new capabilities to ensure the United States can decisively influence events in areas ashore.
Leveraging the inherent mobility of ships at sea to provide a distributed network of sensors and warfighting capability, network-centric warfare is expressed in the maritime concept as the organizing principle for the Navy. Future naval forces must be able to dictate operational tempo across a five-dimensional battle space: sea, air, land, space, and cyberspace. However, the military will be challenged by anti-access strategies built on varied asymmetric and conventional threats and weapons. Maintaining the ability to ensure access, project power, and enable the joint force in light of these threats are among the Navy's principal goals. The Navy's evolving transformation is increasingly more about the way it operates, not about the way it looks. The thrust is toward significant change in Navy force posture and operational concepts, not just force structure—which for a variety of reasons is unlikely to change much (except to get smaller) during the next 25 years.
Network-centric operations will link shooters, sensors, and commanders to provide the superior knowledge required as the military shifts its focus from traditional attrition-based warfare to effects-- based planning. According to Navy documentation, network-centric operations will provide future warriors superior knowledge from real-time netted sensors, enabling them to act at a faster pace than an adversary. The maritime concept sees future naval forces organized around the principles of unity of effort and speed of command.
"Unmatched awareness of the battle space" and understanding of the intentions and likely actions of an adversary will enable the Navy to rapidly attack an adversary's critical vulnerabilities, avoid his strengths, and destroy his centers of gravity. Bringing naval forces together in a network-centric environment is expected to promote the superior knowledge that will foster a shared, near-real-time understanding of the battle space, complementing the Navy's command of the seas with speed of command. The result will be total battle space dominance, with sea-based maneuver forces capable of operating inside the sensor and engagement timelines of any adversary to foreclose the effectiveness of anti-access strategies.
Needs
"Numbers are important," the former Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral Jay Johnson was fond of saying. He repeatedly told audiences, "We can do more with more, and we can do less with less, but we will no longer do more with less." That was not the reality of the past few years, however. The Navy—as well as the Marine Corps and Coast Guard—have done much more with much less. They have done it by working their people, ships and aircraft, and equipment hard and putting them away wet. Commitments have been met, if sometimes only barely, but readiness and retention have suffered greatly-the latter only recently showing signs of improvement. Hence the stress that the current CNO, Admiral Vernon Clark, puts on manpower, readiness, and quality of service as the top priorities of the Navy.
Numbers and force mixes must be examined soberly and comprehensively. Admiral Clark already has outlined the need to focus on requirements and capabilities, in addition to numbers. At the Surface Navy Association (SNA) annual conference in January 2001, he demanded that planners state warfighting requirements clearly, and not just talk about numbers. "I'm tired of under funding the understated requirements, because it's wrong," he said. "I am sick of it." In his briefing to the SNA, Rear Admiral Joe Sestak, head of the Navy QDR directorate, pointed out the capabilities—not numbers of platforms—needed to ensure access, project defense ashore, and enable other joint forces to deploy to a future conflict. Whether expressed as operational capabilities or numbers of platforms, the result is likely to be frustrated by fiscal reality. Since 1986, the last year in which the defense budget saw substantial increase in buying power before 2000, critical investments in research and development (R&D), systems, platforms, and people have been consigned to the "outyears" of future-year defense plans. Moreover, an increasingly greater proportion of scarce resources has been directed at sustaining current operations, thereby mortgaging the Navy's future by allowing capital assets to atrophy and important R&D projects to languish.
Looking at lessons to be learned from the USS Cole (DDG-67) tragedy last year, such threats are expected to grow inexorably in the decades to come—almost without constraint, if the most dire predictions can be believed. Despite the "low-tech" nature of the attack on the Cole, developments in North Korea, the People's Republic of China, and the Near East have generated a great deal of attention on the theater ballistic missile (TBM) threat to U.S. and allied naval forces in the littorals and to forces ashore. But the reality of a TBM threat consisting of both conventional warheads and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by 2015 looks to be different. Only a handful of states will possess these weapons, while even fewer will have the capabilities needed to target and strike ships at sea. Realistic concern about TBMs must not frustrate the relatively small investments needed to blunt much more likely threats, especially small, advanced-technology submarines armed with torpedoes, mines, and missiles. Likewise, the Navy must be concerned with both antiship and land-attack cruise missiles, some armed with WMDs, that are much more widespread geographically and more likely to be used against U.S. forces and their allies.
Although they might be more like "speedbumps" than "show stoppers," mines and other undersea warfare weapons are particularly insidious, cheap, and effective—and they attack our strategies and concepts of operations directly. It bears repeating that from 1946 through early 2000, 14 of the 18 U.S. Navy ships that suffered combat damage were victims of naval mines. Yet the Navy has practically ignored its own naval mines and mining programs. Several programs for modern and sophisticated target detection devices for existing mines, new mine concepts for littoral operations, and modifications to heavyweight torpedoes for mining tasks have been started only to fall victim to lack of funds. Meanwhile, U.S. allies and adversaries continue to upgrade their "weapons that wait."
The Navy Strategic Planning Guidance and other analyses identify broad, top-level capability requirements for tomorrow's fleet:
- Sufficient numbers to sustain combat-credible sea-based forces in important world regions to ensure access and project power ashore
- High speed, extended endurance, and increased payload
- Enhanced stealth—i.e., acoustic, visual, magnetic, infrared, and radar cross sections
- Enhanced passive survivability and reduced susceptibility to damage-a true ability to "fight hurt" that will be critical because future ships will have reduced crews, like the DD-21's goal of 95
- Great lethality of offensive and defensive weapons, and ability to project defenses ashore to protect sea-based ground maneuver elements as well as land-based air and ground forces and their facilities
- Extended reach and increased accuracy and precision of land attack, antiship, antiaircraft/missile, and antisubmarine systems
- Excellent strategic, operational, and tactical intelligence that guarantees extensive precision of effect
Driving Plans
Admiral Clark testified before the Senate and House Armed Services Committees in September 2000 that a force of about 300 ships is marginally sufficient to meet near-term forward-presence and crisis-response requirements, as well as the warfighting requirements of a single major theater war. However, mounting evidence suggests that the 305 ships in the 1997 QDR—some of which are not warships—will not be enough in the future. Consequently, the fleet's ability to carry out a second, nearly simultaneous major theater war, as called for in the National Military Strategy and the Defense Planning Guidance, is a high-risk proposition. As the service prepared for the 2001 QDR, arguments were put forth to keep force levels balanced with expected future employment. The Navy recognizes that a strategy of "virtual presence" equates to "absolute absence."
The Navy plan to sustain 12 carrier battle groups (CVBGs) is shown in Figure 1; but 12 CVBGs already are seen as insufficient to meet the need. Carrier underway time during deployments has risen steadily from historical norms. In 1998-1999, the carrier home ported in Japan had to respond to two unplanned deployments to the Arabian Gulf to cover U.S. commitments. The Navy had no other recourse than to "surge" that carrier into a forward operating area at times in its operational cycle when critical maintenance was needed. Similarly, at the start of Operation Allied Force in 1999, there was no CVBG in the Mediterranean, which limited the pressure that NATO could put on Serbian forces. The carrier that was redeployed quickly from another area of operations then left a gap there. The growing number of CVBG gaps in operational coverage has led to internal assessments of the need for 15 carriers to meet the demands of regional commanders-in-chief. If the Navy is successful in this quest, there will be ripple effects throughout the rest of the fleet.
Figure 2 shows Navy plans for new construction to sustain the 1997 QDR force structure of 116 surface warships. However optimistic these projections may prove to be, an internal Navy surface combatant force level study (completed but never signed formally) determined that as many as 134 to 139 modern, multimission surface warships would be required to meet the operational demands of a single major theater war. Around 170 would be needed to satisfy the National Military Strategy goal of two nearly simultaneous major theater wars.
Recent studies found that the 1997 QDR force structure for nuclear-powered attack submarines and surface warships will not meet future operational requirements or satisfy strategic guidance. In 1999, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) concluded that, by 2012, the Navy would need as many as 68 modern nuclear attack submarines (SSNs), a major step above the 45 to 55 SSNs in the 1997 QDR. Still, Figure 3 shows what the Navy hopes will be possible to sustain 55 submarines in the fleet: an average of one SSN per year through fiscal year 2012 and two to three subs each year thereafter, excluding the conversion of the first four Ohio (SSBN-726)-class ballistic missile submarines to cruise missile and special operations platforms (SSGNs). Although there is doubt this projection can be reached, a far more robust building program will be needed to sustain the JCS objective of 68 SSNs.
The objective for amphibious warfare forces calls for 12 amphibious ready groups (ARGs) to provide lift for the assault-echelon forces of three Marine expeditionary brigade (MEB) equivalents. That said, fiscal constraints have limited Navy assault-echelon lift capacity to less than 2.5 MEB-equivalents, even as it transforms amphibious shipping—large-deck and aviation-capable amphibious assault ships, dock landing ships, and landing platform dock ships—to a force that can affordably meet future needs. Critical elements of Navy plans include acquisition of 12 San Antonio (LPD-17)-class ships, the design, engineering, and acquisition of the next-generation amphibious assault ship, LHA(R), and modernization of ships in service.
Independent assessments of shipbuilding requirements and acquisition strategies by Ronald O'Rourke of the Congressional Research Service (among others) underscore the dilemma. He explained that the Navy does not face a "train wreck," as some analysts have claimed; instead, it is being bled to death by a "thousand cuts." Should the administration and Congress fail to fund 10-12 new ships per year, the 305-ship force level cannot be sustained. Unless new construction rates can be accelerated and sustained beyond the six planned now, and early decommissioning of in-service warships curtailed—namely, frigates and submarines, some with significant service life remaining—a 250-ship Navy is likely by 2025. Figure 5 indicates that, absent a change in course and funding, tomorrow's fleet will look remarkably like today's—only significantly smaller.
If the nation cannot afford what is needed today and tomorrow, even given projected federal budget surpluses through 2010, the Navy will be forced to investigate alternative platform designs and mixes, as well as novel operational concepts that could serve as "virtual force multipliers." If not, Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski, President of the Naval War College, explained during an interview this past January, "being there" will be increasingly problematic. The Navy would come close to embracing U.S. Air Force arguments outlined in the "Global Reach, Global Power" vision document of 1992, and presented in various "Global Reconnaissance Strike" briefings this year. When internal analyses indicate that a Navy of 360-plus ships is required to meet anticipated operational commitments, a fleet of about 250 ships implies that "virtual presence" may indeed be the bumper-sticker of tomorrow's fleet.
A Bridge Too Near?
Captain David Schubert, Assistant Chief of Naval Research, said, "The naval science and technology (S&T) vision seeks to inspire and guide innovation to provide technology-based options for future Navy and Marine Corps capabilities. We are focusing on revitalizing the Navy S&T program to bridge the gap between short-term needs and longer term requirements, move the program closer to the warfighter, integrate vertically various initiatives, and retain Office of Naval Research historical connections to high-quality, world-class fundamental research." With strong commitment to getting systems to the fleet by fiscal years 2007 and 2008, the Corporate S&T Panel—composed of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition, the Vice CNO, and the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps—has approved 12 future naval capabilities (FNC's):
Autonomous Operations. These are technologies and systems that increase the autonomy, performance, and affordability of organic, uninhabited vehicle systems for reconnaissance, surveillance, battlefield identification, and many other tasks. Four programs are being pursued: unmanned aerial, ground, and underwater vehicles, and unmanned aerial vehicle propulsion.
Capable Manpower. The objective here is to get the right war fighters into the right job, at the right time, with the right tools. An example of the need for this new approach is the program for the Zumwalt (DD-21)-class land-attack destroyer. The operational requirements document calls for an advanced surface warship with a crew goal of no more than 95 people, as opposed to a traditional crew of 350-400. The program office is investigating all personnel factors, from recruitment to career progression, because the Navy will need a different type of sailor and different mix of sailors in the future. (The Strategic Studies Group in Newport also has identified the 21st-century war fighter as a central theme for its efforts this year.)
Decision Support Systems. Emerging concepts for network-centric operations will require advanced systems to help war fighters reach the right solutions in dynamic tactical situations. Three formal programs are being pursued to enhance capabilities in the operating forces: Common Picture, 21st Century Command Capability, and Multiplex (Multi-Echelon Planning and Execution).
Expeditionary Logistics. One of the four pillars of the Joint Vision 2020 approach to achieving "full spectrum dominance" is "focused logistics." It will improve the ability of naval forces to get to an operational theater and remain there as long as necessary. Two priorities have been identified: distribution—the ability to deploy from and return to a sea base, and to supply and resupply both the sea base and maneuver units; and logistics command and control—providing tactical and logistical command and control with a common architecture.
Information Distribution. Information superiority is one of the means of the maritime concept and is the foundation for success in network-centric operations. This FNC aims at wireless connectivity among deployed Navy and Marine Corps units to support high operational tempos, speed of command, and operational precision. First priority goes to flexible bandwidth—and lots of it. The second priority calls for enterprise-wide integrated information management and assurance.
Littoral Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW). The shift from the open-ocean conflict environment to the littorals has increased the complexity of the ASW task. The littoral ASW problem consists of small, quiet, advanced conventional as well as nuclear-powered submarines in a "noisy" operational environment. Assessment of current capability gaps has called out four priorities: ability to detect, classify, localize, and track targets and to engage them before they can attack; ability to characterize the littoral undersea battle space to provide content for a common tactical and environmental picture; rapid, covert ability to deploy and sustain surveillance systems for wide-area search, detection, and cueing; and ability to engage or neutralize bottomed, surfaced, or low-Doppler undersea targets beyond their weapon-release ranges.
Missile Defense. Investment strategy for this FNC centers on a single priority: establishing a baseline overland missile defense to provide 3600 surveillance, fire control-quality track, a single integrated air picture, distributed weapon system control, and target interception. It seeks to give war fighters common, consistent knowledge and the ability to defeat all air threats.
Organic Mine Countermeasures (MCM). Until recently, the Navy's MCM capabilities resided in dedicated surface, airborne (helicopter), and explosive ordnance disposal forces. Organic MCM—the ability to detect, characterize, and neutralize mines using a unit's own assets—complements, but does not replace, a dedicated force. The highest priority is for rapid, clandestine surveillance and reconnaissance, and mine and obstacle clearance in very shallow water, and the surf and beach zones. Submarine- and surface warship-deployed autonomous vehicles are key to this category. Next comes organic and off-board sensors to extend the tactical horizon of naval platforms and an integrated undersea capability to detect, classify, and neutralize mines. In the third priority are autonomous systems to defeat buried mines, which can be neutralized only by divers and marine mammal systems.
Platform Protection. Even before the terrorist attack on the Cole, the Navy was investigating enhanced organic self-defense from a diverse range of conventional and asymmetrical threats. Three priorities have been established: avoid or win engagements with torpedoes and mines, particularly wake- and acoustic-homing weapons; defeat or neutralize asymmetric and nonlethal weapons; and resist and control weapons damage while preserving platform operational capability.
Time-Critical Strike. This FNC would enable Navy and Marine Corps war fighters to project power and destroy, neutralize, or suppress targets of immediate concern at the right moment in the battle. It has four priorities: defeat expeditionary warfare targets with naval fires and defeat relocatable targets at long ranges; defeat short dwell-time targets at long ranges; defeat moving targets at long ranges; and defeat hard, deeply buried targets at long ranges
Warfighter Protection. The goal here is to provide the best possible protection to sailors and Marines from operational threats, keeping them from becoming battle or noncombat casualties, and reducing morbidity and mortality throughout the battle space. Three capabilities are outlined: improve combat casualty care and management; prevent casualties by improving individual situational awareness and countering the threat of disease, battle, and non-battle injuries; and ensure a fit, healthy force that can withstand physical and psychological threats.
Total Ownership Cost Reduction. In order of priority, this requires: design, engineering, and materials to reduce maintenance requirements; advanced materials, designs, and manufacturing processes to reduce acquisition costs; and better cost-estimating tools and predictive models for determining the effect of new technologies and designs on "cradle-to-grave" costs.
If there is any criticism of the future naval capabilities program it is that it is picking "low-hanging fruit," a concern that Captain Schubert acknowledged. "But, we are addressing the most critical near-term needs of the operating forces and FNC's are only half the program. For the longer term, we have identified numerous S&T 'grand challenges' that are directed toward meeting the needs of the Navy and Marine Corps 'after-next,' 30 to 50 years in the future. We are taking a purposeful approach that is directed toward difficult but achievable technological advances that promise to revolutionize naval warfare." He went on to say, "Most importantly, these are not linear extensions, nor are they massive engineering projects."
A Navy-after-Next
Rear Admiral Sprigg said the Navy Warfare Development Command is examining three major initiatives, "real innovations that will have the potential to fundamentally change the future Navy and the way it carries out its roles, missions, and tasks. The first is what we're calling 'Dynamic Doctrine'—using web-based environments to facilitate all-fleet access and participation."
The Navy doctrine working party involves the staff of all fleet commanders as it updates all Navy doctrine publications and gets them out to the operating forces in a much more responsive manner. "We are taking good advantage of technology to ensure near-real-time feedback from the fleet in the areas of doctrine, operational art, and tactics, techniques, and procedures, including a robust Navy lessons-learned system, so that our doctrine and related publications can reflect the most recent developments."
Admiral Sprigg continued, "Something that we call the `expeditionary sensor grid' has the potential to revolutionize the way data and information support battle space awareness." He noted that today, even including national sensors, no more than 50 high-cost sensors accompany the battle group, and their products are not integrated in a true network. The draft "capstone concept for network-centric operations in the information age" spells out the critical need for knowledge superiority, one of the two "means"—the other being forward presence—stated in the maritime concept. "What type and numbers of sensors do we really need to ensure war fighter-focused network-centric operations are possible?" he asked. In the view of NWDC, the expeditionary sensor grid will make up thousands of small, low-cost, tailored sensors distributed throughout the battle space and linked in a tiered net that will allow data and information to flow freely among all battle groups and joint forces. "The expeditionary sensor grid will have far-reaching implications, not only for how we fight, but the tools that we bring to the fight," Admiral Sprigg noted. "If we can `offload' sensors from our platforms to the grid, we can then repackage the platforms to more efficiently and effectively carry out their missions."
The third innovation is what Admiral Sprigg called the high-speed vessel (HSV). "We are looking at novel platforms that will give us a significantly large improvement in economies and effectiveness of distributing people and equipment throughout the battle space." He explained that various commercial designs for fast ferries—some capable of 60 knots and several-thousand-mile ranges, with great increases in payload-could extend intratheater lift considerably. "The Navy, Marine Corps, and the Army are all interested in these fast surface vessel technologies, and we look to conduct extensive joint experiments this year and into 2002 to test our hypotheses." These concepts could help rebalance the Navy force mix. "In the future we will not be limited, for example, to only the traditional ARGs comprising just a few, large amphibious assault ships and dock landing ships. At 60 knots and 1,000mile-plus ranges, we could augment the sea-based fighting forces with combat power delivered in HSVs, in essence bringing 'paratrooper thinking' to the ways that we employ Marines and their expeditionary shipping."
According to Vice Admiral Cebrowski, HSV-type ships were used by the Australians in their response to the recent East Timor crisis. In June 1999, the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) chartered HMAS Jervis Bay, a 280-foot catamaran capable of transporting 500 troops at up to 40 knots, to provide logistical support for the international force deployed to East Timor. (See page 90.) After conducting joint interoperability exercises with the RAN and Jervis Bay in September 2000, the U.S. commander of Amphibious Squadron (Phibron) Five submitted an advance concept technology demonstration recommendation based on the "military applications of this minimally manned, heavily automated, fast and commercially developed hull form." The USN-RAN exercises included special warfare training and surveillance insertions, and vehicle and troop embarkation. Referring to the prospects for a U.S. HSV to support contingency operations, Phibron Five reported, "Within a 24-hour period, a fast catamaran could threaten 2,000 nautical miles (nm) of coastline."
"Expeditionary maneuver warfare is the warfighting philosophy that seeks to shatter enemy cohesion through unexpected, sea-based actions," Major General William Whitlow, Director of Expeditionary Warfare on the staff of the CNO, noted late last year. "And it's important to remember that 'littoral' does not mean 'brown water.' We conduct 'littoral operations' from the sanctuary of the high seas, well beyond the reach of our adversaries on the shore." In that regard, it is not an overstatement that littoral operations now begin when U.S. naval forces are some 600 nm away from an objective area. "Tomorrow, with advanced weapon systems, 'littoral ops' will begin more than 1,000 miles from an adversary's coastline. And, because we're expeditionary, we bring with us virtually everything we need to conduct high-tempo, long-endurance operations without the need for access to land-based facilities." The "Australian Solution"—a high-speed amphibious assault ship—offers an interesting "not-invented here" alternative, Admiral Cebrowski emphasized. "We have got to get moving to test this and other innovations."
"The problem that the Navy has faced with both. . . From the Sea and Forward . .From the Sea is that we had a vision, but no strategy to achieve that vision" Admiral Cebrowski said. "We did not define a strategy that allowed us to make rational decisions regarding the Navy of the future. We have continued on a path little different from the Cold War years. We addressed the Navy from the bottom up—everything that we were doing post-. . . From the Sea is what we were doing in 1985: dispersing offensive firepower ... Tomahawk cruise missiles on subs . . . CVBGs with long-range strike aircraft armed with precision weapons. What was truly new for the 'sea change' and 'new focus' on the littoral that ... From the Sea was supposed to have ushered in?"
In 2001 the Navy is at a junction in time, technologies, budgets, and geopolitics such that forays into the "metaphysics" of the future—a clean sheet of paper design for the entire "Navy-after-Next," coupled with a renaissance in experimentation and willingness to accept what ultimately could be dumb ideas and mistakes in the interim—may well result in valuable serendipity for service transformation. In the end, something akin to the HSV, Streetfighter, SEA LANCE, and Corsair being evaluated by the Naval War College, NWDC, and other agencies might indeed become reality. But the underlying importance of these initiatives has been to direct the Navy's attention well beyond straight-line progression from the Navy of today to where it could be in 2025 and after, ship projections in Figure 5 notwithstanding. "The real question," Admiral Cebrowski admonished, "is not where the Navy could be in 2025, but where it should be to respond to a radically transformed competition space."
Needed: A National Fleet
Any objective look at future U.S. naval forces also should consider the capabilities of the U.S. Coast Guard, the fifth and smallest of the armed forces, especially its "deepwater" cutters and aircraft that operate more than 50 nm offshore. This would include formal programs to modernize and recapitalize these forces, along with their support systems and infrastructure ashore. The Coast Guard set up the Integrated Deepwater Systems Capability Replacement Project in 1996. "The Deepwater project is the Commandant's center of gravity in shaping the future of the service," Rear Admiral Patrick Stillman, Assistant Commandant for Governmental and Public Affairs, stated during a January 2001 interview, when he had just been named as the Coast Guard's first program executive officer to take over the revamped Deepwater program. "Our programmatic success in fielding much-needed deepwater platforms and systems will be the sine qua non for Coast Guard operational success well into the middle of the 21st century."
The Coast Guard supports the nation's maritime security needs in several key areas, and its distinctive blend of capabilities undergird its five roles: marine safety, maritime law enforcement, marine environmental protection, maritime mobility, and national defense. However, its ability to continue in these important roles is increasingly in doubt. The Coast Guard's 93 deepwater cutters and 206 deepwater aircraft, and vital support and infrastructure are aging quickly. Most of them are technologically obsolete and unable to perform their missions effectively, and are increasingly costly to operate and maintain. They lack interoperability among themselves as well as with the Navy, other U.S. service and agencies, and foreign maritime forces.
The Coast Guard plans to award a single contract in January 2002, with the first elements of the program to enter service the following year. The first national security cutter is expected to enter service in 2005 or 2006, and the total cost of the program is projected to be $10 billion to $15 billion over 20 years. According to Admiral Stillman, "This is without doubt the single largest acquisition program ever attempted by the Coast Guard in its 212year history. We are intent on doing it right and giving the American taxpayer the best maritime-security and -safety 'bang' for their bucks." "Doing it right" means joint service interoperability, a prime concern of both the Navy and Coast Guard as they flesh out the "National Fleet Policy Statement" signed by Admiral James Loy, Coast Guard Commandant, and then-CNO Admiral Johnson in September 1998. Its intent is synchronized Coast Guard-Navy planning, procurement, and training that will provide the highest level of maritime capability for the nation's investment in the 21 st century. In addition, this endeavor could embrace joint concepts of operations, exercises, and deployments.
Clearly, the joint approach will have broad implications for the Coast Guard and the Navy. Improvements in procurement and training will allow them to stretch budget dollars and maximize total-- force operational effectiveness. Since becoming CNO last year, Admiral Clark has endorsed the national fleet concept as a principal way for both services to meet the national security and warfighting demands of the future. Last January, he said, "I stand four-square behind the arrangements and agreements in place and the Navy's commitment to the Coast Guard. ..we need to build as much combat capability into the Coast Guard as possible." Thus the deepwater project is important for the Navy, too.
More Questions than Answers... for Now
As the Navy concentrates on transformation to the "Navy-after-next," it must remember that modernizing and upgrading existing platforms with new aircraft, weapons, systems and technologies will remain a fundamental need. Admiral Clark recognized this fact of life, as two of his top five priorities highlight force readiness. In this regard, important elements in the transformation of U.S. naval forces will be maximum flexibility of design, modularity, and operation. This will help to ensure that "leading-edge-of-the-shelf capabilities—whether of military or commercial origin—can be inserted when needed to support plans and operations and deal with tomorrow's threats.
The wild card in all this is the new administration and a deeply divided Congress. Already the Bush White House confronts domestic and foreign-policy dilemmas as it looks to achieve its vision for the United States. Education, health care, tax cuts, national missile defense, rebuilding the military, and numerous other initiatives compete for limited resources—even given huge federal budget surpluses. The Bush campaign talked of a nine-year, $45 billion "get-well" program for defense, in addition to another $60 billion for national missile defense. In January 2001, this suggestion was trumped by the Joint Chiefs of Staff request for another $10 billion in supplemental funding for fiscal year 2001. The request piqued the ire of Republican congressional leaders and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and reportedly generated calls for Secretary Rumsfeld to rein in the Joint Chiefs. Other estimates have identified the need for an additional $100 billion in funding over that currently programmed for defense during the 2002 to 2007 plan, thus dwarfing President George Bush's recommendation.
The Navy and Marine Corps alone will need $28 billion to $34 billion annually in procurement just to maintain the 1997 QDR force level, Vice Admiral Edmund Giambastiani, Deputy CNO for Resources, Requirements and Assessments, explained in a January 2001 Defense Week interview. Much more will be needed if the 2001 QDR results call for greater force structure. "For aircraft, we need between $8 billion and $11 billion a year. For weapons, we need about $3 billion. For other systems, including command and control, we need about $6 billion." In recent years, the Navy budget has averaged $22 billion for procurement. There is growing concern that President Bush has promised more than he can deliver.
Obviously, Congress will continue to hold the ace in shaping U.S. naval forces; unless the Navy gets transformation plans and programs in place, the potential is great for parochial interests in Congress to work their will. The Navy did not request the eighth Wasp (LHD-1)-class amphibious assault warship, but is getting it anyway, and the funds may well come from other important programs. Tendencies toward parochialism will be exacerbated by the fact that fewer and fewer senators and representatives have military experience, a potential weakness that might obstruct national security policy.
Looking ahead, the "capability" most urgently required for an effective U.S. fleet is, as President Harry Truman understood, plain speaking—plain speaking by the uniformed and civilian leadership of the sea services. They must accentuate the value of naval forces in the 21st century and the dangers to U.S. interests if maritime power is squandered. They must explain in no uncertain terms the many challenges to be confronted in a dangerous world. Finally, they must demonstrate genuine intent to change from business as usual and put available resources toward response to the "radically transformed competition space" described by Admiral Cebrowski.
At the dawn of the 20th century, President Theodore Roosevelt called for a "Navy second to none," a slogan that spurred the United States to action that proved critical to victory in two world wars and to keeping peace during the ensuing Cold War. Now, President Bush and Congress should make a similar commitment to the nation's armed forces. Tomorrow's fleet hangs in the balance.
Dr. Truver is vice president, National Security Studies, and executive director of the Center for Security Strategies and Operations (CCSO), Anteon Corporation, Arlington, Virginia.