Alternative deployment models can offer the Navy ways to conduct the full range of future operational requirements with current resources.
The new millennium finds the U.S. Navy seriously challenged in meeting the national security objective of a forward-deployed expeditionary force. Specifically, it has become more difficult to maintain the operational capabilities to conduct sustained warfare while carrying out increasingly demanding peacetime forward presence operations. Navy force structure is at its lowest level at any time since the start of World War II, modernization and recapitalization have been postponed, and new and expanding mission areas have increased the pace of operations to the breaking point.
The Navy has eliminated many bureaucratic and unnecessary operations and processes, but there remains an overwhelming burden on the service's most critical resource—people. Retention rates within the Navy and the manpower reserve in the delayed entry pool of prospective recruits are at 20-year lows. Since 1990, the Navy has lost one-third of each year's accession group of enlistees before they completed their first enlistments. Considering that it costs the Navy approximately $8,000 to recruit each enlistee, and another $25,000 to provide them initial training, this is a phenomenal cost in terms of funding and manpower. For example, in 1999, enlisted first-term retention was approximately 28%--about 10% below the estimated long-term target for a steady-state force structure. Second- and third-term retention rates for 1999 also fell below the estimated long-term retention needs.
The situation in the officer warfighting communities also is bad. Retention of surface warfare officers to the department head level (at the approximate five-year career point) is well below the 38% required to maintain steady-state force structure. Retention of submarine and nuclear surface warfare officers is nearly 10% below required levels, and already demanding sea tours have been lengthened to meet safety and readiness requirements. Retention in the aviation community is well below required levels, both at the junior officer and post-command levels. Finally—and indicative of the severity of the problem—the Navy Special Warfare Community, which historically enjoys one of the highest retention rates in the Navy, is unable to meet its steady-state end strength requirements. In recent testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, the Navy leadership described itself as being "in a war for people."
The Navy recruiting picture is equally bleak. In fiscal year (FY) 98, the Navy missed its enlisted accession requirement by 7,000 people. Therefore, in 1999, the Navy reduced the requirement for accessions with high school diplomas from 95% to 90%. This allowed an accession of 2,500 individuals who otherwise would have been excluded from service.
Navy leadership attributes the low retention and recruiting rates primarily to the sustained strong U.S. economy, leading to a historically low unemployment rate, and increased personnel tempo (PersTempo or the number of days at home compared to the number of days at sea). Other frequently cited reasons include the desire for enhanced quality of life, concerns over advancement opportunity, and a low and even declining propensity for military service. Retention has become the Navy's highest priority, leading to the recent creation of a new branch within the manpower and personnel directorate, to be led by a flag officer, whose charter focuses energy and resources on the retention problem.
A series of additional steps were implemented to turn around the critical situation regarding Navy recruiting. As a result, the Navy reported meeting its FY 99 requirements. However, this came at a large cost. In less than a year, the Navy increased the number of field recruiters by 35%, to 5,000, and more than 200 additional recruiting stations are either recently opened or under construction. The annual budget for recruiting advertising alone rose to $73.2 million. The Navy also offered enhanced monetary bonuses and educational opportunities to enlistees. Yet, FY 00 was projected to be one of the most difficult recruiting years to date.
Former Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jay Johnson stated on 1 March 2000 during testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, "Our readiness posture is wholly dependent on attracting and retaining high quality, motivated, and trained Sailors." It is not surprising, then, that readiness is being affected. In 1998, the Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) battle group deployed with a defic it of some 800 sailors, and today 9,200 at-sea billets are gapped. More than half of U.S. Navy ships are under way at any given time; more than 30% are on six-month deployments, up from an average of 20% in 1990. Twice in the past year the Navy has sent a fleet-wide message asking for volunteers to break PersTempo limits to meet minimum shipboard manning levels for deployment.
Layered on the personnel problem is a Navy shipbuilding program that is not funded to sustain the current force structure. The Navy's Program Objective Memorandum 02 shipbuilding rate of 6.5 ships per year when calculated over a 35-year period would result in a Navy of just 250 ships. Similarly, procurement of 128 aircraft in FY 01 is far below the 150 to 210 per year needed to maintain a steady-state force.
In the long term, the Navy will require additional force structure—especially if it adds major missions such as national missile defense. There is minimal benefit in procuring more ships, however, if the Navy cannot fully man the ones it has. The more immediate problem is using people and available resources more efficiently. Therefore, addressing how the Navy organizes and deploys offers options to better meet the Navy's—and the individual sailor's—needs in this new century.
Efficient Deployment—Key to the Solution
Today's Herculean efforts to improve recruiting and retention will not solve the Navy's personnel shortage in the long term. Other options, specifically for how the Navy can employ its personnel and existing warfighting platforms more efficiently, must be debated.
There are numerous models for organizing Navy forces to meet forward deployment requirements, but one concept holds particular potential—Horizon. Developed in 1997 by the Chief of Naval Operations' Strategic Studies Group (SSG), the Horizon concept addresses the Navy's "do more with less" dilemma by organizing, training, and deploying forces more efficiently, and at the same time producing equal or greater combat capability. For example, to provide 36 months of ship presence in distant regions of the world, current deployment models require as many as six different ships deploying for six-month periods. The Horizon model, in a future matured state, envisions a single warship remaining forward deployed for as long as 36 months, while elements of the crew rotate on preselected intervals of up to six months. Other rotational formats are possible and could be structured in response to total Navy commitments and emergent contingency requirements.
Horizon has the potential to increase the operational capability of U.S. expeditionary forces dramatically. The centerpiece of the concept is a plan to leverage current ships, aircraft, and hardware by optimally rotating personnel to and from forward-deployed units, and it is supported by significant organizational change. Navy infrastructure—inarguably redundant and bloated in its current state—would be reshaped and realigned to focus on core mission support to the fleet. Also significant are the perceived gains in terms of personnel issues. Horizon's concept development teams believe that the organizational changes envisioned would result in better trained and more experienced Navy professionals and more stable home lives for Navy families.
Initial research conducted by the SSG, with analytical support from the Center for Naval Analyses, indicates that reorganizing the Navy under the Horizon concept would reverse the current tooth-to-tail ratio, enabling up to 80% of the total force to be in an operational status, ready for deployment. In addition, by utilizing concepts and technologies currently being evaluated in the Smart Ship program, warfighting platforms would be capable of remaining forward deployed for up to three years. When fully implemented, these changes would allow the Navy to provide continual presence in the three major theaters—the Mediterranean, Arabian Gulf, and Western Pacific—within current force structure, while yielding a 40% increase in combat-ready platforms and crews available for other operations and crisis response.
The central organizing structure of the Horizon concept is the fleet readiness center. These readiness centers are geographic hubs that provide centralized support for operational readiness squadrons—the building blocks of Horizon. Readiness squadrons are organized by aircraft type or ship/submarine class and would be assigned to a specific readiness center. The center would provide all administrative services as well as training, logistical support, and intermediate maintenance functions. Ideally, the majority of fleet readiness centers and squadrons would be located in the four fleet concentration areas: Norfolk, Virginia; Jacksonville, Florida; Seattle, Washington; and San Diego, California. These would be augmented by perhaps four or five smaller centers in various geographic areas, such as Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, or Earl, New Jersey.
As envisioned under the Horizon concept, the vast majority of personnel on operational duty are assigned to the fleet readiness centers for operationally focused training centered around a warfighting platform—a format commonly known as "inside the lifelines" training. The current sea/shore rotation system would be replaced with an operational/nonoperational duty construct. Operational billets (80%) are all combat-ready billets as well as all others in readiness centers and squadrons that directly support operational forces. Nonoperational billets (20%) are those indirectly supporting the operational forces, such as recruiters and staff positions. Horizon also envisions that Navy personnel would be grouped by community and assigned by closed-looped detailing, thereby ensuring repeated operational tours in a particular warfighting platform. While on operational duty, service members would rotate within their fleet readiness squadrons, receiving continual training and refining their warfighting skills.
One model that was run by the Center for Naval Analyses depicts a notional deployment rotation of a readiness squadron consisting of four ships and five crews. In this model, a sailor would spend eight years in operational duty, followed by a two-year assignment in a nonoperational billet. This would provide the Navy with an individual who spends 16 out of 20 years in a deployable status, but that sailor actually would be deployed for only about 36 months—depending on platform type—during a 20-year career.8 In this model, one ship remains forward deployed for 30 months, and two of the remaining three ships are fully deployable and ready for contingencies, surge, or local operations. The fourth ship would be in a non-deployable status, undergoing long-term maintenance or overhaul. Although each ship would require a three-to-six-month depot availability once every five years, this model enables all four ships to be operationally ready more than 90% of the time. Notionally, the four-ship, five-crew model is a 30-month deployment cycle during which an individual rotates in the following sequence:
- Readiness center for seven-to-nine months. Individual may be an instructor, receive training/education, or work in a warfighting specialty-related field. In theory, every person is deployable.
- Readiness squadron (afloat, combat-ready units) for 12-15 months. Individual trains both in port and under way on one of the platforms within the squadron.
- Two-week turnover to forward-deployed platform.
- Nominal six-month deployment.
- Return to readiness center/readiness squadron.
This model moves personnel through the cycle three times during eight years of operational duty. It also gives personnel more predictability and geographic stability in their careers, potentially increasing their quality of service and job satisfaction. This rotational deployment within a fleet readiness squadron to man deployed warfighting platforms is similar to how LAMPS helicopter squadrons deploy today. The advantages suggest a sustained high level of personal and unit readiness, similar to the readiness levels of our permanently forward-deployed carrier battle group in Japan.
Technologies, particularly those that support data networking-voice, video, and data-play a key role in enabling Horizon. Modeling suggests they can reduce maintenance requirements, improve material readiness, network forces, facilitate training, and improve individual and unit readiness. Initial research indicates embedded systems and remote sensors in operational platforms will change dramatically the way the Navy makes repairs and conducts inspections and certifications. Modeling, simulation, and other collaborative training technologies can replace time spent under way, as well as change the manner in which battle group workups are conducted.
Where Do We Go from Here?
Now is the time to begin a detailed study of the Horizon concept to determine if forward presence and combat capability gains are possible. Much research and modeling remain to be done, but that already conducted indicates tremendous gains are possible:
- Increased operational capability for the warfighting commanders
- Continuous forward presence in the three major regions with existing force structure
- Reduced ship and aircraft transit times and therefore lower aging and operational costs
- Lower ship and aircraft operating costs and life-cycle impact because of reduced battle group predeployment training
- Savings in time and labor as a result of "as needed" repairs on units rather than calendar-based maintenance
- Efficiencies in training, leading to a more productive and professional workforce
- Increased contingency response capability when historic inefficiencies of cyclic readiness are eliminated
- Resources freed by restructuring and reshaping of the shore infrastructure
- Reduction in personnel tempo, resulting in professional and personal quality-of-life benefits
- More flexible organizational structure that enables rapid response to emergent warfighting and forward presence contingencies with modular, well-trained, and ready forces that can be tailored to meet new requirements
If the Navy intends to remain a vital element in effecting and ensuring U.S. national security interests, a more efficient means of organizing and deploying its forces must be found—and soon. The objective should be to discover the model that will enable the greatest possible combat power with a given set of resources. Anything less will place an unnecessary and unsustainable burden on the Navy's force structure—and the men and women so crucial to ensuring our national security.
Captain Franken is director of the Joint Battle Lab, J9, Joint Forces Command. He was a member of the 1997 SSG Horizon Concept Development Group. Commander Graham is the Deputy Director of the Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities (CETO). She was a staff member of the CNO Executive Panel Innovation Task Force assigned to assist the 1997 SSG. Captain Willis is director of the Strategic Planning Group at Information Spectrum, Inc. He was a member of the 1995 Secretary of Defense SSG assigned to develop a strategy for implementing the transition of DoD to a precision strike regime.