Russia’s new generation of antiship missiles—combined with its increasing willingness to export such weaponry to any buyer with hard currency—could spell trouble for the U.S. Navy.
The threat posed by compact, air-launched antiship missiles over the past decade is evident, as the 1982 Falklands Conflict and the 1987 attack on the USS Stark (FFG-31) demonstrasasste. In the Third World, however, this threat was limited by the absence of Soviet antiship missiles comparable to Harpoon or Exocet. This situation is likely to change dramatically over the next few years. The Russians now are building new weapons similar to Harpoon and Exocet, and some of these are new-generation missiles that will pose a novel threat if they should be exported widely. Moreover, the likelihood of such proliferation is increasing as a result of significant changes in Russian export policy, loosening restrictions on Russian technology transfer, and Russia’s growing need for hard-currency exports.
For many years the Soviet Navy lacked the incentive to develop compact, air-launched antiship missiles. Because the primary mission of Soviet naval aviation’s strike element was the anticarrier role, air-launched antiship missiles were massive weapons, capable of being fired from standoff ranges outside the protective air defense missile shield of the battle group and requiring a large bomber to carry and launch them. The Kh-22 (AS-4 Kitchen) carried on the Tu-22M Backfire bomber was typical of this type of anticarrier missile. Such weapons were completely unsuitable for most Soviet clients in the developing world.[1] Soviet antiship missile sales mainly Were confined to ship-launched weapons such as the ubiquitous P-15 (SS-N-2 Styx).
In August 1992, the Russian government staged its first major aerospace exhibition at Zhukovskiy in the Moscow suburbs. One of the most striking features of the show Was the variety of new antiship weapons being offered for export—no fewer than five new systems. These new missiles run the gamut from Harpoon lookalikes, to advanced supersonic missiles resembling the Franco-German ANS, to novel weapons that have no Western counterpart. Several are adaptations of existing missiles to the antiship role, while others were developed for naval missions from the outset.
The show-stealer was the 3M80 Moskit (Mosquito).[2] The 3M80 was developed for the Su-27K naval Flanker and attracted the most attention if for no other reason than its enormous size. This is not altogether surprising, as it Was developed by the Raduga OKB, the same design bureau responsible for the heavyweight Kh-22/AS-4. Like its ancestors, the 3M80 is massive, weighing in at 4.5 tons with a 320-kg warhead.[3]
Unlike its ancestors, the 3M80 has been configured for greater speed, using a solid propellant rocket engine followed by a ramjet sustainer. Top speed is Mach 3 at high altitude and Mach 2.1 at low altitude. Its range varies with the selected flight profile (about 250 km maximum when launched in a high-altitude trajectory, with the final 50 km at low altitude; about 150 km when the entire flight is at low altitude).
The missile employs inertial guidance with terminal active and passive radar homing. The missile has been test flown on the Su-27K, and the Sukhoi representatives at the show were insistent that the Su-27K could land back on the carrier with the Moskit unexpended. Of the antiship missiles offered at the show, the 3M80 probably will be of least concern. Its export prospects at the moment seem slim because of its intimate connection with the Su-27K carrier fighter. No doubt it could be adapted to other strike aircraft—especially bombers—but few Third World nations operate aircraft capable of launching such a payload.
At first glance, the most familiar missile shown at Moscow was the Kh-35, already dubbed “Harpoonski” in the aviation press. The Kh-35 is a subsonic antiship missile similar in appearance to Harpoon but about 10% lighter and with a smaller warhead. Jointly developed with East Germany, it first appeared as the armament on the East German Navy’s new Sassnitz (BAL-COM-10) fast attack missile craft seen in the Baltic in December 1988. In its surface-launched version, the Kh-35 is now known to NATO as SS-N-25. In 1992, Russia’s main tactical air-to-surface missile design bureau, the Zvezda OKB, began trials to adapt it for air launching.
The Kh-35 is designed to be launched at standoff ranges. Guidance is inertial on the first leg of the flight; terminal homing depends on the variant: both an active radar and thermal imaging variant are being offered for sale. It approaches the target at five to ten meters over the surface.
Also on offer is a heavier, longer-ranged alternative to the Kh-35, the Kh-59M Ovod-M (AS-18 Kazoo). This subsonic missile was not shown at the Moscow display, but technical descriptions were released. It is almost double the weight of the Kh-35, has significantly greater range, and carries a larger warhead. It was offered in both air-and ship-launched versions. It is significantly larger than Exocet, with a warhead twice the weight. The Kh-35 and Kh-59M both represent a familiar type of subsonic threat. They are similar enough in general characteristics to existing Western antiship missiles to fall within the scope of most existing ship defenses.
More worrisome were other weapons displayed or advertised in Moscow. The Kh-31A (AS-17 Krypton) easily could be mistaken for the U.S. Navy’s experimental 1976 Supersonic Tactical Missile. The Kh-31 originally was developed to fulfill a Soviet Air Force requirement for an antiradiation missile to deal with advanced threats such as the Patriot air defense system and the E-3A Sentry airborne warning and control system. An antiship version is its third variant, with an active radar guidance system substituted for the usual passive antiradiation seeker of earlier models.
The Kh-31 A uses a rocket engine followed by a ram-jet sustainer. This gives it a maximum flight speed of Mach 2.9 and a terminal impact speed of not less than Mach 1. Its closest Western counterpart is the French ANS, though the Kh-31A is smaller and armed with a warhead only about half that of the ANS. Such a missile will offer a significant challenge to existing antiship defenses because of its high terminal speed. The Kh-31 can be adapted to a wide range of strike aircraft, including the widely exported MiG-27 Flogger and Su-17/22 Fitter strike aircraft. The Kh-31 already has been exported to Cuba in 1992' though it is unclear which version was involved.
Another adaptation of an antiradiation missile is the Kh-58 (AS-11 Kilter). This 1985-vintage missile was developed for the Soviet Air Force’s air defense suppression mission, and it is roughly comparable to the AGM-88 HARM. At Moscow, the Kh-58 was offered in a new form as an air-launched antiship missile. Its effective range against ships varies—depending on the target’s radar cross-section—from about 70 km against a missile boat to about 180 km against a destroyer or cruiser. It uses an inertial navigation system integrated with a millimeter wave seeker for the terminal phase. The antiradiation version is regularly fitted to the Su-17M Fitter strike aircraft, and it probably is adaptable to other standard Russian strike aircraft, such as the MiG-23BN and MiG-27 Floggers.
Figure 1: New Russian Antiship Missiles
Missiles Displayed at Zhukovskiy
- The massive Raduga Moskit antiship missile, seen here with its wing surfaces folded, is the largest of the current crop of Russian antiship missiles on offer.
- The Zvezda Kh-35, a subsonic antiship missile, has been dubbed Harpoonski because of its similarity to the U.S. Navy missile.
- The Zvezda Kh-31, seen here under the wing of a MiG-29K naval fighter, is being offered in both an antiship and antiradar version.
- The Zvezda Kh-58 is a multirole missile with both antiradar and antiship variants being offered for sale. The Kh-59M Ovod-M was not displayed, but technical descriptions of the missile were available at the show.
- The Raduga Kh-15 is a supersonic aeroballistic antiship missile originally designed as a strategic bomber penetration aid.
An even more novel threat is posed by the Kh-15 (AS-16 Kickback). Like the Kh-31, the Kh-15 originally was developed for another role. It is a close equivalent of the U.S. Air Force’s AGM-69 SRAM, a nuclear-armed missile used as a penetration aid in strategic bomber strikes. The Kh-15 recently has been modified for the antiship role. Its flight profile is similar to that of the older Kh-22 (AS-4 Kitchen). On launch from the carrier aircraft, the missile climbs upward and makes a high-speed terminal dive on the target. In the case of the Kh-15, the terminal dive attains maximum speeds of Mach 5. As a result, it has been called an aeroballistic missile; its maximum velocity is higher than that of well-known tactical ballistic missiles, such as the R-17 (SS-lc Scud B).
The missile’s inertial guidance system places it in a basket of about one square kilometer, and terminal guidance is provided by an active millimeter wave seeker. The need to maneuver while approaching the target no doubt reduces its terminal speed below Mach 5. The missile is small compared to earlier Soviet bomber-launched antiship missiles—only a quarter the weight of the AS-4. Its warhead is modest, only 150 kg, but the missile will have considerably greater damage potential than this suggests because of the enormous kinetic energy of its impact.
The Kh-15 poses an unusual threat for a variety of reasons. Its high terminal speeds greatly reduce shipboard reaction time, and its small size and low radar cross-section will pose significant radar acquisition and tracking problems. Its compact size makes it possible to saturate the defenses of a target. The Tu-22M3 Backfire C can carry ten of these missiles, six on an internal bomb bay rotary launcher. This weapon so far has been confined to strategic bombers, but with recent changes in Russian export policy, some of these missile carriers are being offered for export, notably the Tu-22M3 Backfire C. There already have been reports of the sale of 12 of these bombers to Iran, presumably with some form of missile armament.[4]
In view of the Russian Navy’s decay, the sudden arrival of so varied a selection of new antiship missiles could be brushed off as a Cold War irrelevancy. However, because of the increasing possibility of their export over the next few years, these weapons warrant serious attention by any navy operating in the Third World. These missiles were not displayed at Moscow as a gesture of glasnost and goodwill. They were displayed for sale to Third World armed forces, whose representatives were a conspicuous presence at the show. And the prospects for Russian arms sales of high-tech weapons such as these are increasing.
In the past, the Russians—concerned that their secrets would be compromised—were reluctant to export their most advanced weapons. They might fall into Western hands, or their combat use by export clients might provide Western intelligence with an understanding of their operation. In either case, their future effectiveness in Soviet hands would have been degraded by the development of Western countermeasures. With the end of the Cold War, this disincentive has disappeared.
The changing attitude on technology transfer is being accompanied by changing attitudes toward the role of arms export. In the past, the Soviet arms export program was dominated by the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations. Its traditional focus was on the political and diplomatic advantages of arms export. Most arms transfers were either outright grants to ideologically aligned allies or sales involving very soft credit or favorable barter. The actual economic impact on the Soviet arms industry was a distant concern, oriented toward maintaining a large and robust military industrial base for surge capability in the event of war rather than hard currency earnings.
Dire economic conditions are forcing a change in this traditional outlook toward arms transfer. Russian missile plants have seen their state procurement orders drop by 80% over the past two years, and foreign export orders have dropped as well. Production lines are becoming idle, engineers are not being paid, and the military industries are in confusion and crisis.
The military industries have a vocal lobby among Russian politicians—this was especially true within the recently closed Congress of Peoples Deputies—and they have been lobbying hard for a change in Russian export policy. In late 1991, Admiral Sergei Krasnov attempted to shift control of arms export from the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations (MVES) to a new office directly reporting to Vice President Rutskoi that would be controlled by those more favorably disposed to the military-industrial viewpoint. This attempt was frustrated by the MVES minister, Petr Avens.[5]
For most of 1992, the arms sales program was aimless, caught in the confusing vortices of Russian domestic and foreign policy. The MVES had lost the ideological bearings that formerly had guided the program and was without new guidelines. It firmly resisted the military industry’s inclination to sell virtually anything short of nuclear weapons to virtually any country with hard currency, but its sales policy was guided more by inertia than new thinking. MVES quashed attempts to sell jet engines to South Africa and MiG-29 fighters to Taiwan because of residual political distaste for these one-time ideological foes. The tendency of the MVES to restrict sales for confused ideological reasons and its failure to gamer new markets infuriated many Russian military industrial leaders.
In May 1992, a new law was passed to reform the arms export process. In practice, the MVES conceded the right to a number of new industrial organizations to act as salesmen in hopes of increasing foreign arms sales. But MVES retained the right to veto arms sales that did not meet its criteria. By the end of the year, total arms sales tallied only $1.5 billion in hard currency sales, a far cry from the glory days of the 1980s and too low to satisfy the demands of the military industrial lobby.[6]
During the December 1992 Congress of People’s Deputies, the lobby exacted its revenge. President Boris Yeltsin was given a rough time by conservative and nationalist factions in the Congress, spearheaded by the military industrialists. Although most attention has been focused on the removal of Yegor Gaidar, Yeltsin’s top economic adviser, the military industrialists also were able to finally force Petr Avens’ resignation from MVES in a clear attempt to force a change in the arms export process in their favor.[7]
Over the next few years, Russia’s arms sales are likely to be dominated by the related needs to win hard currency sales abroad and to keep its floundering aerospace factories afloat. In 1992, export sales accounted for 32% of Russian military production. The industrial lobby is currently trying to push up the quotas so that they would be allowed to sell 40% to 50% of their production overseas.[8]
In 1993, the main beneficiaries of this changed policy were expected to be India, China, and Iran, all of whom have shown interest in Russian antiship missiles.[9] Active negotiations already are underway with a wide variety of clients, including both North and South Korea, Argentina, Morocco, Abu Dhabi, the United Arab Emirates, Taiwan, South Africa, and Malaysia. In the case of sales to China, this is likely to magnify the proliferation of advanced antiship missile systems. China largely has failed in its efforts to develop contemporary weapons technology. An influx of Russian technology would bolster its own efforts to develop weapons for the export market.
Nineteen-ninety-two saw important changes in Russian arms export policy at a national level, and changes at the corporate level are likely to reinforce these trends. In the past, little or no currency earned in foreign export made its way to the design bureaus or factories responsible for the actual weapons. At the moment, plans are under way to ensure that some of the hard currency earnings are allotted directly to the factories in hopes of keeping them afloat. These incentives, combined with the loosening of restrictions on negotiating with foreign clients, are likely to decentralize and increase efforts to win foreign export sales.
Russian military industries are beginning to become organized and behave much more like their Western counterparts, but there remain important differences. The Russian military industries are not yet challenged by a vocal public lobby demanding restrictions on arms sales. And in view of the clash between the industries and the Foreign Ministry over the past few years, the industries are reacting instinctively against foreign policy restrictions on their sales, no matter how sensible in the long run for Russian security. This is starting a backlash, with some nationalists asking whether it is wise for Russia to provide China with the latest in high-tech weaponry.[10] For Russian firms facing the prospects of financial collapse, however, the need for hard currency sales is overriding national security concerns.
One of the major changes that these developments will have on Russian weapons development is a greater attention to client requirements. With a larger fraction of their production being devoted to export sales, and the new discipline of a competitive market, Russian weapons producers no longer will be able to maintain their traditional take-it-or-leave-it attitude. Indeed, the extensive display of new antiship weapons was one of the first examples of the Russians introducing new products in response to past client demands.
The final factor likely to help the proliferation of Russian high-tech weapons into the Third World is cost. The Russians easily can underbid any Western competitor because of the lingering peculiarities of the Russian economy.[11] The ruble is still not convertible on the world exchange, and weapons prices are set in an entirely arbitrary fashion. For example, the price of a BMP-3 infantry vehicle for the Russian Army in 1991 was 900,000 rubles, which at the going exchange rate worked out to $25,000. The asking price for foreign clients was $800,000.[12]
The Russian economy is suffering the same sort of hyperinflation that afflicted the Polish and Czechoslovak economies while they transitioned from the Alice-in-Wonderland monetary system of socialism to capitalist reality. But until this process is completed—which will take at least five years—the Russians can tailor the prices of their weapons with a freedom undreamed of by Western firms or governments.
The availability of high-tech Russian weapons at bargain basement prices is likely to foster a more rapid proliferation of new-generation systems than was common in the past. U.S. admonitions to the Russians to curb their arms exports are likely to cause resentment rather than restraint. The Russians are already bitter about U.S. efforts to curb civilian space rocket engine sales to India and feel that such U.S. actions are nothing more than a hypocritical effort to lock up the export arms market for the United States and its allies. While the United States is unlikely to be able to greatly influence the coming expansion of Russian arms sales, it would be unwise to ignore developments in the world’s largest arms-producing state' The weapons in many of the confrontation states of the Third World are of Soviet origin, and if the Russian industrialists have their way, this will continue to be the case for the remainder of the decade.
Mr. Zaloga is the author of numerous books on Russian and Soviet military technology, including Target America: The Soviet Union and the Strategic Arms Race 1945–64 and Soviet Air Defense Missiles: Design Development and Tactics. He is an analyst with the Teal Group in Fairfax, Virginia, specializing in the world missile market.
[1] The Soviets did export the first generation of aircraft-launched antiship missiles, such as the KS-1 Sopka (AS-1 Kennel) and Tu-16KS-1 Badger B to Indonesia in the late 1950s. But the newer missile carriers such as the Tu-22K Blinder B were not exported; Libya and Iraq acquired the Tu-22 Blinder A without antiship missile capability.
[2] The designations used here are primarily the actual Russian terms since U.S./NATO code names are not yet available in all cases.
[3] Technical details for the Russian missiles given here come from displays at the 1992 Moscow air show or from material handed out by the design bureaus to the attendees.
[4] Iran/Russia Wrap Up $2 billion Arms Deal,” Flight International, 15–21 Jul 1992, p. 13. Russian representatives at the 1992 Farnborough air show (where the Tu-22M3 Backfire C was displayed) denied that the sales had taken place However, Russian officials also denied reports of the sales of Kilo submarines to Iran.
[5] Pavel Felgengauer, “Everybody in Russia Wants to Trade Arms,” Nezavisimaya gazeta, 30 September 1992 (Trans.: JPRS-UMA-92-040, pp. 36-38).
[6] “Russian Arms Exports Plummet,” ITAR-TASS News Agency, 29 September 1992 (Trans.: BBC Summary of World Broadcasts SU/1500 C4/4 1 October 1992). Apparently, the total sales amounted to $7.8 billion, but the remainder were arms transfers or soft credit sales, not hard currency sales. “Iran, China, India To Be Main Arms Buyers Next Year,” Interfax, 3 December 1992 (Trans.: FBIS-SOV' 92-234, p. 7).
[7] “Aven Prefers Resignation to Humiliating State,” Interfax, 22 December 1992 (Trans: FBIS-SOV-92-247, p. 19).
[8] “Aven Views Shift in Weapons Export Market, Increased Sales,” Interfax, November 1992 (Trans.: FBIS-SOV-92-234, p. 1).
[9] “Iran, China, India To Be Main Arms Buyers Next Year,” Moscow Interfax, 4 December 1992 (Trans.: FBIS-SOV-92-234, p. 7).
[10] For example, see: Vladimir Skosyrev, “New Defense Technology Being Transferred to China Without the Russian Government’s Knowledge,” Izvestiya, 4 December 1992 (Trans: FBIS-SOV-92-234, p. 13); A. Kabannikov, “We Swap Sukhois for Sausages: Who Controls Arms Deliveries to China?” Komsomolskaya Pravda, 11 December 1992 (Trans.: FBIS-SOV-92-241, pp. 13-14).
[11] "A clear example was the offer of equipment to Turkey in 1992, where Russia was able to undercut European competitors by 66%. “Russia Offers Bargain Deal,” Janes Defence Weekly, 24 October 1992, p. 5.
[12] The export price comes from material handed out by Russian officials at the Defendory arms exhibit in Greece in September 1992.