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By Commander George F. Kraus, Jr., U.S. Navy (Retired)
Appearances Were Deceiving
Over the years, Western naval observers have made a number of assump- hons, based upon available evidence, regarding the building of ships for the Soviet Navy. Among the most persistent were those about the various aircraft-carrying ships that were built beginning in the late 1960s. From the observable hardware, it seemed that the Soviet Navy had requirements different from those of the U.S. Navy. In view of recently available information about the actual decisionmaking process in the former Soviet Union, it is useful to revisit and realign our assumptions to better assess the Russian Navy and its future requirements.
Recent descriptions of the carrier programs make it clear that the professionals in the Soviet Navy understood, at least as early as the 1960s, that the use of vertical-takeoff-and-landing (VTOL) aircraft from ships was an evolutionary step, one that was “to a significant degree ■ . . forced.” The development of VTOL aircraft and the ships to operate them was an auxiliary orientation that got aircraft to sea but would not meet the full requirements of the navy. The need for con- ventional-takeoff-and-landing aircraft (CTOL) at sea derived from three imperatives. First, such aircraft were needed to support the strategic nuclear elements of the navy, providing air cover that would prevent Western antisubmarine warfare (ASW) from interfering with the operations of nuclear-powered attack and ballistic-missile submarines. Second, fighter aircraft were needed to provide cover for the operations of shore-based missile, ASW, and reconnaissance aircraft. And third, fighter cover was viewed as essential for the operations of surface ships, which otherwise would find it impossible to resist the enemy. Moreover, studies indicated that shore-based aircraft would not be sufficient to meet the round- the-clock requirements of the fleet. Carriers with CTOL aircraft were essential.
Two things are clear from this. First, like the U.S. Navy, the Soviets perceived carriers as essential for sea control. Second, unlike the U.S. practice of using the rest of the fleet to support carriers, the Soviets planned to use carriers to support (i.e., provide combat stability to) the fleet.
Although many in the West correctly understood some of these requirements— the imperative for air cover over the ballistic-missile submarine force, for example—it was not clearly perceived that conventional carriers were considered even a possible solution to the problem by the Soviets. As the ships that carried
Though not visible to the West, personal and institutional biases and animosities—not necessarily reflective of naval requirements—skewed Soviet carrier development. Plans for a large- deck CTOL carrier, which were supported by Admiral of the Fleet S. G. Gorshkov (left), were compromised more than once by bureacratic infighting. From his position on the General Staff, Admiral N. N. Amelko (below right) fought to halt large-deck development in favor of smaller helicopter carriers.
aircraft were deployed, beginning with the Moskva in the late 1960s, it appeared from the observables—i.e., ships in the water or on the building ways—that the Soviets had chosen a different path. As the ships and the VTOL aircraft that eventually flew from them became oper-
utional, it was estimated that the Soviets did not require CTOL carriers. It is now clear in retrospect, however, that bureaucratic infighting slowed and skewed the design development, resulting in a series of compromise ships with, in some cases, more limited capabilities than might have been true if the design teams were left to their own devices.
The outcome of the design work of the 1960s and early 1970s was the specification tor an 80,000-ton displacement, nuclear-powered ship capable of carrying no less than 70 CTOL aircraft. The tactical-technical specifications for a ship of this type were let to the Minsudprom design bureau in Leningrad in 1973, under the code name Orel. The air wing for such a ship would have had a mix of fighters, ground attack, ASW, radio-relay, radioelectronic combat, and airborne early-warning aircraft, as well as helicopters—a ship and air wing not unlike Western CTOL carriers and their air wings. Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union S. G. Gorshkov modified the specifications to reduce the air wing slightly and to add antiship missiles, but the concept remained that of a large-deck CTOL carrier. The ship design not only had Soviet Navy imprimatur, but also was approved by Marshall A. A. Grechko, the Minister of Defense. Grechko, when apprised of the design tradeoffs, reportedly responded, "Why are you splitting hairs here? Make an aircraft carrier like the Americans have, with that kind of aircraft fleet."
Of course, Orel never made it from the drawing boards, as bureaucratic politics intervened to delay and reshape the original design. When Minister of Defense Grechko died and was replaced by Dimitry Ustinov, an old scion of the military- industrial complex, a new series of design studies aimed at a smaller. Kiev- sued ship with a 36-aircraft complement were set in motion. Ustinov was inclined toward VTOL aircraft and was influenced by others who did not want a larger, CTOL carrier. As a consequence, the 1973 design was to be revisited over and over for almost a decade.
By 1976, three years after the original Orel specifications went to the design bureau. the bureaucracy was calling for a ship of nearly 60,000-tons displacement, carrying a 50 CTOL-aircraft air wing of mostly fighters, with two catapults and a 3-shaft nuclear powerplant, as well as antiship missiles. This was viewed by the carrier advocates as the "smallest . . . least-effective" version of several Orel designs. Simultaneously, as eventually became apparent to the observers in the West, work in the design bureaus began
on developing catapults and arresting gear tor the ship. But the bureaucracy was not finished yet.
Hedging yet again, they decided to examine the feasibility of employing catapults and arresting gear on the AVer-class ships. As the Kiev and Min.sk already had been launched, and design work and construction were already well along for the next two ships, the catapult study worked out a design for a fifth AVer- class ship. This design was eventually approved in 1979 but quickly was put on hold yet again, this time as a result of the intervention of Admiral N. N. Amelko on the General Staff. Admiral Amelko. previously Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Navy for ASW Defense, a post in which he advocated the development of small, ASW helicopter carriers, was a vocal opponent of larger carriers.
As one of the deputy chiefs of the General Staff, Amelko apparently worked to end the "futile expenditure of the people's money” on large aircraft carriers, continuing his advocacy of helicopter carrier development instead. He continued to advocate his small carrier design (a modification of a civilian container ship), although, as his opponents noted, this ship could not provide air cover for the fleet, and in fact would have required such cover for its own operations. On the General Staff, Amelko was in a key position to influence naval developments. This reported opposition tracks well with his more recent activities, as the now-retired admiral continues to criticize the current crop of aircraft-carrying cruisers, the Kuznetsov, Varyag, and Ulyanovsk.
As a result of the digression toward helicopter carriers, the design for the fifth Kiev languished, resulting eventually in a new design study for a ski-jump equipped carrier of about 45,000 tons. Finally. after a visit to the Kiev by the Minister of Defense during the Zapad 81 (West 81) exercise, Ustinov was convinced that large-deck carriers were needed and authorized the follow-on to the Kiev class. This design was a modification of the latest study: a 55,000- ton, conventionally propelled, ski-jump equipped ship (the Kuznetsov). Instead of the 80,000-ton, catapult-equipped, nuclear-powered ship envisioned in 1973, the 1980s result was a much smaller and less-capable ship. Moreover, the design changes were made for bureaucratic, not technical reasons.
It seems clear that having a carrier opponent like Admiral Amelko on the General Staff was a significant impediment.
But the system also had many levels, with many individuals who could say no, and few key places where a yes would result
in action. Furthermore, the other services were not disposed to support the immense diversion of resources that such a large and complex ship represented. This was certainly true of the ground forces, and Chief of the General Staff Marshall Og- arkov and Chief of the Main Political Directorate General Yepishev also opposed large-carrier development. The naval aviation community—their small numbers effectively submerged in the Air Force—• were not disposed to influence the designs. Finally, the stagnating economy of the late 1970s made the pie smaller for all the Soviet military.
Although the ships that have emerged from the bureaucratic morass have not been the CTOL carriers that were called for in the early 1970s, recent discussions of naval issues, as well as commentary in the aftermath of the Gulf War. clearly indicate that the Russians view aircraft carriers as essential elements of the fleet. "It is an indisputable fact . . . that it is impossible to get by without aircraft in a modern war at any level," notes Captain First Rank V. Kuzin. “It has finally been confirmed that a navy that is not covered by fighter aircraft is not combat capable." Kuzin goes on to describe the requirements for air cover in view of the geography of Russia, requirements that mean large-deck. CTOL carriers with nuclear propulsion are a necessity. Other, lesser ships can carry some of the load but are not optimal.
Perhaps the most cogent argument for these ships has been the discussion of their central role in providing combat stability to other naval forces. In a variety of venues, carrier advocates have asserted that the acknowledged costs of the carriers should be considered in the context of the averted losses of other naval forces—losses that will be prevented because the carriers provide air cover. Without carriers, other ships will be vulnerable and unable to fulfill their missions. Thus Admiral of the Fleet Kapitanets observes, "In the context of a defensive doctrine, when tasks of ensuring the naval forces ability to stand up to combat come to the tore, aircraft-carrying cruisers will increase several times over the combat potential of naval formations."
Numerous discussions of carriers, their value-added for the navy, and the requirements for air superiority in future conflict have appeared in the last several years. Meanwhile, the Ulyanovsk—which is lying unfinished on the way at Niko- layev, and which finally approaches the original 1973 design—is idled by the current upheaval in Russia and the Ukraine. Thus we come full circle: the requirement acknowledged yet again, but the ship to
fulfill the mission not available.
In addition, those compromise ships that were completed have fallen upon hard times. The Kiev and her sisters are facing substantial maintenance, manning, and supply problems. The Minsk is 'die at the pier in the Pacific Fleet as a result of an engineering casualty. The Novorossiysk has had an on-board fire 124 August) and cannot operate because °f shortages of spares, supplies, and personnel. Even the newest carrier, the Kuznetsov, has suffered from the lack of suitable berthing, supply support, and shore facilities.
The most recently launched unit, the Varyag—partially completed at Niko- layev on the Black Sea—has been in the news frequently over the past several months. The subject of a sometimes acrimonious debate between shipbuilders, naval officers, and the two countries that claim portions of the former Soviet Black Sea Fleet, this ship may yet be consigned fo the breakers. Although reportedly offered for sale to India and most recently t0 China, the Varyag is destined for the Pacific Fleet, if it can be completed, according to Russian Navy reports.
In view of the current disarray in the economy and the military, the newly announced Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy, Admiral Feliks N. Gromov, seems likely to face problems operating even the carriers already in the fleet. Nevertheless, it also is clear from the recent reporting that carrier aviation remains a requirement for a viable Russian Navy. The rationale for and design of carriers is viewed in quite familiar terms by Russian naval professionals— the same cadre of planners and designers who established requirements for Soviet aircraft carriers. It also is apparent from the record of the past 25 years that the Russians did not perceive some special requirements that would lead exclusively to VTOL ships. There were no insurmountable technical or design problems that precluded large-deck, CTOL carriers. The development of VTOL ships resulted from personal and institutional biases and animosities inherent in the navy’s ship procurement process. The recently available review in the open literature adds significantly to our understanding of a process that, in the past, appeared much more monolithic.
Mr. Kraus is a senior analyst in the Foreign Systems Research Center of Science Applications Corporation in Greenwood Village, Colorado. His area specialties include U.S. and Russian naval operations and military intelligence. He has served at the senior staff level in the Navy and in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and has taught at the Naval War College during more than 20 years of naval service.
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