"A Tale of Two Cities"
(See E. Wooldridge, pp. 28-32, July 1999 Proceedings)
Commander John M. Pollin, U.S. Navy, congressional liaison, assigned to a Washington acquisition command—While I have little true sense of the esprit of the naval forces in Yokosuka, I can attest to the unquestionable accuracy of Captain Wooldridge's view of Washington, D.C. I might suggest two additional phenomena that are unfortunately sustaining the culture that he describes.
The process is more important than the product. Warfare communities demand that officers operate at the height of efficiency in all aspects of their jobs. This obviously includes the handling of administrative matters. The product that the fleet commanding officer is given at the end of the administrative "chop" chain must be high quality. Where and when required, the initials of reviewing officers on the product mean that a review is complete and presumably satisfactory. In the fleet, the product does not require a process whereby paper—or paperwork—is created just to route the product to the boss.
In Washington, the reverse is true. The ubiquitous staff summary sheet and its attendant pieces of paper, indicating proper and thorough review, take on a quality of importance far out of any logical semblance of proportion. More bureaucrats than are necessary add "chops" to a product that likely could exist with a set of initials and concise margin notations. In a sense, the process of "staffing"—to borrow from the grotesque and profligate butchery of our language in Washingtonian bureaucratese—becomes more important to the action officers than their original drafting of a product.
Sadly, I recently watched a colonel scurry to add the letter i to a word in a staff summary sheet before it went to an organization's commander. One might argue that this is the utmost in professionalism. Indeed, to some extent it is. But the report itself was fine. There is something fatal about a military in which the process overwhelms the product.
Speed, efficiency, and decisiveness are not of value. Warfighters value speed and efficiency in problem-solving. In Washington, these qualities are curiously absent from the daily routine. When a product is not ready, the excuse "It's in staffing" is surprisingly acceptable.
In fact, one can make a powerful argument that action officers and bureaucrats do not want to work quickly because it would give the impression that they are underworked, or they are not giving the product the requisite analysis. Decisiveness means they are vulnerable to blame.
The excuse of "It's in staffing" will sometimes even be applauded, since it gives the superior the mistaken impression that due consideration is being given to the product that will eventually be delivered. What has evolved is a culture in which decisions are delayed and poor staff work is accepted.
We now need a drastic course correction. I will plot mine in the direction of Yokosuka.
Vice Admiral J.B. LaPlante, U.S. Navy (Retired)—I was privileged to serve three active-duty tours in Washington, one at the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and two on the Joint Staff, and since retirement have maintained a close relationship with those who continue to labor in this less-than-lush vineyard. I continue to be somewhat mystified by the disdain with which these officers are regarded by some of their brethren who have chosen not to seek duty in the corporate headquarters.
They also serve who serve in the capital, and they are engaged in activities which should resonate even as far afield as Camp Smith and Yokosuka. Planning for and resourcing the next Navy while trying to find the dollars to operate today's force is demanding and obviously thankless work. These tasks are done in a less-than-friendly atmosphere. The military is neither understood or appreciated inside the beltway, and a large part of the job is spending a great deal of time in building support for programs vital to our nation among people who prefer to take the cheap shot. It not only is difficult work, but also is vital to the continued health of our Navy. And it is absolutely critical that we be represented here by officers who embody our highest principles of service and professionalism.
We are fortunate that the Washington establishment is composed of officers who not only have excelled at sea, but also bring a strong fleet perspective to their daily duties. I have never met an officer assigned to a Washington staff who was not nostalgic about the last sea tour and eager for the next one. Neither have I met one who looked down on those serving on staffs outside Washington. They don't come here to collect the box top; they come for the challenges and for the rewards associated with doing a demanding job well. They come because they think they can make a difference, and they're willing to suffer the long commutes, the personal sacrifices of missed soccer games and graduation ceremonies, and the condescending attitudes of their remote contemporaries in order to do so. They deserve better.
"The Academy Could Learn a Thing or Two from the Ivies"
(See S. Cohen, pp. 50-57, July 1999 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Matthew A. Lisowski, U.S. Navy—I had the good fortune to graduate from the United States Military Academy and I am the first to agree with any Naval Academy graduate that Annapolis provides a more rigorous educational environment than West Point. I believe that most Naval Academy grads, however, will concede that West Point produces better leaders.
Where West Point emphasizes leadership and service in its mission statement, Annapolis never mentions leadership and emphasizes development of mental capacity. The question everyone at the Naval Academy needs to answer is: "Are we trying to produce leaders for the Navy or academically excellent graduates on the level of the Ivy League?" These two philosophies need not be diametrically opposed, but not every great leader is "Ivy League material." General George S. Patton was so known for his lack of academic excellence that it is joked that his statue at West Point faces the library to show him its location, because he never went there. Not every graduate of a service academy needs to be a perfect scholar worthy of the Ivies. A lot of my fellow cadets were not particularly adept at study, but many of them showed great potential to lead.
The service academies provide a great deal more than civilian institutions. Not only are the cadets or midshipmen required to maintain academic standards, they must prove capable leaders, with the requisite military skills and knowledge. They also are required to maintain high standards of physical fitness. When you put this all together, the time required to attain these standards takes up most of the day. Is it any wonder that midshipmen want to get away from the Naval Academy when the weekend arrives? I don't know how Annapolis handles weekends, but West Point allows a specific number of weekends off per semester with a baseline for each class year and added weekends for leadership, academic, and athletic excellence. Even the first classmen don't have carte blanche to leave every weekend.
I don't believe that attending civilian universities will provide much benefit to service academy students. I attended Texas Christian University and the University of Maryland prior to my entry into West Point. I found that the moral and ethical standards, at least at those colleges, proved to be far below the standards of the Military Academy. I found that all that I gained from attending West Point far outweighed the loss of the "party" lifestyle of civilian colleges. I also found that the education provided by the Military Academy far outstripped what was provided at these colleges. The main reason for this is that Military Academy professors sincerely care whether a student "gets it." At West Point I didn't have to deal with 300 people in a classroom while some graduate student filled in for the professor. Only once in my four years did I have a substitute professor.
I admit that the report of midshipmen sleeping in class surprised me. That was sorely frowned upon at West Point. If a cadet were to fall asleep in class, he would be spending his weekends walking tours for punishment. All that is required is respect for the instructor and for the student to stand up to stay awake. "Lights out" for all cadets was at 2330, which allowed for six-and-one-half hours of sleep every night. This strictly was enforced. I hope that the Naval Academy has a strict lights-out policy. If the students cannot get all their work done before lights out, then they should not be bolting from the Naval Academy on weekends.
While I agree with some of what Mr. Cohen had to say with regard to problems like cynicism and the lack of opportunities to experience failure, I wholly disagree with expanding the program beyond four years. It severely would increase the cost of producing officers, thereby nullifying Mr. Cohen's "total cost" estimates.
Finally, Mr. Cohen's impression that midshipmen put much of their energy into "beating the system" doesn't shock me. Many Naval Academy graduates have told me of the great lengths to which they, or a fellow classmate, went to get the gouge or shortcut a project. Once again, I did not experience this at West Point. There definitely is a team approach to helping everyone get through all facets of academy life at the Military Academy, but the ultimate success or failure of a cadet rests on his or her own efforts.
"Another View"
(See E. Smith, p. 14, May 1999 Proceedings)
Major General Norton A. Schwartz, U.S. Air Force, Director of Strategic Planning, Deputy Chief of Staff/Plans and Programs—I am troubled by the implication of your cartoon concerning the Air Force's role in urban operations. The inference is that the Air Force is a "Johnny-Come-Lately" to urban operations and is now trying to establish a new mark for itself in this mission area. Allow me to offer a few comments in rebuttal.
First, urban operations are not a terribly new phenomenon for the Air Force or our sister-service warfighting partners. Aerospace power has contributed significantly to joint urban operations. Panama, Bosnia, and Kosovo are recent cases in point. We readily acknowledge, however, that urban operations present a unique set of challenges for national security decision makers and military commanders.
Traditional approaches to military strategy and force employment may not offer politically and militarily acceptable courses of action in the urban operations setting. In such scenarios, joint aerospace power offers our national political and military leadership an expanded set of options for enhancing warfighting effectiveness, while minimizing the risks associated with committing military forces in this highly uncertain and complex environment.
As a service, the Air Force has been making a genuine effort to explore aerospace roles, missions, and contributions in joint urban operations. Under the auspices of the Joint Staff J-8, Joint Urban Working Group, the Air Force has been fully engaged in the joint effort to develop and refine urban operations doctrine, mission needs, and modeling and simulation tools. Through these initiatives, the Air Force and the other services are living up to important obligations set forth in the Defense Planning Guidance and the National Military Strategy. Similarly, Air Force efforts to examine specific weapon system applications in the urban environment are in line with ongoing joint and service experimentation initiatives, such as the Army Military Operations Urban Terrain Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration and the U.S Marine Corps Urban Warrior Advanced Warfighting Experiment.
Finally, success in the urban setting is closely tied to skillful employment of combined arms capabilities—perhaps more so than in any other operating environment we face. To overcome the numerous advantages that the urban environment may offer our adversaries, joint force commanders must fully exploit and engage the unique capabilities that individual services bring to the table.
As airmen, we submit to your readers that joint service air and space capabilities offer joint force commanders invaluable punch in the urban fight. Examples include: precision strike; near real-time integrated intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; battlespace command and control; and vertical maneuver and sustainment supporting a joint air-ground effort. Through these varied capabilities, aerospace power offers a greatly expanded range of options to help shape, control, or defeat an urban adversary. Failure to bring the military advantages of joint aerospace power to bear in this most challenging of environments puts American military operational success seriously at risk. In short, I say: "Don't go downtown without us!"
"The Recruiting Problem We Don't Talk About"
(See T. Strother, p. 192, May 1999; N.M. Jacobsen, p. 10, June 1999; R. Peniston, pp. 24-26, July 1999 Proceedings)
Shannon Riggs, Navy wife of nearly ten years and freelance writer—Even if Lieutenant Commander Strother's statistics about Navy and Marine recruits were accurate and documented, and even if "blue collar" American young men were predominately sexist and homophobic, his assertion that the Navy should therefore rethink its policies on women and gays in the military shows a complete lack of appreciation and understanding of the role of leadership. Should leaders such as military officers find themselves in a world such as Strother describes, they should feel morally obligated to "raise the bar" and lead their subordinates to higher moral ground. If the Navy really were to cater to the basest human nature, I'd be loath to see the fleet we'd have as a result. Furthermore, instead of viewing the Navy as a "bastion of masculinity," I would encourage Strother and anyone who thinks the way he does to begin thinking of the Navy as a bastion of equality instead.
Lieutenant Commander Randolph R. Weekly, U.S. Navy—While I am sure that Lieutenant Jacobsen is immovable in the strength of her convictions, she provides no facts in support of her anecdotal arguments. She doesn't take into consideration the facts that the current unplanned loss rate in the Navy is 2.5 times higher for females than for males, that the 1992 Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces found that women only have 46-58% of the upper torso strength and 73% of the aerobic capacity of men, and that sex within the ranks (whether heterosexual or homosexual) is devastating to unit cohesion and moral. In the face of these facts, Lieutenant Jacobsen's accusations of closed-mindedness and chauvinism ring hollow.
The physical standards within our military service academies and boot camps have been lowered to accommodate women. Double standards have been employed within naval aviation to ensure that women become aviators, no matter what the cost. The Navy currently employs a pregnancy policy that is discriminatory, demoralizing, and which exacerbates the already serious problem of assigning a sufficient number of deployable personnel to sea-going commands. This policy is also unfair in that a service member is allowed limited duty and extra leave simply by virtue of a voluntary condition. I'm sure that many men in the Navy would welcome the opportunity to be equally non-deployable and be allowed additional leave as a result of the pregnant condition of their wives. When one considers that both men and women have the same obligation to perform their duties, it is clear that this policy is hardly one of "equal pay for equal work."
While I agree with Lieutenant Jacobsen that the core values of honor, courage, and commitment are vital to our military, I would add the virtue of intellectual honesty. Simply wishing something to be does not make it so, and there is sufficient evidence to show that our current policies regarding women in combat roles are deeply flawed. As I stated more than a year ago in this forum, it probably will take a future enemy to show us the error of our ways. We have yet to engage an even marginally competent navy in battle since the lifting of the combat exclusion ban. If we are on this present course when we eventually do engage such an enemy, I fear that many lives will be lost unnecessarily in the name of political correctness.
"Where Will All the Admirals Go?"
(See W.J. Holland, pp. 36-40, May 1999; G. Miller, pp. 14-18, July 1999 Proceedings)
Captain Walt Stephenson, U.S. Navy, a maritime planning officer in NATO's Southern Region—Admiral Holland gives a good glimpse of the future battlespace where he sees direct linkage between commander and commanded and growing marginalization of intermediate positions in the command hierarchy. I would like to examine the way that his sound conclusions relate to naval warfare within an alliance. Consider Operation Sharp Guard, the maritime embargo of Yugoslavia performed by NATO and the Western European Union from 1993 to 1996. Two task groups of frigates and destroyers operated in the Strait of Otranto and adjacent to the Montenegrin coast with augmentation by maritime patrol aircraft, submarines, and tactical aircraft. Command of the task groups rotated among allied nations, and the commander's flagship usually matched the nationality of the commander. The hierarchy of the command was Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEur) to Commander in Chief Allied Forces Southern Region (CinCSouth) to Commander Naval Forces Southern Region (ComNavSouth) to task group commander to unit commanding officer. Would it be possible, in future NATO operations, to eliminate any of the three intermediate commands?
CinCSouth is a regional commander for SACEur. He could be eliminated only if the strategic commander was not fighting a separate conflict in another region—a situation that current NATO doctrine presumes. ComNavSouth contains the maritime staff and controls the high frequency broadcast to the ships. That command could be eliminated by transferring its people and equipment to SACEur headquarters in Mons, Belgium. These consolidations could be achieved in principle, but would represent a significant paradigm shift that would be slow to develop in a political alliance of 19 nations. Elimination of the task group commander would require a significant investment in communications equipment for the allied nations. In Operation Sharp Guard, most of the ships were not equipped for satellite communications. Only ComNavSouth could provide record communications to these ships, and only the task group commander could provide them tactical voice communications. An operation similar to Sharp Guard was planned but not executed in the Kosovo War early this year and planners found that the shipboard communications capabilities had not substantially changed.
NATO is an alliance of modern nations, and yet network-centric concepts seem distant to the NATO maritime planner. The United States is developing maritime communications capacity so fast that NATO, in relative terms, is slowing down. If the U.S. Navy develops to the point of eliminating rear admirals and task group commands, can it still provide a solid contribution to the alliance? Because it would seem that no one wants the United States to slow down, it must find a new way to fit into the alliance. Perhaps all the rear admirals will go to allied commands where they can still contribute to military effectiveness.
"Smart Bombs and Linear Thinking Over Yugoslavia"
(See J. Patterson, p. 88, June 1999 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Keith Harrison, U.S. Navy, Fighter Squadron (VF)-41, airborne forward air controller (FAC[A])—As a member of a Tomcat squadron with combat experience in the Kosovo campaign, I find it difficult to agree with any of the points brought up by Lieutenant Patterson concerning the "weapon of choice" for targets we were attempting to destroy. The three months that we spent in theater were revolutionary both for what we were able to accomplish, and for the tactics that will be solidified for future operations. Collateral damage issues, cost/benefit, targeting, and tactical options were all improved because of Carrier Air Wing Eight's (CVW-8) access to a number of America's finest wartime products. I will attempt to summarize our actions in Kosovo and the critical role that precision guided munitions (PGMs) played in our success.
Collateral damage issues are always a concern when dealing with hostile forces in close proximity to friendlies, or those you are trying to protect. The accuracy we were able to achieve by targeting enemy ground forces with these weapons was unparalleled in the history of American warfighting, owing solely to the benefits of low-altitude navigation and targeting infrared-for-night (LANTIRN) pods and PGMs. In more than 99% of our air wing's attempts to destroy a target, our munitions exploded within 30 feet of their targets, and generally were much closer than that. With just two Tomcats carrying PGMs, we were able to deliver more ordnance on target, first pass, than an entire squadron of B-17s during the raids on Dresden in World War II.
We also saw the use of a mix of "dumb" bombs employed from Hornets which were initially spotted from LANTIRN pod designations and ballistically released. Even with the most precise cueing available, these bombs rarely achieved the accuracy of PGMs, and the errors from these weapons were far greater than from a misguided PGM. Our experience showed that when a PGM failed to guide, more often than not, it also failed to arm because of the mechanics involved with the release system. Also, guidance failures where detonation did occur were very close to ballistic solutions and did not travel far outside parameters as Lieutenant Patterson suggests. Even in the worst cases, we were able to conclude that gross errors were much safer with PGMs than with dumb bombs.
The author's second point that I found unbelievable was the cost/benefit of using PGMs against targets such as enemy tanks and artillery pieces. When involved in armed conflict, it makes the most sense to use the best weapons you have available to bring the most amount of destruction to the enemy in the shortest time. This does nothing less than impart maximum damage and fear into an already unstable enemy mindset and was crucial to the success we achieved. If we are going to spend the country's valuable defense dollars developing weapons technology, then we owe it to the taxpayer to use it and end the conflict as quickly as possible. Who really cares how much a laser-guided bomb costs when you are putting that price against the life of an American or NATO pilot? Delivering these weapons gave us the ability to target precisely without putting ourselves in deadly antiaircraft artillery or surface-to-air missile envelopes, and should be the standard method of employment for all deliveries to follow. Try telling the spouse or mother of a downed pilot that you are sorry for their loss, but their loved one was lost because she or he was doing the job as cheaply as possible.
Finally, without getting into classified specifics, our targeting options for the Kosovo theater of operations were enhanced without equal because of the use of PGMs. The Navy's success can be attributed almost entirely to the efforts of the FAC(A)s and their ability to control the battlefield and deliver ordnance on target properly with minimal collateral damage. Again, Lieutenant Patterson's lack of theater-specific knowledge defeats his own argument. His experience on Fallon or El Centro desert ranges may lend some credence to his arguments, but the terrain in Kosovo is quite different. Kosovo is densely forested and heavily mountainous, lending extreme difficulty to target acquisition, the most critical phase of attack. Serbian forces often hid their tanks, artillery, and troop carriers within the most difficult terrain. And when you add night operation to difficult environmentals, you have an even greater obstacle to overcome. F-14 FAC(A)s were able to precisely target well-hidden enemy forces and directly control ordnance from other aircraft. With a single aircraft controlling the battlefield and providing a laser designation, multiple aircraft were able to ingress, precisely release off their spots, and egress in minimum time with maximum effect. The FAC(A) ensured that none of our forces were over a high-threat environment longer than necessary, primarily because of the availability and use of PGMs. It is optimistic at best to ask a pilot, flying at night in difficult terrain over hostile territory, to ingress and locate a target, ballistically roll in and release, and egress with success.
CVW-8 will shortly be returning stateside with absolute confidence in our success and no losses throughout three months of combat operations in a high threat environment. Rather than bicker about the cost of weapons versus targets or other inane issues, we should focus on equipping the fleet with weapons that work. We can ask no less for our forces in harm's way, and we should offer them the best tools to accomplish the most lethal and challenging of tasks.
"We're in the Enemy's Backyard"
(See R. Rempt, pp. 43-46, July 1999 Proceedings)
Major Fred C. Lash, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)—Since I fall into the category of "been there, done that," I just had to set the record straight regarding a photograph on page 43 of the July 1999 Proceedings. The caption indicates that one of the three photos depicts "the U.S. Marine barracks in Lebanon." Actually, the picture is of the American Embassy in Beirut, Lebanon, that was destroyed by a terrorist's bomb on 18 April 1983. The Marine in the foreground is a member of the 22d Marine Amphibious Unit, which was deployed in the vicinity of the Beirut International Airport. At the time the photo was taken, I was assigned to Beirut as the Officer-in-Charge of the Joint Public Affairs Bureau.
Vice Admiral James H. Doyle, Jr., U.S. Navy (Retired)—In addition to the single unit self-defense system described by Rear Admiral Rempt, theater-wide and area defense systems are vital. The Aegis fleet of cruisers and destroyers was built to protect other forces from cruise missiles while also engaging in attack operations and antisubmarine warfare. They also were designed with the capability, flexibility, forward-fit updates, and potential to adapt to new threats and operations. Modifications and conversions to an area and theater-wide tactical ballistic missile defense (TBMD) system are ongoing. But what about the 21st century combatant?
Will the DD-21 have the onboard sensors, fire control, weapons, instrumentation, network connections, and associated support systems to be capable of theater wide and area ballistic missile defense? She should! Considering the anticipated size, cost, and complexity of a brand-new DD-21, she should be built with a TBMD capability to complement her impressive offensive armament. To do otherwise would be to severely limit her multimission capability. To design DD-21 with such precision as to preclude forward-fit updates would be shortsighted as well. The combined effects of lower force levels and increased dispersion of our ships means that there will be less ability to provide mutual support. Therefore, we should not shortchange the capability we provide for each multi-purpose surface combatant.
In land attack, surface ships make great contributions to offensive warfare, but TBMD from the sea can be done only by surface warships. Thus, ballistic missile defense is a unique core competency for surface warfare. If DD-21 lacks such capability, her competency to prosecute land attack could be called into question.
The Navy has a historic opportunity, and even the duty, to add a powerful new dimension to ballistic missile defense from the sea—the 21st century DD-21 armed with a capability to shoot down ballistic missiles and the flexibility and potential to adapt to new threats and operations at sea. Let us seize the initiative.
"The Typhoon Saga Ends"
(See N. Friedman, pp. 91-92, February 1999 Proceedings)
Norman Polmar, author of Guide to the Soviet Navy—The Typhoon strategic missile submarine, the most innovative SSBN design since the USS George Washington (SSBN-598), did not have a multihull design because "the missile tubes were far too massive to be cut into a normal pressure hull."
The chief designer of the Project 941/Typhoon, Academician S.N. Kovalev of the Rubin Central Design Bureau, considered a large variety of submarine configurations that included a large, single pressure hull with the missiles fitted aft of the sail. This was the configuration of all previous SSBNs built in the United States, Britain, France, and China that carry 12 to 24 missiles, including those of the Project 667/Yankee-Delta designs produced by Kovalev.
The feasibility of providing the Typhoon's RSM-52/SS-N-20 Sturgeon missile in a single-hull submarine can be demonstrated easily. First, U.S. Trident SSBNs carry the D-5 missile with a diameter of 83 inches compared to 94 inches for the RSM-52, an 11-inch difference that could have been accommodated in a single large-diameter hull. Second, the aborted Russian Borey-class SSBN was to have been a single pressure-hull submarine carrying the RSM52U Grom missile—a modification of the RSM-52 with the same basic dimensions.
Several other factors did lead to Kovalev's decision to develop the unique Typhoon design. The principal reason was that to fit the 20 missiles and required twin-reactor machinery, electronics, torpedo armament, and other systems in a single pressure hull would have resulted in a submarine almost 800 feet long, which was too large to be accommodated in existing repair docks and other facilities.
Commander Frank W. Wood, U.S. Naval Reserve (Retired)—Reading Dr. Friedman's article brought back memories of my days working on the Underseas Long Range Missile System (ULMS), the studies leading to the Trident system. I was the staff naval architect for the program manager at Electric Boat. The initial missile concepts by Lockheed used Polaris type solid fuel, and the missiles were as huge as the Typhoon. We studied various missile proportions and all sorts of submarine configurations, including some similar to the Typhoon. The subs were indeed large and would not have been cheap.
The Navy's Special Project Office and Lockheed finally decided to spend the money researching a new, denser, and more powerful solid fuel. The end result was the Trident system with a large but more classical submarine hull. Where a Polaris/Poseidon missile is lighter than a missile tube full of water—requiring the submarine to discharge compensating water after firing missiles—Trident D4 missiles are heavier than water and require more water to compensate. In addition, the internal volume of the submarine required to support the weight resulted in more space, allowing plenty of room for machinery component access and interchange than would otherwise have been affordable. But not a sauna, waterfall, or aviary.
It is interesting to me to note that the Typhoon hull form is similar to the rectangular submarine tankers proposed in a Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers paper published in 1959, of which I was a co-author. We did some model tests of that design at the Stevens Institute.
"Human-Centric Warfare"
(See A. Zimm, pp. 28-31, May 1999; S. Rowe, pp. 18-20, July 1999 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Colonel Roger Charles, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired), co-author of a 1992 Newsweek magazine cover story on the USS Vincennes (CG-49)—It's understandable that Commander Zimm used the tragic 1988 incident of the Vincennes downing an Iranian commercial airliner as the key case study to support his argument that "the human is the governing factor in total information dominance and network-centric warfare." But it's disappointing to note that the editorial staff of Proceedings failed to alert Commander Zimm that using the book Storm Center: The USS Vincennes and Iran Air Flight 655 (Naval Institute Press, 1992) as his only source was unwise. Relying on the misleading and false version of events as portrayed in Storm Center without also conducting careful research of primary source documents almost guaranteed that Zimm's article would repeat errors from the seriously flawed version of that naval disaster.
The major misstatement of fact repeated from Storm Center is that the Vincennes was under attack by Iranian Boghammers. The Aegis cruiser's bridge log, transcripts of sworn testimony taken in the post-disaster investigation, and other original source documents provide clear and indisputable evidence that paints a very different picture than Storm Center's. Captain Will Rogers sped his ship north at 30 knots for 22 minutes before crossing into Iranian territorial waters, and then proceeded deeper into Iranian territorial waters at flank speed for another 6 minutes before slowing to 20 knots, as he fired on the Iranian small craft.
Captain Rogers' claim—repeated by Commander Zimm—that he had been alerted for "more aggressive behavior" on the part of Iranian tactical air is belied by overwhelming evidence that the Iranians were extremely cautious in their air operations in the vicinity of U.S. Navy warships. The Iranians had suffered not just defeat but humiliation at the hands of U.S. naval forces in Operation Praying Mantis on 18 April 1988. The Iranians were understandably fearful of U.S. warships operating in a hair-trigger mode. Furthermore, U.S. intelligence reports had informed our forces in the area that several of the Iranian pilots harbored pro-U.S. attitudes.
As to the tagging of the airliner as "unknown, assumed enemy" when the doomed Airbus first appeared on the Aegis tactical data presentations, the relevant issue is that from the time of that appearance to the time of missile impacts, Flight 655 was inside Iranian national airspace. Even if the unknown bogie had been an Iranian F-14, it had every legal and moral right to be there. It was the two U.S. warships, the Vincennes and the Elmer Montgomery (FF-1082), that were engaged in a breach of international law. This breach rendered the later claim of self-defense void on its face.
Further, Commander Zimm parrots the claim of Captain Rogers and the U.S. government that the "workload/time compression on the Vincennes was extreme," failing to note that Rogers' reorganization of his combat information center (CIC) into an ad hoc, untrained, and never-tested collage contributed in a major way to the chaos and near-panic into which Rogers' CIC degenerated.
An additional aggravating factor was the fact that on this day, senior officers assumed general quarters watch billets that they had not routinely stood. This produced a ripple effect wherein some of the most qualified watchstanders were not in key billets and others were moved into new billets. The end result was a tragedy with at least one farcical element—a senior petty officer had to leave his own console, step over to an officer's keyboard, and punch in the proper key sequence to permit launching the missiles.
An analysis based on the true record of the destruction of Iran Air Flight 655, without relying on the flawed Storm Center, would have led Commander Zimm to a vastly different conclusion, one that would have supported the premise of his article. For if Captain Rogers had placed his Aegis combat system on full automatic, removing the human factor from the immediate tactical decision, 290 innocent civilians would not have died, nor would the U.S. Navy have committed one of the most egregious tactical blunders in its history.
Until the Naval Institute acknowledges the serious flaws in Storm Center, writers such as Commander Zimm will continue to sail into waters with a Naval Institute-published chart that conceals hazards to navigation.
Commander William E. Brooks, Jr., U.S. Naval Reserve (Retired), former Editor and Publisher of the Vincennes Sun Commercial—In learned terms, Commander Zimm writes that Captain Will Rogers of the USS Vincennes (CG-49) was overloaded with too much information in too little time. My version is that Rogers had to make a decision while sliding around the combat information center as his ship heeled hard over in a surface engagement. Just before that short span of 2 minutes 22 seconds, the Vincennes had lost half of her main battery. The famous automatic forward mount had jammed. Rogers turned hard to unmask the remaining 50% of his total surface battery.
I can visualize Rogers and the CIC personnel sliding around, because I saw the Vincennes during sea trials off Pascagoula. After serving on a three-stack four-stacker and a Gearing (DD-710), I looked around to see what preparation there was for a full gale and a quartering sea. Stabilizers, I was told, took care of that minor matter. Later, during trials in a full-speed turn, Vincennes heeled at what I would guess was about 35 deg. People were grabbing any available handholds. You could hear loose gear clattering above and below.
When the Vincennes heeled over in a combat situation, I seriously doubt that the Aegis combat center was a scene of calm consideration where information carefully was sorted. My guess is that people, gear, chairs, charts, and overlays went flying, along with rational deliberation. In the midst of all that, Captain Rogers was called on to either risk his ship and his men in the hope that things would turn out happily, or use the only means of protection available—"Birds away."
Commander Zimm is too polite to say what I will: The CO of the Vincennes, or any Aegis cruiser, or any Navy combatant, is not a glorified CIC officer. Regardless of doctrine, Rogers should have been on the bridge, not with his head stuck in the screen of the world's most complicated radar. The CO is responsible for fighting all of his ship.
We now know that fire control radar had a picture that varied totally from the Aegis system. On the bridge, Rogers might have been able to compare and weigh the two. In the Aegis center, such information from fire control was a distraction to be ignored in favor of more detailed, and more complicated radar.
There is, of course, no way to put the Airbus back in the sky, give the Vincennes a good name, or turn Captain Rogers into an admiral. It is possible to learn that sound decisions are made on limited but essential information.
"Making the Case for SSGNs"
(See W.P. Houley, pp. 47-49, July 1999 Proceedings)
Captain John E. O'Neil, Jr., U.S. Navy (Retired)—Admiral Houley fails to make a convincing argument for converting the four oldest Trident submarines into either cruise-missile submarines or special operations forces (SOF) troop carriers. The 18 Trident subs have served the nation well, but the Nuclear Posture Review recommended that the Navy maintain only 14 to continue the present homeport system on both coasts, equipped with the Trident II (D-5) missiles. The remaining four subs would be placed in a non-accountable strategic weapon status. Electric Boat has set aside some $1 million to develop the concept of converting these boats, and there is naturally some support for this scheme among politicians in Washington and Georgia. While I agree there could be some synergy and limited cost effectiveness in maintaining a proven ship with its extensive logistics and maintenance facilities, when you peel back this nuclear-powered onion, the estimated $1.86 billion price tag does not make sense.
My experience in embarking Marines—and in some cases Army and SEAL forces—for weeks or months at a time on small and large naval ships does not convince me that SOF troops would adapt well to life underwater. Maintaining the weapons skills, physical stamina, and physiological state of embarked troops is always a challenge for leaders as they transit and prepare for a mission. An underwater SOF effort was carried out early in World War II in the famous Makin Island raid where Colonel Evans Carlson led his Marine raiders from two submarines in wiping out the Japanese garrison at the cost of 30 sailors and Marines. Other such missions were carried out with mixed results. The one thing in common in all these operations was the requirement that the subs get very close to shore to place their troops effectively during hours of darkness. This would be extremely hazardous to a huge Trident, which is relatively hard to maneuver and sometimes is visible and detectable from the air. In addition, a new and costly underwater system—such as high-capacity mini-subs—would have to be developed to allow the Tridents to remain farther out at sea.
A case could be made for Tomahawk land-attack missile (TLAM) launch tubes from submarines. We do not, however, have enough of the newest TLAMs to fill all the current and soon-to-be-delivered launching systems in the fleet. The recent extensive use of TLAMs in Europe and Iraq necessitate procurement of more of these weapons to restock spent cells, fill the cells that don't have the required number of weapons, and build up an adequate war reserve. Navy budget dollars are sorely needed to fund these ordnance requirements. In addition, the current Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) ship-building program is producing a large number of weapon launch cell capacities, and the DD-21 will have many weapon cells for land attack missions. It is difficult to fathom a cost-effective plan to convert the four subs into TLAM shooters when compared with the projected number of TLAM launch cells now being delivered to the fleet.
A complex, lengthy conversion plan for four Trident submarines that could carry only 60 troops and a limited number of Tomahawks has very little operational return on investment. I believe a practical person would readily see that a ticket to ride this nuclear-powered bus is not cost-effective regardless of Congressional or corporate interest.
EDITOR's NOTE: See this month's U.S. Navy column, "A Submarine for All Seasons?" (pp. 87-88), for additional information on this topic.
"Leadership From the Front"
(See W. Bowers, pp. 48-50, June 1999 Proceedings)
Steven Zoraster—Captain Bowers' article includes significant errors in accounting for the deaths of war leaders of Classical and Pre-Classical Greece. I am referring specifically to a sentence in which Captain Bowers writes that "tellingly, other successful leaders—including Achilles, Hector, Leonidas, Brasidas, Nicias, Demosthenes, Epameinondas, and Alexander the Great—all died (or died later from wounds) while personally leading their armies into battle." Victor Davis Hanson's book, The Western Way of War, is cited as the source for this information, but the facts given in the article do not all come from that book.
Alexander the Great, for example, died of fever in Babylon, in a palace, not in battle. Nicias and Demonsthenes were the incompetent leaders of the Athenian attack on Syracuse in Sicily during an interlude in the Peloponnesian War, and were executed by the people of Syracuse after mishandling the Athenian retreat from Syracuse. Achilles killed Hector, but the fight between the two was more like a duel than part of a battle. Finally, Achilles was murdered by Hector's brother in a temple while trying to negotiate a marriage between himself and one of King Priam's daughters.
Leonidas died in battle, but whether he was a "successful" general is open to argument. The real question about Thermopylae is how the 7,000 Greeks involved managed to lose the battle, not how they managed to hold on so long. The narrow seaside pass was only about 50 feet wide at its narrowest, hardly wide enough for more than 20 men to attack at once. And the Greeks guarding the alternate route over the mountains were assigned such poor leaders by Leonidas that they did not put up a fight when a contingent of Persians casually marched past them to get behind the Spartans holding the lower pass.
"December 7,1999: The Second, Silent Attack on Pearl"
(See P. Marghella, pp. 60-65, May 1999 Proceedings)
Walter Zeltmann, President of the International Weather Corporation—Lieutenant Commander Marghetta's scenario on biological terrorism is a believable demonstration of what might occur in any urban area in the world. It contains, however, a number of aspects that need further amplification.
The discussion of the meteorological aspects of an attack is much too simplistic. One can't use general climatology in planning an attack. An attack will occur during specific weather conditions that usually will be completely different from statistical averages, and one must know about them at the point of release, in transit to the target, and at the target.
Wind speed and direction must be known with precision in order to release the agent at the right location and distance from the target and there must be no unexpected changes until the plume is on target. If wind speed is too low the plume may not reach the target. If it is too high, the plume may be so attenuated by dispersion that it would lose some of its effectiveness.
The stability of the atmosphere is important. In a stable atmosphere, a plume trapped near the ground under an inversion can maintain its concentration and effectiveness. In an unstable atmosphere, convective currents can carry much of the plume well above the target.
Relative humidity would have an effect on an aerosol. If the air is too dry, the agent may be killed or weakened. Precipitation will tend to scavenge some of the plume out of the atmosphere, creating an increased hazard at ground level but reducing the hazard at normal breathing levels.
If the plume is released in daylight, the effects of solar radiation must also be considered. Ultra-violet radiation can kill or weaken micro-organisms as can certain photo-chemical reactions.
A stable atmosphere with low wind speeds is conducive to air pollution episodes. Each urban area produces its own particular mix of pollutants. Virtually nothing is known about how these pollutants would interact with the bacterial plume.
The manufacture of biological agents must be done under level IV bio-safety protocols. Failure to achieve and maintain these protocols can result in the release of the agent into the surrounding community as occurred at Sverdlovsk in 1979. Level IV protection is not easy to achieve. There are only a few such facilities in the world. The problem is not so much in obtaining hardware, but in getting the right people. Those who work in level IV facilities must be highly trained professionals who are dedicated, conscientious, emotionally stable, and who will observe the safety protocols without fail even when not under direct supervision. Not many such people will be available to most terrorist groups.
There is one piece of good news. The April 1999 issue of Science reports that an advanced nucleic acid analyzer has been developed which can be used in the field with battery operation to detect bacteria within seven minutes.