While they haven’t been used recently, the U.S. Navy is still cautious of mines in the Persian Gulf. Even though the Iranian government’s threat of mining the Strait of Hormuz is perhaps only a rhetorical tool, U.S. naval planners cannot discount it. As the U.S. Navy designs possible contingency plans for the Gulf, it must also revisit its force structure. Between minesweepers, airborne assets, and explosive-ordnance-disposal personnel, we have a very capable mine-countermeasures (MCM) force that will be radically enhanced when the littoral combat ship (LCS) reaches full operational capability. However, a complete reliance on the existing MCM force may fall short when considering the ever-present threat of an effectively placed mine. The most confounding problem of all is the simple floating mine. The real challenge in the realm of mine warfare is to find a way to counterbalance this hazard and render it obsolete. Our naval surface forces—particularly those operating independently—need an organic, self-contained, and integrated mine-queuing system that will preserve their freedom of movement even when mines are thought to be present.
Systematic Survivability
Self-sustainment at sea is necessary for rapidly fixing equipment casualties and repairing unforeseen system degradations. However, history has shown that self-preservation is often the key consideration after an attack, when survival has become the primary goal and the mission has essentially ended. (The Samuel B. Roberts was the perfect illustration of such a catastrophic event.) This is not our philosophy in an air battle—that would be like taking the first hit without assessing hostile intent. Once a hostile act has occurred, the situation becomes clear and self-defense becomes fairly straightforward.
With mines that wait for their prey, we’ve accepted that when a ship gets hit the crew will contend with the situation through damage-control efforts with very little chance of fighting back. Even so, the U.S. Navy has notional plans easily tailored to warfare-commander preferences that can help overcome the mine threat. When a floating mine is sighted, surface ships execute preplanned responses and do their best to avoid it. In addition, where there is potential for the presence of bottom-influence mines, those areas are periodically surveyed for mine-like objects. If discovered, those anomalies are avoided as necessary and neutralized as required by the MCM force.
These capabilities are primarily designed to detect and disarm influence mines—and in some cases moored mines—that could be deployed in the relatively scarce strategic sea beds throughout the world that range from 10 to 200 feet deep.1 This type of operation would require surface combatants to become part of the mine-clearance effort to protect the minesweepers. The combatants would “follow” the minesweepers in a 500-yard-wide lane astern to provide air defense against any fast-moving cruise missile–armed attack craft prevalent in Persian Gulf waters in conjunction with persistently airborne armed helicopters for antisurface action. But there are trade-offs. Such shiphandling demands precise navigation, which would leave combatants with few maneuver options. Moreover, if fixed-wing aircraft are incorporated, the command-and-control would become significantly more cumbersome, adding to the fog of war.
Although this is a systematic plan and methodical process, it impedes the movement of combatant, amphibious, and heavy-lift forces. It would require enormous resources to overcome the bottom-influence/moored-mine problem using dedicated surveillance effects and optimizing sanitized transit routes while avoiding mine danger areas. To make matters worse, the floating mine introduces great uncertainty. This absolute wild card is typically deployed outside the 200-foot underwater topography curve.2 Consequently, when surface forces depart the area of the countermeasures effort, they become completely vulnerable to underwater attack. This is hardly a recipe for survivability.
To maintain force momentum throughout an entire region, the Navy must do so without calling on the MCM forces likely resourced for clearance in other high-priority near-shore areas. An organic shipboard MCM capability is needed for the disbursed forces that operate at great distances from the support of mine-warfare assets.
David and Goliath
Since 1950, 16 American warships have been struck by mines. Recognizing that during the same period only four ships were struck by other weapons, it becomes apparent that the naval mine represents a threat greater than all others combined. The hostilities in the Persian Gulf during the 1980s gave us many examples of a well-placed mine’s asymmetry—not only from the perspective of simplicity, but from a financial standpoint. The cost to repair the Samuel B. Roberts was approximately $96 million while the floating mine that damaged her was estimated at a mere $1,500. As one of the oldest weapons ever conceived, mines are a complete game-changer and truly a “cheap shot” in every sense of the term.
One misperception is that naval forces have cognizance of a mine’s presence. Other than a rogue nation flagrantly placing mines in the water in outright defiance to the international community, it is difficult to imagine how naval forces would have any type of indication or situational awareness about a mine’s general location. If a regime wanted to slip floating mines into the Persian Gulf or the Strait of Hormuz in the middle of the night from a fishing dhow that looked like hundreds of others, it is unlikely that even the most sophisticated surveillance systems would detect it. If it were known that a mine was placed in the water, the United States would be forced to react at the operational level of war to contend with a theater-wide threat that could impact local navies as well as the global commercial-shipping industry. Engagement with partner nations and the larger maritime community would be required to collectively understand this threat politically, militarily, and economically.
In addition, fleet schedulers would rewrite the theater-wide maritime scheme of maneuver to separate maritime-patrol areas from mine-danger areas. This would include executing plans to deploy the entire theater MCM force for extended periods with all intra-theater transportation requirements and sustainment needs being fulfilled. Consequently, escort operations might ensue as well as requests for surge forces from other theaters or the continental United States. Also, fleet commanders would prepare to heighten force-posture levels and seek changes to the rules of engagement in the event that circumstances created a hostile environment and a wartime situation unfolded.
This scenario evokes a fight in which an underdog defeats his foe with technology that outmatches the overwhelming force he faces—such as David killing Goliath with only an ordinary sling, a few well-aimed stones, and a small sword. Considering the asymmetric nature, sheer volume, and clandestine aspect of these barely detectable weapons along with the low probability of reliable warning, this vulnerability must be taken more seriously than ever.
The Navy’s advanced weapons, particularly within the surface-combatant force, are very complex. Line officers must have a thorough understanding of combat-system capabilities and limitations to manage the integration of those weapons into battle orders and respond to hostile threats in multiple dimensions. This is especially true in regard to the Aegis weapon system, with its robust automation and display capability that supports its awesome firepower. But these sophisticated weapons are still vulnerable to rudimentary kinetic devices such as naval mines, and there tends to be limited understanding and awareness about their devastating effects.
It is fairly certain that the Iranian government could possess up to an estimated 600 influence mines, all of which are acoustic, magnetic, and pressure-activated with warheads ranging from 500 to 1,500 pounds of high explosives. These weapons are designed for use in the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most strategic choke points, which is completely minable for bottom-type mines. But most concerning are the almost 4,000 basic floating mines, which pack anywhere from 250 to 500 pounds of dynamite.3 This underwater guerrilla warfare must be addressed to ensure freedom of navigation for the U.S. Navy.
Possibilities for Protection
The Navy has taken several steps to combat mines. For example, the Kingfisher modification to the Arleigh Burke–class hull-mounted sonar can provide surveillance data for safe navigation around hazardous small objects such as mines, and electro-optical/infrared systems have operated successfully on many airborne assets and shipboard weapon systems. Magnetic anomaly-detection (MAD) gear could be refined for mine-detection applications. Typically, all of these sensors incorporate watchstander decision-aid systems with tactical displays that have embedded pull-down menus and variable action buttons. But the most promising device under development uses laser detection and ranging technology: The AN/AES-1 airborne laser mine-detection system (ALMDS) is designed to detect, classify, and localize floating mines using pulsed, blue-green laser technology to image a surface-to-depth volume. The ALMDS is fired into the water, and cameras on an aircraft-mounted pod capture water reflections to create images. These lasers are designed to search the entire water column from the surface to 40 feet in depth, where moored mines are the biggest threats.4
ALMDS is designed for installation on the HM-60S Seahawk for the purpose of wide-area reconnaissance and assessment of mine threats in littoral zones, confined straits, and choke points to support expeditionary and carrier strike groups. In addition, the HM-60S with ALMDS could be embarked on large-deck amphibious ships and carriers so that naval forces can conduct “in-stride” operations in mined waters. This technology meets a mission needs-statement requirement to rapidly detect, classify, and localize floating and near-surface moored sea mines for the self-protection of carrier and expeditionary strike group assets.5
The U.S. Navy’s mine-warfare strategy is good, and the LCS, with its MCM mission module, will expand these capabilities for persistent coverage of the world’s most contested waterways. But since those ships cannot be everywhere all the time, the remaining surface forces need an organic mine-countermeasures capability more than just Kingfisher, Degaussing, and a Bull Nose lookout with a pair of binoculars. Why not develop and field a variant of ALMDS to be installed on the Fire Scout unmanned aerial vehicle, with priority going to ships scheduled to deploy to the U.S. 5th Fleet area of responsibility? This mine-warfare package, or system-of-systems, should include a Fire Scout modified with a payload to include ALMDS and MAD gear to complement the Forward-Looking Infra-Red and electro-optical camera.
On the ship, a high-resolution mast-mounted optical sight could view floating mines in concert with the Fire Scout camera as well as an enhanced Kingfisher small-object avoidance system. For tactical decision makers, an advanced display system in the combat information center would be essential for disseminating information while providing course-to-steer recommendations and drift calculations. There should also be a decision-aid library compatible with the Mine Warfare Environmental Decision Aid Library and the Global Command-and-Control System–Maritime. Automatic modes of operation would allow the Fire Scout to maintain an exact geo position at a predetermined location, say, 100 feet and 1 nautical mile ahead of the ship. With all of this, any American warship would have water-space awareness wherever a floating mine could be in its path—basically anywhere in the Persian Gulf.
The Menacing Mine Problem
Few things are more worrisome to naval operators than the lurking threat of a mine, and the Middle East’s geography is ideal for creating a maritime defensive concept that incorporates mines into any anti-access/area-denial strategy. When the time comes, the U.S. Navy will be seriously challenged by operations that are paralyzed due to the presence of mines—similar to what happened during the anti-shipping campaigns known as the Tanker War during the Iran-Iraq conflict, and the lead-up to Operation Desert Storm. We must contend with these dangerous facts before it’s too late. Of course, there could not be a worse time to advocate for another program of record that will compete for shrinking defense dollars. Without an offset, programming another $11.3 million for ALMDS or $18.2 million for Fire Scout and associated support equipment would be unpopular. However, the discussion should still take place; requirements are requirements, regardless of their ability to survive budget battles.
If anything should be fast-tracked through the budget-development process, it is a self-contained, organic mine-countermeasures system-of-systems configured into the Navy’s surface ships. An integrated package deal with effective command-and-control that can sanitize a 500- to 800-foot-wide swath of ocean one mile ahead of a ship would facilitate safe navigation anywhere there could be floating mines. For the ship driver, operating with the mine-countermeasures Fire Scout should become an everyday skill similar to standard helicopter operations, underway replenishment, or taking station on the aircraft carrier for plane-guard duty.
With several technologies showing great potential, all of this is possible. Even ideas that might seem like science fiction should be considered—the drone antisubmarine helicopter raised a few eyebrows back in the 1950s, but that platform eventually evolved into the Light Airborne Multipurpose System, which revolutionized antisubmarine warfare. An airborne laser such as ALMDS that can penetrate the sea for complete situational awareness with reliable detection of floating mines is noteworthy. This capability should be fielded very soon. Otherwise, the U.S. Navy risks taking a shot from the cheap seats, then re-demonstrating our damage-control proficiency to the world—while sacrificing control of the sea where it matters most.
1. Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Warfare Publication, Naval Mine Warfare, NWP 3-15, vol. 1, September 2010.
2. Gregory K. Hartmann, Scott C. Truver, Weapons that Wait: Mine Warfare in the U.S. Navy (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1979).
3. Gregory J. Cornish, “U.S. Naval Mine Warfare Strategy: Analysis of the Way Ahead,” U.S. Navy Thesis Research Study, 2003.
4. John Keller, “Navy’s Laser-based Airborne Laser Mine Detection System Enters Final Development Before Full-scale Production,” 8 April 2012, www.militaryaerospace.com.
5. Naval Sea Systems Command, Office of Corporate Communications, “System Description and Background: AN/AES-1 Airborne Laser Mine Detection System (ALMDS),” 31 October 2012.