Realigning to meet the nation’s changing needs will require a painful reorganization—to include standing down the III Marine Expeditionary Force on Okinawa—but the Marine Corps that emerges can provide a better capability for the nation and an improved quality of life for the troops.
The Marine Corps has embarked on a journey into a new era, filled with much uncertainty. This is not new for us; our history is filled with such times of challenge and duress that we as Marines have overcome—a time-honored tradition that we have come to expect of ourselves and our nation of us. This time, however, our challenge is made greater by the environmental turbulence within which we operate: global political uncertainty, downsizing, shrinking defense budgets, changing and competing roles and missions, increasing societal expectations, the ever-increasing pace of technology, and the upswing in jointness and operations other than war.
The challenge before us is to do more with less. We have done this and continue to do so with uncommon vigor and resourcefulness. In fact, no other organization—military or otherwise—does a better job of allocating scarce resources to competing needs and maximizing the benefits than the Marine Corps. In spite of this, we are approaching our threshold of effectiveness, because our strategy and capabilities are not in sync with today’s environment.
The Marine Corps is affected by two environments—external and internal—each of which consists of five broad elements; political, economic, physical, technological, and societal. The external factors influence the internal policies and practices, which in turn influence our values, attitudes, and behavior.
Political Element. The Department of Defense is in the midst of a congressionally mandated reduction in force. But what we have discovered is that because of the unstable nature of global politics, U.S. willingness to intervene, and additional requirements to operate in joint arenas and conduct operations other than war, operational tempo has not been reduced in proportion to force reductions. The Marine Corps’ response has been to improve existing capabilities within the reduced force structure and to operate smarter, using advanced technology and our inherent ingenuity.
The nut that has yet to be cracked, however, is the one that balances operational training, operational deployments, and the morale and welfare of our Marines within current personnel and budget restraints. It is well documented that 10-25% of our active-duty force is operationally deployed at any one time. The Marine Corps currently is at approximately 87% manning from its peak years of the mid-1980s. It has the longest training pipeline of all the armed services, along with requisite school requirements, joint billet requirements, the manning of a joint task force headquarters, and an inordinately high first-term attrition rate (approximately 30%). This leaves an effective operating force of 50-70% of total personnel strength.
In an effort to minimize the impact on the operational force, we have established personnel staffing goals, pro-rata distributions of critical military occupational specialties (MOSs) and ranks, and out-of-hide tables of organization (T/Os). This has created a phenomenon I call “peg-holing.” Let’s say there are six people qualified to fill ten billet requirements. Essentially what happens is that respective monitors chase these billets through continuous reassignment, with the squeaky-wheeled command getting the grease, leaving some other command bone dry.
As an extreme example, consider the shortage of 0402 logistics majors within the 2d Force Service Support Group- While I was assigned to 2d Landing Support Battalion—from August 1993 to July 1995—the battalion’s T/O called for six majors; the staffing goal was two; one was on hand- Another example within the same battalion is 0481 landing support specialists. The T/O calls for 312; on hand were 277, of whom 119 were deployed. The remaining 158 Marines then must support day-to-day II Marine Expeditionary Force operations, meet annual training requirements, fill out-of-hide T/O requirements, and maintain an Air Contingency Force detachment (and also squeeze in schooling or annual leave).
An additional challenge to our operational force has been the establishment of such new military occupation specialties as computer small systems specialists and the adoption of systems such as the MAGTF Deployment Support System II, which reflect our incorporation of advanced technologies. They have come at the expense of other MOSs, because we have imposed the requirement without increasing overall force strength or compromising mission capabilities. The result—once again—is an overextended operational force.
Economic Element. Ever deeper defense cuts have come at great expense to the Marine Corps, despite our ability to squeeze more value out of every dollar spent. Those who entered active service after 1 August 1986, upon retiring at 20 years, will receive 40% of their base pay instead of the 50% received by those who entered prior it this date. Dependent health care is costing active-duty members more each year. Collectively, our equipment exceeded its service life. The Marine Corps procurement budget is averaging only 50% of the $1.2 billion it needs annually. Prepositioned war reserves have been depleted to offset non-repairable equipment, and a growing portion of our budget is being spent to repair aging equipment. The Army is acquiring additional bigger, faster, more capable ships in support of its maritime prepositioning force. We are forced to buy and fix less-capable ships.
Most of our shrinking budget, out of necessity, is being spent to sustain operational forces. This leaves little money to maintain or upgrade existing facilities, including base housing (which is substandard, inadequate, or uninhabitable in several locations), or to purchase garrison property. Most alarming is the backlog of military construction projects the Marine Corps has accumulated. During a recent visit to the 2d Force Service Support Group, Major General B. Don Lynch noted that at current funding levels, it could take another 100 years to fund our current military construction requirements.
Physical Element. Many of the facilities in which we Work and live require extensive renovation or replacement. Complicating our housing problems is the shortage of base quarters in high-cost geographical areas such as Washington, D.C., Southern California, and Hawaii. Often the Wait for quarters is as long as 12-24 months, and the best off-base housing locations are well beyond the means of most Marine families. Many Marines must deal with an excessive commute time because they cannot find affordable off-base housing close to work. Those who can afford to buy homes often are reluctant to do so, because they fear having to sell or rent when they are transferred after their typical three-year tours. Furthermore, housing allowances often fall short of the true cost of housing.
Technological Element. In our rapidly changing age of technology, the accumulation of technology doubles every seven years—faster in some fields. The Marine Corps is doing its best to sort through what it can and cannot use or afford. We are discovering that what we can afford will not keep us at the forefront in operational readiness. In many instances, we are able to buy only enough promising technologies to keep our foot in the door. Often by the time we can afford and fully implement a technology it has become obsolete.
We are even having difficulty assessing the value of technologies because of personnel shortages. A significant part of adopting new technologies is recognizing the personnel requirements to operate and maintain them. This has placed us in the situation of having to create new MOSs at the expense of others—and thus continue to expand the mission requirements of our Marines.
Social Element. The word's out on the street that what you will get from the Marine Corps is demanding work, frequent deployments, substandard living quarters, little free time, slow promotions, and fewer reenlistment opportunities. These impressions, the abolishment of the draft, and eroding benefits are making it difficult for the service to attract society’s best and brightest young men and women. It is showing in the Marine Corps' first-term enlistments: one-third fail to complete their enlistment contracts. This problem probably is multifaceted: there is a prevailing societal attitude of “If it doesn’t feel good, don’t do it”; many young people are growing up without healthy role models; and some become disillusioned with the Marine Corps when it fails to meet their expectations. But the most serious contributing factor is that more than 45% of our first-termers enter under some type of enlistment waiver—and not just for minor traffic violations. They include admitted and frequent drug use, serious offenses, juvenile felonies, and medical (to include psychological) waivers.
I found this figure appalling and unbelievable, so I decided to put it to the test. I randomly surveyed 125 of my first-termers. To my surprise, 57—or 45.6%—had entered with waivers other than for minor traffic violations. As many as 49 of the 57 waivers were given at individual recruiting stations. We are having to compromise our institutional standards to meet our enlistment goals. In addition, I found a direct positive correlation between those enlisting with waivers and those who were subject to non-judicial punishment and first-term attrition.
Societal pressures and expectations add to our challenge. For example, we must allow for and accommodate marriages of our junior Marines, further exacerbating our leadership challenge and our need to stretch a dollar. Many of these young marriages fail, adding to an already inordinately high divorce rate among Marines. As these marriages deteriorate, we spend significant time providing counseling and dealing with issues such as bad debts and alcohol or spousal and child abuse.
Reshaping for the Future
This picture leaves much to be desired, but it is not all gloom and doom. The short answer to our problems is a lot more money and many more quality young men and women with moral fiber and a strong work ethic. Unfortunately, the reality is that our budget most likely will be cut further, our force will get smaller, and societal values and expectations will not change anytime soon. What remains for the Corps to do is to assess more realistic options—those that meet the needs of our nation, preserve our integrity, and stay in line with our Commandant’s planning guidance—and choose the one that best meets the challenges of current and future environmental turbulence and is responsive and quickly adaptable to both new threats and emerging opportunities.
The first step in the process is to re-identify ourselves. Who are we, and what is our role/mission? As the Commandant has stated, “The Marine Corps is the nation’s naval, combined arms, expeditionary force in readiness. Our reason for being is what it always has been—warfighting.” He further states, “It is vital that our organization be designed with one goal in mind: success on the battlefield.” To this end, the Marine Corps should be measured by the return on investment it offers the nation. The two key factors that determine return on investment are competitive effectiveness and strategic responsiveness.
Competitive effectiveness is a measure of how well we operate. It can be divided into two submeasures: efficiency in swiftly and decisively responding to our nation’s needs, and effectiveness in getting the job done. Strategic responsiveness is a measure of how well we relate to the environment. It also can be divided into two submeasures: attractiveness, that is, being the force of choice; and capability responsiveness, or whether capabilities match battlefield needs.
I believe that our force can be structured and equipped better—to meet the changing needs of our nation and our Commandant’s vision for the future, to preserve the integrity of our institution, improve quality of life for our Marines, and maximize return on investment—within current operating restraints. The proposal is a painful one, but it can preserve our future as the force of choice. We cannot sustain today’s Marine Corps and meet tomorrow’s needs. A leaner, better-equipped, and more-prepared force should be our objective.
Our warfighting capabilities should focus on:
- One warfighting Marine expeditionary force (MEF) capable of organizing a Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) in support of a major regional contingency
- One warfighting MEF capable of organizing a MAGTF in support of a small-scale regional contingency
- One MEF maintaining a fully capable, expeditionary, joint task force headquarters
- One MEF capable of executing the full range of operations other than war
- The capability to employ three forward operating Marine forces in the form of Marine expeditionary units (special operations capable) (MEU/SOCs)
- The capability to employ forward operating maritime prepositioning squadrons (MPSs) as part of the Marine Corps Maritime Prepositioning Force as logistics support to a contingency MAGTF
- A fully integrated indivisible reserve force
A force built around this concept could look something like this:
- Commander, Marine Forces Pacific/I MEF, with a co-located headquarters at Camp Pendleton, California, capable of organizing a MAGTF in support of one major regional contingency; employing two forward operating Marine forces in the form of a MEU(SOC), with one in reserve; and employing one operating MPS—with current staffing goal force structure.
- IMEF (Forward), located in Guam or Australia and capable of orchestrating Asian/Pacific Rim contingency operations; a forward logistics base in support of regional contingencies and joint training operations; employing one forward operating MPS.
- III MEF would be stood down entirely (personnel and equipment), with equipment redistributed to I MEF, II MEF, and prepositioned war reserves; personnel reassigned as needed to support I MEF (Forward) mission and to fill I MEF and 11 MEF shortfalls, as well as joint task force headquarters, joint, and critical non-FMF billets; remaining force reduced through end-of-active-service and retirement attrition.
- Commander, Marine Forces Atlantic/II MEF/Joint Task Force Headquarters, with co-located headquarters at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, and joint headquarters at Norfolk, Virginia, tasked with employing one warfighting MEF capable of organizing a MAGTF in support of a small-scale regional contingency; employing a fully capable, expeditionary, joint task force headquarters; executing the full range of operations other than war; employing one forward-operating Marine force in the form of a MEU(SOC) with one in reserve; employing one forward-operating MPS. This includes standing down one infantry-regiment equivalent and proportionate support personnel/equipment, reassigning personnel and reducing strength equivalent through end-of-active-service and retirement attrition and redistributing equipment.
- Non-FMF/Support Commands capable of sustaining or improving current FMF support within the present command structure, with a reduction of personnel strength in line with FMF force reduction and an increased number of joint billets, as required.
This plan reduces our force strength by 17,000-22,000. with the following advantages:
- It complies with the Commandant’s planning guidance-
- It reduces force strength 10-12% without significantly compromising operational capabilities.
- It reduces overseas deployments by 40-60%, thus saving money and improving force morale.
- It allows us to divert dollars previously committed to support deployments and procurement dollars planned for replacing aging equipment to other areas historically neglected because of funding shortages, as well as to innovative technologies and concepts that will put us at the cutting edge in expeditionary force readiness.
- It makes the Marine Corps more appealing to young men and women, which eventually will allow for more selective recruiting.
- It increases the nation’s return on its investment in the Marine Corps.
- It shrinks the strategy-capability gap.
This is not a panacea for all our ailments, nor does it completely close our strategy-capability gap. It is, however, a necessary step in the right direction, when coupled with initiatives to get more Department of the Navy/Defense dollars, divest ourselves of unproductive areas, streamline processes, lengthen tours, shorten promotion time, and improve reenlistment incentives.
Major Anderson is commanding officer of Combat Service Support Detachment 21, 2d Force Service Support Group, at Cherry Point, North Carolina. He holds a doctor of business administration degree from Unite States International University.