Since the mid-1960s, new surface ship design or development programs have incorporated some form of reduced manning to lower cost and improve efficiency. Present plans for SC-21 are no exception. Proponents of minimum manning point to the maturity of computers and digital control systems as evidence of a paradigm shift that justifies new thinking in ship design and operation. The problem with such arguments is that they focus on whether complements can be reduced, rather than on whether they ought to be.
The benefits of automation technology are indisputable. First-generation engineering control systems, such as those found on the Spruance (DD-963) and Ticonderoga (CG-47) classes, have proved their reliability and validated the concept of machines replacing—or at least augmenting—men as valve turners and gage readers. The next generation of automation, just beginning to make its way into the fleet, will build on these accomplishments by integrating engineering and combat systems controls.
The problem with reduced manning clearly is not technical; it is a function of how we employ and maintain our ships. The histories of the FFG-7 and DD-963 programs are instructive: designed with minimized crews in mind and incorporating the most advanced shipboard automation available, these ships nevertheless have seen a 20%-25% growth in complement since their introduction. Where did all these people come from? The new systems required fewer operators and watchstanders, but basic ship’s business—maintenance, preservation, and administration—required more people to make these ships viable fleet units.
A historical comparison is instructive: a New Orleans (CA-32)-class cruiser, circa 1936, was 588 feet long, displaced 11,500 tons, and had a crew of 700. Today’s Ticonderoga-class cruiser is 567 feet long, displaces 9,600 tons, and has a crew of about 350. Compared to his predecessor, today’s sailor has twice as many square feet to paint, sweep, swab, and polish. As science still has not provided a more efficient solution to the ancient problem of rust than a sailor with a chipping hammer and paintbrush, we must assume that we will continue to require a certain number of warm bodies to take care of the fundamentals. The gradual manning creep experienced by the Spruance and Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7) classes may indicate that a lower practical limit already has been reached.
The success of foreign navies in minimizing crew size often is used to justify similar initiatives in the U.S. Navy. These arguments, however, ignore our unique operational requirements and attendant convictions about shipboard self-reliance. The three to four month uninterrupted periods on station in the Indian Ocean throughout the 1980s would not have been possible if our battle group escorts had lacked the manpower to support robust watch-bills and provide a significant self-repair capability.
The Dutch, British, and Canadians have built superb frigates with crew sizes ranging from 165 to 200, but they have paid a price in reduced sustainability. Most of these ships have a difficult time going beyond 20 straight days at sea. Constant watches wear out the crews, and on-board repair capability is minimal; they often are forced to fly in civilian technical representatives to make electronic and mechanical repairs that most U.S. “small boys” can make themselves.
Foreign ships’ companies work in much the same manner as air crews: operating the ship for the duration of the mission, then handing it over to specialized maintainers upon return to base. In home port, basic housekeeping tasks such as exterior preservation are contracted out, and some administrative functions are farmed to the shore establishment, freeing crewmembers for training and schooling.
We could make reduced manning viable in our Navy if we were willing to rethink our concept of fleet support; that means beefing up waterfront maintenance activities and programming more money for contracting routine requirements such as decking and exterior painting.
We also would have to get serious about decreasing the administrative burden on the fleet. These kinds of initiatives haven’t worked out well in the past.
We ought to stick with our traditional strengths. U.S. ships should be self-reliant; accordingly, they must be larger and more heavily manned than their foreign counterparts. Most important, we must examine the effects of minimal manning on the workload of the fleet sailor—our bluejackets should always be busy, but never overburdened.
Lieutenant Good is a student at the Naval Postgraduate School. He previously served on board the USS Lake Champlain (CG-57) and on the Commander, Standing Naval Forces Atlantic, staff.