The South African Navy stands poised to transform itself into a modern navy, capable of meeting regional needs and assisting the international community.
In 1994, South Africa transitioned peacefully, after years of regional conflict, into a multi-party democracy. At first, euphoria set in, but soon harsh economic realities became evident. Such issues as the socioeconomic requirements for housing, employment, and education are covered under the Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP).
Within this environment, the South African Navy has received on average over the past two decades some 6-8% annually of the national defense budget. This budgetary neglect, combined with arms sanctions, has eroded complete capabilities such as antisubmarine warfare, and it currently threatens such existing capabilities as submarine warfare and surface warfare. Nevertheless, the South African Navy has maintained extremely high standards in the disciplines it has kept alive. Ironically, the loss of certain capabilities brought a tighter focus in the remaining fields, such as mine countermeasures and surface warfare, resulting in specialization and dedicated expertise. South African naval officers now tend to be submariners, mine countermeasures, or surface (missile boat) warfare specialists.
The integration of former adversaries and non-statutory forces, such as the African National Congress’s Mkonto We Sixwe (MK) and the Azanian Peoples’ Liberation Army (APLA) into the existing South African National Defence Force (SANDF) is under way and, fortunately, is proving to be relatively painless. The South African Navy has been integrated to a fairly high extent for some 18 years. The problems encountered were not related to racism, but rather were more in the line of mutual acceptance between former adversaries and the recognition of qualifications, rank, or seniority. Royal Navy officers under the auspices of the British military advisory training team assisted in this matter, and integration is nearly completed.
Having completed a successful national transition, the South African Navy must consider its own positioning for the future, with regard to strategy, politics, and resources. Historical precedents such as the “Simon’s Town Agreement” with the United Kingdom or Apartheid siege mentality must be discarded and replaced by a new set of criteria. The South African Navy should keep the following considerations in mind when developing a new maritime strategy:
- South Africa’s relative economic health and high-tech infrastructure within an African context
- South Africa’s “island economy” with respect to import and export
- South Africa’s geographic position in terms of its proximity to sea routes and access to Antarctica
- South Africa’s rich offshore resources and their potential for development
- The perennial instability in African countries to the north
- The potential for internal unrest within South Africa itself
- South Africa’s joining the Organization of African Unity (OAU)
- The readmittance of South Africa into the Commonwealth
Judgment on the last two events may be clouded when taking into account the South African Navy’s participation in combined international exercises. World navies that have visited the Republic—including navies from the United States, the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, India, Italy, and a combined fleet from Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay—often have been surprised by the South African Navy’s professional and technical expertise. Sanctions and isolation had caused the South African Navy to become an unknown entity to most countries.
Sanctions were economically and emotionally harmful to South Africa. They did, however, force the country to establish certain strategic defense-related capabilities on a local level, the most famous being the development of nuclear weapons. All these nuclear weapons have been rendered harmless, but a country that demonstrates the technical and scientific expertise required to build such weapons (as well as Rooivalk combat helicopters) also should be able to apply these skills to the naval field. Included in these high- technology maritime capabilities are: the refitting of submarines and the potential to build them; the production of fast-attack craft missiles and combat support ships; tactical and strategic communications equipment and networks; naval combat systems for submarines and surface vessels; weapon systems, electronic warfare systems, and naval ammunition from 20-mm to 76-mm caliber; and the development of sonar and third-generation fuse systems for naval weapons.
South Africa’s pariah status prior to elections had an ironic positive spin-off: The South African Navy was forced to travel great distances to visit its “friends.” In fact, the so-called brown-water navy guided-missile patrol combatants of the Minister class made several blue-water foreign deployments to countries as far away as Chile and Taiwan during its isolation years. These deployments were supported by the combat support ship SAS Drakensburg, which provided replenishment at sea and carried a Transportable Logistic Support Unit for the combatants. These deployments are almost unbelievable considering that the 435-ton guided-missile patrol combatant had to travel such incredible distances across the Atlantic and Indian Ocean and transit the Pacific and South China Sea. A Daphne-class submarine accompanied by three guided-missile patrol combatants and the SAS Drakensburg sailed to Argentina and Uruguay for combined exercises in February and March 1993.
Nonetheless, inherent professionalism and a high level of maritime skills alone are not enough; the South African Navy will have to be relevant in the new South Africa. It must seek its place in the current African and world orders, first acknowledging the following realities:
- South Africa is part of Africa.
- South Africa is poor by First World international standards.
- Current national policies do not place a high priority on defense spending.
- There is no short-term military threat to South Africa.
Despite all this, however, the present government appears to realize the need for a navy, showing a better understanding of maritime requirements than the previous government. The challenge to the South African Navy, therefore, will not be to convince its new masters that a navy is needed, but rather to learn how to allocate resources and funding to the most appropriate requirements without losing existing capabilities. The first priority for the South African Navy is the acquisition program for helicopter-capable patrol corvettes. The Minister- class guided-missile patrol combatants have served the South African Navy well for many years now, but they are not suitable for operations in the notoriously rough South African seas. Besides that, these vessels all were commissioned between 1977 and 1988, and almost all of them have high mileage on both machinery and hulls. The South African Navy’s Daphne-class submarines currently are undergoing extensive combat suite and battery upgrades. But with the first of this class, the SAS Maria Van Riebeeck, delivered in 1971, these too are reaching the end of their useful lives.
In its quest for funding, the South African Navy competes not only with the nation-building RDP but also with the other services. The army has to pay salaries to tens of thousands of former guerrillas who have been incorporated into the South African National Defence Force. The South African Air Force also faces block obsolescence and soon must begin to replace transport, jet trainer, and maritime patrol aircraft, light helicopters, and air-defense systems.
South Africa must maintain its core capabilities to meet minimum peacetime requirements and to maintain the structure and potential resources to expand its forces to a full wartime footing within a predetermined time period. For the South African Navy to remain relevant, it must: become more involved in regional cooperation and assistance; emphasize peacetime missions, including assisting neighboring states; be more available for international peacekeeping or disaster-relief operations; increase its flag-showing diplomatic missions.
The South African Navy has largely adopted NATO standards and procedures, so adaptation to First World-navy methods should not be difficult. Unfortunately, many of the regional states are former Soviet Union clients, and the South African Navy has little background in Soviet standards. The former Soviet client nations who have navies include Angola in the west and Mozambique, Tanzania, and Madagascar in the east. All of these countries are heavily dependent upon the sea, and all are experiencing fishery infringements by foreign nations as well as limited piracy problems. Their navies are in a poor state of repair and require extensive retraining and almost complete re-equipping. Most important in the short term, their coastlines require patrolling.
Namibia, until recently a colony of South Africa, has a very limited fishery patrol capability. The country has shown extreme determination in apprehending and punishing fishery offenders in the past, but it does not have a credible deterrent and requires a genuine naval capability. An agreement exists between South Africa and Namibia to provide mutual assistance in the pursuit of fishery offenders. On one occasion a Minister-class guided-missile patrol combatant, on request of the Namibian government, apprehended and escorted a Spanish trawler to the Namibian port of Luderitz, where the trawler was impounded.
To the north of Tanzania on the east coast, Kenya has a small but well-equipped navy. Their guided-missile patrol combatants of the Nyayo and Mamba class operate Otomat and Gabriel and surface-to-surface missiles. The South African Navy has already paid a diplomatic flag-showing visit to Kenya.
As the South African Navy approaches the 21st century, it stands ready to transform itself into a modem regional navy, capable of fulfilling its missions and assisting the international community. The patrol corvette program will become a reality in early 1996, and upgrades for the submarines and guided-missile patrol combatants also are well advanced.
The South African Navy is far too important an asset to South Africa and to the international community to be allowed to decay and fade into nonexistence. A vacuum in terms of naval power in the region inevitably would result in foreign intervention at some stage; such a possibility should be avoided by African countries and, indeed, the world. The South African Navy—as small as it is—is the only significant navy in Southern Africa capable of being called upon to carry out regional policing or offshore disaster relief duties.
Commander Jamieson is a surface warfare specialist currently serving as the Commanding Officer of the newly upgraded Minister-class strike craft SAS Frederick Creswell, based in Durban, South Africa.