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One of the most vivid and enduring images of the Gulf War is that of Army Patriot missiles streaking skyward (pictured below) to intercept Saddam Hussein’s Scud and Al-Husayn missiles. After the war, there was considerable debate about the Patriot’s effectiveness, but one aspect of the post-war discussions remained clear: the need to improve our ability to defend against hostile theater missiles.
In this era of declining defense budgets, few issues are receiving as much attention as theater missile defense (TMD). At least part of the services’ interest is generated because TMD is one of the very few growth areas in the declining defense budget. But there is good reason for growing TMD budgets: The threat is increasing in virtually every region of U.S. interest.
Theater missile defense is decidedly a joint issue, because enemy missiles pose a significant threat to all components of a joint force. Normally, the Air Force is not threatened by hostile tanks; the Army is rarely concerned about enemy surface or sub-surface naval vessels; and the Navy doesn’t spend much effort monitoring the development of field artillery systems in potentially hostile nations. But all components of a joint force are threatened by hostile theater missiles. All the services monitor this issue closely, and each has its own ideas and capabilities for coping with the increasing theater missile threat. Nevertheless, all forces must harmonize their doctrines, techniques, and systems so that when a joint force commander is confronted by a theater missile threat, the combination of service TMD capabilities will protect the force.
One of the most noticeable aftereffects of the Gulf War was an increased awareness of the threat posed by theater missiles. The threat can be divided into three categories: ballistic missiles; cruise missiles, including remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs) and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs); and air-to-surface guided missiles. Many of these missiles have the potential of carrying weapons of mass destruction.
Thirteen nations outside Europe and North America produce theater ballistic missiles with ranges of more than 300 kilometers. The power and quality of missiles vary greatly—from short- range, unguided free rockets to ballistic missiles with ranges up to 3,000 kilometers.1 Two factors can make this class of weapon much more deadly: the use of nuclear, chemical, or biological warheads and improved terminal guidance for better accuracy' When accuracies close to a 50-meter circular error probable become common (possibly through the use of commercial Global Positioning System data), long-range ballistic missiles will be able to hit specific piers in a port, hangars on an airfield, or buildings on a base. The mere threat of missile use could lead to a substantial diversion of military effort.
Cruise missiles are essentially a guided, unmanned aircraft- They are relatively inexpensive to acquire, and because they can fly close to the surface, cruise missiles make a difficult target for defenders. In addition, the mobility of the cruise missile launch platform compounds the defensive problem. The Army sees cruise missiles as a joint target. Navy, Marine
Corps, or Air Force aircraft can kill hostile cruise-missile-carrying aircraft before they can launch. The Navy is best suited to destroy hostile naval vessels (including submarines) armed with cruise missiles. Land- based Army air-defense systems can engage enemy missile-carrying aircraft or the weapons themselves.
Ground-launched cruise missiles are a challenging target, because the launchers are difficult to find, and cruise missiles have a small launch signature. These weapons do not necessarily follow a predictable trajectory from which an impact or launch point can be extrapolated, and their low-altitude flight paths are not easily seen by radar. The extreme difficulty of finding cruise missile launchers prior to their firing means that we must have effective active defenses.
Most of us consider RPVs/UAVs as reconnaissance platforms, but these systems unquestionably have weapons-delivery capabilities. Although slow, RPVs can take circuitous routes to their objective. Once in the area, they can loiter, while operators with real-time television links to the RPV select a specific target. Thus, armed RPVs have the potential advantage of man- in-the-loop control. Like cruise missiles, the RPV’s ability to fly low makes it a difficult target to locate.
Air-to-surface guided missiles include relatively short-range Weapons for use against point targets—such as ships—to long- range nuclear-capable systems. The mobility, speed, and range °f the aircraft launch platforms complicate the problem for the defender, as shown by the skillful Argentine attacks against the Royal Navy in the Falklands and surprise Iraqi strikes against oil tankers in the Persian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq War. How- fiver, if an adequate detection system is available, the aircraft launch platform can be located and destroyed before launch. For example, the extensive Allied airborne early-warning capabilities during the 1991 Gulf War would have made airborne Iraqi missile strikes much more difficult to execute successfully than surface-launched ballistic missile attacks. Nevertheless, air-launched systems pose a serious challenge to defenders.
In a future war scenario, U.S. forces could be deploying into one or two relatively austere lodgment areas—a far different situation than in Cold War Europe, where a massive logistics infrastructure was available and extensive air-defense systems Were in place. A future lodgment area might have only one or two ports or airfields—ideal high-value targets for enemy theater missiles. Ships participating in the deployment would be vulnerable until enemy air- and surface-launched missile systems are suppressed. Although one component of a U.S. joint force may predominate, this is a joint problem. All the capabilities of the joint force may be required to defeat the theater missile threat, and each component brings different systems to defeat enemy theater missiles.
There are four elements, or pillars, of TMD recognized by the services and codified in joint doctrine: passive defense, active defense, attack operations, and battle management/com- mand, control, communications, and intelligence (BM/C3I).2
Passive defense refers to those measures designed to reduce the odds of suffering damage from theater missile attacks and to enhance the ability to recover from damaging hits. Potentially, effective passive defense can negate the enemy’s ability to target our forces successfully. Passive defense includes: timely tactical warning; deception measures such as decoys, camou-
Proliferation of theater ballistic missiles has become a worldwide dilemma. The power and quality of missiles vary greatly, but the lesson is clear: The U.S. armed forces must be prepared to defend against this threat.
tlage, and concealment; operational security to complicate the enemy’s targeting; hardening of key assets; dispersal; and preparations for recovery and reconstitution following enemy strikes. These aspects of passive defense apply to friendly military forces and also can apply to such potential friendly civilian targets as factories, population centers, airports, ports, power stations, and other important facilities. Preparation for nuclear, biological, and chemical strikes also must be part of passive defense preparations.
Active defense means shooting down enemy missiles in flight. It is particularly important during initial lodgment operations, when a few ports and airfields will be lucrative targets for hostile missiles. If we are unable to control the battlespace in and around the lodgment, we face an early loss of initiative. The entire operation could fail if hostile theater missile systems overwhelm our defenses and make the lodgment area untenable. The Navy s ability to perform TMD over lodgement areas could be critical. Once land forces begin to maneuver out of the initial lodgment area(s), the active defense battlespace will expand dramatically. Our holding the initiative will be at risk if we can not protect our maneuvering land forces and their supporting bases. The depth of maneuver and tempo of operations of Army and Marine forces ashore may be so great that only organic active defense systems that travel with land forces will be adequate to protect them.
The Army envisions a two-tier active-defense system. Upper- tier defense engages enemy ballistic missiles at long range and high altitude. Currently, no service has an upper-tier engagement capability, although the Army and Navy are both hard at work. The Army system being developed for this role is the Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system. THAAD consists of two separate but closely related programs:
In its execution of theater missile defense, the Army conducts attack operations to locate and strike enemy missile launchers and support facilities. Army offensive TMD assets include the Army tactical missile system, special operations forces, and attack helicopters—such as the new Apache D, here with the Longbow targeting radar system, firing a Hellfire missile.
the THAAD weapon system and the Theater
Missile Defense/Ground-Based Radar (TMD-GBR). _________ ,
The THAAD missile will be a hit-to-kill system, as opposed to a fuzed high-explosive warhead that explodes near an approaching enemy missile. A hit-to-kill, kinetic-energy missile such as THAAD has a better chance of destroying a nuclear- or chemical-tipped enemy warhead. Terminal guidance of the THAAD missile will be from an on-board infrared seeker. The TMD-GBR will be a trailer-mounted, phased-array radar capable of providing targeting for THAAD as well as theaterwide surveillance. TMD-GBR will have sophisticated target discrimination and classification capabilities and will provide in-flight corrections to the missile. THAAD will be deployed beginning about 2001.
Lower-tier systems, such as Patriot, are designed to complement the upper tier by engaging any enemy missiles that “leak” past upper-tier engagement. It should be remembered, however, that the lower-tier capabilities came first. Patriot is here now; THAAD is a future system. Significant improvements to the Army’s Patriot are under way. The next version of Patriot, the PAC-3, will be fielded in 1998 and will increase by tenfold PAC-2’s coverage area.3
The Army is also designing the Corps Surface-to-Air Missile (Corps SAM) system to provide a highly mobile lower- tier system that can move with land forces and engage short- range theater missiles, very-low-altitude cruise missiles, and RPVs/UAVs. The Army intends to field the Corps SAM in 2005-2007.
Successful attack operations would obviate the need for passive and active defense and are intended to locate and strike enemy missile launchers, support facilities, and command- and-control systems—ideally, prior to an enemy missile launch. Since locating enemy transporter-erector-launchers (TELs) is a difficult task, strikes against them probably will occur after a missile launch has taken place. Effective attack operations will reduce the number of enemy launchers and ease the burden for active defense; however, attack operations probably never will be able to strike all TELs before launch.
The Army has formidable capabilities for conducting attack operations. For instance, the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) provides the ground commander with an advanced, non-nuclear long-range missile and munitions to attack multiple targets, including surface-to-surface missiles and infrastructure. ATACMS is fired from the M270 tracked launcher that is also used to deliver the 40-kilometer-range multiple launch rocket. Key munitions for the ATACMS are antiper- sonnel/antimateriel (APAM) submunitions, or the BAT brilliant antiarmor submunition, which has acoustic and infrared sensors. ATACMS Block I is armed with approximately 950 APAM submunitions and is employed against small point targets. When armed with 13 BAT submunitions, ATACMS Block II will be capable of engaging moving, armored targets—or moving TELs. From the time a target is detected, ATACMS can strike the enemy in less than ten minutes, including flight time. Although not originally designed for TMD attack operations, ATACMS can make a significant contribution to that mission. In 1998, a product-improved version of ATACMS (ATACMS
Block 1A) will be fielded that incorporates the Global Positioning System, a lighter payload of 275 APAM submunitions, and a range approximately twice that of the current version.
Army attack helicopters are another attack operation asset. For instance, with its high speed and superb night-fighting ability, the AH-64 Apache attack helicopter has a formidable ability to locate and destroy an opponent’s missile systems. Armed with 16 Hellfire missiles, an Apache can strike targets more than 200 kilometers away. Its ability to use masking terrain to approach the enemy at very low altitude is also a great strength of the system. With their quality on-board sensors, attack helicopters are particularly effective against mobile TELs, which present an extremely difficult challenge because of the short time they dwell at the firing location. The Army’s new armed reconnaissance helicopter, the RAH-66 Comanche, will enter the force by 2006, assuming funding is available. With a mission radius of more than 200 nautical miles, the Comanche will complement the Apache attack fleet. In addition, beginning in 1996, 227 Apaches will be modified to the D model, which will include the formidable Longbow targeting radar system. This system will give Apache—and later about one third of the Comanche fleet—a fire-and-forget capability for their Hellfire missiles. With their long range, excellent night-fighting and target-acquisition capabilities, and ability to loiter in the target area to search for hostile missile launchers, these Army helicopters make an important addition to the attack options of the joint force.4
The Gulf War illustrated the effective use of Army special operations forces (SOF) by U.S. and Coalition forces. Like Navy SEALs, Army SOF can locate missile launchers, support facilities, missile storage sites, and command-and-control elements. Depending on the situation, SOF units could monitor or take direct action against key enemy theater missile systems or infrastructure.
Battle management/command, control, communications, and intelligence (BM/C3I) is required to integrate the entire TMD effort. The challenge is for all components in a joint force to have C3I systems that will facilitate passing intelligence in real time, rapid exchange of hostile launch warning, quick assignment of attack missions among the component, and accurate post-strike assessments.
The most challenging part of TMD is the identification and location of mobile theater missile systems, which blend in among moving vehicles, radios, and radar emitters on the battlefield. Therefore, intelligence support of TMD must begin, if possible, prior to hostilities to analyze the battle area and to predict possible enemy missile launch areas. The Army calls this analysis process Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield. When hostilities begin. Army analysts will focus reconnaissance capabilities on key search areas, called Named Areas of Interest. Signal intelligence, special operations forces, and airborne sensors will search for clues that enemy missile activity is imminent.
Future Army BM/C3I will include the following:
► The All-Source Analysis System (ASAS) is an automated tactical intelligence fusion system that allows Army commanders to access national, joint, and multinational intelligence data bases and to have a common view of the battlefield. The first version of the system has been fielded to the 82nd Airborne Division.
* The ground station module (GSM) is the Army’s portion of the Army-Air Force Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (J-STARS). GSMs will be deployed at division level and higher to give commanders real-time access to J-STARS data. ^ The joint tactical ground station (JTAGS) will provide direct downlinks from national space-based sensors and supply all components in a joint force with real-time launch warning and cuing information. JTAGS is being funded jointly by the Army and Navy.
^ The Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS) will be a high-speed, near-real-time data-communication system that will transmit warning, alerting, cuing information, and engagement operations data. It will be for air-to-ground and ground-to-ground use. The Army has embedded JTIDS requirements in the Patriot, JTAGS, THAAD, and Corps SAM Programs.
Theater missile defense is a joint mission. Army ATACMS and attack helicopters; Navy and Marine aircraft, guns, and mis- sdes; and Air Force aircraft all contribute to attack operations. Similarly, Army land-based missiles and Navy Aegis ships Provide active defense. To optimize the active-defense and attack-operations potential of each service’s systems, joint BM/C-B ,s essential. The contentious issue will likely be command and control of TMD—specifically, whether to centralize or to decentralize.
Organic self-defense capabilities are essential. Army and Marine forces will maneuver rapidly within their areas of operations. Whenever there is a threat of hostile theater missiles, land maneuver forces must have the capability to engage incoming missiles with organic assets. This applies to low-altitude cruise missiles, RPVs/UAVs, and ballistic missiles. The area air defense commander must provide guidance, rules of engagement, and coordination for the theater active defense effort. However, control can not be centralized during time-crit- ■cal execution operations.
A key consideration in attack operations can be timeliness. For instance, an enemy tank battalion that is located 50 kilometers in the enemy’s rear may not be an immediate threat, because there is time available to decide which component(s) can best strike the target. But that is not so with hostile theater missiles, particularly the TELs themselves. Minutes count when a TEL is identified during its launch-preparation cycle, and in this case, decentralized execution is mandatory. The Joint Force Commander should already have given all component commanders guidance on priority TMD targets, rules of engagement—to include criteria for avoiding fratricide and collateral damage—and specific coordination requirements, once a target is identified.
Depending on the situation, the Joint Force Commander has a number of ways to control and coordinate attack operations. He can centralize control or make arrangements for decentralized attack operations by the components. It should be remembered that during the Gulf War, centralized control of attack operations performed primarily by aircraft was unsuccessful, because it was too slow. Enemy TELs moved too quickly. In the future, if we are to engage enemy missile systems successfully, before or after launch, procedures must be established within the joint force to allow for rapid engagement of the threat.
We must ensure the protection of our forces, along with those of our friends and allies and such critical locations as population centers. The theater missile threat is increasing around the world, and for us to defeat this threat, the four elements of TMD passive defense, active defense, attack operations, and BM/C-H—must be integrated successfully. As all the services strive to enhance TMD systems, we must do so in a way that maximizes the ability of joint forces to protect themselves from this threat. This will require close coordination of the TMD efforts of all the services. This is very much joint business.
1Ballistic Missile Proliferation—An Emerging Threat, Arlington: Systems Planning Corporation, 1992, pp. 12, 22-29.
’“Joint doctrine on Theater Missile Defense," Joint Publication 3-01.5, describes “passive defense,” “active defense,” “attack operations,” and “BM/C3I” as being the major elements of TMD.
’1993 Report to Congress on the Theater Missile Defense Initiative, Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, Department of Defense, Washington, D.C., pp. A5-A6. J"Army Weaponry and Equipment,” Army 1993-94 Green Book, pp 270-272 274280. 293-301.”
Lieutenant Colonel Gordon is assigned to the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans at Headquarters, Department of the Army, in the Pentagon. He is a member of the Concepts, Doctrine, and Force Policy Division.
The Northeast Asia Nuclear Threat
Continued stability in Northeast Asia depends on a committed U.S. presence and the deployment of a regional theater missile defense system.
Commander Jonathan Sears, U.S. Navy
Today’s strategic security environment is a product of pivotal changes in regional security, global economics, and domestic and international politics. Conflict between nations occurs on both an economic and military level—where dominance on the “battlefield” can be gauged in terms of gross domestic product, the renewal of most-favored-nation status, currency devaluations, and missile payload and throw weight. This transformed relationship is exacerbated by emerging ethnic, ideological, and cultural diversity—where political uncertainty and economic stability coexist collectively. In addition, an acrimonious bipolar relationship involving the former Soviet Union has been supplanted by a multipolarity of rogue powers, which threatens the stability of a global security framework centered around the United States.
The stability of Northeast Asia is being shaken by these rogue powers. Emerging conflicts could lead to a heightening of hostilities, which eventually could involve either a conventional or nuclear exchange through ballistic missile attacks. As a result of its defensive treaty commitments to South Korea and Japan, the United States has a leading role in providing for the secu-