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The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 has forced the military into the joint operations arena. Interservice cooptation is paramount; promotion to flag and general officer billets requires joint experience. Air Force officers n°w exercise command authority over submarines, and Marine commanders have controlled naval operations from command ships at sea. In this environment of joint operations, combining the three Department of Defense service academies into the U.S. Defense Academy (USDA) ls a sensible option.
Many traditionalists feel that it would be impossible for (he three services to study side by side, but cadets at The Citadel, the Virginia Military Institute, Texas A&M, and Norwich University have been doing it for years. Indeed, ■a this era of joint operations and budget reductions, it jftakes even more sense to train at least some of our military officers together, building a cadre of officers trained 'n joint operations from day one. Consolidation also Would allow us to conduct a bottom-up review of all Programs at the academies, drawing from the best each has to offer.
Further study would have to be done to determine Proceedings /July 1995
which current academy site would host the combined service academy, but the best initial choice is the Military Academy at West Point. It is not as large as the Air Force Academy, but it offers access to a navigable waterway that would be important to training cadets choosing a naval commission. The Naval Academy is small in comparison to the other two, but acquisition and use of the facilities at Naval Station Annapolis across the Severn River could make it a viable location.
The size of the student body would remain at approximately 4,000 cadets. Services would recruit their own candidates for matriculation, but some movement among services could be expected once students begin their courses of study. Assuming 1,333 cadets in each branch of the service, the remaining officers required by each service would be educated in the ROTC program.
The Defense Academy’s organization would be basic. The Corps of Cadets would all wear the same uniform of the USDA, perhaps with a special insignia to denote branch of service. The Corps would be organized into battalion and company level units, with a cadet’s chosen service having no impact on his or her position within the Corps. Honor, performance, and conduct systems would remain.
Table 1: Professional and Joint Education Requirements for USDA Cadets
| Professional | Joint |
Fourth Class | ||
Fall | Leadership and Military Fundamentals | Strategy and Policy 1 |
Spring | Service course | Strategy and Policy II |
Third Class | ||
Fall | Service course | Joint Military Operations |
Spring | Service course | Joint Professional |
Second Class | ||
Fall | Service course | National Security Decision Making |
Spring | Advanced Leadership | Joint Professional |
First Class | ||
Fall | Service course | Joint Professional |
Spring | Service course | Law of Armed Conflict |
Table 2: Modular Summer Training Matrix for USDA Cadets
June
July
August
Fourth-Class | New class | Plebe Summer | Army Week |
Summer | reports in July | Indoctrination | Navy Week Air Force Week USMC Week |
Third-Class Summer | Joint Professional | Leave | Service Training |
| Training | Plebe Summer | (General) |
Second-Class Summer | Service Training | Leave | Joint Professional |
| (Specific) | Plebe Summer | Training |
First-Class Summer | Service Training | Leave | "3rd Lieutenant' Training in |
| (Specific) | Plebe Summer | Operational Units |
The athletic program would be scaled down, playing in Division 1-AA or Division III (where the U.S. Coast Guard Academy competes with success). The emphasis on bigtime athletics that threatens to destroy the academies would end, and the Army-Navy football game would be reduced to an intramural flag football event one fall afternoon.
The position of Superintendent (0-8) would rotate among the Air Force, Army, and Navy; the Commandant (0-6) always would be a Marine Corps colonel. The positions of Academic Dean (0-6/0-7) and Director of Professional Education (0-6) would be held by the two services not occupying the position of Superintendent. Within the Department of Professional Education, each service would have a component commander (0-5) in charge of the service-specific division (e.g., the Division of Aerospace Studies). An equal mix among the other officers would be maintained, and civilian faculty would be welcome. Company/tactical officer positions would be eliminated to provide the Corps of Cadets additional leadership opportunities. Officers from the Department of Professional Education would be assigned as advisors to the cadet company commanders, similar to the arrangement at The Citadel and Virginia Military Institute.
Academic programs would not change radically. Despite a call by some for a back-to-basics approach, reversion to a “lock-step” curriculum is neither required nor desired. The academic majors program would continue, emphasizing engineering disciplines.
The guiding principle behind the academic program would change. Rather than structuring a program based on academic accreditation standards, the USDA would stress the professional education of the officer candidates. If accreditation standards also could be met, all the better, but professional education would be the priority. The mission is to create professional officers who justify the Academy’s cost; USDA graduates would have to be clearly superior officers.
Each semester, every student would be required to take two “professional” courses (see Table 1), one of which would be joint. Professional courses would expose the officer candidate to instruction in his or her own service, while joint courses would concentrate on other services and joint matters. The core joint courses—Strategy and Policy, Joint Military Operations, and National Security Decision Making—could be based on three similar courses now at the Naval War College. These courses could be scaled down to the undergraduate level and designed to meet the objectives of Joint Professional Mil<" tary Education required in Goldwater- Nichols. Currently, similar courses (Structuring Operational Forces, Operational Decision Making, and Military Strategy) are taught in the Military Instruction Department at West Point.' The joint professional elective would be chosen from the professional courses of another service.
Summer training also would be restructured to support joint objectives (Table 2). From a week of exposure to each service during plebe summer (similar to the Professional Training of Midshipmen at the Naval Academy) to joint professional training (a cadet attends the same general service training that a classmate who selects that service completes), USDA would focus on educating the whole military officer. Summer training with units in other services is not a new concept; summer exchanges between Naval Academy and West Point students were routine in the World War II era.
Advantages
Using the data from the Congressional Budget Office study, an annual savings of $267,376,750 (see Tables 3 and 4) could be realized by combining
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Proceedings/July 199?
Table 3: DoD Average Cost per Graduate in 1989'
___________ Army_______ Navy______ Air Force
Academy $229,000 $153,000 $225,000
ROTC $55,000 $53,000 $58,000
OCS $15,000 $20,000 $18,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Table 4: Projected Annual Savings (in 1989 dollars) With Proposed U.S. Defense Academy | ||||
| Army | Navy | Air Force | Total |
Proposed USDA3 | $76,314,250 | $76,314,250 | $76,314,250 | $228,942,750 |
Balance of required officers through ROTC4 | $36,671,250 | $35,337,750 | $38,671,500 | $110,680,500 |
Total cost under new proposal | $112,985,500 | $111,652,000 | $114,985,750 | $339,623,250 |
Current cost to educate academy graduates | $229,000,000 | $153,000,000 | $225,000,000 | $607,000,000 |
Savings | $116,014,500 | $41,348,000 | $110,014,250 | $267,376,750 |
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'West Point: Leadership for a Changing World, 19931994 U.S. Military Academy Catalogue (West Point, NY: U.S. Military Academy, 1993), pp. 102-103. •Congressional Budget Office, Officer Commissioning Programs: Costs and Officer Performance (Washington: Congressional Budget Office, June 1990), p. 6. 'Determined by multiplying 1,333 officers by the cost per graduate at West Point divided by four (the num-
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the service academies. The savings could be greater if the number of required officers continues to decline. Another advantage is a cadre of well-trained, professionally educated officers who are more knowledgeable in joint operations and more qualified to command operational units than their service academy predecessors. Third, con-
solidation will give the leaders of today’s armed forces an opportunity to make an honest and detailed appraisal of the service academies and retain only those qualities and programs that are the best that they can be.
The Department of Defense cannot continue to support the service academies in their current form. In 2000, when the classes of 1997 fail to augment in significantly larger percentages than their peers from ROTC and Officer’s Candidate School, Congress will begin to examine the academies even more closely. DoD should act now to prevent Congress from mandating the future of the officer corps in the 21st century.
her of years each student spends at the academy). 'Determined by multiplying the remaining officers—2,667—not educated at the academies by the cost per ROTC graduate.
Lieutenant Haraden, a surface warfare officer, recently left active duty. A 1988 graduate of The Citadel, his last assignment was as an instructor in the Department of Seamanship and Navigation at the U.S. Naval Academy.
Deadline: 1 August 1995
INTERNATIONAL NAVIES PHOTO CONTEST
Rules:
1. Images must pertain to naval or maritime subjects of countries other than the United States.
2. There is a limit of five (5) entries per person. Eligible entries include black-and-white prints, color prints, or 35-mm mounted color transparencies (glass-mounted transparencies are not eligible). The minimum print size accepted is 8" x 10".
3. The Naval Institute will award cash prizes of $200 to the winner, two first honorable mention awards of $100 each, and two second honorable mention awards of $50 each. Winning entries will appear in the 1996 International Navies issue of Proceedings. The Naval Institute will consider all other entries for purchase (at our standard rates) for use in U.S. Naval Institute publications. Any entry not accompanied by a self-addressed, stamped envelope or international postal coupon will become the property of the U.S.
Naval Institute without the necessity of purchase.
4. On a separate sheet of paper and attached to the back of each print or on the transparency mount, print or type full captions and the photographer's name, address, social security number (if applicable), and date the photo was taken. Entries are not limited to photos taken in the calendar year of the contest. (Please do not write directly on the back of a print and do not use staples.)
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Proceedings / July 1995