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If a rogue state were to launch a nuclear weapon against U.S. forces, how would the United States react? Without a firm and explicit policy— such as retaliation and overwhelming destruction—we forfeit deterrence and will be forced to negotiate from a position of weakness if threatened.
Wayne Tunick
Today, the threat of nuclear annihilation has virtually disappeared. Russia still can launch a devastating nuclear attack, but this does not seem likely. In the wake of the Cold War, the emerging threat is the proliferation of nuclear weapons by rogue states. What policy can the United States implement to deter these states from using weapons of mass destruction against deployed forces?
Currently, there is no clear, concise, and published policy. If Iraq were to launch a small nuclear weapon against U.S. forces, how would the United States respond? Retaliate with nuclear weapons? Respond with massive conventional attacks? Ignore the nuclear attack and press on with conventional forces? The answer is unclear, and that is precisely the problem.
An ambiguous nuclear policy, combined with the current trend toward defensive systems, may seduce rogue states into seeing only the potential benefits of nuclear weapons. If a despot launches a nuclear, chemical, or biological attack, the United States will be faced with a complex decision. Clearly, the result of this decision must be framed in established policy now, not developed in the middle of a crisis situation.
The United States compensates for this dearth of distinct policy by spending large sums of money searching for the “mother of all defenses.” Developing a defensive system will be costly, and it is doubtful that one can be developed to cover every contingency. Theater ballistic-missile defense may (it doesn’t yet exist) protect against limited ballistic-missile attack, but what happens when nuclear-tipped cruise missiles become abundant? What if a weapon is launched against an ally or before assets are on station? A purely defensive system treats only the symptoms of the problem and ignores the cause. We should continue to develop defensive systems, but we must acknowledge their limitations and realize that they are no substitute for a deterrence policy.
A legitimate policy can be derived from one of the proved successes of the Cold War. Mutually assured destruction (MAD) provided the ultimate level of deterrence because it raised the cost side of the cost-benefit equation to infinity and reduced the benefit side to zero. In a post-Cold War scenario, MAD is not a valid strategy against a rogue state, but the idea that the threat of assured destruction can deter is still valid.
The United States has the power to destroy a rogue state by conventional or nuclear means. This destruction can range from the removal of institutions and capabilities that define a state (e.g., utilities, government, transportation, and military) to physical annihilation. Our overwhelming nuclear and conventional capabilities must be harnessed into a new post-Cold War policy: retaliation and overwhelming destruction (ROD).
ROD requires the United States to state publicly that any use of nuclear weapons against U.S. forces will be met by destruction of the aggressor regime, state, or both. Retaliation could be conventional or nuclear, but it would not necessarily be limited to military targets (as has been the trend with the advent of precision-guided munitions). It would be designed to inflict maximum punishment. This may sound draconian, but we are talking about a response to a nuclear attack on U.S. forces!
The benefits of ROD are clear:
► The main idea of ROD is deterrence. Deterrence worked for 40 years in the Cold War—it can work again. The current absence of policy creates a vacuum in which aggressors could believe they might benefit from the use of nuclear weapons or the threat to use them. For example, if North Korea threatens the use of nuclear weapons against Seoul, the United States would be forced to negotiate—again. If Iran threatens nuclear attacks against Saudi ports, the United States would have to change its strategy to compensate. We must remove this powerful tool from the hands of potential aggressors or we will be doomed to negotiate or compensate from an inferior position.
> ROD does not have to keep pace with weapons technology. It deters all types of nuclear attacks, regardless of the means of
delivery. In addition, the policy could be expanded to include the deterrence of chemical and biological attack (especially significant because the United States has no offensive chemical or biological capability).
>■ ROD would be relatively low cost. Nuclear and conventional weapons already in the inventory could put the necessary teeth in the policy.
The main disadvantage of ROD is the prospect of civilian casualties, for the intent is not to kill innocent people but to deter the use of these weapons against our own forces. If a rogue state does launch a nuclear attack against our forces, then the policy has failed. It may only deter for 5 or 10 years before someone tests it—or perhaps it will last for 40 or 50 years. Certainly, the protection it provides U.S. forces is worth the limited risk.
ROD would be only an interim measure, but until another policy is found, it could provide critical deterrence needed by forces involved in regional conflicts. Those who believe current policy is essentially the same as ROD are mistaken. If current policy does incorporate similarities, it is rendered useless as a deterrent by its shroud of secrecy. A successful policy must communicate U.S. will explicitly to those it is designed to deter.
As the sole superpower, the United States must police the world. A prerequisite of this responsibility is that the United States cannot be held hostage, either economically or militarily, to proliferators. The United States must begin a high-priority effort to develop a comprehensive policy that includes deterrence as a major element and provides direction in the post-Cold War world. Without deterrence, the United States will be forced to deal from a position of weakness, rather than strength, when facing nuclear aggressors.
Lieutenant Commander Wayne Tunick currently is a Navy Federal Executive Fellow at RAND.
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Proceedings / April 1995