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Webster’s defines leadership as: the quality of a leader; capacity to lead. This definition does not include - F°° anY hints as to who is qualified to lead or how one goes are di about getting to a position of leadership. Junior officers Centc look to their commanding officer and admire the dedica- ifale tion, perseverance, and sacrifices he or she made to as- •S we' sutne command at sea, the goal of every naval officer. 1 jum! “onus-command, the stepping stone to flag rank, requires :arrif even more personal sacrifices and dedication to one’s impf1 Occupation. As a naval flight officer in the E-2C airborne early warning community, if I am able to clear the Aero’ hurdles, and make the sacrifices required of a carrier air servi1 w'ng commander (CAG), then that opportunity should be t ev£ bailable. If the Navy closes that avenue, then the Navy derW" may not jje choosing its leaders correctly, a shjf Within an air wing, no other community places so many Is vvi1 demands upon aircrews—regardless of rank—than does it Be jhe E-2C’s. The world political climate has brought over- and power projection strikes to the forefront of carrier significant increase in radio transmissions. Furthermore, current element leads and strike leaders face some of these same difficulties. Regardless of the size of the strike package, the strike leader will always have trouble maintaining visual contact on every aircraft in his package.
Once the package has pushed off from an initial rendezvous, each element is strictly focusing on accomplishing its particular mission. Who is looking at every facet of the strike? The E-2C crew. Hopefully, the E-2 squadron has the support of the CAG to be designated a no-go criteria. The E-2’s radar is by no means a perfect system and was never designed to provide overland detection, but some operators can squeeze water out of a rock.
If the strike lead is in the fighter sweep or even attached to the strike package, what happens if his strike encounters even one enemy fighter or the impending threat of a surface-to-air missile launch? The lead has to devote
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mtion. As a junior officer, I will be tasked to provide a ^mand, control, communications, and intelligence to ,hStr!ke package of more than 20 aircraft. It is arguable ty, 11 >s difficult to look at an E-2’s radar and determine an element is joined, ready to proceed inbound, or te h- £r a delay ‘s needed. This information, however, is d'ly available to the E-2 mission commander with no
all of his efforts to eliminating that particular threat. (Can he keep track of the remaining aircraft ? Maybe, but it would be extremely difficult.) Who has the big picture? Once again ... the E-2.
What professional training does an E-2 naval flight officer receive? There are three major carrier aviation graduate-level schools: Naval Fighter Weapons School (Top-
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Naval Aviation
Gun), Naval Strike Warfare Center (Strike U.), and Carrier Airborne Early Warning Weapons School (CAEWWS). Does either the A-6 or EA-6B community send its aircrew to TopGun to learn air combat maneuvering? No. Does any community send its officers to CAEWWS to learn basic command and control issues? No—specific graduate-level command and control topics
by ensuring the first two factors, it can enable the strife package to arrive at a position so it can put the bomb on target, on time.
To make the management equation even more complex how are outside assets employed to support an air wins operation? Given the current world political climate, mo< military analysts do not envision a U.S. military campaig1 in which one branch of the service operate- independently of the others. Additionally, one . time strikes during contingency operations are for better or worse, being executed as a join '
operation. The E-2 squadron in the air win!
Thi;
is uniquely qualified to lead efforts to incot 0n porate the AEGIS cruiser, non-air wing nave ,/!e ^
aircraft such as the EP-3, and various U.S. A'1 Force command, control, communications, an1 intelligence platforms into every phase of' strike.
To be able to integrate all of these assets E-2 aircrews spend several days on board t*1 Aegis cruiser to observe the combat direct^ center and LINK-11 operations. How man,' other communities do the same? E-2 squadron1 thatl regularly conduct personnel exchanges wtf carry aircrews from the Air Force’s E-3 airborn1 warning and control system (AWACS) an1 scree RC-135 Rivet Joint aircraft. To incorpora11 hyth
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these aircraft as support to air wing operations
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are not taught outside of the E-2 community. E-2 aircrews regularly attend all three schools.
Although each carrier air wing (except CVW-5) trains regularly at Strike U. at Naval Air Station Fallon, Nevada, who attends the classroom lectures? Only the senior officers, commanding officers, executive officers, and senior department heads, who are currently our strike leaders. Is the Navy, efficiently training its leaders if it takes approximately 12 years to be a strike lead?
If the E-2 mission commander is the strike lead, will he know specifically how long it takes a Hornet to perform a Hornet high-pop to a visual delivery or even the time of flight of a HARM launched 20 nautical miles from its target? Without a doubt the answer is “No”; but the current system does not require him to have that knowledge. Conversely, current strike leaders do not know everything about the E-2 nor are they expected to—but do they have adequate situational awareness during all phases of the strike to ensure success?
With a strike package proceeding along its planned route, what are some of the most critical functions that a strike leader must perform? He must ensure the discipline and safety of the entire package, dissemination of realtime critical tactical information, and, ultimately, get the bombs on target. The E-2 cannot put bombs on target, but
the air wing commander is availing himself0 tra'n extremely capable force multipliers. If an $ ^ 1 wing does not know the way to use these & |e^ sets, it may experience losses that could ha'1' Corde.' been prevented. I Grun
Although the fighter community practice rect0] defensive air combat tactics against many °Pme ferent kinds of fighters from just about as many differs1' T-l^ countries, does this qualify them to lead a strike? PosS'' °°mr
. . . . t*o
bly, but just as the fighter is performing his tactics, $ *°rC( -- - - *-* /\vi
controller in the E-2 is watching the tactics of both friendly and hostile aircraft and must be just as knov' edgeable as the fighter pilot about the expected enefl1- tactics, weapons parameters, and various other concef sign& grouped into situational awareness to control the engage irig aj ment to a successful conclusion. *988
When the air wing is operating in sensitive or restricts U$. ( airspace, it is the E-2 that gets airborne first—and is °°ke
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last to recover at the end of the day. If the air wing ^°r|c
operating in sensitive air space, the burden is on ea( E-2C crew member to know every detail of the rulesf engagement better than any other aircrew in the air wi^ Knowledge does not equate directly with leadershif but for a leader, knowledge is essential. Considering ^
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complexities of carrier aviation, the E-2 community ^ it
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" 1 Lieutenant Morgan is an E-2C mission commander with VAW-115. f Pie, ]j
* "aft,
officers with the requisite knowledge to be strike 1^ ers—and even CAGs.
manently forward-deployed at the Naval Air Facility Atsugi, Japan has orders to VAW-110, the West Coast E-2 Fleet Readiness Squatfe at Naval Air Station Miramar, San Diego, California.
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Proceedings / September
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