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The issue of embarking Marine assault forces in large-deck carriers is now being debated in Norfolk, Little Creek, Quantico, and Washington, D.C., and on board U.S. naval ships in the Mediterranean. So far, the indications are not promising.
Marines have served on U.S. aircraft carriers since the late 1920s, when the first large carriers went to sea the Lexington (CV-2) and the Saratoga (CV-3). Marine detachments were put on board these ships—like battleships—to provide
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a security force, man secondary gun batteries, and serve as the core of a landing force. From November 1931 until November 1934, Marine scouting squadron VS-15M flew from the Lexington and VS-14M from the Saratoga. Marines— other than ships’ detachments—were not assigned to carriers until late 1944, when the threat of Japanese kamikaze attacks led to Marine F4U Corsairs being put on board the Navy’s fast carriers. (Shortly thereafter, four all-Marine air groups were organized to fly from escort or “jeep” carriers.)
After World War II, Marine squadrons
periodically flew from carriers for brief periods. After the Miday (CV-41) was homeported in Japan in 1973, the Marines provided RF-4B Phantom reconnaissance aircraft for the carrier’s air wing. From the 1970s, Marine electronic warfare aircraft flew from carriers to make up for the Navy’s shortfall in EA-6B Prowlers.
The deliveries of the AV-8A Harrier to the Marine Corps in 1971 and the F/A-18 Hornet to Navy and Marine combat squadrons a decade later led to Ma-
rine squadrons flying periodically from large-deck carriers. On 13 January 1992, the Secretary of the Navy directed that the Navy and Marine Corps more closely integrate Marine tactical aviation into carrier air wings. The memorandum directed that the Navy and Marine Corps “undertake innovative measures to enhance the efficiency of naval aviation through closer integration,” especially of Marine fighter- attack (VMFA) and electronic warfare (VMAQ) squadrons, to reduce naval aircraft requirements by at least 140 planes in those categories.
Thus, Marine aviation has become a
familiar sight on the Navy’s large-deck carriers.
Then, in 1992, the U.S. Atlantic Command began looking into the feasibility of putting Marine ground combat troops on board large-deck carriers. The rationale for the move reportedly was:
► To better justify large-deck earners by giving them an assault capability
>■ To provide more fleet flexibility by being able to rapidly embark a Marine assault force in a carrier
► To provide an assault capability in an
Sharing a flight deck is not as easy as it looks, as these Marines and the 5,000 Navy men on board the Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71) are learning.
area without deploying an amphibious ready group, i.e., three to five amphibious ships with a Marine expeditionary unit (MEU) of some 2,000 Marines embarked
Accordingly, in mid-January, just more than 500 Marines embarked in the large-deck carrier Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71) for a month of at-sea training
Squadron | Aircraft |
VF-84 | F-14A Tomcat |
VFA-15 | F/A-18C Hornet |
VFA-87 | F/A-18C Hornet |
VMFA-312 | F/A-18C Hornet |
VA-36 | A-6E Intruder KA-6D Intruder |
VAW-124 | E-2C Hawkeye |
VAQ-141 | EA-6B Prowler |
HS-3 | HH-60F Seahawk HH-60H Seahawk |
SPMAGTF Squadrons: | |
HMH-362 | CH-53D Sea Stallion |
HMLA-167 | UH-1N Huey |
and workup. Designated as a special purpose Marine air-ground task force (SPMAGTF), the Marines consist of a rifle company (190 men) of Company I, 3rd Battalion, 6th Marines; a command staff and various detachments, including an 18-man reconnaissance platoon; and a heavy helicopter squadron (HMH-362) with a component from a utility and attack helicopter squadron (HMLA-167). They total 538 Marines, including 227 aviation personnel.
Following the month-long workup, on 11 March 1993, the Theodore Roosevelt battle group departed Norfolk, steaming for the Mediterranean and a six-month forward deployment as a component of the Sixth Fleet. On board the Theodore Roosevelt is Carrier Air Wing Eight, with the following squadrons:
Missing from Carrier Air Wing Eight is Air Antisubmarine Squadron (VS) 24, the wing’s S-3B Viking unit, which was left ashore to make room for the Marine helicopters. Similarly, the inclusion of the Marine F/A-18 squadron caused Navy Fighter Squadron (VF) 41 also to be left on the beach with its F-14s. The Vikings are of particular concern to some Navy planners because of their antisubmarine prowess, and also their effectiveness for general surveillance and their value as tankers for extending the range of the Hornets. The two latter roles could be of particular importance as the Theodore Roosevelt operates in the Adriatic Sea, supporting the efforts to stop the racial fighting in the former Yugoslavia.
Although the Atlantic Command had at one point envisioned the Theodore Roosevelt with embarked Marines as a substitute for an amphibious ready group (ARG), in fact, an ARG with a MEU embarked also is deployed in the Med.
The Navy and Marine Corps are seeking new means to “prepare the naval service for the 21st century,” and the deployment of the SPMAGTF on board the Theodore Roosevelt is a valid effort in this direction. But, many problems already have been identified:
Tactical. Under the new doctrine articulated in “. . . From the Sea,” the Navy and Marine Corps will “respond to crises and can provide the initial, ‘enabling’ capability for joint operations in conflict— as well as continued participation in any sustained effort.”' In this context, the forward-deployed Marines are referred to as the “tip of the spear” of the enabling forces.
The concerns being voiced center on that “tip” being some 200 Marine riflemen, too small a force to be effective at essentially any level of crisis or conflict. Their largest weapons are three 60-mm mortars, six 7.62-mm machine guns, and a few antitank weapons—far too few to counter any significant Third World opposition.
The argument has been made that support for the SPMAGTF rifle company is an entire carrier air wing. However, this response assumes that the carrier will remain within tactical range of the Marines ashore and that weather and visibility will permit the carrier aircraft to fly close air support missions.
Such a force has little real combat capability, and there is fear that Navy and national planners could commit the small force to a situation beyond its capabilities. As a senior Marine officer remarked to the author: “This concept could get 500 lightly armed people in trouble in a heartbeat.” Support. With their limited cargo helicopter capability (six CH-53Ds and four UH-lNs), even in suitable flying weather the Marines on the Theodore Roosevelt cannot bring ashore heavy trucks and other equipment. While amphibious ready groups have helicopters for landing troops, including the heavy-lift CH-53E Super Stallion, they also have air cushion landing craft, conventional landing craft, and tracked amphibian vehicles that can provide seaborne logistic support to the troops ashore, regardless of weather conditions.
Operational. The aircraft carrier with its air wing is one of the most flexible and mobile weapon systems in existence. Should the SPMAGTF be lifted ashore, will the battle group commander be required to remain in the area to provide air support—and possibly air evacuation—for the Marines? How else will putting the Marines ashore inhibit the carrier’s flexibility and mobility?
Also, embarking Marines on a large- deck carrier is seen as a means of rapidly employing an assault force, i.e., flying the Marines out to a forward area and having them lifted by helicopter aboard the carrier. However, as already demonstrated, a month’s workup is useful if not necessary for deploying a Marine unit on \ board a carrier.
The carrier’s flight deck situation also is becoming a problem. Carrier flight decks operate on the basis of launch and h; recovery cycles that are quite different n from the helicopter carriers in which Marines usually are embarked. This al- 11 ready is causing problems, as the Marine n
aviators want to spread their rotors and p
fly between the normal aircraft cycles, causing major problems for the flight deck crewmen. n
Political. Possibly most significant in the long term, the embarking of Marines in , s large-deck carriers probably will have lit- I c tie or no positive impact on justifying car- i 1 rier force levels. If successful, the concept could lead politicians to reconsider i £ the construction of additional amphibious ships, believing that carriers with t
Marines on board could substitute for new amphibs. 1
There certainly are benefits to be I
gained and lessons to be learned by such experiments as placing the SPMAGTF on board a large-deck carrier. Indeed, there will be modifications to the next SPMAGTF, which will go aboard the carrier America (CV-66) in the fall for deployment to the Mediterranean. Although there will be changes in the Marine unit (probably including more helicopters), the situation could become more complicated because the America is smaller than the Theodore Roosevelt5
Obviously, aircraft carriers and Marine assault forces will have a vital role in future U.S. political-military actions. Continued refinement of these forces is necessary for both operational and—increasingly—budgetary reasons. However, the Theodore Roosevelt SPMAGTF seems to be creating more problems than the concept can solve, while potentially having major implications for future carrier operations and amphibious ship procurement.
‘U.S. Navy and Marine Corps, “. . . From the Sea” (1993), p. 3. (See November 1992 U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, pp. 93-96.)
2While the final composition of the America SPMAGTF had not been decided when this column was written, Atlantic Command planners have used numbers as high as 1,100 Marines.