This html article is produced from an uncorrected text file through optical character recognition. Prior to 1940 articles all text has been corrected, but from 1940 to the present most still remain uncorrected. Artifacts of the scans are misspellings, out-of-context footnotes and sidebars, and other inconsistencies. Adjacent to each text file is a PDF of the article, which accurately and fully conveys the content as it appeared in the issue. The uncorrected text files have been included to enhance the searchability of our content, on our site and in search engines, for our membership, the research community and media organizations. We are working now to provide clean text files for the entire collection.
“Why No Gays?”
(See E. T. Gomulka, pp. 44-46, December 1992
Proceedings)
John R. Williams—Governor Bill Clinton has said that he will remove the ban on homosexuals in the military by executive order. There are, however, at least two formidable constitutional obstacles to such an order.
First, in most states, sodomy remains u crime, and, to date, the U.S. Supreme Court has sustained these antisodomy laws. If conduct is criminal, it is the President s duty to prohibit it; and to condone it by executive order is beyond his power.
Second, by the Constitution, the President is the Commander-in-Chief, but Congress is vested with the power—in Article I, section 8—to make rules for the government of the armed forces. Therefore, the President does not have the constitutional authority to decriminalize homosexual behavior within the armed forces—Congress alone can do so. □
“Let’s Abolish the Corps”
(See H. C. Peterson, pp. 55-58, November 1992 Proceedings)
General Merrill B. Twining, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)—Why a Marine Corps? People have been asking that question since 1775. Major Peterson says it is because the American people want one. Is this a good reason or just an oversimplification?
When World War II began, only the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and the United States had Marines. Today, 13 countries maintain a corps of marines or an effective equivalent thereof. Does this say anything? □
“Aviation: It’s About Support”
{See M. Ott, p. 112, November 1992 Proceedings)
Colonel Dale C. Hill, U.S. Air Force— To Captain Ott’s question of whether air power has ever taken or held a square foot of territory or a single sea line of communication, I would reply, “Why
must it? Air power can deny an enemy the ability to do the same things by mak ing life more miserable for him than many of us can imagine. Surely Captain Ott remembers the condition of the Iraqi soldiers as a result of the air campaign waged against them. Furthermore, where does it say you win a war by merely occupying and holding territory? Karl von Clausewitz said war is an instrument of political policy and success is determined by whether or not political objectives are met. If the political objective is the seizure and holding of land, then ground forces are required, even if all they do is occupy what an enemy force has been forced to withdraw from because of an overpowering air campaign.
Captain Ott claims that the logistical support of front-line Iraqi forces wasn’t eliminated, based on his observation of a single ambulance run and one night resupply mission made by some very brave—or very stupid—but very lucky Iraqis. When did we start targeting ambulances and what does Captain Ott think happened to the mountains of supplies and munitions Saddam Hussein moved into Kuwait and southern Iraq in anticipation of the ground offensive? Things didn t just disappear into thin air and most attempts to reach these supplies meant an early departure to the Promised Land for the unfortunate soldiers sent after what hadn’t been destroyed by air power. When the ground offensive commenced, only a small portion of the Iraqi Army was in any condition to fight because its soldiers were in such wretched shape—as a direct result of the air campaign which had destroyed their equipment and cut their supply lines. Sounds like successful interdiction to me!
If any view of the role of air power is one-sided, short-sighted, and narrow, it is that of Captain Ott and others like him who think air power exists only to support ground forces. The role of air power is best captured in the Air Force’s mission statement: “[T]o defend the United States through control and exploitation of air and space.” In air and space, the Air Force seeks: to control the environment (you control air and space if you can move through it at will and
Contents:
Why No Gays?—13 Let’s Abolish the Corps—13
Aviation: It’s About Support________ 13
Short Circuit—14
Building Blocks of Naval Power—14 It’s Time for a Revival—15
Chalk up Another Chicken!—15
How About An Aegis Tour?—18
Tanks! Tanks! Direct Front!—18
Commanders Must Command—18
The Best Kept Secret in Pentagon Room 4E-686—18
Is There A Place For The Mk-71 8-inch Gun?—18
Exocets, Air Traffic & the Air Tasking Order—19
... From the Sea—20
■. From the Sea: Steady As She Goes—2d
Gator Aid—21
Fly Off: F/A-18E vs. 18C—22
ENTER THE FORUM
We welcome brief comments on material published in Proceedings and also brief discussion items on topics of naval, maritime, or military interest for possible publication on these pages. A primary purpose o/Proceedings is to provide a forum where ideas of importance to the sea services can be exchanged. The Naval Institute pays an honorarium to the author of each comment or discussion item published in Proceedings. Please include your return address, your social security number, and a daytime phone number.
WW11 warships and great ocean liners in stock.
Hundreds of other ships, including freighters, tankers, ferries and tugs. WWII naval aircraft.
We purchase or consign collections.
Send $2 for catalogue. Visa & Mastercard accepted.
SCALE- 1:1250 (1"-104.2") FULLY ASSEMBLED AND PAINTED
SUPER DETAILED SHIP MODELS
UNBELIEVABLY DETAILED METAL WATERLINE MODELS FROM EUROPE.
Write tor quarterly catalogs featuring new and out-of-print domestic and foreign publications. Each catalog contains 48 pages and approximately 1500 sale items.
Send only $5.00 for a 1 year (4 catalog) subscription
Antheil Jjp
2177 P Isabelle Court No. Bellmore, New York 11710-1599
International Booksellers/Founded 1957
<^^S> Of Ships 6 Sea -------------
Cape Cod Weather Glass
Predict the weather-changes hours in advance with this Cape Cod Weather Glass. A hand- blown reproduction of weatherglasses used on many an old Clipper Ship.
Comes complete with black wrought-iron bracket and teak mounting-board. Detailed instructions. 11-1/4" x 3-1/2" x 3-1/2"
Price: $29.95 ppd.
Fully illustrated 112-page catalog shows hundreds of deco ative, nautical ideas for the hon
Also shown are ship models and kits, striking ship’s clock, figureheads, ship’s wheels, nautical lamps, and scores of famous marine paintings. CALL TOLL FREE: 1-800-836-1165
Send for free catalog to: PRESTONS
188-Y Main St. Wharf, Greenport, NY 11944
. NYS residents please add Sales Tfrx -------------------------
Vintage Limited USA
29761 Weatherwood, Laguna Niguel, CA 92677 Phone (714) 249-8687 FAX (714) 248-7120
| |
NAVAL • MARITIME" MILITARY • AVIATION MILITARY HISTORY | |g |
decide who else shall do so); and exploit the environment (you know how to operate in air and space and possess the efficient and effective means to do so). While performing its mission, the Air Force will fulfill the following roles:
► Aerospace control (counterair and counterspace);
► Force enhancement (airlift, air refueling, electronic combat, etc.);
► Force support (logistics, combat support, etc.)
>■ Force application (strategic attack, interdiction, and close air support)
By the way, in Air Force Manual 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force, dated March 1992, nothing is said about how far away “friendlies” have to be in order to conduct close air support.
Now, in response to Captain Ott, I could say that land forces exist only to fix enemies in place so air power can destroy them—and neither one of us would be right. Captain Ott and those who share his views must understand air power operates at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war—and can do so independent of land and sea forces. However, air power most often operates in concert with all forces available to the theater commander to allow him to meet national objectives. Therefore, the bottom line is that air power does not exist simply to support ground forces. □
“Short Circuit”
(See B. Norton, p. 28, August 1992; H. A. Caldwell, p. 13-14, September 1992; A. Taplin, pp. 26-28, November 1992 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Jeffrey E. Morse, U.S. Navy— Mr. Caldwell describes the Navy as a “service that has fallen away from the principles of integrity and accountability.” A more proper description would be: a service that, through the unacceptable behavior of a few individuals who do not belong in the naval service, has fallen from grace in the public eye.
It is time to put Tailhook in its proper perspective. It was simply a display of outrageous—possibly criminal—behavior by a few bad apples. These men were not the typical sailor and they do not belong in the Navy. Therefore, it is the Navy’s attitudes—not so much its integrity—which require a baseline review.
In many highly popular films and comedy acts the type of behavior that occurred at Tailhook is not the object of scorn, it is held up as acceptable, if not downright admirable. It is unfortunate that some officers mistakenly construed this standard as the Navy’s. Nevertheless, what they did is not—and never has been—acceptable conduct for Navy officers and enlisted personnel. The Navy has always tried to maintain itself as above reproach and must strive to reinforce the idea that the only acceptable behavior is the most honorable behavior.
Nevertheless, I fail to see how Mr. Caldwell's idea of “firing a few admirals whenever there is a palpable naval screwup” is a feasible solution to any divergence in conduct by naval personnel. If, because of some bad press, the Navy sacks an admiral who epitomizes every desirable trait in an officer, he is not, as Mr. Caldwell would have us believe, “just [being] sent home a little early with a nice pension and an honored title.” He is being publicly humiliated and disgraced.
I agree that where appropriate, those who are in a position of responsibility— different from authority—must be held accountable. But, how far up the chain- of-command should accountability be traced? For example, Admiral Kelso, has done an excellent job implementing the Navy’s sexual harassment retraining program. He should not be criticized for the failure of Tailhook, but praised for embarking on the retraining program once the problem surfaced.
The immediate firing of admirals and other senior officers whenever a relatively minor embarrassment generates adverse press coverage—and prior to proper adjudication—might not solve the problem and, in some cases, might make things worse. Let’s not throw the baby out with the bath water. □
“Building Blocks of Naval Power”
(See F. B. Kelso, pp. 39-44, November 1992 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Sean Patrick Clark, U.S. Navy—It is astonishing that the world’s most powerful navy finds itself replaying history with regard to the exploitation of mines and countering the threat of a minefield. Where were our naval strategists in the turbulent late 1980s when the presence of mines wreaked havoc on all shipping in the Persian Gulf and led to an uproar in the industrialized, oil-dependent West?
As I read Admiral Kelso’s article, I wondered how many other areas of naval warfare we’ve simply let drift into the haze of our memories. Are there no leaders willing to take charge and guide the entire future of modem naval warfare, or is the Navy becoming a force that can only react to whatever threats may pop up on the scene? □
“It’s Time for a Revival”
(See J. A. Winnefeld, pp. 31-35, September 1992; R. J. Kelly, pp. 14-16, October 1992; C. Sapp, pp. 23-24, November 1992 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Colonel Richard F. Schalk, U.S. Marine Corps—Commander Winnefeld clearly identifies the challenges facing naval aviation and offers some compelling recommendations for meeting them. He makes the point cogently that as the world has changed, so too have U.S. society’s expectations for its military—creating challenges that can be met successfully only if there is teamwork within and between the naval services. Solutions must be developed that preserve essential naval capabilities, yet adapt to rapidly changing global-security needs and declining defense resources.
However, Commander Winnefeld errs somewhat by presuming that the Marine Corps is reluctant to proceed with the integration of Marine tactical aircraft within Navy carrier air wings. Quite the contrary, the Marines are aggressively pursuing the current plan for integration with a Marine F/A-18 squadron from each coast now assigned to Navy carriers for a deployment. The eventual goal is the integration of four Marine squadrons—three F/A-18C and one EA-6B—into carrier air wings.
The decline of the Soviet Navy as a high-seas threat has permitted a refocusing of U.S. Navy forces on littoral warfare and brown-water operations. A logical corollary of this change is that carrier battle groups now can be committed to direct support of Marines ashore—a break with past doctrine that concentrated on blue-water operations. It is this increased emphasis on the carrier’s support role that permits dedication of a portion of Marine F/A-18 and EA-6B squadrons to carrier integration.
Commander Winnefeld’s goal of a Marine squadron on each carrier is attractive but infeasible, given the small number of active Marine Corps squadrons—eight F/A-18C and four EA-6B at the Base Force level—and the continuing requirements for tactical air support. Marines fight as an integrated team of air and ground forces; they depend on the combat power provided by their expeditionary tactical aircraft. By itself, increased support from carriers would not fill the gap left by permanent reassignment of all Marine fighter/attack and electronic-warfare squadrons to carrier air wings. And the Air Force could not fill the gap because it is neither organized nor equipped to operate with Marine ground forces under expeditionary conditions.
The Department of the Navy’s plan for a mix of sea-based and expeditionary land-based tactical air power is sound. Marines are committed to providing squadrons for integration into carrier air wings and are looking for ways to expedite the process. Because we view it as a strengthening of the Navy-Marine Corps team, Marines enthusiastically support this integration. □
“Chalk Up Another Chicken!”
Peter Mersky, author of Vought F-8 Crusader (Osprey Publishing, 1989)—Mr. Brugioni added plenty of detail to a relatively unknown facet of the Cuban Missile Crisis. The U.S. Air Force received a lot of publicity—including a feature story in Life—for the contribution of its RF-101 Voodoos. In truth, the long-nosed reconnaissance fighters sat out most of the vital week of 23-28 October because of problems with their camera systems. Therefore, as Mr. Brugioni points out,
“... and a few Marines”: Captains Gary Heinz (left) and Harold Austin— of VMCJ-2 pose in front of one of the two RF-8As they flew over Cuba from Guantanamo Bay.
low-level photoreconnaissance was very much a Navy show—but one not without the presence of a few Marines.
Four Marine aviators from Marine Composite Reconnaissance Squadron-2 (VMCJ-2) were detailed to VFP-62’s Blue Moon detachment and flew missions over Cuba in the Navy RF-8As (the designation system had just been changed, and the F8U-1P had become the RF-8A). All four received the Distinguished Flying Cross.
Also, it is not generally known that a two-plane detachment from VMCJ-2 was based at Guantanamo Bay and flew missions over Cuba—including several night runs—during the crisis. □
“How About An Aegis Tour?”
(See E. B. Hontz, p. 54, July 1992; T. W.
Leavitt, p. 28, September 1992; J. S.
Goldfinger, p. 23, December 1992 Proceedings)
Lieutenant Commander Paul S. Gross- gold, U.S. Navy—As a former detailer for the airborne early warning (VAW) community, I would like to put a personnel spin on the fine idea put forth by Captain Hontz. No doubt there are many benefits to be derived from placing officers into nontraditional billets. The problem is finding enough talented people available “in the window” to go around.
When I started flying ten years ago, there was only one place for a front-running E-2C naval flight officer to go for his second sea tour—back to a fleet squadron. Things have changed for the better, however, and the emphasis has shifted toward disassociated tours in aircraft carriers and on the staffs of fleets, carrier battle groups, cruiser-destroyer groups, and carrier air wings. Unfortunately, because of this change, there just isn’t enough available talent in the VAW community to support the establishment of an antiair-warfare (AAW) billet on every Aegis ship.
Captain Hontz is right that paradigm changes are needed to open up new possibilities. If there aren’t enough aviators
(RUSSIAN MILITARYx HISTORY TOUR
• MOSCOW
• ST PETERSBURG
• KRONSTADT
• STALINGRAD •YALTA
• SEVASTOPOL
With Visits To...
• Balaklava
• St. Petersburg Naval Museum
• Monino Air Museum
• Moscow Tank Museum
• Meet Soviet Vets. / Military Historians
• Battlefields / War Museums / Memorials
• Home Visits For Those Interested.
Escorted By
PROFESSOR BOB FELDMAN SEPT. 2-18, 1993
"Tour Price All Inclusive"
From: New York...$3730.
Los Angeles....$3890.
For Brochure Detailing Tour Please Write To;
EAST-WEST INTERNAT10NALT0URS,INC. 1248 Montevideo Avenue i Placentia, CA., 92670 or Call: J
^-1/800/359-6719 —'
to fill an AAW billet on every AAW ship, then an alternative may be to have one in the antiair-warfare commander’s ship in every battle group. Expanding cross-decking opportunities ashore also will enhance both warfare specialties by returning a better rounded aviator to his cockpit, or surface warrior to the combat direction center. Billets for aviators at Surface Warfare Officer School and Surface Warfare Development Group already exist as do surface-warfare officer billets at Strike Leader Attack Training School and Carrier Airborne Early Warning Weapons School. They have been highly successful.
Let’s touch on a sensitive subject. The detailer will inevitably field the following question: “Will I be treated fairly by a Black Shoe on my fitness report?” Given what has been heard over the years about the different grading standards of the warfare communities, this is a valid concern. But, after two years of reviewing countless personnel records, I can say it is groundless. We need only look at aviators who have been successful on a cruiser-destroyer group’s staff, or at surface warriors who excel on aviation staffs, to understand that talented officers will fare well wherever they go.
There is always a natural tendency to resist changes to conventional wisdom. Now, more than ever, we all have an obligation to put our parochial concerns behind us and overcome our community prejudices for the good of the order. □
“Tanks! Tanks! Direct Front!”
(See J. G. Zumwalt, pp. 72-81, July 1992 . Proceedings)
Lieutenant Butch Bornt, U.S. Naval Reserve—As a reservist who recalls stories about a “Sad Sack” Army Reserve unit from Georgia that, even though it went through training several times, was unable to get its act together for the Gulf War, I was glad to read about the superb accomplishments Bravo Company, 4th Tank Battalion.
Why the difference in performance? Leadership, pure and simple. Obviously, Captain Parkison took his unit’s mission seriously, communicated that attitude throughout his command, and ensured they received the necessary training.
Unfortunately, a “We’ll never be called up” attitude pervades much of the Naval Reserve. It’s probably correct, too. The Gulf War was a good indicator of the Naval Reserve units that will be needed in the future—mainly medical and logistics. You could safely apply Pareto’s Rule—80% of your mobilization missions
are performed by 20% of your reservists—and send home (or transfer to the Individual Ready Reserve) most of the Selected Reservists. □
“Commanders Must Command”
(See E. Hebert, pp. 55-59, September 1992; E. |
B. Hontz, p. 14, October 1992; K. A. Eubanks,
pp. 13-14, December 1992 Proceedings)
Commander Joseph E. Lyons, U.S. Navy (Retired)— There seems to be some sort of cycle at work within the Navy that periodically makes it attractive to say that no individual can be expected to master everything on a warship and still effectively use that ship as a weapon.
The first time I saw this was about the time the naval tactical data system and surface-to-air missiles were introduced into the fleet. Now, apparently, Aegis and other sorts of technically complex gear make it too hard to be a line officer. Many “specialist versus generalist”" arguments have been voiced in the past, but it’s interesting to observe that the nuclear power community consider the embodiment of tactical excellence and mastery of the engineering plant in one person as an attainable goal.
Two other points need to be made. First, no amount of training or tactical emphasis can overcome a personnel problem on the scene. HMS Sheffield's crew was a product of the kind of system that Commander Herbert proposes. The crew of the USS Stark (FFG-31) was a product of the Navy’s existing system, warts and all. Both ships came to the same end, and apparently for the same reason—■ errors in judgment, not training.
Finally, it is time to recognize that the reason engineering skills and jobs are less attractive is that they are simply harder and dirtier than the rest. They are more demanding of time and expertise and lack the glamour and visibility of the warfighting skills. In a fairer world, the level of glamour and importance would directly proportional. If this were only true. □
“The Best Kept Secret in Pentagon Room 4E-686”
(See R. W. Selle, pp. 102-105, November 1992 Proceedings)
“Is There A Place For The Mk-71 8-inch Gun?”
(See R. W. Selle, p. 104, November 1992 Proceedings)
James B. Soper—Commander Selle’s articles on the Iowa (BB-61)-class battleships and the Mk-71 8-inch major cal-
OWN A BEAUTIFUL DATA PLAQUE OF THAT SPECIAL SHIP OF THE FLEET
A WWI FLUSH DECK FOUR STACKED - OR A SUPER CARRIER...
...Ship data plaques are also available for other ships of the Fleet and Coast Guard Cutters...from WWI to the present.
These beautiful plaques make ideal gifts and are striking additions to any den or office. Ship Data Plaques are 10"x16” and are made of polished, non-tarnishing brass, mounted on a rich walnut grained base.
Ship Data Plaques are only $49.00 plus a $3.50 shipping charge (California residents add $3.80 sales tax).
For a plaque of your ship-call toll free:
800-327-9137
SPRITE INDUSTRIES
2512A East Fender Ave. Fullerton, California 92631
iber lightweight gun made it clear that these are workable solutions to the problem of providing naval gunfire support, and that the charge that they are too expensive just doesn’t wash. In fact, a recent cost analysis performed by a comptroller at the National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF) shows that the price tag of putting all four battleships in the NDRF is close to $400 million and that the cost of keeping a battleship in commission for one year is $25 million. Therefore, the Navy could have operated two of these magnificent ships for four years for about half of what it will cost to mothball all four of them.
I believe that part of the reluctance to maintain at least two battleships and to go forward with the Mk-7! gun is because those who want to abandon the primary assault (forcible entry) mission and capability of the amphibious task force know that retaining the battleships would undercut their position. This non-assault concept of amphibious operations has never been validated. If this type of thinking drives force structure in the future, the Marine Corps will lose its raison d’etre and the Navy will become a transportation agency.
Robert S. Kaplan—Commander Selle’s admirable idea of integrating advanced- technology battleships into the amphibious assault force should be embraced with enthusiasm by all power-projection advocates. Eliminating the battleship from the littoral warfare equation is analogous to omitting the actions of the USS Washington (BB-56) from an account of the Second Naval Battle of Guadalcanal on 14-15 November 1942.
To postulate a need for naval gunfire support and then strip the Navy of the ships best able to provide it stands logic on its head. Brave men going into battle deserve the support of the biggest guns in the fleet. If battleships are in the combat picture, Marines will be able to advance faster and suffer fewer losses, because enemy formations will be flattened under accurate and withering long-range gunfire and missile strikes from the dreadnoughts.
Those who argue that the nation cannot afford to keep the battleships in commission are promoting a false economy. I am sure that during the 1982 Falklands Conflict, there were many men in the Royal Navy—not to mention the British Army and the Royal Marines—who would have been happy to exchange the 4.5-inch guns of their destroyers and frigates for the 15-inch guns of the battleship HMS Vanguard which had been carted off to the breakers in 1960.
How can short-sighted bean counters (who won’t be anywhere near a fire- swept battlefield) ignore the irony that they are casting into oblivion a reliable and robust bombardment platform that technology can make more formidable? Instead of trashing our superb battleships, let’s put them on the starting team. □
“Exocets, Air Traffic & the Air
Tasking Order”
CSee L. DiRita, pp. 59-63, August 1992; T. F.
Marfiak, p. 13, September 1992; T. Johnson, p.
23, October 1992 Proceedings)
Lieutenant W. H. Johnson, U.S. Navy— The comments of Lieutenant Commander DiRita and others concerning the real-time utility of the Air Tasking Order (ATO)—and the implications of working within the Joint Force Air Component Commander architecture—are understandable, but ring sharply of the parochialism that jointness is supposed to cure.
Although my ship, the USS Kitty Hawk (CV-63), did not participate in the Persian Gulf War, we did play a major role in the recent exercise Tandem Thrust 92. Operating with Air Force and Marine aviation, the Kitty Hawk and Carrier Air Wing-15 conducted around-the- clock operations governed strictly by an ATO. As the Assistant Strike Operations Officer, I saw how an ATO can be “beaten into submission.”
As a document, the ATO is user-unfriendly. As stand-alone strike-planning guidance, a great deal of searching is necessary in order to identify every sortie operating at a given time and to head off any potential conflicts. These problems are compounded—and the ATO becomes extremely complicated—whenever multicarrier battle forces operate with ground- based Air Force and Marine aircraft.
The key to using the ATO lies in the integration of command, control, and communication and data processing. The introduction of the Contingency Tactical Air Control System Automated Planning System—an Air Force system coexisting with Navy Tactical Command Systems-Afloat (NTCS-A)—eventually will allow strike planners to visualize target areas, threats, and coincident sorties as well as focus on individual strike packages. The visual representation of the ATO will enable commands to preview flight operations for any given area, time, unit, or mission. In effect, this will convert the ATO into a living, breathing document, or at least provide a plan from which to deviate. As a P-3 naval flight officer, I can see how useful such a capability will be.
From an afloat perspective, the other major drawbacks to the ATO are the lead time required for target identification and air support requests, and determinations of asset availability. Carrier-based forces, in particular, traditionally operate very well in quick-reaction operations. An immutable document written 12 to 24 hours prior to implementation does not exploit carrier aviation’s advantage. Therefore,
The Association Naval Aviation
... an educational, professional, and fraternal organization supporting a strong Naval Aviation Force
For information, call 800 666-9262, local call (703) 998-7733 or write: ANA, 5205 Leesburg Pike, Suite 200, Falls Church, VA 22041
real-time communication connections, not yet guaranteed at sea, are essential for ATO modification and adaptation. Once this data-exchange problem is solved, the ATO will prove to be invaluable for warfighting.
The ATO is not about to go away. As with any new system, especially one geared toward land-based utility, the Navy will be forced to adapt until all of the mechanisms are in place. Joint air operations are essential to bring all of the right bombs to the right targets, and the ATO goes a long way toward making it happen. □
. . From the Sea”
(See S. O’Keefe, F. B. Kelso, and C. E. Mundy, pp. 93-96, November 1992 Proceedings)
. . From the Sea”: Steady As She Goes”
(See A. P. Heim, pp. 26-27, December 1992 Proceedings)
Anthony Harrigan—Did Army and Air Force officers on the Joint Staff draft the guidelines for the new Navy and Marine Corps White Paper that is supposed to provide a “new direction” for the naval service? The internal evidence in the White Paper strongly suggests this is the case.
“. . . From the Sea,” which virtually redefines the naval service as an auxiliary, bears the hallmark of General Colin Powell’s conviction that land power should have the preeminent role in U.S. national defense. General Powell’s buzzword is “jointness,” and almost every page of the White Paper refers to joint operations. Naval operations as such are treated as something from another era. It asserts that “there is a fundamental shift away from open-ocean war fighting on the sea toward joint operations conducted from the sea.” It also says that the Navy and Marine Corps “will be focusing on the littoral area.” This represents a complete break with the historic role of the Navy and Marine Corps. It is a prescription for a Stalin-era Soviet-style Navy focused on inshore operations that are designed to safeguard the flanks of ground forces.
The doctrinal prescription of “. . . From the Sea” seems based on General Powell’s land-power bias—not on strategic realities. It completely overlooks the fact the Soviet blue-water naval capability is still in existence. It is important to keep in mind that the political situation in Russia and the other former Soviet republics is far from settled. The former republics are stalling on the removal of strategic nuclear missiles. Russian scientists have revealed continuing research on chemical weapons. Russia has announced that it won’t remove any more of its troops from Lithuania. Another coup, the erosion of Russian President Boris Yeltsin’s power, or a shift in his policies and Russia’s honeymoon with the West could come to an abrupt end— and the Soviet Navy could again emerge as a open-ocean threat.
Writing in the 30 October 1992 issue of The New Republic, columnist Charles Krauthammer warned that with China’s growing power “the relative quiet we enjoy in the Pacific” may not long continue. He added that the new generation of leaders in Germany and Japan might very well “ask themselves why they are not assuming the great power status— with the concomitant armed and nuclear forces to which their dominant economies entitle them.” All the more reason for the United States to maintain strong blue- water naval forces.
And other nations represent a growing naval threat. The Iranians just received their first Russian-built Kilo attack submarine, giving Iran striking power in the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean.
Ironically, the White Paper says that “sealift”—transporting large ground forces—“is an enduring mission for the Navy,”. But all the sealift capability in the world is useless unless you control the oceans—and to do that you need a blue-water navy.
One of the most disturbing aspects of the White Paper is its assertions with regard to command in transoceanic operations. It states that in a focus on littoral areas, the Navy and Marine Corps would seize and defend “an adversary’s port, naval base or coastal air base to allow the entry of heavy Army and Air Force forces.” In other words, the Navy would be a kind of super-Coast Guard. After this coastal mission is carried out, the naval services will turn things over to a “Unified Commander”—who, one suspects, will likely be an Army or Air Force officer.
As disturbing as anything in “. . . From the Sea” is the announcement of the formation of the Naval Doctrine Command under the direction of a rear admiral and a Marine major general “to provide for smooth integration of naval forces into ! joint operations at any level.” This doesn’t sound like an independent body that draws on various branches of the naval service to determine the most effective combat doctrines. Instead, it sounds like what it clearly is—an effort at thought control over the Navy and : Marine Corps to force them to bend to j the service bias and the political will of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense.
The need now is for those who un- 1 derstand the importance of naval capabilities to the security of the United States to expose the fallacies and Defense Department politics embodied in the White j Paper. It must be seen for what it is and be withdrawn. Public and congressional scrutiny of this hurtful doctrinal coup attempt must start immediately. □
“Gator Aid”
(See A. M. Smith, p. 67-75, October 1992
Proceedings)
Captain S. Ann Ross, Nurse Corps, U.S. Navy (Retired)—I completely enjoyed Captain Smith’s article and was particularly intrigued by his comments that “Following Desert Storm, amphibious task force physicians identified shortages in ICU [intensive care unit] nurses” and that “the services of these professionals are mandatory for supporting critically injured personnel.” What Captain Smith does not say is that one of the major obstacles to providing an adequate number of these professionals is the requirement that they be men.
Before the National Fleet Surgical Team (NFST) was created, surgical teams from all naval hospitals were rotated for service on board amphibious assault ships. A small number of male nurses served almost constant back-to-back deployments while well-qualified female nurses were denied an experience they eagerly wanted. The returning surgical teams often complained of the very problems mentioned by Captain Smith.
With the conversion and subsequent deployment during the Persian Gulf War of the two new hospital ships—the USNS Mercy (T-AH-19) and the USNS Comfort (T-AH-20), I thought the Navy would no longer use amphibious assault ships as definitive treatment facilities. However, as Captain Smith points out, the Navy expects them to function as minihospital ships. If the Navy plans to continue to provide definitive medical care in these ships, it needs to take a serious look at increasing the number of professional nurses on the NFST and dropping the requirement that these nurses be men.
I am not implying that those male Nurse Corps officers who have deployed with the surgical teams did not perform in an outstanding manner—because I know they did. However, the vast majority of officers in the Nurse Corps are women and this probably will not change. To require a small group to deploy again and again while preventing a large group of ready and willing professionals from obtaining excellent experience is not fair to either group or the Navy as a whole.
As far as exposure to combat is concerned, female nurses have been in harm’s way, serving the sick and wounded, in every war the United States has fought.
At this time, when the Navy is considering opening more career opportunities for women at sea, the Navy should also consider the career needs of women Who serve in more traditional roles. □
IS YOUR SHIP OR AIRCRAFT AMONG OUR 35,000 PHOTOS?
Members save 20% on photo orders from our ship £nd aircraft photo collection.
Choose from over 35,000 photos housed in the U.S. Naval Institute SHIP AND AIRCRAFT PHOTO COLLECTION, including U.S. Navy and Coast Guard vessels commissioned since 1883 and extensive aircraft shots. All photos currendy available for sale are black and white with your choice of glossy or matte finish. Now at 20% off for USNI Members!
YES! Please send me the black and white photos listed below. I understand that as a member 1 will receive a 20% discount on photos I purchase from the Naval Institute.
Name___________________________________________ Member #________ -______________
Address __ ______________________________________________________________________
City______________________________________________ State_______ Zip_______________
Ship name, hull number, and year aboard OR Aircraft type and year
1. _ ___________________________________________________________________________________ ( )Matte ( )Glossy
2. ____________ ________________________________________________________________________________ ( )Matte ( )Glossy
3. ( )Matte ( )Glossy
( ) If photo is not available, please substitute sister ship photo.
Member photos @ $6.40 x | $ |
|
Non-Member photos @ $8.00 x | $ |
|
Subtotal | $ |
|
MD residents add 5% tax | $ |
|
Shipping and Handling | $ | 2.00 |
Total enclosed | $ |
|
Please allow four to six weeks for delivery. Send order form and payment to: |
|
|
Ship and Aircraft Photo Collection, U.S. Naval Institute, Annapolis, MD 21402 |
|
|
“Fly Off: F/A-18E vs. 18C”
(See F. C. Spinney, pp. 41-46, September 1992;
C. E. Steidle, pp. 16-18, November 1992
Proceedings)
James P. Stevenson, former editor of the Navy’s Fighter Weapons School’s Top- gun Journal and author of the forthcoming Naval Institute Press book The Pentagon Paradox: The Development of the F-18 Hornet—Captain Steidle’s attack on Mr. Spinney’s article is as off target as many of the dumb bombs the F/A-18s dropped during the Persian Gulf War.
Captain Steidle, the F/A-18 Program Manager, claims Mr. Spinney wants “a reversal of the defense acquisition process” because he “presented two papers opposing the planned program for the F/A-18E/F” in which, he claims, Mr. Spinney “asserted that the F/A-18E/F could not achieve its specified range.”
The F-5D-1 Skylancer (right) began as a modified F-4D-1 Skyray (left); it ended up as a new airplane. There are those who say the Navy should admit that the planned changes to the F/A- 18A/C make the E/F a new aircraft.
Captain Steidle contends the Defense Acquisition Board’s (DAB) decision was delayed to address this claim, which was disproved later by NASA experts. Captain Steidle also alleges that in 1983 Mr. Spinney suggested canceling the F/A-18 in favor of the A-7 and stopping the production of an improved Sparrow air-to- air missile—both of which Mr. Spinney categorically denies ever doing in writing and/or verbally.
Mr. Spinney is an analyst with the Department of Defense’s (DoD) Office of Program Analysis & Evaluation (PA&E) which is supposed to provide alternate views and ideas to stimulate debate and improve the decisionmaking process.
Kir. Spinney’s papers did not say that the F/A-18E/F could not make its range. He did say, however, in an April 1992 memorandum, that it was unclear “how the F/A-18E would achieve a 28% increase in combat radius, given only a 4.9% increase in fuel fraction, higher engine SPCs [specific-fuel consumption], similar wing loading, and lower thrust- to-weight ratios. ...” A point paper he wrote that same month said:
The DAB has no insight into how this can be done, and OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] has not done an independent performance analysis to verify Navy/MacAir #s [McDonnell- Douglas numbers].
It is interesting to note that the language of Captain Steidle’s mischarac- terization of Mr. Spinney’s position on the F/A-18E/F’s range is virtually identical to language that was submitted—in the name of Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney—to the Senate Appropriations Committee in June 1992 by F/A-18E/F advocates within DoD. On 28 July 1992, Mr. Spinney wrote to Mr. David Chu, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for PA&E, charging that this language violated federal law about making false statements to Congress and demanding an investigation. Apparently his allegation was correct, because, within a month, the statement was replaced with the correct language. One wonders on what grounds Captain Steidle revives the original claim.
Whatever the case, Mr. Spinney’s questioning of the Navy’s and DoD’s claims about F/A-18E/F is justified. In 1975, the Navy claimed that for $1.4 billion it could develop an F/A-18 capable of delivering four 1,000-pound bombs 650 nautical miles from an aircraft carrier and returning. The Initial Operational Test and Evaluation squadron later revealed that, when armed with the four bombs, the Hornet’s radius of action actually was about the same as the A-4 Skyhawk— roughly 345 nautical miles. Subsequent analysis by the General Accounting Office showed that the “interdiction range” of the current F/A-18C was only a little more than half of the early F/A-18 A. Undoubtedly, this range/payload reduction is the source of some aviators’ sardonic description of the F/A-18: “One pilot, one bomb, one hour.”
Not only did the Navy fail to achieve the range objective, the cost to develop the F/A-18 was almost 40% more than the predicted amount in 1975 dollars. Now, the Navy claims it can achieve the 1975 range goal if the taxpayers will just ante up $4.88 billion to develop the F/A-18E/F. Since the Navy missed its range goal by almost 50% and its cost goal by nearly 40%, it is not unreasonable for Mr. Spinney to ask for proof. The Navy wants to avoid having the
F/A-18E/F perceived as a new airplane because to do so would subject it to the intense scrutiny required by DoD’s procurement regulations. What Mr. Spinney suspected—which was verified by DoD’s Inspector General—was that the relationship of the F/A-18E and the F/A-18A is much the same as the Navy’s Douglas F4D-2 Skylancer and Douglas F4D- 1 Skyray in the 1950s. Their designer Ed Heinemann said:
[The Navy] . . . ordered two prototypes of what, at the time, was designated the F4D-2. The F4D-2 represented an attempt on our part to correct the weaknesses of the F4D. . . . [The F4D-2 gradually evolved as an entirely new aeroplane retaining nothing in common with the F4D-1, apart from the actual wing planform, and this development was, in consequence, to be redesignated F5D-1 [Skylancer], . . . The F5D-1 had appreciably thinner wing sections; . . . lengthened fuselage. . .; [and the] internal fuel capacity was markedly increased.
Ed Heinemann anticipated engine problems with the F5D Skylancer. “As if we were not presenting ourselves with sufficient problems, we compounded them with a decision to use an entirely new ... engine.” The F5D Skylancer was canceled before the Navy committed to production.
All Mr. Spinney is suggesting is that the Navy return to the process of prototyping. After all, the F/A-18 evolved from a prototype, the YF-17. Building two YF- 17s cost the taxpayers less than $60 million. Therefore, it seems that giving the Navy $1 billion to build a prototype of I the F/A-18E/F to prove its claims is reasonable. This is particularly true in view I of the fact that the Navy claims the F/A- 18E/F’s fighter-escort mission radius-of- action will be a mere three nautical miles more than the 1976 F/A-18A specification—which the Navy missed by more than 20%.
Captain Steidle fails completely to address Mr. Spinney’s article. Instead, he reverts to the classic bureaucratic maneuver of making ad hominem attacks coupled with the shallow logic of argu- mentum intimidatum. If there are valid counters to Mr. Spinney’s points, they remain to be aired. If the quality of Cap- | tain Steidle’s logic and research for this j article is indicative of the quality of the Navy’s work on the F/A-18E/F, then t Chuck Spinney was entirely correct to ( ask for a thorough reexamination of the program. □