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By Norman Polmar, Author, Guide to the Soviet Navy
Carrier Conundrum Continues
Despite the unsettled and confused conditions in the former Soviet Union, discussions of future aircraft carrier programs continue at the Russian Main Naval Staff headquarters in Moscow. This occurs even though most if not all of the Russian Navy’s existing “carriers” are swinging at anchor buoys, and all work has stopped on the two large carriers that were under construction at the Black Sea Shipyard at Nikolayev (now in Ukraine). Reports persist, however, that one unfinished carrier, the 65,000-ton Varyag, has been sold to China. Such a transfer is highly unlikely.
Today the Russian Navy has five completed aircraft carriers: the 65,000- ton, full-deck carrier Admiral Flota Sovetskogo Soyuza Kuznetsov, which was delivered to the Northern Fleet in the Arctic in December 1991; the 43,000-ton, vertical/short takeoff and landing (V/STOL) carriers Kiev in the Northern Fleet and Minsk and Novorossiysk in the Pacific Fleet; and the 45,000-ton V/STOL carrier Admiral Flota Sovetskogo Soyuza Gorshkov, also in the Northern Fleet.
However, both the Kiev and Minsk are out of service and in need of major overhauls, which can only be done effectively at the Black Sea Shipyard in Ukraine. A junior Russian officer has written of the deplorable condition of the Minsk: piles of trash, rust, puddles of stagnant water. “The heads...are blocked off. The officers heat water in kettles for washing up in the mornings, keep- lng the water in whatever receptacles they can find. They receive [fresh] water very farely. . . .‘The ship is dying.’ I heard that statement from everyone with whom I sPoke. . . . ‘The ship is in critical condi- hon. Only an overhaul will save it,”’ he wrote.1 '
There also are two 14,600-ton antisubmarine cruiser-helicopter ships in the “lack Sea, the Moskva and Leningrad. Completed in 1967-1968, these ships have limited aviation capabilities, each embarking 14 helicopters. The Leningrad has now been decommissioned and is being offered for scrap—and the same htay be true for the Moskva.
Carrier overhauls are low on the list of issues being argued by the governments of Russia and Ukraine.2 More critical at this time is the future of the two unfinished carriers at Nikolayev, the Varyag—the second ship of the Kuznetsov class—and the still larger Ul'yanovsk. The latter was to have displaced some 75,000 tons full load and have nuclear propulsion.
The Russian government had claimed that the unfinished carriers belonged to Russia because it paid for their construction; Ukraine claimed that the unfinished ships at the Black Sea Shipyard belonged to it. Western intelligence sources—primarily satellite photography—indicate that work ceased on the two carriers about November 1991. The U.S. Navy states that scrapping of the Ul’yanovsk—some 20% complete— began on 3 February 1992, to provide space in the massive Nikolayev graving dock for building merchant ships.3
The future of the Varyag is less certain. Military officials of Russia and Commonwealth of Independent States have indicated that the Varyag eventually will be completed and assigned to the Northern Fleet. Some sources indicate that a massive pier is under construction at Murmansk to support that ship. As Russia and Ukraine move toward an agreement on the status of Black Sea Fleet forces, that fate becomes more probable.
However, the Varyag has been offered for sale, with both India and China having expressed some level of interest in her purchase. It is far from clear, if the ship were to be sold, to whom the money would be paid; whether the ship would be completed at Nikolayev or in the purchasing country; and whether the weapons, sensors, and other systems planned for the ship actually could be supplied in view of the economic-production chaos in the former Soviet Union.
Other reports contend that the Varyag has been offered for sale as scrap. Allegedly, an American firm offered $100 per ton, but the Ukrainians were holding out for $300 per ton. (The allegation that the Pacific Fleet’s inactive carrier Minsk—completed in 1978—has been offered for scrap is a further indication of the confusion in and about the former Soviet Union.)
At this time, it appears that the Russian Navy could have four operational carriers by the mid-1990s, if the Varyag is completed. Both the Kiev and Minsk would be out of service for several years, even if the Ukrainian government could come to an agreement with the Russian Navy for their overhaul and modernization at Nikolayev. The alternative of building a new graving dock in Russian territory large enough to handle these carriers is probably prohibitive.
Meanwhile, discussions of the need for aircraft-carrying ships continue on the Russian Main Naval Staff. Writing in the military newspaper Red Star, a retired flag officer recently explained:
Our country is experiencing tough times, times of political instability and profound economic crisis. Under these conditions, it is difficult to talk about building warships, much less an aircraft carrier fleet. Only a country with a healthy economy can build and de- ' velop such a fleet. Our situation is a different story.
Nevertheless, it seems to me that there is something to discuss here. I am convinced that it is inadmissible to totally halt scientific research and design work on the development of aircraft-carrying ships. We need to preserve the intellectual potential that Soviet [sic] shipbuilding possesses today and the positions and priorities achieved in this field.'1
The admiral concluded, “And 1 therefore believe that this [carrier] work should continue on a basis of material outlays that our society can afford."
There also have been appeals and petitions from the fleet supporting a earner force. For example, the pilots, engineers, technicians, and aviation specialists at the Center for the Combat Training of Ship- Based Aviation, located at Saki airfield in the Crimea, have appealed to the pres-
Despite the fact that most of the Russian Navy’s carriers are not operating at present—above, the Minsk; inset, the Gorshkov— discussion of future aircraft carrier programs continues in Moscow.
idents of Russia and the Crimea to “voice our concern over the statements given via the mass information media by the people’s deputies of the Ukraine and Russia on the abandoning of the use and construction of aircraft-carrying cruisers for the Navy.”5
The Saki group called attention to the massive U.S. carrier force and the defensive nature of Russian carriers that “will make it possible to reduce the losses of surface ships, submarines, and naval aircraft. ... in the course of possible combat operations.”
Many more senior Russian officials also have argued in favor of the carrier program, albeit with significant opposition from Russian legislators, political scientists, and even some senior naval officers. Among the more vocal carrier critics are Georgi Arbatov, head of the influential Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies in Moscow, and retired Admiral N. N. Amel’ko, a former First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy.
Still, the Russian Main Naval Staff is reported to be advocating a force of at least six aircraft carriers—three for the Northern Fleet and three for the Pacific Fleet (with Vladivostok as their home port). This force is being proposed for “political presence” in forward areas and not for the traditional Soviet justification of the antisubmarine role or the protection of Soviet antisubmarine forces hunting Western strategic missile submarines.
If that number of carriers is approved—and funded—by the Russian or Commonwealth of Independent States government, that force could be achievable if the Kiev and Minsk could be made available. Alternatively, new carriers would be constructed at the Black Sea shipyard.
Even more complex than the carrier issue is that of aircraft to fly from the ships. The four V/STOL carriers originally went to sea with the Yak-3 8MP Forger, a fighter/attack aircraft that became operational in 1976. Each ship embarked some 30 aircraft—12 or 13 Forgers and 14 to 17 helicopters. Production of the Forger ended some years ago and the advanced Yak-141 Freestyle—the world’s only supersonic V/STOL aircraft—was developed as its successor.6 Because of political and economic turmoil, development and production of this advanced V/STOL aircraft were halted in August 1991; subsequently, the Yakovlev design bureau began a new series of flight tests in September 1991 and announced that the bureau would “bear the costs” of the flight tests. About the same time, the then-Soviet Air Force expressed interest in the Yak-141, based on lessons from Iraqi airfield vulnerability during the 1991 conflict in the Persian Gulf.
This advanced V/STOL aircraft has fly-by-wire controls and is powered by an afterburning, 34,170-pound-static- thrust turbojet cruise engine and two 5,180-pound turbojet lift engines. Top speed is 970 knots. The plane has pulse- Doppler radar and is armed with a 30- mm. rotary cannon and can carry almost 6,000 pounds of missiles, rockets, and bombs. Twelve world records for acceleration and altitude for V/STOL aircraft have been claimed for the Yak-141.
The first two flying Yak-141s had made about 200 test flights from their first flight in March 1989 through August 1991. logging some 150 hours. But one of the two flying prototypes crashed during a landing on the carrier Gorshkov in late 1991; the pilot ejected safely and there was no damage to the ship. Still, it raised further questions about the future of the Yak-141. Two additional aircraft serve as ground test and system integration vehicles.
A new series of fixed-wing aircraft were developed for the Kuznetsov and for later full-deck carriers. The planes, variants of land-based Russian aircraft, are the Mikoyan MiG-29K Fulcrum and Sukhoi Su-27K Flanker. Both are twin- engine fighters with modern look- down/shoot-down missile capabilities. A modified version of the Su-27 (designated P-42) set 27 world records for rate-of- climb and level-flight altitudes from 1986 to 1988. The aircraft both have 30-mm. rotary cannon and air-to-air missiles, and the MiG-29K also can carry air-to-ground weapons. The aircraft have folding wings, arresting hooks, and other features for shipboard operation.
In addition, the Su-25UTG Frogfoot, a two-seat variant of a ground attack aircraft, is employed as a shipboard training aircraft. However, an attack variant easily could be developed for carrier air wings. With the current uncertainties in Russia, the status of the
120
Proceedings / November 1992
various carrier aircraft programs is far from clear.
The Russians are keenly aware of the need for airborne early-warning (AEW) operations, and a carrier variant of the Antonov An-74 Madcap AEW aircraft as well as the new Yakovlev Yak-44 were in development for the ship-based AEW role. These are both short takeoff and landing (STOL) aircraft. According to Admiral of the Fleet Vladimir Chemavin, Commander-in-Chief of the Commonwealth Navy, the Yak-44 “radio-electronic support aircraft” was selected over the Antonov design. The Yak-44, Cher- navin said, “will improve the effectiveness of our fighters and helicopters. It is the equivalent of the U.S. Hawkeye and will be used for observation, target indication, and homing.”7
Little is known publicly about the Yak-44. A recently shown model of the aircraft indicates a design somewhat similar to the E-2, with twin turboprop engines in elongated nacelles and a twin- tail configuration.
A radar-fitted variant of the Ka-27 Helix also has been seen.
The Kuznetsov and the smaller Kiev- class ships also operate the Helix and some of the older Ka-25 Hormone helicopters in the antisubmarine, search-and- rescue, and probably missile targeting roles.
Many issues are unresolved in the former Soviet Union, especially with tts military programs. The carrier program continues to have supporters— within the navy, the political leaders, and the defense-industrial community °f both Russia and Ukraine. The 60- year goal of Soviet governments to See a force of first-line aircraft carriers, however, is unlikely to come to fruition in the near-term.
'<7r- Lt. Lysenkov, “No Limits? This Is How Ships ^re Dying in the Union’s Ruins,” Krasnya Zvezda, f5 March 1992, p. 2.
^ee N. Polmar, “The Black Sea Fleet,” U.S. Naval nstitute Proceedings, July 1992, pp. 105-107.
The Black Sea Fleet,” Office of Naval Intelligence, act Sheet, 7 July 1992, p. 1. According to Soviet sources, at least one additional nuclear-propelled car- Ner was planned.
T'dm. Ye. Shitikov (Ret.), “View of a Problem: ‘ "ipbui Iding Should Be Carried Out on the Basis o Outlays Society Can Afford,” Krasnya Zvezda, 15
November 1991, p. 2.
Appeal from the Personnel of the Center for Comat Training of Ship-Based Aviation to the Presidents v Russia and Ukraine,” Morskoy Sbornik, No. 4, }*>2, p. 13.
tli ^ ant* Yak-141 indicate aircraft produced by e Yakovlev design bureau; the F-series names are J^ngned by NATO to fighter-type aircraft.
Quoted in Piotr Butowski, “Yak-44 Will Give Hawking ^P^ttity,” Jane's Defence Weekly, 28 March "L P- 501.
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